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GENERAL INTRODUCTION
0.1. The overall structure and format of this Annual
Report is similar to that of last year. Separate chapters
deal with revenue and each of the expenditure areas
that fall under the headings of the financial perspective.
There is a new Chapter 6 dealing with pre-accession aid
for which a separate financial perspective heading exists
from 2000 onwards. The concluding chapter contains
and explains the Statement of Assurance. The Court’s
observations concerning the activities of the sixth, sev-
enth and eighth European Development Funds are pre-
sented separately.
0.2. The chapters dealing with revenue and the finan-
cial perspective expenditure areas (1) contain sections
dealing with budgetary management, the specific
appraisal in the context of the Statement of Assurance,
and the follow-up of previous observations of the Court
in annual and special reports. A new element this year
is that the principal findings and recommendations in
the special reports adopted by the Court since the last
discharge are summarised in the chapters. This means
that the Annual Report this year contains all the prin-
cipal findings and recommendations concerning the
implementation of the general budget and the European
Development Funds that the Court has published since
the last discharge.
0.3. In agreement with the suggestion by the Euro-
pean Parliament in the 1999 discharge resolution, the
Court is publishing the replies of the Commission, and,
where appropriate, the other institutions, alongside the
text of the Court.
The Court’s work covers a wide range of European Union
activities
0.4. In addition to its work on the Annual Report, the
Court has adopted 18 special reports covering a wide
range of European Union activities (2). One concerns
own resources, seven deal with different aspects of the
common agricultural policy, three concern the imple-
mentation of structural measures, one is in the field of
internal policies, five concern external actions financed
from the general budget, including the common foreign
and security policy, and one deals with the European
Development Funds.
There are some positive findings
0.5. The results of the Court’s audits indicate signifi-
cant positive findings. For example, in the agricultural
area the reformed clearance-of-accounts system and the
integrated administrative and control system have con-
tributed to improved, if not yet fully satisfactory, man-
agement of large amounts of EU funds, and the milk
quota regime has restricted production to the target
level. The Commission’s strategy for dealing with BSE is
basically sound. With regard to structural measures, the
URBAN Community initiative has helped the imple-
mentation of many urban development projects and
has enabled local authorities to access European Union
funds. In the external actions area the work of the
Agency charged with the reconstruction of Kosovo was
both efficient and economical. The Tacis cross-border
cooperation programme is an instrument which has
the potential to play a useful role in addressing issues
relating to the new eastern border following the next
accession.
But often major objectives are not achieved, and evalu-
ation of results is inadequate
0.6. However, it was also found that major objectives
had not been achieved, or only limited progress had
been made. Further, it was frequently found that there
was either insufficient or no evaluation by the Commis-
sion of the achievement of objectives. Inmany instances,
for example the URBAN Community initiative and the
structural measures to improve employment, the objec-
tives of the programmes themselveswere poorly defined.
In such circumstances the Commission is not able to
assess whether expenditure is worthwhile, and what
changes are needed in order to use European Union
funds more efficiently and effectively. The Commis-
sion’s reform programme is increasing the focus on
results and performancemeasurement,within a resource
allocation framework reflecting predetermined priori-
ties and defined objectives. The Court’s findings on
recent programmes show that the Commission still
faces major challenges in this area.
(1) Except for Chapter 6, which, as a new one, follows a dif-
ferent structure.
(2) A full list of the reports and opinions adopted by the
Court in each of the last five years appears in Annex II to
this report.
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Weaknesses persist in checks of Community operations
0.7. Persistentweaknesseswere found inMemberStates’
checking of Community operations concerning pro-
grammes with management shared between the Com-
mission and the Member States. This was the case for
IACS (3), export refunds, and the control regulation for
structural measures. The results of the audit in the con-
text of the Statement of Assurance covering the agri-
cultural and structural measures areas again confirmed
this. Improving the control arrangements in the Mem-
ber States is central to ensuring the correct use of Euro-
pean Union funds. It is also important if the Court is to
place at least some reliance for its own audit purposes
on the checks carried out by the various audit and
supervisory services in the Commission, and in the
Member States.
Further simplification and harmonisation of rules is still
needed
0.8. The Court repeatedly observed that simplification
of regulatory provisions and harmonisation of systems
and procedures across Member States would facilitate
better management, reduce administrative costs, and
ease the burden on beneficiaries of aid. Major efforts
have been made in various areas of European Union
policies over the past decade to simplify the rules, and
there has been undoubted progress in some areas, which
the Court has commented on. The reports show, how-
ever, that despite these efforts, there remain significant
problems. For example in the fruit and vegetables com-
mon market organisation, one of the purposes of the
1996 reform was to simplify the scheme. Despite sim-
plification in some areas the continued complexity of
the regulations has resulted in measures within the
operational programmes which are inappropriate and
inconsistent (4).
Some of the Court’s proposals for strengthening finan-
cial management and control have been taken up by the
Commission
0.9. The Court has adopted seven opinions since the
last Annual Report, of which four have been published
in the Official Journal (5). The most significant of these
is Opinion No 2/2001 (6) on the Commission’s pro-
posal for recasting the Financial Regulation which is
one of the most essential elements of the Commission
reform programme. The revised proposal of the Com-
mission (7). has taken up a number of the suggestions
in the Court’s opinion, notably to clarify or strengthen
the provisions relating to methods of implementation
of the budget, advance payments, procurement, presen-
tation of the accounts, and the offices.
0.10. The Court also particularly welcomes the intro-
duction of new provisions intended to contribute to the
establishment of a coherent legal framework in the field
of budgetary execution based on the primacy of the
Financial Regulation, the absence of which has been
criticised by the Court onmany occasions in the past (8).
But the Court’s opinion on other important matters of
principle has not been followed
0.11. However, the Court’s position has not been fol-
lowed on certain important matters of principle, on
which its opinion is clear, notably:
— the making of budgetary, and legal, commitments
in artificial annual instalments, which means that all
specific expenditure decisions taken during a given
financial year are not exhaustively recorded in that
year, and adds greatly to the complexity of financial
management,
— the inadequate definition of the professional and
financial responsibility of authorising officers for
serious errors leading to losses to the budget or
damage to the financial interests of the Community,
— the inclusion of provisions regarding the powers of
the Court which could be interpreted restrictively
by auditees,
— the derogations for specific fields, such as the supple-
mentary period for EAGGF-Guarantee payments and
themaking of Structural Funds appropriations avail-
able again),
(3) Integrated administrative and control system.
(4) See paragraphs 2.146 to 2.150 of this report.
(5) See Annex II to this report.
(6) OJ C 162, 5.6.2001.
(7) These comments are based on the draft revised proposal
as at 10 October 2001, date of the formal adoption of the
Court’s Annual Report.
(8) Most recently in its Opinions No 4/97 (paragraph 12) and
No 2/2001 (paragraph 73).
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— various matters which have a marginal financial
impact but which make management systems com-
plex and may lead to confusion when financial
statements are read, such as the carrying-over of
unused appropriations from one year to another,
and maintaining the negative reserve.
0.12. The Court is continuing to monitor other aspects
of the reform process. It would, however, be premature
for the Court to attempt any overall assessment of the
process, given that changes in financial management
and control have only recently taken effect, and that
decisions on aspects of staff management have yet to be
reached.
The budget surplus in 2000 was the largest ever recorded
0.13. A particular feature of budget implementation in
2000 was the emergence of a very large surplus of rev-
enue over expenditure, amounting to 11,6 billion euro.
This surplus amounted to more than 14 % of final pay-
ment expenditure. The main factors which led to this
situation were a higher revenue yield than budgeted (9)
and lower payments on structural measures, in particu-
lar those for the 2000 to 2006 programming period (10).
0.14. It has not been the Commission’s practice to pro-
pose in a supplementary and amending budget adjust-
ments to budgeted revenue and expenditure when it
becomes apparent that a large surplus such as that in
2000 is emerging. Carrying such a large surplus for-
ward into the following year significantly distorts the
revenue position for the following year. Information
was available in sufficient time for adjustments to be
made to the revenue side of the budget to reduce the
surplus significantly, but this was not done. The Court,
in Chapter 1, recommends that the Commission exam-
ine how it can better use the supplementary and amend-
ing budget procedure to avoid excessive budget sur-
pluses.
Further improvements are needed in the information
provided by the Commission analysing budget manage-
ment
0.15. In order for the budget authority and others to
be able to assess how well the budget is being managed,
sufficient reliable information analysing budget man-
agement is essential. Accordingly, in the last few years
the Court has been paying more attention to the qual-
ity of the information presented by the Commission on
the management of the budget in Volume 1, Part 2 of
the ‘Revenue and expenditure account’. As a result of
the Court’s observations the Commission committed
itself to substantially improving the quality and consis-
tency across the budget headings of the information
presented. It is now devoting more resources to this,
and improving the way in which information is gener-
ated and compiled. The comments of the Court in the
various chapters of this report indicate that progress
has been made, but that further efforts are needed.
Questions which require further attention concern, for
example, the levels at which the analysis should be done,
how much detail should be provided, the need not just
to identify what has happened in terms of variances,
budget transfers, etc., but also to provide brief explana-
tions for the key underlying developments, and how to
ensure a consistent approach across the different budget
areas.
The extent and effectiveness of action taken by the Com-
mission to follow the Court’s observations varies
0.16. The Court, responding to the wishes of the dis-
charge authority, has continued to follow up the obser-
vations in previous annual and special reports. Themain
purpose of this is to review what action has been taken,
principally by the Commission, in response to the obser-
vations of the Court, the recommendations of the Coun-
cil and the resolutions of the European Parliament.
0.17. In all of the subjects examined, some action has
been taken. The extent and effectiveness of the action,
however, varies considerably. In general, the Commis-
sion, in particular where it agreed with the earlier obser-
vations and propositions, has adopted measures
designed to respond to them and to improve the situa-
tion. In some cases corrective action has been slow, in
others insufficient staff or financial resources have been
allocated to achieve the desired level of improvement
(for example, nuclear safety within the Phare and Tacis
countries (11)). In the agricultural measures examined
by the Court (common market organisations for sheep
and goatmeat and for fruit and vegetables, and export
refunds) a number of modifications have been made to
the arrangements, but many of the problems previously
(9) See paragraph 1.4 of this report.
(10) See paragraphs 3.8 and 3.17 of this report. (11) See Chapter 5, paragraphs 5.45 to 5.76.
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noted by the Court have not been addressed, or, if they
have been addressed, still persist. This shows that effect-
ing improvements in the management and control of
complex programmes involving many organisations at
different levels is difficult and takes time. Structural
rigidities have often to be overcome, and in the areas of
shared or decentralised management, which account for
more than 80 % of the general budget, the Commission
has to obtain action from others.
0.18. Notwithstanding that achieving change can be
difficult, the Commission should ensure that it takes all
the measures within its power to implement the recom-
mendations of the Court and the discharge authority.
0.19. Sometimes action is not taken because the Court’s
recommendations are not accepted. A particular case
concerns one of the Court’s recommendations to all
institutions in its Special Report No 5/2000 on the
Court of Justice’s expenditure on buildings. The recom-
mendation that the Communities should look into the
advantages of direct borrowing to finance the construc-
tion of their buildings resulted in the Commission
including the possibility of such an option in its pro-
posal to amend the Financial Regulation. This was,
however, not taken up (12). As a result, several institu-
tions continue to finance their property purchases by
means of ‘special purpose vehicles’ which have the same
principal characteristics as loans, but are less transpar-
ent and cost more than if they had been contracted
directly. It is regrettable that the institutions have to
resort to such arrangements for this purpose.
Progress has been slow in reorganising the European
Union’s anti-fraud work
0.20. The Court’s Special Report No 8/98 concerning
the Commission departments specifically involved in
the fight against fraud contributed significantly to the
debate which led to the replacement of the then-existing
anti-fraud unit (UCLAF) with the European Anti-fraud
Office (OLAF). In early 2001, as part of its follow-up
work, the Court reviewed progress. The new arrange-
ments for OLAF provide a more appropriate adminis-
trative framework, with greater independence for the
Office than its predecessor. The Office also has a legal
basis for investigations, and procedures are being
improved. Staffing has increased more slowly than fore-
seen (13). The main difficulties have, however, subse-
quently been resolved.Databases andmanagement infor-
mation criticised in Special Report No 8/98 have only
begun to be improved since the Court’s review, and
there is a need to modify the staff rules and procedures
to facilitate investigations within the institutions.
0.21. The Office now needs to plan its work so as to
concentrate on areas of activity under the first pillar
which concern the responsibility of the Commission, or
the other Institutions, and where there is direct risk to
the budget. It also needs a period of stability: the inves-
tigation units of the Commission have been reorganised
twice in seven years, and it is necessary to allow the
new arrangements time to settle down.
0.22. The Court continues to work closely with OLAF.
It has established formal procedures to ensure that the
relations between the two organisations are efficient
and effective. It has also established a constructive dia-
logue with the committee established to supervise the
work of OLAF.
Statements of Assurance
0.23. With regard to the Statement of Assurance concern-
ing the general budget (see Chapter 9), except for the
effects of certain matters contained in the statement,
the Court is of the opinion that the revised accounts for
the financial year ended 31 December 2000 as pub-
lished in the Official Journal (14) reflect reliably the
Communities’ revenue and expenditure for the year and
the financial situation at the end of the year.
0.24. As far as the legality and regularity of underly-
ing transactions are concerned, the audit of the princi-
pal management and control systems applicable to
(12) The Court made a similar proposal in its opinion submit-
ted to the Intergovernmental Conference prior to the
amendment of the Community Treaties in Nice, which
was also not taken up.
(13) See paragraphs 7.43 to 7.45.
(14) Volume IV of the documents was submitted by the Com-
mission to the European Parliament and Council and to
the Court at the official date of 1 May 2001 (shortly avail-
able in the Official Journal; available on the site:
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/fr/com/cpi_index_en.html).
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agriculture and structuralmeasures revealedweaknesses
in the functioning of control procedures aiming to
secure the legality and regularity of the transactions.
The audit of operational expenditure revealed an unac-
ceptable incidence of error affecting the amount of the
payments or the reality or the eligibility of the underly-
ing transactions.
In view of all the results of its audit, the Court is of the
opinion that the transactions underlying the financial
statements, taken as a whole, are legal and regular in
respect of revenue, commitments and administrative
expenditure but declines to provide this assurance in
respect of the other payments.
0.25. With regard to the Statement of Assurance concern-
ing the European Development Funds (see Chapter II of the
report on the activities of the European Development
Funds), the Court is of the opinion that, except for cer-
tain items set out in the statement, the financial state-
ments and the revenue and expenditure accounts for
the financial year 2000 reliably reflect the revenue and
expenditure of the sixth, seventh and eighth EDFs for
the financial year and their financial situation at the end
of the year.
0.26. As far as the legality and regularity of the under-
lying transactions are concerned, the Court is of the
opinion that, in light of the findings set out in the state-
ment, the transactions underlying the financial state-
ments of the sixth, seventh, and eighth EDFs for the
financial year ended 31 December 2000 are, taken as a
whole, legal and regular.
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INTRODUCTION
1.1. In the area of traditional own resources, the Court’s
audit for the purpose of preparing the Statement of
Assurance (DAS) concentrated on the establishment and
recovery of customs duties, the implementation of Com-
munity legislation on anti-dumping measures and the
information available concerning the protection of the
Community’s financial interests. In addition, the Court
presentedobservationson the customsvalueof imported
goods in Special Report No 23/2000 (1).
1.2. For the VAT own resource, the audit concentrated
on the arrangements for the protection of the Commu-
nity’s financial interests. For the GNP own resource, the
audit covered the Commission’s procedures ensuring
the quality of the GNP statistics.
BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT
Budgetary implementation
1.3. Table 1.1 summarises Community revenue for the
financial year 2000 and Graph 1.1 shows the distribu-
tion of the different types of revenue. Graph 1.2 illus-
trates the evolution of actual revenue over the period
1989 to 2000.
1.4. Table 1.1 shows that the following significant
changes occurred between revenue shown in the initial
budget and actual revenue:
(a) collected gross customs duties (2) amounted to
14 568,3 million euro, whereas only 12 300 mil-
lion euro had been forecast. The VAT resource for
the current financial year reached 34 187,6 million
euro, whereas only 32 554,6 million euro was
shown in the initial budget. Both underestimations
resulted mainly from the use of too low a forecast
of economic growth in the European Union in 1999
and 2000 for the establishment of the initial budget;
(1) OJ C 84, 14.3.2001.
(2) The resources specified in Article 2(1)(a) and (b) of Coun-
cil Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom of 31 October 1994 on
the system of the European Communities’ own resources
(OJ L 293, 12.11.1994, p. 9).
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(b) the developmentsmentioned under (a) togetherwith
the surplus from the financial year 1999 of
3 209,1 million euro led to a large decrease in the
GNP resource, which was 43 049,8 million euro in
the initial budget and was reduced to 37 253,2 mil-
lion euro in actual revenue;
(c) total actual revenue was 92 724,4 million euro (as
against 89 440,6 million euro in the final budget)
and total expenditure reached only 81 105,3 million
euro. Consequently, the budget was no longer bal-
anced. A resulting surplus of about 11 619,1 million
euro (highest surplus in the last decade) will neces-
sarily become part of the revenue available in the
financial year 2001. This will lead to significant
1.4. (c) In future the Commission will endeavour to provide
amore thorough analysis of the origin of the surplus.
Table 1.1 — Revenue for the financial years 1999 and 2000
(Mio EUR)
Type of revenue and corresponding budget heading Actual revenuein 1999
Development of the budget
2000 Actual revenue
in 2000
% change (1999
to 2000)
Initial budget Final budget
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) = [(d)−(a)]/(a)
1. Traditional own resources 13 857,6 13 108,4 13 703,7 15 267,2 10,2
— Agricultural duties (Chapter 1 0) 1 187,3 1 102,2 1 102,2 1 198,4 0,9
— Sugar and isoglucose levies (Chapter 1 1) 1 203,5 1 162,7 1 162,7 1 196,8 – 0,6
— Customs duties (Chapter 1 2) 13 006,5 12 300,0 12 961,4 14 568,3 12,0
— Collection expenses (Chapter 1 9) – 1 539,7 – 1 456,5 – 1 522,6 – 1 696,3 10,2
2. VAT resource 31 332,3 32 554,6 34 048,6 35 192,5 12,3
— VAT resource from the current financial year (Chapter 1 3) 31 381,6 32 554,6 34 048,6 34 187,6
— Balances from previous years (Chapter 3 1) – 49,3 p.m. p.m. 1 004,9
3. GNP resource 37 512,0 43 049,8 37 805,1 37 580,5 0,2
— GNP resource from the current financial year (Chapter 1 4) 37 011,7 43 049,8 37 805,1 37 253,2
— Balances from previous years (Chapter 3 2) 500,3 p.m. p.m. 327,3
4. Budgetary imbalances – 169,2 0,0 0,0 – 70,9 – 58,1
— UK correction (Chapters 1 5) – 167,8 0,0 0,0 – 70,8
— Final calculation of UK correction (Chapter 3 5) – 1,4 0,0 p.m. – 0,1
5. Other revenue 4 375,4 674,1 3 883,2 4 755,3 8,7
— Surplus from previous financial year (Chapter 3 0) 3 022,2 p.m. 3 209,1 3 209,1 6,2
— Refunds to Member States (Chapter 3 3) 0,0 p.m. p.m. 0,0
— Miscellaneous revenues (Titles 4 to 9) 1 353,2 674,1 674,1 1 546,2 14,3
Grand total 86 908,1 89 387,0 89 440,6 92 724,4 6,7
Source: Budget 2000, and 1999 and 2000 revenue and expenditure accounts.
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Graph 1.1 — Breakdown of actual revenue (2000)
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Graph 1.2 — Evolution of sources of actual revenue 1989 to 2000 (Mio EUR)
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changes regarding revenue in a supplementary and
amending budget in 2001 since the first estimation
of the surplus in the initial budget for 2001 is 900
million euro. The Commission, however, does not
present in Volume I a thorough analysis of the ori-
gin of the surplus (3), notwithstanding the signifi-
cance of this element in the budgetary outcome.
1.5. The increase of actual revenue in 2000 (+ 6,7 %)
was considerable, mainly due to the strong economic
expansion. GNP in value for 2000 largely exceeded the
GNP figure used in the latest version available of the
financial perspectives 2000 to 2006 (January 2001).
This factor alone would make the appropriations for
payments change from 1,12 % of GNP to around 1,10 %.
1.6. Graph 1.2 illustrates how the GNP resource has
grown in importance since 1989 and becamemore than
40 % of the revenue in 2000. It will continue to grow
as a result of the new own resources Decision (4).
1.7. The Court recommends that the Commission
examines how it can better take into account, during its
budget process for the year, underspending of appro-
priations for payment and the unexpected evolution of
revenue, notably within the context of a supplementary
and amending budget.
1.7. The Commission monitors actual revenue throughout
the annual budget process. After consulting the Member
States within the Advisory Committee on Own Resources, the
forecasts for traditional own resources and the VAT/GNP
bases are regularly adjusted in spring, for the first time, by an
amending budget. In autumn, if necessary, the Commission
enters an initial estimate of the foreseeable balance for the
year, based on the information available, in a letter of amend-
ment to the PDB.
(3) The Court has reviewed the information presented by the
Commission in volume I of the revenue and expenditure
account. This volume provides a commentary on budget-
ary management for the year and, in particular, explana-
tions of variations between the initial approved budget
and the actual revenue. This review did not seek to pro-
vide assurance as to the reliability of these explanations.
Rather it sought to identify any significant variations for
which explanations are not provided and to identify any
explanations that might be considered misleading.
(4) Council Decision 2000/597/EC, Euratom of 29 Septem-
ber 2000 on the system of the European Communities’
own resources (OJ L 253, 7.10.2000, p. 42).
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The budgetary presentation of own resources
1.8. The Court found, in connection with the 2000
budgetary analysis, that the quality of the budget infor-
mation published, in terms of legibility and transpar-
ency, particularly that sent to the budgetary authority,
is not always satisfactory.
1.9. With regard to the management of supplemen-
tary and amending budgets, the Court found that the
time limits for publication in the Official Journal laid
down in the Financial Regulation are not adhered to.
On occasion, the information presented does not enable
changes that have taken place to be traced in the proper
manner.
1.10. The Court recommends:
(a) a review of the budgetary presentations concerning
own resources and of the nomenclature currently
applied;
(b) improved planning of the use of supplementary and
amending budgets.
SPECIFIC APPRAISAL IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE
Introduction
1.11. The Statement of Assurance does not cover duties
that are evaded since they do not reach the accounts. In
order to take this problem further into consideration,
the Court has:
(a) taken account of the work of other auditors, nota-
bly that done by Commission services;
(b) reviewed the arrangements to identifying, reporting
and monitoring fraud and irregularity, in the con-
text of protecting the Communities’ financial inter-
ests (see paragraphs 1.53 to 1.68 and 1.75 to 1.92).
1.9. The Commission will ensure that the provisions of the
Financial Regulation on deadlines for the publication of
supplementary and amending budgets are complied with.
1.10.
(a) The Commission intends to act on the Court of Auditors’
recommendation and to submit amendments to the bud-
getary authority regarding the budget presentation of own
resources.
(b) The Commission will strive as far as possible to limit the
number of supplementary and amending budgets, which
should be submitted only in the event of unavoidable,
exceptional or unforeseen circumstances, as specified in
Article 15 of the Financial Regulation. The Commission
is, however, required, once the accounts have been closed,
to submit an SAB in order to include the previous year’s
out-turn in the budget for a given year.
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Traditional own resources
1.12. The objective of the Court’s audit work was to
ensure that duties entered in the accounts had been
established accurately and in a timely manner, and that
the accounting procedures were reliable. In addition to
the audit of transactions, theCourt alsomadean in-depth
audit of themanagement and collection of anti-dumping
duties, where the incentive to evasion is particularly
high (see paragraphs 1.21 to 1.52).
Audit of transactions
1.13. The Court audited import duty receipts, drawn
from the Commission’s accounts, which included items
from 11 Member States. The audit was limited to exami-
nation of documents available to the Member States’
customs authorities for clearance of customs transac-
tions.
1.14. Import duty is established by Member States’ cus-
toms authorities and is entered in national accounting
systems, from which it is identified and made available
to the Commission; it is therefore important that these
systems should be reliable and auditable. In Germany,
three different and only partly coordinated accounting
systems exist for customs entries, and much of the pro-
cessing is manual.
1.15. Established entitlements for which no security
has been provided, and those which have been chal-
lenged and might be subject to change, need not be
made available but may instead be entered by the Mem-
ber States in separate accounts (the B accounts). Each
Member State provides a quarterly statement of its B
accounts to the Commission. The balances are included
in the balance sheet under ‘Amounts owed by Member
States’ (VII. B.2.c) (see paragraph 9.6 on the provision
calculated by the Commission).
1.16. The total balance standing in B accounts increased
by 4,3 %, from 2 168,7 million euro at 31 December
1999 to 2 261,6 million euro at 31 December 2000.
The increase is less than half the average annual increase
in the period 1990 to 1999. Since the quarterly state-
ments for the Commission require only a report of
aggregate changes, without analysis of the B account
balance by age or otherwise, Member States are free
simply to aggregate totals reported by local offices,
without making any central or local analysis of what
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types and number of cases make up the balance. It is
not known how many individual entries there are. A
few entries are large: 532,7 million euro (some 23 % of
the total balance) represents the customs debts arising
from the investigations of New Zealand butter
imports (5); these debts have been challenged and the
matter is before the courts in the United Kingdom.More
typical large items are two 1995 entries made by Bel-
gium, which relate to cigarette smuggling in 1993 and
together total 29,4 million euro (1,3 % of the total).
1.17. In 2000, as in previous years (6), problems were
found with the maintenance of the B accounts in sev-
eral Member States. In Germany, the accounting cen-
tralisation procedures for B accounts are manual and do
not include sufficient checks to give assurance of reli-
ability. Cases were found where established amounts
had not been entered (United Kingdom), or had not
been adjusted following court decisions (Belgium). In
the Netherlands, procedures are now being revised to
ensure that the rules applied fully reflect the legal
requirements. In Finland, the B account is overstated by
at least 0,75 million euro, representing a calculation of
the potential duty on seized goods; however, the cus-
toms debts on these goods have been extinguished by
the acts of seizure and confiscation. In a number of
Member States (Belgium, Denmark, Germany), entries
are routinely made in the B accounts for secured cus-
toms debts arising from undischarged transit opera-
tions, regardless of whether there has been a formal
appeal. This is in breach of the regulation, which requires
that secured amounts should be made available.
1.18. Part of the B account balance is highly likely to
be irrecoverable. The regulation prescribes a write-off
procedure for use where it appears that recovery is
1.17. The Commission agrees that the current separate
accounting system based at local level can lead to errors,
mostly one-off but some systematic, resulting from erroneous
interpretation of Article 6 of Regulation (EC, Euratom)
No 1150/00. The Commission takes appropriate action to
remedy matters and continues to offer guidance to Member
States on how to operate the procedure.
Turning to the Member States specifically mentioned, a Com-
mission survey in Germany of 282 cases reported as write-
offs revealed that more than half had not been given the cor-
rect accounting treatment. Appropriate advice to improve
matters has been given. The Commission also found weak-
nesses in the Danish, Netherlands and UK systems. Negotia-
tions are in progress regarding the required changes to their
procedures. As a result of a request from the Commission, the
Finnish authorities changed their system earlier this year. As
negotiations with Belgium have so far proved unsuccessful, the
Commission has started infringement proceedings.
(5) Special Report No 4/98 on importation at reduced rate of
levy into the Community and disposal of New Zealand
milk products and Swiss cheese (OJ C 127, 24.4.1998 and
OJ C 191, 18.6.1998).
(6) See Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999,
paragraphs 1.12 to 1.16; Annual Report concerning the
financial year 1998, paragraph 1.10; Statement of Assur-
ance concerning activities financed from the general bud-
get for the financial year 1997, paragraphs 8.13 and 8.14
(OJ C 349, 17.11.1998); Statement of Assurance concern-
ing activities financed from the general budget for the
financial year 1996, paragraphs 19.6 and 19.7 (OJ C 348,
18.11.1997).
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impossible in the long term for reasons which cannot
be attributed to the Member States, but does not define
any criteria or time limits by which a Member State
must so deem a debt.
1.19. The Commission has submitted a proposal (7)
for a regulation that would provide for removal from
the B account of amounts deemed irrecoverable after a
period of five years from the date of notification or of
the final judicial decision. As long as the Council has
not adopted such a regulation, the B account balance
will continue to contain many amounts which are de
facto irrecoverable. In the Court’s view no useful pur-
pose is served by maintaining items in the B account
indefinitely if they are not likely to be recovered, and it
therefore considers that such amendments to the regu-
lation should be made.
1.20. The minor errors found in the course of the
audit of transactions do not materially affect the import
duty shown in the revenue and expenditure account,
nor the legality and regularity of the collection of the
amounts shown in that account.
Anti-dumping measures of the European Union
Introduction
1.21. European Community rules concerning anti-
dumping (8)measureswere established in 1968 (9). Since
(7) Amended proposal for a Council Regulation (EC, Eura-
tom) amending Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom)
No 1552/89 implementing Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom
on the system of the Communities’ own resources —
COM(98) 0209 final (OJ C 150, 16.5.1998, p. 20).
(8) Besides anti-dumping measures, Community legislation
also provides for countervailing measures against subsi-
dies granted by third countries for exports to the Com-
munity. In the present report the term ‘anti-dumping’
measures is intended as comprising also the ‘countervail-
ing measures’, whose contents, application procedures
and effects are very similar to those of the ‘anti-dumping’
measures.
(9) Council Regulation (EEC) No 459/68 of 5 April 1968
(OJ L 93, 17.4.1968, p. 1).
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then, the regulatory framework has been modified (10)
in order to comply with the development of the inter-
national agreements in the context of theGeneral Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) (11).
1.22. According to the provisions of Council Regula-
tion (EC) No 384/96, the basic Regulation on anti-
dumping, a product is considered to be dumped if its
export price to the Community is lower than the nor-
mal selling price in the exporting country. An anti-
dumping duty can be applied if there is injury to the
Community industry, if there is a causal link to the
dumping and if the measure is in the European Union
interest (12).
1.23. Anti-dumping duties are own resources of the
Community and are collected by customs authorities in
the same way as normal customs duties. Some 139 mil-
lion euro of anti-dumping duties were collected, all over
the Community, during the budget year 2000. At the
end of the year, 70 products originating from 38 coun-
tries were subject to definitive anti-dumping measures.
1.24. The procedure leading to the adoption of an anti-
dumping measure starts with a written complaint by a
natural or legal person acting on behalf of the Commu-
nity industry affected. The complaint must include
(10) As regards anti-dumping measures, Council Regulation
(EC) No 384/96 of 22 December 1995 (OJ L 56, 6.3.1996,
p. 1) and, as regards countervailing measures against sub-
sidies, Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6 Octo-
ber 1997 (OJ L 288, 21.10.1997, p. 1) apply. For products
covered by the European Coal and Steel Community
(ECSC) specific rules are laid down in Commission
Decisions No 2277/96/ECSC of 28 November 1996
(OJ L 308, 29.11.1996, p. 11) and No 1889/98/ECSC of
3 September 1998 (OJ L 245, 4.9.1998, p. 3). The out-
lines of both Decisions follow the basic Council Regula-
tions.
(11) Concerning anti-dumpingmeasures: ‘Agreementon imple-
mentation of Article VI of the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade 1994’; concerning countervailing measures
against subsidies ‘Agreement on subsidies and counter-
vailing measures’. The World Trade Organisation (WTO),
established in 1995, constitutes the international admin-
istrative framework for the enforcement of the GATT
agreements.
(12) Anti-dumping duties are set up to bridge the gap between
the dumped and normal export prices at a level adequate
to remove the injury to the domestic industry.
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evidence about the dumping, the injury and the causal
link between the two. On the grounds of the complaint
the Commission decideswithin 45 days about the open-
ing of an investigation, which has to be concluded
within 15 months. After 60 days, and not later than
nine months, from the opening of the investigation, the
Commission can impose provisional anti-dumping duties,
applicable for a maximum period of nine months and
always covered by a guarantee. Where at the end of its
investigation, the Commission considers that dumping
and consequent injury exist and an intervention corre-
sponds to the Community interest, it proposes the impo-
sition of definitive anti-dumping duties through a Coun-
cil regulation. Anti-dumping duties can be imposed
retroactively (see paragraph 1.41) on the condition that
the customs authorities have been informed of this pos-
sibility in due time (13).
1.25. An investigation may be concluded without the
impositionof anti-dumpingduties if the exporters under-
take to avoid dumping prices. The Commission can
accept the exporters’ undertakings if it is satisfied that
they eliminate the dumping. For reasons relating to the
protection of commercial interests, the detailed content
of the undertakings (minimum prices and/or maximum
quantities for exports to the Community) is known only
to the Commission. The Essen European Council of 9
and 10 December 1994 instructed the Commission, as
regards candidate countries for accession, to accept
undertakings, when possible, rather than to impose
anti-dumping duties (14).
1.26. The Court’s audit of the management of anti-
dumping measures was carried out at the Commission
and in eight Member States (15). It also included discus-
sions with representatives from the industries con-
cerned about the practicability and effectiveness of anti-
dumping measures.
1.25. The key parameters of undertakings are kept confi-
dential not only to protect the commercial interests of the
exporters, but also to avoid that the proposed undertakings
and their enforcement lead to anti-competitive behaviour.
(13) The registration of imports has to be requested by a spe-
cific Commission regulation.
(14) The conclusions of the Essen European Council provide
that the Commission ‘... will give, on a case-by-case basis,
where appropriate, a clear preference to price undertak-
ings, rather than duties in order to conclude anti-dumping
cases where injury is found’.
(15) Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, the Netherlands,
Sweden and the United Kingdom.
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Audit findings
Management and cont ro l o f the ant i -dumping measure s
Anti -dumping database
1.27. According to Article 14(6) of the basic Regula-
tion, Member States are requested to report to the Com-
mission every month on the import trade in products
subject to investigation or to measures and on the
amount of duties collected. UsingMember States’ reports
the Commission set up in 1997 a database known as
‘database 14/6’. This database, if reliable, could be used
for monitoring anti-dumping measures and assessing
their effects, as well as for cross-checking the amounts
declared by the Member States in their monthly state-
ments of own resources accounts (16).
1.28. The Court compared the amounts reported by
Member States for the database 14/6 with the amounts
reported in themonthly statements of the own resources
accounts. Significant differenceswere found for allMem-
ber States. These differences result from objective fac-
tors, such as different methods of data collection (17)
and different reporting periods (18), but mainly from
misunderstandings or errors.
1.29. The biggest difference concernsGermany, where
in 1999 24 million euro of anti-dumping duties was
collected and accounted for, but 188,8 million euro
reported for the database 14/6. This was partly due to
1.28. Based on a comparison between the two data sources
mentioned in this paragraph the Commission confirms the
Court’s findings. The discrepancies found were investigated
during last year’s inspection visits. Insofar as the differences,
caused by misunderstandings, these were addressed with the
Member States concerned. However, the Commission consid-
ers that as one system needs to include topical data on both
provisional as well as definitive duties and the other only
information on recovered definitive duties reported in line with
accounting timescales the differences, although apparently sig-
nificant, will always prove inconclusive.
1.29. The Commission confirms the Court’s findings and
would add that as the design of the German reporting form
contributed to the confusion, the authorities have been asked
to change it.
(16) Themonthly statements are forwarded according to Com-
mission Decision 97/245/EC, Euratom of 20 March 1997
laying down the arrangements for the transmission of
information to the Commission by the Member States
under the Communities’ own resources system (OJ L 97,
12.4.1997, p. 12).
(17) The database 14/6 must be quickly available, it does not
include corrections made at a later date. Furthermore
database 14/6 shall include provisional (guarantees) and
definitive anti-dumping duties while for own resources
only cashed anti-dumping duties are recorded.
(18) For example the database 14/6 for month ‘n’ will reflect
the transactions for that month, these do not reach the
Commissions financial statements until month ‘n + 2’.
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the fact that in a number of cases customs officers indi-
cated in the database 14/6 reports, instead of the amount
of duty collected, the figure relating to the weight in
kilograms of the imported goods. These errors were not
noted because no reconciliation was made in Germany
between the customs records on anti-dumping duties
collected and the manual reporting system used for the
database 14/6.
1.30. Because of unreliable data and the lack of a rec-
onciliation, either at Member States or Commission
level, only a limited use of the 14/6 database was pos-
sible up to the date of the Court’s audit.
Insuf f ic ient spec i f ic controls on impor ts subject to
ant i -dumping dut ies
1.31. As an anti-dumping duty is much higher than a
normal customs duty (19), a rather high risk exists that
importers will try to avoid it through incorrect declara-
tions regarding the country of origin or the character-
istics of the goods, the tariff heading applicable, the
producer or exporter, the import price if a minimum
price is set. The particular risks linked to import decla-
rations related to goods subject to anti-dumping duties
should be analysed by the customs authorities and the
use of specific control tools and methods envisaged.
1.32. Due to the extremely high number of import
operations and to the economic necessity of ensuring
smooth international trade, most customs declarations
are accepted without control or on the grounds of a
simple prima facie examination of the documents
1.30. The Commission can confirm that the reliability of
the 14/6 database at the time of the Court’s audit was still
limited. Nevertheless available data were being used, for vari-
ous applications, notably the monitoring of undertakings. In
addition, the Commission services have produced new guide-
lines, which came into effect on 1 January 2001. The con-
siderable efforts made over the past two years to improve the
quality of the data are now beginning to pay off.
It is important to keep in mind the size of the task at hand,
which is to check and integrate into the database submissions
from 15 Member States made on a monthly basis for a total
of tens of thousands of transactions.
1.31. to 1.34. Within the concept of risk management
anti-dumping must be qualified as a specific area of atten-
tion. In 1997 the Commission has drafted, in cooperation
with the Member States, and published ‘A Guide to risk
analysis and customs controls’. In chapter 3, subsection 3 of
this guide, specific risk indicators for goods subject to anti-
dumping and countervailing duties are defined. These indica-
tors are supposed to cover the risks indicated by the Court’s
audit.
(19) For example, the rate of the anti-dumping duty on imports
of tube or pipe fittings from the People’s Republic of China
or Taiwan (Council Regulations (EC) No 584/96 and (EC)
No 763/2000) is 58,6 %, where the customs duty rate is
3,7 %.
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presented by the importer. A specific treatment of cus-
toms declarations related to anti-dumping duties can
only be assured if a selection of a substantial number of
transactions for adequate specific controls (physical
examination of the goods, laboratory analysis, verifica-
tion of the authenticity of documents, etc.) is possible.
When a computer system recording all customs decla-
rations exists, the selection can be made using auto-
matic earmarks (filters) resulting from a risk analysis. In
this case, the customs official dealing with an earmarked
declaration is informed of the fact that the declaration
presents particular risks and needs a specific control.
1.33. The Court’s audit showed that in Germany the
customs administration does not have a comprehensive
computer system for the clearance and recording of all
import declarations. This weakness is not compensated
otherwise: there is still no operational central unit for
risk analysis and the customs offices are not adequately
informed about the characteristics of imports subject to
anti-dumping duties.
1.34. The quality of the customs control depends of
course on an effective and adequate use of the available
tools. In Belgium, France and Spain it was noted that in
some cases the filters applied did not adequately cover
specific risks linked to the importation of goods subject
to anti-dumping measures. In the United Kingdom the
number of errors and omissions found during the
Court’s audit showed insufficient use of available tools.
Determinat ion of the impor t pr ice
1.35. The ‘net, free-at-Community-frontier price’ is
the basis for the calculation of ad valorem duties and for
the control of minimum import prices. Article 147 of
the Regulation implementing the Community Customs
Code (20) lays down that, in case of successive sales
before customs valuation (including sales within the EU
customs territory), the import price to be taken into
account is normally the price set for the last sale before
1.33. The Commission agrees that all national administra-
tions need to continually improve their operational infrastruc-
ture, preferably by increasing the use of information technol-
ogy, particularly in the field of risk analysis.
1.34. The anomalies mentioned by the Court are being fol-
lowed up by the Commission which will take any necessary
corrective action.
It should also be noted that numerous activities are under way
under the Customs 2002 programme to promote a Commu-
nity approach to risk management. Forming part of the Risk
Analysis implementation plan and building on the earlier
work, these activities include developing risk indicators for the
customs processes of entry, import, export and transit.
1.35. to 1.36. The Commission wishes to stress that,
pending a definitive view on this question, provisional guid-
ance was given to Member States on several occasions by the
Commission Services.
(20) Commission Regulation (EEC) No 2454/93 of 2 July 1993
laying down provisions for the implementation of the
Community Customs Code (OJ L 253, 11.10.1993, p. 1).
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entry for free circulation of the goods, supposed to be
the highest selling price. By applying the successive sales
rule it could be possible to increase the import price up
to the level of the minimum price, thus avoiding anti-
dumping duties.
1.36. Germany, the Netherlands and the United King-
dom asked the Commission for guidance in the applica-
tion of the successive sales rule to anti-dumping mat-
ters, but at the time of the audit the Commission had
not yet expressed a definitive opinion on this subject.
Di f ferent ia ted ant i -dumping dut ies
1.37. The rate of an anti-dumping duty can be differ-
entiated according to the individual exporter or pro-
ducer concerned. Particular problems arise if the export-
ers and producers benefiting from a more favourable
duty rate are not clearly identified in the wording of the
regulations. An example of such problems is Council
Regulation (EC) No 1567/97 of 1 August 1997 impos-
ing a definitive anti-dumping duty on imports of leather
handbags originating in the People’s Republic of
China (21). This Regulation establishes differentiated anti-
dumping duties for handbags produced in Chinese fac-
tories by a number of companies not incorporated
under the law of the People’s Republic of China.
1.38. Uncertainties about the real owners of the Chi-
nese factories, the correct spelling of Chinese company
names and the coincidence of the companies shown in
the export documents with companies with slightly dif-
ferent names mentioned in the Regulation were serious
obstacles to effective customs controls.
1.37 to 1.38. The Commission wishes to clarify the spe-
cific conditions under which anti-dumping policy must be
applied. The application of anti-dumping duties, including
those concerning individual exporters, must be carried out on
the basis of the relevant Regulation. In most cases this is a
straightforward affair and companies entitled to an individual
duty can be easily identified on the basis of the import docu-
ments. As regards the specific case mentioned, which dates
back to 1997, difficulties arose from the particular corporate
structure of the exporting producers (mainly the fact that sev-
eral producers incorporated in Hong Kong produced in the
People’s Republic of China through manufacturing branches
without a legal personality under the Law of the People’s
Republic of China), which had to be reflected in the regula-
tions imposing measures, in addition to linguistic problems
(such as the transliteration of Chinese names).
In any event, continued efforts have been carried out in order
to improve the clarity of anti-dumping Regulations. When
necessary, the addresses of individual companies are provided
in the Regulation in order to make identification easier.
(21) OJ L 208, 2.8.1997, p. 31. The list of companies for which
differentiated anti-dumping duties apply was extended
and modified several times:
(a) Council Regulation (EC) No 2380/98 (OJ L 296,
5.11.1998, p. 1);
(b) Council Regulation (EC) No 175/2000 (OJ L 22,
27.1.2000, p. 25);
(c) Council Regulation (EC) No 133/2001 (OJ L 23,
25.1.2001, p. 9).
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1.39. In one case where the exporter’s name did not
coincide with the name stated in the regulation, the
German customs first requested anti-dumping duties.
Later on the duties were paid back upon presentation
by the importer of the photocopy of a confidential let-
ter sent by the Commission to a Belgian lawyer, who,
apparently, had sought clarification about the identity
of one of the firms benefiting from reduced duty rates.
This letter explained the links between the beneficiary
of the reduced duty explicitly mentioned in the Regula-
tion, the manufacturing factory and a parent company
marketing the handbags.
1.40. For the sake of a correct, uniform and effective
enforcement of the anti-dumping measures, the deci-
sions taken by customs should be based on the word-
ing of the Council Regulations. If the Commission con-
siders that certain provisions allow a broader
interpretation than that resulting from their strict word-
ing, it should officially inform all national customs
administrations, so as to ensure an equal treatment of
all importers. In any case, the Commission should care
for a clear formulation of anti-dumping regulations,
permitting effective customs controls.
Retroact ive col lect ion of ant i -dumping dut ies on regis -
tered impor ts
1.41. The retroactive collection of anti-dumping duties
on registered imports is, for customs officials, an unusual
procedure. The Community Customs Code makes a
specific reference to the collection of provisional anti-
dumping duties (22). However, no reference at all is
made by the Community Customs Code to the much
more sensitive situation of retroactive anti-dumping
duties. Although the anti-dumping Regulations consti-
tute a sufficient legal basis for the retroactive collection
of anti-dumping duties, a mention in the Community
Customs Code, and, in particular, the definition of a
specific deadline for the recovery (as it has been done
for the provisional anti-dumping duties) would make
customs officials attentive to this particular situation.
1.39. The Commission points out that the granting of a
reduced duty rate to the exporter in question was justified and
wishes to clarify the situation. The German customs levied the
countrywide duty rate on imports from an exporter entitled to
a reduced duty rate because the relevant sales documentation
did not identify the company with its full name, as it appeared
in the relevant Regulation. The exporter requested the Com-
mission to confirm that it actually benefited from the reduced
duty rate. After verifying the relevant documentation, the
Commission provided this confirmation which, following the
usual practice, was sent to the Brussels-based legal representa-
tive of the exporter. This confirmation was then sent by the
exporter to the German customs via the importer of the goods
with a request to benefit from the applicable reduced duty rate.
The Commission acknowledges that contrary to its usual prac-
tice, no copy of its correspondence with the exporter was sent
to the customs authorities directly.
1.40. The Commission makes available to the Member
States, via the TARIC, data related to the anti-dumping leg-
islation published, in order to ensure the uniform and simul-
taneous application of the anti-dumping measures.
The Commission seeks to obtain clear legal provisions. In
addition, the Commission services provide clarification on the
applicable texts upon request by the Member States.
1.41. It is true that the Community Customs Code makes
no reference to the retroactive collection of anti-dumping duties
in the cases to which the Court of Auditors refers. In such
situations, however, the specific provisions of the code appli-
cable to the retroactive processing of import duties are appli-
cable. So, in accordance with Article 220(1) of the Code,
where import duties have not been entered in the accounts or
have been entered for less than the amount legally owed, the
amount of duty to be recovered or which remains to be recov-
ered must be entered in the accounts within two days of the
date on which the customs authorities become aware of the
situation and are in a position to calculate the amount legally
owed and to determine the debtor. The amount of duty pay-
able must be communicated to the debtor within the time
limit set in Article 221 of the Code.
Since there is a general rule on deadlines for payment, it is not
necessary to set a specific deadline for this type of import duty.
Nonetheless, the Customs Code Committee, together with the
Member States, will look into the advisability of establishing
a specific deadline, as it may be necessary to amend the Com-
munity Customs Code.
(22) Article 218(2) of Council Regulation No 2913/92 of
12 October 1992 establishing the Community Customs
Code (OJ L 302, 19.10.1992, p. 1).
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1.42. Problems were noted in most Member States
visited by the Court concerning cases where anti-
dumping duties had to be collected retroactively on reg-
istered imports. The most relevant are the following:
(a) in Germany, as no computerised recording system
of all import declarations exists, customs offices
register imports by putting aside a copy of the
import declaration. This procedure does not guar-
antee completeness: overlooked transactions or lost
documents would never be identifiable;
(b) in the port of Hamburg (Germany), registration for
refillable lighters (23) had not been made. The error
was detected by customs only several months after
the imposition of the anti-dumping duties. In the
meantime some of the importers had gone bank-
rupt and some others could not be found at the
given address. At the time of the audit, the collec-
tion of anti-dumping duties for some 1,1 million
euro was still pending;
(c) in the port of Antwerp (Belgium), imports of refill-
able lighters subject to retroactive duties were not
selected and extracted from the database recording
all customs declarations. The Court estimates that
because of this failure some 1,7 million euro of
definitive anti-dumping duties have still to be col-
lected;
(d) in Sweden, because of a misunderstanding on the
distribution of responsibilities between central and
regional offices, duties for about 0,1 million euro
were not collected;
(e) in Southampton (United Kingdom), due to failures
in the registration procedure, the retroactive collec-
tion of duties on imports of handbags from China
started only shortly before the audit visit of the
Court. The collection of outstanding anti-dumping
duties for about 0,4million eurowas still in progress
at the time of the Court’s audit.
1.42.
(a) The Commission is aware of the administrative risks
inherent in the German system and has repeatedly
requested computerisation.
(b) to (e) The Commission is investigating these matters
and will take any necessary measures, including
the imposition of interest on late establishment if
appropriate.
(23) Commission Regulation (EC) No 971/98 of 7 May 1998
(OJ L 135, 8.5.1998, p. 38). The definitive anti-dumping
duty for registered lighters was imposed by Council Regu-
lation (EC) No 192/1999 of 25 January 1999 (OJ L 22,
29.1.1999, p.1).
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Insuf f ic ient fo l low-up to mutual ass i s tance messages
1.43. Specific rules on ‘mutual assistance’ between
national and European administrations (24) request the
Member States to inform the Commission on goods
suspected of having been the object of breaches of cus-
toms legislation, on methods and practices used to
breach customs rules, and on shortcomings or gaps
noted when applying customs legislation. Information
on cases needing coordinated enquiries and interven-
tions by several national administrations is diffused to
the Member States by OLAF (25) as ‘mutual assistance
messages’.
1.44. Shortcomings in the follow-up to these mes-
sages have been noted in the United Kingdom, in Ger-
many and in Belgium. In the United Kingdom only three
of ten recent mutual assistance messages examined by
the Court’s auditors had been adequately followed up.
This was due as well to administrative deficiencies as to
a general limitation of enquiries to cases where poten-
tial revenue at risk exceeds one million pounds sterling
(about 1,6 million euro). In Germany, it is not possible
to identify all customs offices through which suspected
irregular imports could have been made. The central
customs administration forwards the mutual assistance
messages to a limited number of local offices selected
on the basis of empirical judgement. Both in Belgium
and in Germany the Court noted a number of cases
where, following mutual assistance messages, irregulari-
ties had been detected, already in 1999 and 2000, but
the amounts due had still not been recovered.
1.43. The Commission is examining the effectiveness of the
systems used by each Member State to deal with mutual assis-
tance messages as part of 2001’s annual inspection pro-
gramme.
1.44. The Commission has also informed the UK authori-
ties of shortcomings in their procedures for dealing with
mutual assistance messages. Further verifications of proce-
dures in the United Kingdom, Belgium and Germany will be
made in 2001. The points made by the Court will be followed
up in the context of this inspection.
(24) Council Regulation (EC) No 515/97 of 13 March 1997 on
mutual assistance between the administrative authorities
of the Member States and cooperation between the latter
and the Commission to ensure the correct application of
the law on customs and agricultural matters (OJ L 82,
22.3.1997, p. 1).
(25) OLAF: European Anti-fraude Office.
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Limi ta t ions to the e f fe c t i venes s o f ant i -dumping measure s
Long and complex proceedings
1.45. The following proceedings could weaken the
effectiveness of anti-dumping measures:
(a) the Commission acts normally on a written com-
plaint which must already provide substantiated evi-
dence on the dumping and injury. The preparation
of such documentation includes the obligation for
the industry to prepare exhaustive and time-
consuming files and statistics;
(b) even if the written complaint leads to an investiga-
tion by the Commission, a decision on the imposi-
tion of provisional anti-dumping duties is often
taken only towards the end of the maximum delay
of nine months from the start of the investigation
and the issuing of a decision on definitive anti-
dumping measures usually takes up the maximum
allowed period of 15 months;
(c) for each modification or review of an existing mea-
sure the same long procedure applies: a written
complaint is required, including full documented
evidence.
1.46. An example of the economic disadvantages of
the long duration of the proceedings is represented by
the fertilisers’ sector. As fertilisers are mainly bought
and used during the sowing period, if the dumping
starts near the beginning of this period, before the first
possible anti-dumping measure (provisional duties) is
taken the Community producers of fertilisers affected
will have lost a full marketing season.
1.45.
(a) According to the applicable legislation, complaints have
to be documented. The quasi-judicial nature of anti-
dumping investigations means that decisions and find-
ings must be based on facts, the Commission cannot ini-
tiate investigations or impose measures on the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations.
(b) and (c) The services of the Commission always work
within the deadlines set in the relevant interna-
tional agreements and Community legislation.
Anti-dumping measures must be based on a
thorough and complete investigation, which
takes time. If measures were imposed after a
quick and superficial investigation the instru-
ment would lose all credibility and remain
exposed to undesirable challenges in the courts.
In any case, provisional duties can be imposed
if warranted, and they usually are in cases in
which definitive duties are finally imposed. It
should also be noted that, in the case of reviews,
measures are usually already in place.
In short, due process, including the rights of the defence, takes
time and resources but is a necessary requirement.
1.46. The Commission would stress that the applicable legal
requirements have to be respected. Measures can only be
imposed after a thorough investigation. In addition, if mea-
sures were taken hastily before the Community industry’s alle-
gations are verified, exporters might unjustifiably lose an
entire marketing season if the allegations turned out to be
unfounded.
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Weaknesses of under takings
1.47. The confidentiality of undertakings causes prob-
lems to the customs authorities especially when imports
take place via third countries as was the case for Coun-
cil Regulation (EC) No 2320/97 of 17 November 1997
imposing definitive anti-dumping duties for seamless
steel pipes (26) (27).
1.48. Although the Regulation requests production
certificates issued by the exporting producers, it does
not provide for a cross check between the certificates
presented for customs clearance and the lists of the
issued certificates that have to be sent to the Commis-
sion to allow it to monitor the exporters’ compliance
with the undertakings.
Insuf f ic ient market protect ion
1.49. The Court’s audit revealed that goods subject to
anti-dumping duties if imported from certain countries
can be imported in large quantities from other coun-
tries at prices lower than the prices of the imports to
which anti-dumping duties apply (for instance
unwrought magnesium, refractory chamottes, glypho-
sate). In the case of refractory chamottes, in 1999 the
1.47. The Commission stresses that the details of price
undertakings are commercial information of an extremely
sensitive and confidential nature (see also comments to point
1.25. above). This does not prevent customs from checking
the authenticity of either the production certificates referred to
by the Court or of any other formal requirements, which are
not covered by confidentiality. The Commission actually helped
Member States’ customs to ascertain the authenticity of such
certificates whenever doubts arose. Finally, the respect of the
minimum prices is monitored by the Commission services.
1.48. For reasons concerning the protection of commercial
interests, only the Commission knows details of undertakings,
as the Court also stated under point 1.25 of its Report.
TARIC includes data concerning the obligation to present a
certificate (mentioned in the respective anti-dumping legisla-
tion) as a condition to apply a differentiated anti-dumping
duty rate or exemption of the duty, for the company in ques-
tion.
Data supplied by Member States for the 14/6 database per-
mits to distinguish imports subject to duties from those sub-
ject to undertakings by individual exporters. Together with the
undertaking reports made by the same exporters, a double-
checking system is in place which allows the identification of
potential problems.
1.49. The fact that a product subject to measures may be
imported from other countries at prices which are lower than
those of the imports to which duties apply is irrelevant. A low
price does not necessarily mean that the product is being
dumped. The purpose of anti-dumping measures is not to
protect the Community market from low-priced imports in
general, but to remedy dumping causing injury to the Com-
munity industry.
(26) OJ L 322, 25.11.1997, p. 1.
(27) According to Article 2 of Council Regulation (EC)
No 2320/97, the products must be produced and sold for
export to the Community by the companies listed, upon
presentation to the competent Member State’s customs
services of a valid, original production certificate issued
by one of the companies listed in the Regulation. Under-
takings were accepted for 11 producers from Hungary,
Poland, Czech Republic, Romania and the Slovak Repub-
lic.
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quantity imported from countries not affected by anti-
dumping duties was nearly three times larger than the
quantities subject to anti-dumping duties, and the prices
of the former were up to 50 % lower than those of the
latter (28). It is questionable if, in cases like this, the anti-
dumping measure applied assures an effective protec-
tion of the Community market.
Conclusions and recommendations
1.50. Globally, the Court’s audit did not reveal any
major bias in the implementation of the anti-dumping
regulations. However, the control of the existing system
has shown a number of weaknesses both at Commis-
sion level and at Member States level. The evasion of
anti-dumping duties does not only result in a loss of
own resources but also reduces the effectiveness of the
anti-dumping policy.
1.51. In this context the Commission should:
(a) ensure the reliability of the database 14/6 and cross-
check its content with the financial information for-
warded by the Member States on own resources
corresponding to anti-dumping duties (para-
graphs 1.27 to 1.30);
(b) ensure the effectiveness of customs control by avoid-
ing ambiguous or imprecise formulation of the regu-
lations on customs and anti-dumping duties (para-
graphs 1.40 and 1.41);
(c) give appropriate guidance to national customs on
matters of construction and enforcement of anti-
dumping legislation (paragraphs 1.36 and 1.40);
(d) collect and analyse all available information (such as
database 14/6, declarations on own resources,
Ownres, mutual assistance, Eurostat, etc.) highlight-
ing anomalous trade patterns or practices and take
it into account when devising and implementing its
anti-dumping policy.
1.50. The Commission’s replies have drawn upon the results
of its own inspections during 2000, looking at the effective-
ness and reliability of procedures for calculating and collect-
ing anti-dumping duties in Member States. As well as the
individual reports made to each Member State, which incor-
porated 35 observations, the Commission also produced a
thematic report drawing together the various trends seen. The
Commission’s inspections of anti-dumping duties were made
using a systems-based approach concentrating on key areas
including, of course, an assessment of compliance.
1.51.
(a) The Commission considers that implementing this rec-
ommendation is unlikely to provide any substantial
improvement, given the different objectives and timing
phases of the two systems.
(b) The Commission makes continuous efforts to obtain clear
legal provisions and does not consider that the present
formulation of the anti-dumping regulations is ambigu-
ous.
The Community Customs Code and its related imple-
mentation provisions have been and continue to be the
subject of regular updating and simplification.
(c) Implementation of Community legislation is, of course,
primarily the responsibility of Member States, but insofar
as clarification can be given the Commission will natu-
rally assist Member States.
(d) The Commission ensures proper use of the information
channels at its disposal but it considers that one of the
principles of its anti-dumping action, i.e. that it is driven
by industry complaints, should be maintained. Action on
its own initiative has to respect the legal framework and
will have to remain ancillary.
(28) According to statistical data from Eurostat.
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1.52. The national customs authorities should:
(a) set up and effectively use adequate technical tools
for selection and control of customs declarations
related to anti-dumping duties (paragraphs 1.31 to
1.34);
(b) proceed to the swift collection of retroactive anti-
dumping duties still due and avoid missing such
collection in the future (paragraph 1.42);
(c) follow-up adequately mutual assistance messages
(paragraph 1.44).
Protection of the Community’s financial interests
Introduction
1.53. With regard to own resources, in principle fraud
and other irregularities, unlike expenditure, are not
recorded in the budget at all and therefore cannot be
pinpointedwhen its implementation is checked. Against
this background, the Court wanted to put the results of
its DAS-related work into perspective, hence its presen-
tation of a summary of the situation regarding the pro-
tection of the Community’s financial interests in the
field of own resources.
1.54. For the purpose of financing the budget, reduced
receipts under the headings of traditional own resources
or the VAT-based resource are offset by increased
recourse to the GNP-based resource. The main conse-
quence of that, therefore, is that the distribution of the
financial burden divided between the Member States
and various categories of taxpayers is different. Any
malfunctioning of the traditional own resources and
common VAT systems is ultimately likely to have an
impact on the principles of the single market.
The legislation
1.55. Article 280(1) of the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Community and two Council Regulations (29) pro-
vide the framework for measures taken by the
1.55. At present thirteen Member States have ratified the
Convention; the Commission continues to encourage the oth-
ers to do so.
(29) Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2988/95 of
18 December 1995 on the protection of the European
Communities’ financial interests (OJ L 312, 23.12.1995,
p. 1) and Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2185/96
of 11 November 1996 concerning on-the-spot checks and
inspections carried out by the Commission in order to
protect the European Communities’ financial interests
against fraud and other irregularities (OJ L 292,
15.11.1996, p. 2).
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Community and the Member States to protect the Com-
munity’s financial interests at the level of both revenue
and expenditure. Furthermore, a convention on the
protection of these interests by means of the harmoni-
sation of national criminal codes was signed on
26 July 1995 by the representatives of the Member
States’ governments. However, this convention and its
successive protocols had still not entered into force (30)
on 7 September 2001, as it had not been ratified by all
the Member States.
1.56. With more specific regard to Community own
resources, Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1150/2000 (31)
contains several provisions requiring the Member States
to provide regular information on fraud and irregulari-
ties they have detected and on the controls they have
introduced to prevent and monitor them.
1.57. A Commission decision (32) defined the form of
the various notifications required of the Member States
by the Regulation. The Commission also set up in 1997
a computerised system (Ownres) for recording and for-
warding data on cases of fraud and irregularities amount-
ing to more than 10 000 euro.
Results presented by the Commission
1.58. Since the Court’s last Annual Reportwas adopted,
the Commission has published a great deal of informa-
tion on the establishment and collection of traditional
own resources and, in particular, fraud and irregulari-
ties detected (Table 1.2).
1.59. It should be noted that the total value of the
fraud and irregularities cases notified by the Member
States doubled between 1999 and 2000, despite a fall in
the number of such cases.
On 23 May 2001, in view of the incomplete ratification of
these instruments (see below), the Commission proposed a
directive based on Article 280(4) taking up the majority of
the provisions and protocols of the convention. This directive
is currently being discussed within the Council. The Commis-
sion has urged the Member States to pursue the ratification
process in order to enable the provisions not included in the
directive also to enter into force. The Council has also on sev-
eral occasions urged Member States to ratify the convention.
1.57. Amendments to the Commission Decision of
20 March 1997 have been proposed in order to overcome the
shortcomings found in practice.
(30) Convention on the Protection of the European Commu-
nities’ Financial Interests (OJ C 316, 27.1.1995).
(31) Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1150/2000 of
22 May 2000 implementing Decision 94/728/EC, Eura-
tom on the system of the Communities’ own resources
(OJ L 130, 31.5.2000, p. 1).
(32) Commission Decision 97/245/EC, Euratom of 20 March
1997 laying down the arrangements for the transmission
of information to the Commission by the Member States
under the Communities’ own resources system (OJ L 97,
12.4.1997, p. 12).
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1.60. At the end of 2000, on a cumulative basis,
Ownres contained 11 407 cases. These cases totalled
1 482,8 million euro, 362,6 million euro of which has
been recovered.
The scope of the information presented
1.61. The Commission stresses that, as far as fraud and
other irregularities are concerned, the figures provided
by the Member States since Decision 97/245/EC, Eura-
tom was adopted, have not been homogeneous and that
explanations will have to be sought of them concern-
ing the anomalies detected (33). These difficulties are
especially acutewhen it comes to distinguishing between
fraud and other irregularities. The Commission also
believes that the different control methods applied by
the various national administrations preclude valid com-
parison of the figures submitted by the Member
States (34).
1.61. The Commission has approached the national admin-
istrations to stress the need to receive homogenous informa-
tion. It has also made improvements to the presentation of
this information and decided that, as of the financial year
2000, the reports required under Article 280 of the Treaty
and Article 17(3) of Regulation (EC, Euratom)
No 1150/2000 would be merged.
(33) Paragraph 2.2.1. of the ‘Summary report of the comments
made by the Member States on the activity and the results
of their controls as well as the questions of principle as
regards traditional own resources — Financial year 1999
— (Article 17(3) of Council Regulation (EC, Euratom)
No 1150/2000)’ (Document COM(2000) 718)). Germany,
for example, seems to have provided a figure that is highly
disproportionate to the volume of goods it traded; the
Netherlands is supposed to have forwarded a partial set of
figures, due to informatics difficulties etc. Problems regard-
ing the homogeneity of data forwarded by the Member
States persisted in 2000 (see paragraph 11 of the 2000
Annual Report on the protection of the Communities’
financial interests and the fight against fraud — (Docu-
ment COM(2001) 255)).
(34) Paragraph 2.1.2. of the abovementioned SummaryReport.
Table 1.2 — Traditional own resources — Fraud and irregularities involving over 10 000 euro notified by the
Member States
(Mio EUR)
Number of cases Amounts Percentage of the budget Budget
1996 2 149 284,4 2,09 13 583,6
1997 2 628 294,0 2,07 14 172,3
1998 2 126 249,2 1,77 14 110,7
1999 2 752 266,2 1,92 13 857,6
2000 2 403 534, 5 3,50 15 267,2
Source: European Commission.
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1.62. Under the terms of Decision 97/245/EC, Eura-
tum, no questions are put to the Member States con-
cerning the methods and criteria used to check declara-
tions prior to clearance through customs (percentage of
declarations checked on the basis of documents and
physical examinations of goods, risk profiles applied to
select declarations that are to be checked, etc.). The same
applies to the payment of levies provided for by the
common organisation of the market in sugar. Informa-
tion concerning the various national administrations’
powers as regards amounts still to be collected was pre-
sented for the first time in 2001 (35), while recovery
measures by the Member States are frequently charac-
terised by slow administrative and legal procedures and
differing interpretations of Community law by the
national authorities (36).
1.63. As the Commission has found, the information
available does not yet enable the Member States’ effi-
ciency in detecting fraud and other irregularities, or
their ability to recover outstanding amounts promptly,
to be assessed (37).
Commission audits connected with protecting the Communi-
ties’ financial interests
1.64. Every year the Commission carries out audits in
the Member States that are based on detailed risk analy-
sis that takes account of, inter alia, information con-
tained in the Ownres system. The Commission also
checks that national provisions concerning the collec-
tion and the making available of own resources comply
with Community law, examines and enters in the
accounts the monthly statements forwarded by Mem-
ber States and closely follows up any observations that
the Court of Auditors has notified to Member States or
published in its reports.
1.65. Amongst other things, OLAF investigates mat-
ters relating to traditional own resources.OLAF reported
that it had opened 120 files in connection with sus-
pected fraud in 2000. The total amount recoverable is
608,7 million euro (38).
1.62. As part of their supervision, in line with the resources
available, the Commission services check that the controls car-
ried out by the customs authorities meet the requirements of
Community regulations. The Commission also uses its avail-
able resources to avoid differing interpretations of Community
legislation.
(35) Paragraph 8 of the 2000Annual Report (abovementioned
document COM(2001) 255).
(36) Paragraph 7.1 of the Commission’s 1999 Annual Report
on protecting the Communities’ financial interests and
the fight against fraud (document COM(2000) 718).
(37) Title II of the 2000 Annual Report (abovementioned
document COM(2001) 255).
(38) Paragraph 12.3 of the 2000 Annual Report (abovemen-
tioned document COM(2001) 255).
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Conclusions and recommendations
1.66. Given that it has been over five years since the
Convention on the Protection of the European Com-
munities’ Financial Interests was signed, the entry into
force of this Convention and of its Protocols ought to
be considered a priority. This cannot take place, how-
ever, unless the Member States that have not yet rati-
fied it do so as soon as possible.
1.67. Information on the Member States’ efforts to
protect the Community’s financial interests in the field
of traditional own resources is not yet sufficiently con-
sistent and complete. For this reason it cannot be used
to assess the various Member States’ ability to detect
and efficiency in detecting fraud and other irregulari-
ties as well as recovering the sums involved.
1.68. This is why the Court recommends that the
Commission should:
(a) continue and intensify its dialogue with Member
States so as to identify better the sort of informa-
tion that is useful and arrive at an unequivocal inter-
pretation of this information;
(b) continue its efforts with a view to making an evalu-
ation and comparing the efficiency of the adminis-
trative and judicial procedures and structures set up
by the Member States to protect the Community’s
financial interests. The likelihood of recovering a
substantial proportion of the debts entered in the B
accounts could then be assessed more accurately
(see paragraph 9.6).
VAT/GNP own resources
1.69. In the case of the VAT and GNP own resources
the scope of the audit is limited because the EU’s receipts
reflect macroeconomic statistics whose underlying data
cannot be tested directly. In contrast, the EU’s expendi-
ture and revenue from traditional own resources are the
direct product of the aggregation of numerous indi-
vidual transactions where the legality and regularity can
be directly tested.
Analysis of the system
1.70. The VAT/GNP audit takes as its starting point the
receipt by the Commission from the Member States of
the macroeconomic aggregates (either as forecasts or as
real figures) and seeks to assess the Commission’s sys-
tem for handling the data until it is ultimately reflected
in the final accounts.
1.67. The Commission is currently in the process of updat-
ing Decision 97/245/EC, Euratom in order to improve its
practical effectiveness.
1.68.
(a) and (b) The Commission shares the Court’s concerns.
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1.71. The quality of themacroeconomic data provided
by Member States clearly affects the ultimate value of
individual Member States’ contributions. However, the
current absence of an accepted means of measuring the
quality prevents the Court from assessing the financial
impact of any failings. The Court looks at the difficult
question of quality separately in its special reports, such
as the recent Special Report 17/2000 (39) and its
follow-up (see paragraphs 1.107 to 1.121).
Audit findings
1.72. The audit identified some problems in commu-
nications between Commission departments. The unit
which informs Member States about adjustments to
their VAT and GNP own resource payments at the end
of the year got a disjointed and at times misleading flow
of data from units responsible for verification. More-
over there was confusion as to which unit was respon-
sible for checking that Member States made available
the correct amounts of own resources.
1.73. Furthermore, the audit found that the Commis-
sion failed to reconcile properly the different sets of
data (local system, accounting system and the data
warehouse) on which the published statutory revenue
account is based (see paragraph 9.46).
1.71. The Commission has worked with the GNP Commit-
tee since 1988 to ensure the quality (i.e. the consistency with
ESA concepts, the comparability, the reliability and the exhaus-
tiveness) of the GNP data used for budgetary purposes. The
Commission believes that, in conjunction with the activities of
the GNP Committee, the regular checks conducted by its
departments of Member States’ compliance with accounting
rules and the improvement of statistical sources are sufficient
to ensure an appropriate level of quality of own resource GNP.
Quality assurance procedures are being put in place by Euro-
stat and Member States’ statistical offices in a number of
areas of basic statistics. However, to put a numerical value on
the quality of GNP is, as the Court acknowledges, very dif-
ficult and the Commission and the GNP Committee have
already expressed reservations with respect to this approach
(see Commission’s reply to the Special Report 17/2000 of the
Court, page 20, paragraphs 63 to 79). However the Com-
mission has tried several approaches and continues to explore
others to address this very difficult question.
1.72. Member States’ budget contributions are determined
on the basis of the best available information. Whenever the
unit responsible for controlling Member States’ bases for own
resources acquires more precise data about those bases, it for-
wards the data to the unit that manages receipts as soon as
the usual checks have been accomplished, unless there appears
to be a risk of confusion. The communication of certain new
VAT data as late as November 2000 did not give rise to any
difficulties. There was one error concerning a Member State’s
GNP base because the late lifting of a reservation was not
taken into account when the balance was notified to the
national authorities. This error has been corrected and par-
ticular attention will be paid to such operations in future. The
Commission’s services have also taken steps to clarify and
strengthen the procedure for reconciling payments to the own
resource account with recovery orders.
1.73. Based on recent technical improvements, a new
approach for regular reconciliation is under analysis and a
first limited test has been carried out for the 2000 annual
closure on consumption and commitment appropriations.
This approach relies on reconciliation between DWB and
DWC data in order to cover the full chain of the different sets
of data.
(39) OJ C 336, 27.11.2000.
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Conclusions and recommendations
1.74. Taking into account the limitation to the scope
of the audit, the Court obtained a reasonable assurance
that the VAT and GNP resources were correctly assessed
and collected. However, the procedures to ensure the
integrity of the computing data during the accounting
process do not comply with current best practices.
Therefore, the Commission should continue to improve
the procedures to regularly reconcile the different sets
of data.
Protection of the Community’s financial interests
The importance of VAT
1.75. More than one third of the EU budget is funded
from the VAT-based resource. The Member States’ con-
tributions (40) are fixed by applying a call-up rate to the
taxable transactions stipulated in the sixth VAT Direc-
tive (41). Any loss due to fraud or shortcomings in the
national systems may affect the VAT resource base.
1.76. Even though some Member States’ bases have
been capped at 50 % of their GNP, on account of the
applicable rules, the other Member States’ (42) contribu-
tions accounted for approximately 65,5 % of the financ-
ing of the VAT resource in 2000.
Estimates of VAT losses
1.77. Various disparate and non-comparable data exist
for evaluating VAT losses, specifically with regard to
fraud (43). The general conclusion is that ‘the VAT system
as a whole is considerably affected by fraud’ (44). A recent
Commission document on changes in VAT revenue in
the Member States states that fraud leads to a consider-
able loss of revenue in absolute terms (45). The impact
1.74. The Commission’s services accept their responsibility
to continue to improve procedures and to comply with current
best practices.
1.77. The document quoted (SCAF No 60) concluded that
several types of fraud have been detected in the present VAT
system, affecting pure domestic trade as well as intra-
community and international trade. Moreover an increasing
problem of fraud affecting intra-community trade and inter-
national trade has been identified. The Commission has ana-
lysed Member States VAT receipts and has concluded that,
(40) Council Decision 94/728/EC, Euratom of 31 October
1994 (OJ L 293, 12.11.1994, p. 9).
(41) Council Directive 77/388/EEC of 17 May 1977 (OJ L 145,
13.6.1977, p. 1).
(42) Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, Fin-
land and Sweden.
(43) See, for example, the Commission communication, ‘A
strategy to improve the operation of the VAT system within the
context of the internal market’ COM(2000) 348 final of
7 June 2000; SCAF document No 26 of 30 June1997;
SCAF document No 37 of 2 February 1998.
(44) SCAF document No 60 of 17 November 1998.
(45) Working document ‘Trend in Member States’ VAT receipts’
of 15 January 2001, p. 16.
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on the Community budget represents a mere fraction of
this loss. The effect is limited by, firstly, the capping of
part of the VAT bases and, secondly, by the application
of the call-up rate (0,8644 % in 2000).
Regulatory framework
1.78. In principle, the Member States alone are respon-
sible for managing VAT. However, they must inform the
Commission of the procedures they apply for register-
ing taxable persons and for determining and collecting
VAT, and of the operation and results of their inspec-
tion systems. The Commission is required to examine,
with each Member State, whether these procedures may
be improved in any way. It is also required to report on
the matter every three years (46). The Council consid-
ered that these provisions would enable measures to
combat fraud (47) to be strengthened.
1.79. The national administrative authorities cooper-
ate with one another and with the Commission so as to
ensure that this VAT legislation (48) is complied with. To
this end, the Commission must centralise the Member
States’ experience, in particular as regards new means of
tax evasion or fraud, so as to improve the mechanism.
The Member States must also provide the Commission
with any information concerning intra-Community
transactions which may be of interest at the Commu-
nity level, as well as the texts of any national law provi-
sions they adopt in the field of administrative coopera-
tion. The Commission provides the competent authority
in each Member State with any available information as
quickly as possible. Lastly, every two years the Commis-
sion publishes a report on the conditions governing the
application of these provisions.
although detected fraud in intra-Community trade accounts
for a considerable loss of receipts in absolute terms, it does not
appear to have a tangible impact on VAT receipts.
(46) Article 12 of Council Regulation (EEC, Euratom)
No 1553/89 of 29 May 1989 (OJ L 155, 7.6.1989, p. 9).
(47) Declaration recorded in the Minutes when Article 12 of
Regulation (EEC, Euratom) No 1553/89 was adopted.
(48) Articles 11, 12 and 14 of Council Regulation (EEC)
No 2189/92 of 27 January 1992 (OJ L 24, 1.2.1992, p. 1).
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Limited follow-up on national control systems
1.80. The workings and performance of national VAT
control systems need to be monitored by the Commis-
sion. However, the information concerning collection
in the Member States and on the importance of certain
aspects of VAT fraud is scattered amongst various Com-
mission departments and not consolidated. For example,
the Commission’s work does not bring out differences
between Member States as regards their recovery effort
and the extent of the fraud.
1.81. The Commission’s actions are geared to the obli-
gation to publish a report every three years (49). The
various reports contain a summary of the information
provided by the Member States in response to a ques-
tionnaire. However, the Commission does not conduct
independent analyses of this information. The reports
do not allow the effectiveness of the various national
inspection systems to be compared or their develop-
ment to be assessed. The fact is that they are character-
ised by structural inconsistency and by generic observa-
tions and recommendations, which are sometimes
identical fromone report to another. Byway of example,
although the introduction of a system of risk analysis is
oneCommission recommendationwhichhasbeenmade
in various reports since 1992, this matter has not been
specifically evaluated for each Member State.
1.82. The Court has already commented on certain
problems posed by these reports. For example, the
Commission undertook to analyse and evaluate each
Member State’s inspection system (50). However, this
analysis is not reflected in the most recent report (51).
1.80. Under Article 12 of Regulation (EEC, Euratom)
No 1553/89 on own resources accruing from VAT, Member
States must inform the Commission of the ‘modalities and
results of their VAT control systems’. The Commission stresses
the fact that control procedures change only slowly over time.
Information about these procedures is therefore provided on an
intermittent basis and the Commission has neither the require-
ment nor the resources to monitor them continuously. The fact
that information about VAT fraud and systems of control and
recovery are shared among different Commission departments
is justified by the responsibilities and consequent needs of
these departments. The Commission believes that its services
coordinate their activities well enough to avoid the risks
implicit in the Court’s remarks and provide each other with
the information that they need to perform their respective
tasks.
1.81. The Commission does not believe that the object of its
reports on VAT own resources is to compare the effectiveness
of the various national VAT control systems and assess their
evolution. These analyses are best conducted in the directorate-
general charged with developing and implementing the Euro-
pean Union’s fiscal policy, which is in any case closely involved
in the preparation, execution and follow-up of own resource
control missions. The focus of successive reports has varied as
the Commission has identified matters that merited particular
attention at the time in question. For example, there were
obvious reasons why the report published in 2000 should
concentrate on the transitional intra-Community VAT system
in operation since 1993. Moreover, the Commission has for
some time been actively promoting the introduction and refine-
ment of risk analysis mechanisms in the national VAT admin-
istrations. A further seminar in the series devoted to the devel-
opment of this technique, at which all Member States, the
candidate countries and the Commission will be represented,
will be held in the framework of the Fiscalis programme in
September 2001.
1.82. The Commission would recall that on 28 January
2000 it submitted to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment a report constituting a comprehensive examination of
each Member State’s VAT control system (COM(2000) 28
final) and that it has therefore fulfilled its undertaking. This
report made recommendations to improve VAT control and
administrative cooperation. These recommendations were based
on a review in depth of each Member State’s control system,
encompassing 63 specific questions covering areas such as
control powers, control programmes, selection methods, pen-
alties, number of control visits, control officials, multilateral
controls, etc.
(49) See paragraph 1.78.
(50) Paragraphs 3.22 to 3.26 of Special Report No 9/98,
together with the Commission’s reply (OJ C 356,
20.11.1998).
(51) COM(2000) 28 final of 28 January 2000.
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1.83. As regards the monitoring of the development
of VAT revenue, the Court’s 1998 Annual Report (52)
noted the incomplete and uncoordinated nature of the
Commission’s work. In February 2001, the Commis-
sion submitted a report on the development of VAT
revenue for the first time. It mentions that some Mem-
ber States, especially Germany and Italy, experience
problems in collecting VAT, but provides no further
explanation (53). Additional analyses would be useful.
Failings in the administrative cooperation between Member
States
1.84. In order to improve administrative cooperation
with regard to VAT, several instruments have been
employed at Community level:
(a) the Standing Committee on Administrative Coop-
eration (SCAC) (54) and its anti-fraud sub-committee
(SCAF), made up of representatives of the Member
States and chaired by the Commission;
(b) the Fiscalis programme, which aims to improve the
internalmarket’s systemof indirect taxation (40 mil-
lion euro over five years) (55);
(c) exchanges of information under Regulation (EEC)
No 218/92 and Directive 77/799/EEC (56);
Moreover, these recommendations have been taken up by the
Council’s ad hoc Working Party on Tax Fraud. The Ecofin
Council on 5 June 2000 took note of the conclusions of the
ad hoc Working Party and called on the Commission to sub-
mit, as soon as possible, appropriate proposals for increasing
administrative cooperation between Member States to combat
tax evasion.
1.83. The Commission’s working document on the evolu-
tion of VAT receipts, which has been forwarded to the Court,
concluded that there is no evidence to suggest that fraud in
intra-Community trade has a tangible impact on VAT receipts.
However, anomalies have been found for a fewMember States.
This could indicate that they have problems in collecting VAT.
However, an analysis of trends in VAT receipts is bound to be
based on approximate estimates and therefore caution must be
exercised in the interpretation of the figures. The Commission
will further examine these anomalies in the framework of the
VAT own resource controls.
(52) Paragraphs 1.19 to 1.26 (OJ C 349, 3.12.1999).
(53) See aforementioned ‘Trend’ document (p. 16).
(54) Established under Article 10 of Regulation (EEC)
No 218/92.
(55) Decision No 888/98/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 30 March 1998 (OJ L 126, 28.4.1998,
p. 1).
(56) Envisaged in Article 4 of Regulation (EEC) No 218/92.
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(d) the Advisory Committee for the Coordination of
Fraud Prevention (Cocolaf) (57);
(e) other general measures to fight fraud within the
single market (5,65 million euro in 2000).
1.85. With regard to fraud, the Commission relies on
the information Member States are prepared to submit
within the Committees. However, the operations of the
SCAC and SCAF Committees are affected by legal and
administrative problems. Nevertheless, Article 10 of
Regulation (EEC) No 218/92 invests the Commission
with responsibility for proposing the necessary mea-
sures, even in the event that the Committees do not
manage to adopt an official position. The situation is
also characterised by other problems, such as the lim-
ited powers of the national representatives and the
doubts expressed by SCAF as to its ability to recom-
mend ‘anything at all’ (58). These difficulties slow down
thedecision-makingprocess andexplain theoften repeti-
tive nature of items on the agenda.
1.86. The Fiscalis programme includes staff exchanges
and training. As the performance criteria were not
clearly defined, it is difficult to evaluate its contribution
to improving administrative cooperation.
1.87. In order to compensate for the abolition of cus-
toms checks and ensure that tax revenue was not lost
when the ‘transitional’ VAT system came into effect in
1993, a computerised system for automatically exchang-
ing information on the value of intra-Community deliv-
eries of goods (VIES) was set up between the national
authorities. In spite of improvements made since the
system was introduced, the problems affecting VIES to
which the Court has already drawn attention (59) have
not yet been resolved, i.e. the slowness of the system,
1.85. Unlike traditional own resources, there is no legal
obligation for Member States to inform the Commission
about fraud in the VAT area (number of cases detected,
amounts involved, etc.).
The Commission agrees that decision-making procedures are
slow in SCAC. This is largely due to the fact that most of the
decisions relating to administrative cooperation and the fight
against fraud must be taken by consensus in non-legally-
binding decisions. The Commission stresses that one of the
objectives of the new proposal for a regulation of the European
Parliament and the Council on administrative cooperation in
the field of VAT (COM(2001) 294 final of 18 June 2001)
is to transform the SCAC into a regulatory committee that
will be able to take decisions on all matters by qualified
majority vote.
1.86. The Fiscalis programme has a range of instruments
to achieve its objectives: seminars, exchanges of officials, multi-
lateral controls, training activities and IT systems. All activi-
ties must have objectives set before approval is given and out-
comes can be measured individually against those objectives.
In addition, as required by the Fiscalis Decision itself, a mid-
term evaluation of the programme has been carried out, tak-
ing full account of reports on the impact of the programme
by Member States.
1.87. The Commission points out, in its First Article 14
report, that the VIES functions technically well. The availabil-
ity of the information depends on the time limits for input
imposed on traders. These time limits are regulated in the
sixth VAT Directive and are therefore not a shortcoming of
the system itself. A shortening of the time limits imposed on
traders is considered disproportionate since it would increase
significantly the administrative burden on business, while it
would not substantially decrease the possibilities of fraud.
(57) Commission Decision 94/149/EC of 23 February 1994
(OJ L 61, 4.3.1994, p. 27).
(58) See SCAF No 220 of 28 September 1999, paragraph 8,
on the subcommittee’s doubts concerning making rec-
ommendations to SCAC.
(59) Special Report No 9/98, paragraphs 3.10 and 3.11 and
3.18 to 3.21.
15.12.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 45
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS COMMISSION’S REPLIES
the inability to stop large-scale fraud in time and the
failure to include certain activities (such as services, the
purchase of new means of transport by persons not
identified for VAT purposes and distance sales).
Insufficiencies in the legal armoury
1.88. At national level, the exchange of relevant infor-
mation within the Community for anti-fraud purposes
is often hampered by the Member States’ legislation on
the protection of personal data. However, Community
legislation (60) authorises the Member States to limit the
rights of individuals, in particular in cases of criminal
proceedings and the protection of the financial interest
of the Member State or of the European Union in the
area of taxation (61). Furthermore, with regard to fight-
ing fraud, other shortcomings were identified by the
Council’s ad hoc group set up in 1999 (62).
1.89. At Community level, the Convention on the
Protection of the European Communities’ Financial
Interests, interpreted in the light of the report explain-
ing this convention, does not include VAT as it is not an
own resource collected directly on behalf of the Com-
munities. The same is true of Regulation (EC, Euratom)
No 2988/95 (63), concerning the same area. Any
As concerns the possibilities of using VIES information to
detect some specific types of fraud in time, the Commission
believes that additional means of control are needed in order
to stop such types of fraud and that risk analysis both at the
stage of registration and at repayment as well as more rapid
and direct administrative cooperation are essential tools which
could be used. The new proposal for a regulation of the Euro-
pean parliament and of the Council on administrative coop-
eration in the field of value added tax (COM(2001) 294
final) will offer new possibilities for quick exchange of infor-
mation.
The Commission intends to intensify the exchange of infor-
mation between Member States to overcome the present short-
comings of the system. The new proposal on administrative
cooperation in the field of VAT envisages (outside the VIES
system) also in this area increased possibilities of exchanging
information.
1.88. The Commission services are aware of the problems
raised by the Court relating to the exchange and the process-
ing of personal data They take the view that Member States
should make use of Article 13 of Directive 95/46/EC on the
protection of individuals with regard to the processing of per-
sonal data and on the free movement of such data, which pro-
vides for measures to safeguard the financial interests of the
Member States. This problem, as well as the all other legal
obstacles identified by the Council’s ad hoc group on tax
fraud, are dealt with in the new proposal for a regulation on
administrative cooperation in the field of VAT.
(60) Directive 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 (OJ L 281,
23.11.1995, p. 31).
(61) Article 13(1)(d) and (e) of the aforementioned Directive.
(62) For example, obstacles to officials from other Member
States’ tax authorities being present.
(63) OJ L 312, 23.12.1995, p. 1.
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measure to make the fight against fraud more effective,
including the adoption of a common definition, is likely
to be financially beneficial for the Community budget.
1.90. When OLAF was set up in 1999, the Commis-
sion was aware of the lack of an adequate legal basis
and of certain Member States’ reluctance to recognise
the legitimacy of any UCLAF operational measure to
combat VAT fraud (64) at Community level. However, a
more specific and adequate legal basis was not pro-
posed at the time. Recently, the Commission stated that
‘another element likely to increase the risk of fraud is
the absence of a clear legal basis for international coor-
dination of VAT investigations by OLAF/Com-
mission’ (65).
Conclusions and recommendations
1.91. The Member States have sole responsibility for
managing VAT, but the Commission is responsible for
facilitating and coordinating the measures undertaken
in the Member States. The Court considers that the
Commission does not make enough use of the informa-
tion at its disposal and of the room for manoeuvre it
enjoys to improve administrative cooperation and sys-
tematically monitor the operations and performance of
the national systems.
1.92. In view of the above, the Court wishes to make
the following recommendations:
(a) the Commission should adopt an integrated
approach tomonitoring national VAT systemswhich
also deals with recovery and fraud problems;
1.90. In order to improve Community-wide cooperation
and information exchange in fields susceptible to cross-border
fraud, the Commission included in its work programme 2001
the task of framing a proposal for a directive of the European
Parliament and of the Council establishing a system for coop-
eration between the Member States’ authorities and the Com-
mission with a view to protecting the financial interests of the
Communities against illegal activities, including VAT-related
activities and money laundering.
1.91. Member States bear primary responsibility for VAT
control. However, the present Community legal framework for
administrative cooperation in the field of VAT does not offer
the Commission a coordination function. Regulation (EEC)
No 218/92 (VIES) and Directive 77/799/EEC provide a
framework for the system of exchange of information among
Member States, but not for exchange of information between
the Member States and the Commission. The role of the Com-
mission is limited to evaluating the functioning of the arrange-
ments and to offering Member States the facility to pool ex-
periences. Moreover, Article 12 of Regulation (EEC, Euratom)
No 1553/89 does not confer on the Commission a task of
facilitating or coordinating VAT control. The Commission
has neither the requirement nor the resources to undertake
more in this area.
1.92.
(a) The Commission notes this recommendation;
(64) See the Commission’s reply to Special Report No 9/98,
paragraph 3.39.
(65) See the Commission’s reply to the Court’s 1999 Annual
Report, paragraph 1.59 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000).
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(b) the Commission’s reports must focus more on its
monitoring of the performance and development of
national control systems;
(c) the institutional mechanisms introduced by way of
administrative cooperation should be reviewed.
Their aims must be clarified and their procedures
improved. The Commission should demonstrate the
utility of its programmeswithin the national authori-
ties. It should also highlight the effects of its actions
on exchanges of information between Member
States;
(d) the draft new legal base consolidating the current
instruments for administrative cooperation and
mutual assistance should enable the difficulties
described to be overcome and clarify the respective
responsibilities of the Member States and the Com-
mission. Legal problems, such as the protection of
personal data, affecting the exchange of informa-
tion between Member States and between Member
States and the Commission must be resolved.
Overall conclusion
1.93. The checks and systems analysis carried out for
traditional own resources gave satisfactory overall results
concerning the reliability of the accounts and the legal-
ity and regularity of the underlying transactions entered
in the accounts of the Member States. The errors found
during examinations of transactions and systems did
not materially affect the accuracy of the revenue in the
revenue and expenditure account, and the Court there-
fore concludes that the amounts shown are correctly
stated and refer to legally and regularly collected duties.
Nevertheless, particular problems concerning the main-
tenance of B accounts remain to be resolved (para-
graphs 1.17 to 1.19).
(b) The Commission takes an increasing interest in this ques-
tion. For example, the references in the Court’s annual
report for 1999 to studies carried out in two Member
States on the use of statistical methods to detect sectors
at risk is the subject of continuing discussions between
the Commission and the Member States;
(c) The new Commission’s proposal for a regulation of the
European Parliament and of the Council on administra-
tive cooperation in the field of value added tax revises the
functioning of the current arrangements. As regards the
Fiscalis programme, the Commission fully agrees with
the Court on the importance of being able to assess the
impact of the programme tools. That is why the Com-
mission has just carried out an evaluation exercise which
concludes that the programme was a good instrument to
achieve a better cooperation between tax administrations;
(d) To strengthen administrative cooperation in the field of
VAT, the Commission adopted, on 18 June 2001, a pro-
posal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of
the Council on administrative cooperation in the field of
value added tax. This proposal establishes a single legal
framework which sets out clear and binding rules govern-
ing cooperation between Member States. The framework
provides for more direct contacts between services with a
view to making cooperation more efficient and faster. It
will also facilitate more intensive and swifter exchanges
of information between tax administrations for the pur-
pose of combating fraud more effectively.
1.93. The Commission is concerned about the structural
deficiencies in the separate accounts system and is continuing
to explore those avenues that might improve the overall per-
formance.
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1.94. Regarding VAT and GNP, the Court obtained a
reasonable assurance that the resources were correctly
assessed and collected. However controls over data integ-
rity in the Commission’s computer accounting system
still need to be improved. The Court underlines that like
all taxation schemes, customs duties and VAT are
exposed to evasion (paragraphs 1.53 to 1.68 and 1.75
to 1.92).
FOLLOW-UP TO PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS
Traditional own resources
1.95. Most of the observations, forwhich the follow-up
is detailed below, were covered in the Council’s recom-
mendations on the Discharge and in the European Par-
liament’s resolutions (66).
Annual Report concerning the financial year 1998
1.96. In its Annual Report concerning the financial
year 1998, the Court noted that the separate accounts
kept by the Member States contained significant errors.
As it stated in its reply, the Commission concentrated
its checks on the Member States’ separate accounts. In
addition, it initiated two cases of infringement proceed-
ings against Germany, one of which it had announced
in its reply to the Court’s observations. Measures poten-
tially leading to similar proceedings were also under-
taken in the course of 2000 so as to ensure that Austria,
Belgium and Denmark modified accounting practices
regarded as not complying with Community legislation.
Securities and guarantees provided for in the Commu-
nity CustomsCode to protect the collection of traditional
own resources (Special Report No 8/99)
Postponement of payment of duties, temporary importation
of goods and incomplete declarations
1.97. The Court noted a number of anomalies in respect
of specific legislative situations. The anomalies
(66) In particular, the European Parliament’s Resolution of
16 January 2001 concerning the Court of Auditors’
Special Report No 8/99.
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essentially concerned inadequate monitoring of adher-
ence to the applicable provisions when goods were
released for free circulation under a simplified declara-
tion procedure, insufficient monitoring of guarantees
provided when goods were imported temporarily and
the failure to observe deadlines for rectifying incom-
plete declarations.
1.98. The Commission, in particular by means of its
own checks, took account of the Court’s observations
so as to ensure that the Member States corrected the
anomalies observed. It reminded the Member States, in
the context of the Advisory Committee on Own
Resources, of the requirements of the Community Cus-
toms Code with respect to guarantees where payments
are postponed.
Transit
1.99. The Court noted several anomalies in the imple-
mentation of the rules governing the monitoring of
overall guarantees, the granting of exemptions from
guarantees and requests for securities under the transit
system. The Commission asked the Member States for
the information and clarification required to determine
the potential financial consequences of the anomalies
observed. It also asked them, in a communication to the
Advisory Committee on Own Resources, to ensure that
Community rules on the establishment, evaluation and
annual appraisal of the value of the overall guarantee in
the context of Community transit were correctly imple-
mented.
1.100. In its reply to the Court’s observations, the
Commission stated that it had been unable to secure
agreement from the Member States to adjust the provi-
sions concerning the overall guarantee. According to
the Member States, the new computerised transit sys-
tem (NCTS) could be expected to provide a satisfactory
response to guarantee problems. The fact is that a par-
ticular module of the NCTS would make it possible to
monitor the use of each type of guarantee. The legal
provisions governing the introduction and use of such
a system should be adopted in April 2001. The Com-
mission plans to implement the new system in full
towards June 2003.
1.100. Four Member States and three partner states signa-
tory to the Common Transit Convention, which are currently
already implementing the new computerised transit system
(NCTS), are preparing to incorporate new functions into the
system as of 1 December 2001.
Three other Member States and three partner states are pre-
paring to join the system in the first half of 2002 at the
operational level which the first group will have reached by
that time.
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TIR (transport international routier)
1.101. The Court noted that in Germany duties on
imports which took place using TIR carnets and which
were theoretically guaranteed were entered in a separate
account. Consequently, these sums should have been
made available to the Community budget. Thus, in
November 2000 the Commission sent the German
authorities a reasoned opinion pointing out the irregu-
lar nature of this course of action. However, in January
2001 theMember State rejected the Commission’s argu-
ments.
1.102. Furthermore, the Commission undertook mea-
sures to improve the implementation of the TIR agree-
ment which led to the agreement being amended. These
amendments concern the guarantee system and were
adopted by the TIR Convention Management Commit-
tee at its session of 19 October 2000. The amendments
will be sent for approval to signatories by the Secretary-
General of the United Nations and should come into
effect no more than 15 months later.
Appeals
1.103. The Court highlighted cases where the Customs
Code provisions requiring the provision of a guarantee
were implemented incorrectly, in particular when an
administrative appeal is lodged against the customs
authority’s decision. The Commission sought informa-
tion from the Member States as to the nature of the
various situations in question. At the end of 2000, it
submitted to the Advisory Committee on Own
Resources an initial summary report and continued to
examine the information it had obtained.
Making established entitlements covered by a guarantee avail-
able to the Commission
1.104. The special report noted that the approach to
entering customs debts covered by a guarantee in the A
orBaccounts differed fromoneMember State to another.
Similar problemswere noted in the 1998Annual Report
and are subject to appropriate monitoring (see para-
graph 1.96).
Conclusions and recommendations
1.105. The Commission has endeavoured to continue
its examination of the cases brought up by the Court
and to ensure that Member States rectify the anomalies
1.101. The Commission is continuing to pursue this
infringement.
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observed. Even if most of the Court’s observations con-
cern the Member States’ administrative activities, the
Commission remains responsible for implementing
Community legislation in a homogeneous and consis-
tent manner. In this respect, the infringement proceed-
ings which it has initiated are a move in the right direc-
tion. As regards transit, it will be possible to assess the
results of computerisation only once implementation
has commenced.
1.106. The Court urges the Commission to continue to
press the Member States to support a project portrayed
as essential for remedying the most substantial prob-
lems in the transit scheme.
The Commission’s management of the quality of GNP
statistics
The need for transparent control of GNP statistics
1.107. Gross national product (GNP) is the key statistic
in the Community VAT/GNP resources system. In this
context, the Court highlighted in its previous reports
the need for systematic and transparent verification of
the production of GNP statistics, (67) allowing for a reli-
able and auditable framework (68).
1.108. In its recommendation on the Discharge to be
given to the Commission for the financial year 1999,
the Council endorsed the Court’s recommendations
that the Commission take measures to better explain
the way it verifies GNP statistics and to improve the
transparency of this process.
1.109. The latest audit consisted of a review of the
existing quality control systems and standards, an
(67) Special Report No 17/2000 on the Commission’s control
of the reliability and comparability of the Member States’
GNP data, paragraph 82.
(68) Special Report No 6/98 concerning the Court’s assess-
ment of the system of resources based on VAT and GNP,
paragraph 5.11.
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assessment of the management control of two GNP res-
ervations for four Member States (Belgium, Spain, the
Netherlands and Sweden) (69), and a review of the way
users of GNP statistics are informed about their quality.
A sound framework for the management of GNP
statistics
1.110. A mandatory framework defines the basis for
both bilateral and multilateral verification and assess-
ment of GNP statistics:
(a) Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1150/2000
defines the bilateral verification between the Com-
mission and each Member State;
(b) Council Directive 89/130/EEC, Euratom provides
the framework for themultilateral verification based
upon a committee comprising of representatives of
the Member States and chaired by a representative
of the Commission (the GNP Committee).
1.111. In addition, the Commission, in conjunction
with the GNP Committee, provides a sound basis for
the management of GNP quality, by way of Commis-
sion decisions or by proposing guidelines and recom-
mendations (for example: Commission Decision
94/168/EC, Euratom on GNP exhaustiveness and Rec-
ommendations of the GNP Committee on the border-
line between intermediate consumption and final uses).
1.112. Voluntary initiatives are also relevant. The ‘Qual-
istat’ initiative has been introduced by the Commission
in order to improve the quality of statistics, in line with
internationally accepted standards (e.g. ISO norms) and
existing best practices employed by someMember States.
Output and process quality control form part of the ini-
tiative, both of which can be used to ensure a greater
degree of quality and understanding of the production
of GNP statistics.
(69) A reservation is placed by the Commission when, after
examining the inventories of the sources and methods
used by the Member States for producing their GNP, it
detects a significant discrepancy between the Community
norms and the national practices.
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Flexibility of the management framework
1.113. The GNP Committee is adaptable, and has been
able to plan its activities for the coming years taking
into account major changes, for example:
(a) the need for a new directive following the ratifica-
tion of the new own resources Decision (e.g. in order
to implement the change from gross national prod-
uct to gross national income);
(b) the increasing demand for quality issues in the Com-
mission and subsequent involvement in voluntary
initiatives.
Inadequate application of the management framework
1.114. With regard to quality assessment and report-
ing practices, the framework is not systematically used.
The audit showed that documentation of the treatment
of some GNP reservations was not always clearly and
precisely linked to underlying evidence. In some cases,
there was only a general reference to documents and
missions. References to paragraphs within these docu-
ments and mission reports would provide a much bet-
ter tool for purposes of reviewing and auditing. Further-
more, this would facilitate transfer of knowledge in case
of staff changes.
1.115. Because of these shortcomings, the Commis-
sion’s judgement cannot be easily assessed. The lack of
transparency can lead to less efficient verification, and
differences in the treatment between Member States.
The Court’s opinion on the GNP fourth resource man-
agement is stated in Chapter 9 of this report concern-
ing the Statement of Assurance (see paragraph 9.56).
Communication to users is occasionally incomplete
1.116. According to international standards (e.g.
ISO 8402), quality is defined by reference to the perfor-
mance of a product or service in satisfying the needs of
the user. The Court has examined whether these needs
are explicitly formulated by the users (70), and satisfied
by the Commission’s statistical services.
1.114. The Commission is currently improving the presen-
tation of the documentation in its control files and one feature
will be a better cross-referencing between documents.
1.115. The Commission is naturally eager to remedy any
apparent lack of transparency and believes that its services
have made substantial progress in this respect, both in the
course of their own work and in response to previous remarks
by the Court.
(70) The GNP Committee, Commission services in charge of
the revenue management, and the Discharge Authority.
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1.117. The Commission provides the GNP Committee
with documentation, on which it bases its opinion on
the GNP statistics. This opinion is largely founded upon
two documents which present respectively the data and
explanatory information collected every year by the
Commission from each Member State (the ‘GNP ques-
tionnaires’), and also on the reports and analyses pro-
vided by the Commission itself throughout the year.
1.118. However, the contents of the replies to the lat-
est GNP questionnaires have been shown to vary mark-
edly among Member States and there is no clear indica-
tion of any references to previous responses to the
questionnaire. Moreover, the reports and analyses, upon
which the opinion of the GNP Committee is based, are
not evident.
1.119. Occasionally, the information sent to users is
incomplete. For instance, in 2000, the Commission rev-
enue management service misinterpreted information
from the statistical service concerning theGNP resource,
largely due to insufficient explanation of the figures (the
‘meta data’). Consequently Belgium was requested to
contribute a wrong amount.
Conclusions and recommendations
1.120. A sound and adaptable framework for the man-
agement of the GNP quality control is already in place
at Community level. However, in practice, the Commis-
sion does not systematically employ this framework,
which can lead to a lack of transparency in the process
of quality control and can weaken its assessment of the
GNP statistics. Moreover, the communication to users
regarding the quality of GNP statistics is occasionally
incomplete.
1.121. For these reasons, the Court recommends that:
(a) the Commission should systematically apply the
existing norms or guidelines for verification and
reporting purposes;
1.118. The Commission is aware of the Court’s desire that
the opinion of the GNP Committee should refer more explic-
itly to the many individual reports on which the overall opin-
ion is based. The Commission will examine the feasibility of
this proposal in conjunction with the GNP Committee.
1.119. The Commission accepts that an isolated particular
error was made in interpreting the GNP data for Belgium,
leading to a request for overpayment. This error has since been
corrected. The responsible services will in future submit GNP
data to a check specifically intended to ensure that this kind
of situation cannot arise again and that the calculation of the
adjustments to the balances fully coincides with the figures
officially transmitted by Eurostat. The growing importance of
the GNP own resource obliges the Commission to keep under
review the procedures for receiving and verifying the Member
States’ statistical data on which the resource is based.
1.120. The Commission considers it does systematically
apply all the ‘management framework’. Answers to the Court’s
specific comments are given in paragraphs 1.114, 1.115,
1.118 and 1.119. The Commission is putting in place pro-
cedures to ensure greater transparency of its GNP verification
process for users.
1.121.
(a) The norms and guidelines for GNP verification and
reporting purposes have been developed by the Commis-
sion in conjunction with the national accounts experts of
the Member States in the GNP Committee. They have
been, and will be, consistently applied;
15.12.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 55
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS COMMISSION’S REPLIES
(b) the Commission should systematically accompany
figures or technical opinions with relevant supple-
mentary information to users;
(c) the preparation of the new directive, implementing
the change from gross national product to gross
national income, should be the occasion to require
Member States to report periodically on the quality
of their statistics.
(b) The Commission (Eurostat) always endeavours to accom-
pany figures or technical opinions with supplementary
information relevant to users. It should be remembered
however that the needs of users vary: administrators in
the Commission’s Budget services, statisticians in the
GNP Committee, auditors in the Court and so on;
(c) Under current discussions on a future GNP Directive, the
Commission is examining with the GNP Committee the
feasibility and possible content of a periodic report on
quality by the Member States.
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INTRODUCTION
2.1. This chapter concerns the expenditure of the Guar-
antee Section of the European Agricultural Guidance
andGuarantee Fund (EAGGF-Guarantee), and the expen-
diture charged to chapter B2-5 1 (‘Controls and other
operations in the agricultural sector’) (1).
2.2. Almost all of this expenditure is handled by pay-
ing agencies in the Member States. Every month the
Commission advances them an amount based on the
payments declared in the previous month. These pay-
ments are booked monthly to the expenditure accounts,
subject to any corrections that may be necessary when
the accounts are cleared at the end of the financial year.
2.3. This chapter consists of five parts:
(a) the implementation of the budget for the financial
year 2000;
(b) the specific appraisal of agriculture in the context of
the Statement of Assurance for the financial year
2000;
(c) the clearance of the accounts;
(d) the follow-up of previous observations;
(e) principal observations in special reports.
2.4. In addition to the observations contained in this
chapter, the common agricultural policy has been the
subject of special reports and opinions. A list of these
is published in the Annex II.
BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT
The initial budget became the final budget
2.5. For the financial year 2000 the initial appropria-
tions under subsection B1 of the budget for the
(1) The figures given under the heading ‘Implementation of
the budget for the financial year 2000’ (paragraphs 2.5-
2.28) only concern subsection B1 of the budget. With
regard to Chapter B2-5 1, the initial budget in respect of
commitment appropriations amounted to 51,5 million
euro. These appropriations were not amended in the
course of the year and commitments for the financial year
came to 49 million euro (95,1 %).
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EAGGF-Guarantee amounted to 41 469 million euro (2)
(including the monetary reserve (3) of 500 million euro)
(see Table 2.1), i.e. 49 % of the total operating appro-
priations for payment from the budget. This 41 469 mil-
lion euro was equivalent to 99,4 % of the ceiling pro-
vided in the financial perspective (41 738 million euro)
and 89,1 % of the amount in the agricultural guideline
(46 549 million euro).
(2) — Excluding provisional appropriations of 24,9 million
euro.
— Final adoption of the general budget of the European
Union for the financial year 2000 (OJ L 40, 14.2.2000).
(3) The monetary reserve is intended to cover (in respect of
amounts above 200 million euro) adverse changes in the
dollar/euro parity used for budget estimates. Conversely,
any savings above 200 million euro due to a favourable
change in this parity are to be transferred to the monetary
reserve.
Table 2.1 — EAGGF-Guarantee 2000
(Mio EUR)
Financial perspective heading: 1. Subsection B1: EAGGF-Guarantee (1)
Total
heading
Of which:
B1-1 B1-2 B1-3 B1-4 B1-5 B1-6
Vegetable
products
Animal
products
Related
expen-
diture
Rural
development
Accompanying
measures
Monetary
reserve
Financial perspective ceiling 41 738
Budget changes
Initial appropriations (2) 41 494 25 867 9 521 1 501 4 084 21 500
Final appropriations available 41 469 25 909 9 328 1 238 4 184 0 810
Implementation of the budget
Appropriations used (3) 40 437 25 813 9 276 1 172 4 176 0 0
% of final available appropriations 98 100 99 95 100 0 0
Appropriations carried over to 2001 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
% of final available appropriations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Appropriations lapsing 1 062 98 52 94 8 0 810
% of final available appropriations 2 0 1 8 0 0 100
(1) Non-differentiated appropriations.
(2) Including the provisional appropriations (B0-4 0) and the monetary reserve of 500 Mio EUR.
(3) Commitments.
Source: 2000 revenue and expenditure account.
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2.6. The initial appropriations (4) were not amended
by any supplementary and amending budgets during
the financial year. The final appropriations therefore
amounted to 41 469 million euro.
Expenditure amounted to 98,7 % of appropriations
2.7. Expenditure amounted to 40 437 million euro, i.e.
98,7 % of the total appropriations available, excluding
the monetary reserve (see Table 2.1) and 87 % of the
agricultural guideline. Plant products accounted for
63,8 % of expenditure, animal products 22,9 %, ancil-
lary expenditure 3,0 %, and rural development 10,3 %.
Broken down by type, expenditure was divided between
direct aid (70 %), refunds (13,9 %), structural measures
(10,5 %) and intervention measures (3,2 %). Structural
measures, which were essentially linked to rural devel-
opment, showed an upward trend, while direct aid and
intervention measures fell slightly.
Provisional appropriations were cancelled
2.8. The provisional appropriations (24,9 million euro)
initially earmarked for ‘other measures in the veterinary,
animal welfare and public health field’ (4 million euro)
and for ‘support for the management of resources in
support of the common fisheries policy’ (20,9 million
euro) were not used and were therefore cancelled at the
end of the financial year.
310 million euro irregularly transferred to the monetary
reserve
2.9. In view of the change in the dollar/euro parity (5),
surpluses amounting to 510 million euro were entered
under various items. As stipulated in the Regulation on
budgetary discipline (6), savings in excess of 200 million
euro, i.e. 310 million euro, were transferred to the mon-
etary reserve.
(4) SAB no 1 only amended the allocation of appropriations
between B1-4 0 8 and items B1-4 0 8 0 and B1-4 0 8 1.
This SAB, approved on 2 August 2000, was not pub-
lished in the OJ until 17 April 2001.
(5) The budget was drawn up on the basis of a parity of
1 euro = 1,12 US dollars, whereas the average quotation
over the reference period (1.8.1999-31.7.2000)was 1 euro
= 0,99 US dollar.
(6) Council Regulation (EC) No 2040/2000/EC of 26 Sep-
tember 2000 on budgetary discipline, Article 11
(OJ L 244, 29.9.2000, p. 27).
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2.10. However, the time limit stipulated in the Regula-
tion for the proposal for a transfer was not respected.
The Commission forwarded this proposal to the Coun-
cil on 10 January 2001, whereas, according to the Regu-
lation, it should have been forwarded at the end of the
month of October 2000 at the latest. It is clear that,
under the current regulations and with the procedure
followed by the Commission, it will never be possible
for this time limit to be observed.
2.11. In addition, when making the transfer to the
monetary reserve the Commission withdrew most of
the 310 million euro from Chapter B1-3 7, ‘Clearance of
previous years’ accounts and reduction/suspension of
advances’, and not from the items where the savings
had been made (see Table 2.2). The Commission there-
fore waited for the last statements from the Member
States in order to determine under which items appro-
priations were still available. This procedure, which has
already been the subject of a Court observation (7), does
not allow to present to the budgetary authority all the
transfers between chapters that ought to have been sub-
mitted to it.
2.10. Although there would be sufficient overall appropria-
tions to cover the transfer of EUR 310 million to the mon-
etary reserve, the precise location of these availabilities could
only be determined after Member States had transmitted
detailed information on execution by budget line, informa-
tion which did not exist at the time when the report was
established. Once the availability of the necessary funds had
been identified within the individual budget lines of the EAGGF
Guarantee Section, the Commission presented the transfer
proposal to the budgetary authority. This was the procedure
followed by the Commission which, in its view, even if it led
to a delay in the presentation of the transfer proposal, was
consistent with the principles of sound budgetary manage-
ment and avoided unnecessary recourse to other procedures
such as a supplementary and amending budget.
2.11. The Regulation on budgetary discipline does not
require transfers to the monetary reserve to be effected solely
and entirely from those lines where expenditure is influenced
by changes in the euro/dollar parity. In this respect, the second
sentence of Article 11(1) of that Regulation states ‘where the
dollar strengthens against the euro compared with the rate
used in the budget, savings in the Guarantee Section of up
to EUR 500 million in 2000 and 2001 and EUR 250 mil-
lion in 2002 shall be transferred to the monetary reserve’.
Only in the case of the additional budgetary costs engendered
by a fall in the dollar against the euro is it specified that trans-
fers shall be made to those particular headings of the EAGGF
Guarantee Section affected by the fall in the dollar (third sen-
tence of Article 11(1)).
(7) See Annual Report 1998, paragraph 2.28.
Table 2.2 — Transfer to the monetary reserve
Budget chapter Origin of savings Withdrawals actually made
B1-1 0 Arable crops 371 0
B1-1 1 Sugar 48 48
B1-1 3 Cotton 44 0
B1-1 8 Other vegetable sectors (rice) 6 0
B1-3 0 Products outside Annex I 35 0
B1-3 2 Islands and peripheral regions 7 0
B1-3 7 Clearance of former years 0 262
Total 510 310
Source: Transfer of appropriations No 79/2000.
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Significant amounts of revenue entered in the expendi-
ture budget
2.12. According to the principle of universality (8), rev-
enue may not be assigned to particular items of expen-
diture and no offsetting adjustments may be made
between revenue and expenditure. Nevertheless, nega-
tive amounts totalling 3 798,3 million euro (more than
9 % of expenditure) (as against 3 057,7 in 1999 and
2 498 in 1998) (9), are included in EAGGF-Guarantee
expenditure (10). The Court considers, as mentioned in
its Opinion No 1/2001 (11) — given on a proposal for a
regulation amending the Financial Regulation — that
this negative expenditure should be entered in the gen-
eral statement of revenue.
2.13. The overall total for items showing negative bal-
ances was 1 899,4 million euro, whereas the budget
provided for revenue of only 1 220 million (+ 55 %). Of
this 1 899,4 million euro, the balance from previous
financial years accounted for 568 million (29,9 %),
reductions in advance payments for 510 million (26,9 %)
and the additional levies due on account of milk quota
overruns for 161 million (8,5 %) (12).
The Commission has pointed out in previous reports and
transfer proposals concerning the impact of movements in the
dollar exchange rate (for example, in the Report and Transfer
Proposal for 1998—SEC (1998)1893 final of 13.11.1998)
that the savings for each sector need not necessarily result in
identical end-of-year availabilities. Factors other than the dol-
lar exchange rate have a very significant effect on final appro-
priation requirements for the various chapters for any year, for
example, the volume of exports, the level of world prices in
dollars or fluctuations in payments. Indeed the Commission
drew attention to such factors in its reply to point 2.28 of the
Court’s Annual Report for 1998 (OJ C 349, 3.12.1999,
p. 53).
2.12. The Commission considers that negative expenditure
should not be entered in the statement of general receipts.
Instead it considers that these amounts, which are repayments
of amounts which have already been financed by the EAGGF,
should be treated as earmarked revenue to be used by the
EAGGF, as proposed in the recast of the Financial Regula-
tion.
2.13. The difference of EUR680millionbetween the budget-
ed negative expenditure (EUR 1 220 million) and the actual
negative expenditure (EUR 1 899,4 million) is accounted for
principally by higher than expected receipts from sales of goods
stored in public intervention (+EUR 383 million) and higher
than anticipated reductions in the advances (+EUR 410 mil-
lion).
Receipts from such budget items are, by their nature, very dif-
ficult to foresee, depending in the case of sales from public
storage on very fragile market conditions and prices influ-
enced by unforeseeable crises such as BSE and foot-and-mouth
disease. Particularly in the cases of reductions of the advances,
the amounts result from the non-respecting of the legislation
by Member States (non-respect of payment deadlines, absence
of controls) or faults on the part of the operators (fraud,
irregularities, milk levy); these are amounts recovered on
expenditure declared by the Member States and included in
the Community’s budget.
(8) See Articles 4 and 27 of the Financial Regulation.
(9) See Annual Report 1999, paragraph 2.10 and Annual
Report 1998, paragraph 2.11.
(10) 27 budget items (almost 14 % of items) include negative
expenditure.
(11) Opinion No 1/2001 (OJ C 55, 21.2.2001).
(12) This amount of 161 million euro does not include the
additional levy for the financial year 2000 for Italy (245,9
million euro), which was subject to a reduction in the
advance payment (see paragraphs 2.17 and 2.19).
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2.14. Revenue also came from profits made on the
sale of stocks of agricultural products, mainly because
of pessimistic depreciation (corresponding to the differ-
ence between the buying price and the estimated price
on disposal). This revenue amounted to 588 million
euro (13).
2.15. Finally, 72 million euro of the 1 899,4 million
euro concerned 21 budget items against which the total
revenue estimates entered amounted to only 50 million
euro.
2.16. For the Commission, the effect of this general
underestimation of revenue is an increase in the appro-
priations available and therefore a greater flexibility in
the management of the budget.
Substantial reductions in advance payments once again
2.17. One of the main features of the financial year
2000 (as for the 1999 financial year) is the scale of the
reductions in advance payments imposed on various
Member States, due, on the one hand, to weaknesses in
the application of the integrated system and in the
implementation of controls (Greece, 75,2 million euro)
and, on the other, to the absence of the additional levy
payments on milk quota overruns (Greece, 7,5 million
euro; Spain, 6,2 million euro; Italy, 380,6 million euro;
Portugal, 20,6 million euro).
2.14. As indicated in point 2.13, the receipts from sales of
intervention products are influenced by many factors of which
depreciation is but one. In accordance with Regulation (EEC)
No 1883/78, stocks are depreciated at the end of the finan-
cial year to their foreseeable sale prices in order not to transfer
potential losses to succeeding financial years. Higher than
budgeted ‘profits’ on subsequent sales can be the result of
lower than expected purchases into intervention, higher prices
for sales or higher than expected volume sales, which are all
direct results of market changes.
2.15. The 21 items referred to concern recoveries due to
frauds and irregularities which are again by their nature very
difficult to estimate. It would be imprudent to overestimate
such receipts without a minimum of documentary evidence.
2.16. The Commission’s approach is to take a prudent and
rigorous approach to estimating all budgetary requirements.
The underestimates referred to by the Court arose principally
in items dealing with sales from public storage, which are
strongly influenced by changes in market conditions not eas-
ily foreseeable at the time of establishment of the budget, and
reductions in the advances, which are by their nature impos-
sible to forecast.
(13)
Financial year 2000
(Mio EUR)
Outturn Available appropriations
Skimmed-milk powder – 291 – 63
Beef and veal – 95 – 130
Butter and cream – 47 – 12
Olive oil – 16 – 18
Rice – 9 – 6
Cereals – 130 25
– 588 – 204
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2.18. In the case of Italy, the 380,6 million euro con-
cern the marketing year 1999/2000 (245,9 million) and
the marketing year 1998/1999 (134,7 million). The
reduction in the advance payment for the marketing
year 1999/2000 is due to the forwarding of erroneous
data. This situation forced the Commission to include
this amount under the reduction of advance payments
item instead of under the additional levies item, which
constitutes a breach of the principle of specification of
appropriations and leads to a lack of transparency in
the accounts. The reduction of 134,7 million euro in
the advance payment (due to a delay in forwarding the
data for the financial year 1999) was entered in the
accounts for the financial year 2000 and this consti-
tutes a breach of the annuality rule (14).
2.19. The scale of these reductions in advance pay-
ments (509 million euro compared with 464 million in
1999) demonstrates the continuing existence of short-
comings in the systems of the Member States con-
cerned.
Management of the budget marred by too many
transfers of appropriations
2.20. The Court reviewed (15) the financial informa-
tion relating to the management of the budget for the
financial year, presented by the Commission in Vol-
ume I of the revenue and expenditure account for the
financial year 2000.
2.18. The reduction of EUR 245,9 million for Italy in
respect of the marketing year 1999/2000 marketing year
resulted from the fact that Italy, in contravention of the leg-
islation which provides for payment of the amount due by
1 September of the year in question, did not collect or pay over
to the EAGGF the full amount of the supplementary milk levy
due in respect of that marketing year.
In cases where the legislation has not been respected, the Com-
mission proceeds with the recovery of amounts due by way of
reductions of the advances for which a specific budget item has
been provided (B1-3 7 0 1). As highlighted by the Court, the
Commission has no alternative in such a situation.
A revised questionnaire submitted by the Member State after
the end of the financial year 1999 gave rise to an additional
reduction of EUR 134,7 million in respect of the 1998/1999
marketing year. The late transmission of the information
made it impossible to collect this amount in the financial year
1999. However to prevent a repetition of this problem based
on the data transmitted for the financial year 1999/2000,
the Commission based its reduction of EUR 245,9 million
referred to above on an extrapolation of previous years’ data
rather than simply relying on the initial questionnaire pro-
vided by the Member State.
2.19. The main reductions within EUR 509 million con-
cern non-payment of the milk levy (EUR 414,8 million)
involving only four Member States.
(14) See Annual Report 1999, paragraph 2.15.
(15) The Court has reviewed the information presented by the
Commission in Volume I of the revenue and expenditure
account. The purpose of that Volume is to provide a com-
mentary on budgetary management for the year and, in
particular, explanations of variations between the initial
approved budget and the appropriations finally available,
as well as between the appropriations finally available and
those utilised. This review did not seek to provide assur-
ance as to the reliability of its contents. Rather, it sought
to identify any significant variations for which explana-
tions are not provided and to identify any explanations
that might be considered misleading.
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2.21. Volume I does not give a true and fair view of the
execution of the budget for the financial year. For
example:
(a) there are no explanations of the reasons for trans-
fers;
(b) there is no mention of the supplementary and
amending budget;
(c) there are virtually no explanations for the differ-
ences between the budget outturn and the final
budget;
(d) the presentation of figures is inconsistent (figures in
millions sometimes rounded, sometimes retained in
full; difference between outturn and budget some-
times mentioned, sometimes passed over without
comment) and sometimes wrong (16);
(e) lastly, only the rural development chapter is pre-
sented in accordance with the Commission account-
ing officer’s instructions.
2.22. Neither does Volume II give a very accurate view
of the budgetary implementation. For example, expen-
diture that had been correctly charged to headings
B1-4 0 8 0 (Main agriculture-related measures) and
B1-4 0 8 1 (Other measures) were grouped together
under article B1-4 0 8 (Promoting the adaptation and
the development of rural areas), obscuring the separa-
tion of these expenditure items that had been adopted
by SAB No 1.
2.23. During the financial year, 175 out of 218 budget
items were affected by transfers of appropriations. In
all, these movements — i.e. the total amount of the
transfers — came to 8 189 million euro (19,7 % of the
final appropriations), which represents a considerable
increase in comparison with previous financial years
2.23. It would be normal to expect a high level of transfers
in a year which was particularly tight for budget execution
with 98,7 % of the available appropriations utilised. This is
highlighted by the fact that the transfers necessary, including
those for rural development, after receipt of the final monthly
declaration amounted to EUR 4 437,06 million. In addition,
(16) In the clearance of accounts chapter expenditure is men-
tioned, but it is, in fact, revenue, and in the ‘Intervention
in the form of beef storage’ article, there is mention of a
reduction of expenditure, whereas it is, in fact, revenue;
the amount for the initial budget in the ‘Other measures’
chapter is wrong; the expenditure total in the ‘Food aid’
chapter is wrong; some of the totals in the table of changes
in appropriations and expenditure in 2000 are wrong.
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(10,2 % in 1999 and 5,2 % in 1998) (17). The Commis-
sion partly justifies the scale of these transfers with the
erroneous initial allocation of appropriations within the
rural development chapter.
2.24. However, the number of transfers is influenced
by the variable quality of the Member States’ estimates
and monitoring of expenditure. Some transfers were
made in order to cope with additional expenditure
entailed by delays in payments, or in the implementa-
tion of the programmes. For example, item B1-1 2 2 0
(‘Consumption aid and schemes related to the consump-
tion of olive oil’) was the subject of five increases in
appropriations totalling 19,6 million euro for expendi-
ture during the 1997/1998 marketing year and item
B1-1 0 6 2 (‘Five-year set-aside’) was the subject of six
increases totalling 10,6 million euro for expenditure
relating to the period 1988 to 1992. The Commission
must demand more reliable payment estimates by the
Member States, so that it does not continually have to
adjust the appropriations.
2.25. Transfers made purely for reasons of conveni-
ence, such as those already mentioned in the Court’s
Annual Report concerning 1999 (18), increased in vol-
ume in 2000. For example, in the case of 32 budget
items (involving a total of 226,8 million euro (19), com-
pared with 41,6 million euro in 1999 (18)), the with-
drawals carried out had to be offset by means of sub-
sequent replenishments or vice versa.
as mentioned by the Court, 2000 was the first year for the
declaration of expenditure under rural development pro-
grammes and transfers within this chapter alone on 18 bud-
get items accounted for EUR 3 878 million.
2.24. As indicated in the 1999 Annual Report, the Com-
mission has already taken steps by providing in Regulation
(EC) No 1750/1999 for corrections where actual expenditure
differs significantly from forecasts.
The budget items B1-1 0 6 2 and B1-1 2 2 0 concern two
measures which had terminated prior to the financial year
2000 and for which the 2000 budget did not therefore pro-
vide any appropriations. In fact Member States executed pay-
ments more slowly than anticipated and a series of transfers
was necessary in order book the declared expenditure to the
budget. As old measures were involved, it was considered pru-
dent only to request transfers to deal with expenditure effec-
tively realised instead of basing the requests onMember States’
forecasts.
2.25. In effect, in order to be able to book expenditure to
the budget on a monthly basis, rather than leaving it sus-
pended, it is sometimes necessary to carry out transfers of
appropriations, and afterwards to re-establish the original
situation. Such movements can be necessary due to the nature
of the line, as for example in the case of budget lines dealing
with ‘Other costs of public storage’ where losses may occur
during a certain period which later, due to market move-
ments, are transformed into profits (see point 2.26) or because
of accounting adjustments carried out by Member States. For
example, in the case of budget item B1-1 0 5 1, which was
reinforced during the year, excess appropriations existed at the
end of the financial year because one Member State moved
EUR 19,4 million of expenditure from this item to other
items in the final monthly declaration of expenditure.
(17) See Annual Report 1999, paragraph 2.6, and Annual
Report 1998, paragraph 2.4.
(18) See Annual Report 1999, paragraph 2.21.
(19) The following items were affected by withdrawals or
increases that were subsequently offset by movements in
the contrary direction: B1-1 0 0 0, 1 0 0 1, 1 0 1 3,
1 0 1 4, 1 0 4 0, 1 0 4 1, 1 0 4 3, 1 0 5 0, 1 0 5 1, 1 0 5 2,
1 0 5 4, 1 0 5 5, 1 0 6 0, 1 2 3 0, 1 5 0 2, 1 5 1 5, 1 6 1 1,
1 6 2 2, 1 6 2 3, 1 7 1 0, 1 7 5 0, 1 8 0 0, 1 8 5 1,1 8 5 4,
2 0 2 4, 2 0 3 4, 2 1 2 5, 2 1 2 9, 3 0 1 2, 3 0 1 3, 3 0 1 9,
3 9 9 0.
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2.26. Other movements of appropriations also reveal
shortcomings in the monitoring of appropriations. In
the case of ‘other public storage costs for cereals’, the
initial budget of 25 million euro was first increased by
13 million euro, then subjected to six withdrawals for a
total of 166,1 million euro, ending with a (negative) bal-
ance of final appropriations of – 128,1 million euro.
The Commission should endeavour to tighten up on
the management of transfers.
AGREX computer system will be modified
2.27. In its Annual Reports concerning the financial
years 1997, 1998 and 1999 (20), the Court criticised the
lack of progress in replacing the computer system used
for the management of agricultural expenditure
(AGREX). In 2000 the Commission began the introduc-
tion of a new system which is due to become opera-
tional in 2002.
Conclusion
2.28. Expenditure under subsection B1 amounted to
40 437 million euro, i.e. 98,7 % of final appropriations
(see paragraph 2.7). The budget management for 2000
was once again characterised by a high number of
transfers (8 189 million euro, i.e. more than 19 % of ini-
tial appropriations) (see paragraph 2.23) and by the
inclusion of significant sums of revenue or negative
expenditure (3 798 million euro, or more than 9 % of
expenditure) (see paragraph 2.12). Transfers and the
amount of negative expenditure both increased consid-
erably compared with 1999 (they doubled and qua-
drupled, respectively). The large volume of these trans-
fers certainly made for a high rate of utilisation of most
of the budget headings, but it also reflects the variations
in the quality of the estimates both of revenue (see para-
graphs 2.12 to 2.16) and of expenditure (see para-
graphs 2.23 to 2.26). The Commission should therefore
2.26. It is very difficult to forecast the outcome of budget
lines which cover the ‘profits or losses’ on the sale of interven-
tion goods such as the one cited by the Court, dependent as
they are on fragile market conditions and price movements.
For the budget line in question, effective expenditure at
31 January 2000 stood at EUR 41 million, necessitating a
reinforcement of EUR 16 million compared to the original
budget in order to book the expenditure to the budget. How-
ever, taking into account a profit forecast by the Member
States of EUR 3,5 million, the reinforcement requested was
limited to EUR 13 million.
Subsequent improvements in market conditions/sales resulted
in higher than expected receipts (see comments under point
2.14).
2.28. The increase in the level of transfers was due to a
number of factors, including the presence of rural development
expenditure for the first time (see point 2.23) and changing
markets for products in public storage (see point 2.25) and it
was necessary to ensure a very high level of budgetary execu-
tion (98.7 %). High receipts from the clearance of accounts
procedure, reductions of the advances and sales from public
stocks contributed to the increase in negative expenditure.
Particularly good market conditions for cereals, skimmed milk
powder and butter were also responsible for a certain varia-
tion in the estimates of receipts and expenditure for these
products.
The Commission is conscious of the need to improve the qual-
ity of forecasts and has already provided for corrections in the
(20) Annual Report 1997, paragraphs 2.24-2.25, Annual
Report 1998, paragraphs 2.33-2.34, and Annual Report
1999, paragraph 2.23.
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make an effort to improve the quality of these estimates
(in cooperation with the Member States) and to review
certain budgetary management procedures (see para-
graphs 2.23 to 2.26). Finally, concerning negative expen-
diture (see paragraphs 2.12 to 2.16) the practice must
be reviewed (in particular in the context of the current
revision of the Financial Regulation), as recommended
by the Court in its Opinion No 1/2001.
SPECIFIC APPRAISAL IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE
Examination of a representative sample of transactions
2.29. The payments relating to the 2000 appropria-
tions of subsection B1 of the budget (40 437 million
euro, see Table 2.1) were subjected, for the Statement of
Assurance, to a sample survey covering both the reli-
ability of the accounts and the legality and the regular-
ity of the underlying transactions. Each transaction
selected was examined (21) on the premises of the pay-
ing agency, the competent local authority and the final
beneficiary.
2.30. The Court’s comments on the reliability of the
accounts have been grouped together in Chapter 9 (see
paragraphs 9.8 and 9.24). The comments on the legal-
ity and the regularity of the underlying transactions are
set out and described below.
Substantive errors
2.31. The Court examined the whole range of agricul-
tural expenditure (66 % of which is under the integrated
administration and control system (IACS)). The audit
covered all aspects of the operations from the Commis-
sion’s payments through the paying agencies in the
Member States up to the final beneficiaries (in most
cases farmers). Substantive errors are errors which affect
the value of the selected transaction. The audits did not
provide evidence of improvement in the situation previ-
ously remarked on.
area of rural development where actual expenditure diverges
significantly from the forecasts of Member States.
In the matter of negative expenditure the Commission re-
affirms its proposal in the recast Financial Regulation that
such amounts should in future be treated as earmarked rev-
enue (see point 2.12).
2.31. The Commission does not agree with the Court’s view
that certain types of error are substantive where it considers
that the Community rules have been followed. The Commis-
sion does not consider that any of these cases was irregular in
any way.
In several other cases, the Commission will request clarifica-
tions from the Member States to establish more precisely the
irregular nature of the operations in question.
(21) With a view to verifying the reality of the transaction, its
conformity with the eligibility criteria and other regula-
tory requirements, as well as the accuracy of the amount
of the aid and its entry in the accounts.
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Errors at final beneficiary level
2.32. In the case of the errors linked to the common
market organisations (90 % of the expenditure), most of
these errors were at the level of the final beneficiary and
concerned for the most part overstatements either of
area (oftenminor overstatements) as regards plant prod-
ucts (about one error in two), or of the number of head
of stock for the animal premiums (about one error in
five).
2.33. Area overstatements concern numerous Mem-
ber States (Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy,
Sweden, United Kingdom). In contrast, overstatements
of animals primarily affect two Member States (Italy
and United Kingdom).
2.34. Other errors come from incorrect application of
the regulations, such as when the final use of a subsi-
dised product is not respected (pastry-cooks’ butter,
Spain), or when dispatches to secondary warehouses
are regarded as external deliveries (aid for dried fodder,
France).
2.35. As regards rural development (10 %of the expen-
diture), most of the errors are at the final beneficiary
level. All these errors concern agri-environmental mea-
sures and derive either from an area over-declaration or
from non-observance of the provisions of the regula-
tions.
In the case of another group of types of errors which the Court
considers substantive, the amounts involved are often minor,
even though the Court regards some of these operations as
totally incorrect. For obvious reasons of cost-effectiveness, no
action is taken on these small amounts. The Commission is
aware that certain errors and financial corrections are made
during the clearance of accounts procedure.
The Commission does not therefore totally agree with the
Court about these errors.
However, the Commission would stress that it takes due note
of all the Court’s comments and where necessary will make the
corrections required during the clearance of accounts proce-
dure, as and when it obtains the relevant information from
the Member States concerned.
2.32. The Commission agrees with the Court that the
amounts in question are minor, even where the Court has
attributed a high percentage of errors to these operations.
2.33. In absolute terms, these over-declarations of areas
and animals often concern small amounts.
2.34. An investigation will be made into the case of pastry-
cooks’ butter in Spain to determine whether it is systematic in
nature; if appropriate, it will be dealt with under the clear-
ance of accounts procedure.
In the case of aid for dried fodder (France), the Commission
does not accept the Court’s legal interpretation of the rules
and does not accept that errors occurred.
2.35. A certain number of cases concerning rural develop-
ment are still under consideration awaiting a response from
the Member States.
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Systematic management errors
2.36. Some of the errors found prove on examination
to be systematic. They affect the whole range of transac-
tions of a particular type managed by an intermediate
body. The principal type of systematic error observed
concerns unwarranted deductions from aid payments.
2.37. Greece again deducted (22) a contribution of 3 %
for the ELGA (compulsory agricultural insurance fund)
from all aid granted for citrus fruits, cotton (23), olive oil
and tobacco. Altogether, this contribution represented
almost 64 million euro. For olive oil there is also a sec-
ond deduction — equivalent to 1 % of the aid paid —
for the national confederation of producers (i.e. approxi-
mately 8 million euro).
2.38. In Italy three national confederations (24) deduct
a contribution from payments to their members, on
behalf of the local organisations of producers. For one
of the three confederations alone these contributions
accounted for almost 4 million euro.
2.39. Finally, in Sweden, as in the previous year (25),
the cost of land surveys carried out had to be paid by
the farmers before any aid application was submitted.
This practice, which is the equivalent of a deduction
from the amount of aid, enabled the Member State to
recover approximately 3,6 million euro. It should be
noted, however, that this practice was terminated with
effect from the marketing year 2000.
2.40. In addition to these national levies, there were
other levies that were charged on a local scale by pro-
ducer associations and cooperatives. For example:
— arable crops (2 %, Greece),
— olive oil (1 % + a standard charge, Greece),
— fruit and vegetables (1 %, Greece) and flat-rate reten-
tion per hectare (Spain),
— tobacco (3,5 % Germany, 2,63 % Greece).
2.36. The Commission is already aware of the errors con-
cerning unwarranted deductions which stem from the practices
of the Member States and has notified them to the Member
States under the clearance of accounts procedures.
2.37. The Commission is aware of the situation in Greece
and is taking action.
2.38. The Commission is aware of the situation in Italy
and is taking action.
2.39. As regards Sweden, the rules have always forbidden
deductions to meet the cost of land surveys of cropland. The
Swedish authorities have abandoned this practice. The Com-
mission will make an appropriate financial correction.
2.40. As regards Greece, a correction has been made since
1994 through the clearance of accounts. The Commission
does not consider that the rules forbid such deductions in the
case of fruits and vegetables. Action will be taken on the cases
of Germany and Spain.
(22) Annual Report 1999, paragraph 2.29.
(23) In the case of aid for cotton, the contribution is deducted
by the mills and then paid to ELGA.
(24) CNO, Unasco and Unaprol.
(25) Annual Report 1999, paragraph 2.30.
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2.41. These practices are compatible neither with the
Community regulations, which stipulate that aid —
apart from deductions for which there is express provi-
sion — must be paid to the recipient in full, nor with
the more general principle of equal treatment of all
farmers in the Union.
Other management errors
2.42. The other substantive errors at the level of local
management, i.e. the administration of aid for a given
region, account for approximately one substantive error
in every ten. For example, compensatory aidwas granted
on a volume of products higher than the volume per-
mitted by the regulation (citrus fruitwithdrawal, Greece).
2.43. The substantive errors at the level of central
management, i.e. the administration of aid for the whole
of a Member State’s territory, account for approximately
one substantive error in every four. For example, the
Spanish authorities omitted to deduct from the advances
paid a sum that they should have deducted, the deduc-
tion being deferred to the payment of the balance and
therefore to another financial year (production aid for
table olives) (26). Similarly, France has not yet applied to
a forwarding agent the regulatory penalties for a delay
in delivery (food aid for Russia in November 1999).
2.44. Lastly, other errors come from calculation errors
(use of an erroneous exchange rate as regards animal
premiums, United Kingdom) or from mistakes of inter-
pretation of the regulations (non-application of the
reductions relating to quantities notmarketed as regards
aid for bananas, France) (27).
Formal errors
2.45. Formal errors do not affect the amount of the
transactions examined. They concern the non-
observance of a regulatory provision, but the non-
2.41. Apart from the comments by the Commission on
these points, constant vigilance is maintained on non-
compliance with the rules.
2.42. As regards the withdrawal of citrus fruit in Greece,
the Commission does not consider that the rules forbid this
practice.
2.43. In the case of Spain, the deduction was applied to the
balance.
In the case of France, the Commission will take appropriate
action.
2.44. The incorrect exchange rate in the United Kingdom
will be considered in the light of the response from the Mem-
ber State. In this case, as in that concerning non-application
of the reductions relating to quantities not marketed as regards
aid for bananas in France, action will be taken through the
clearance of accounts.
2.45. Where a formal error affects a provision concerning
checks, the Commission applies the guidelines on flat-rate
corrections in the clearance of accounts.
(26) The national implementing circular has since been
amended and provides for deduction from the advance.
(27) The aid must be given for fruit actually marketed.
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observance does not have any direct consequence as
regards the value of the transaction. However, such an
infringement of the regulations, in particular when it
concerns a provision concerning controls, can have sig-
nificant consequences, since it may even make it impos-
sible to check the legality and the regularity of certain
transactions.
2.46. The frequency of the errors discovered by the
Court (disregarding multiple errors affecting the same
transaction) is still high and most of them are at the
level of the central or local management in the Member
States.
Checks carried out by the Commission
2.47. With regard to the management of payments by
the Commission, the Court’s analysis of the monthly
payment orders showed that, for eight months out of
twelve (corresponding to a total of 33 286 million euro,
i.e. 82,4 % of payments), the payment orders had been
initialled after the regulatory deadlines. The extreme
example is that of a commitment of December 1999
(6 924million euro) that was recorded on 30May 2000,
whereas the deadline was fixed by the regulations at 20
March. A similar observation was made for 1998 and
1999 (28).
Checks carried out by the Member States
2.48. In 1999 and 2000 the Court examined the extent
to which IACS was implemented in 1998 at the Com-
mission and in six Member States (Germany, Spain,
France, Ireland, Portugal and United Kingdom). The
examination concerned, in particular, area aid schemes
and beef and veal premiums. The Court’s observations
were set out in a special report (29). Although the final
deadline for full implementation of IACS was 1 January
1997, persistent weaknesses were found in the Member
States visited during the Court’s audit. These mainly
concerned insufficient cross-checks of surface areas and
animals, some incomplete and out-of-date databases
and poor quality field inspections. Moreover, practices
in the Member States differed, although the Commis-
sion issued a number of interpretations and recommen-
dations of the complicated regulations. The Commis-
sion needed to continue its efforts to improve the quality
of the information it requested and received from the
Member States and to evaluate and use that information
to improve its management of their implementation of
IACS.
2.47. While recognising that progress remains to be made,
the Commission notes that the situation with regard to the
time allowed for payment orders to be initialled has improved.
Since August 2000, only two delays have been encountered,
of one and five days respectively.
2.48. See the Commission’s response to point 2.66.
(28) Annual Report 1999, paragraph 2.33.
Annual Report 1998, paragraph 2.49.
(29) Special Report No 4/2001 (OJ C 214, 31.7.2001).
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2.49. The substantive, systematic and formal errors
mentioned in this chapter demonstrate the persistence
of these weaknesses in the systems in many Member
States. The Court’s audit thus highlighted a number of
shortcomings:
(a) as regards the data needed for carrying out admin-
istrative checks:
(i) IACS computer files for animal premiums (France
and United Kingdom), cereals and cotton (Greece)
and olive oil register (olive oil, Italy) had not been
updated;
(ii) olive oil register incomplete (olive oil, Greece);
(iii) land register lacked reliability (aid for process-
ing citrus fruit and citrus fruit withdrawal,
Greece);
(iv) shortcomings and inconsistencies in documents
held either by producer organisations (citrus
fruit withdrawal, Greece, and dried fodder,
France) or by producers (Germany, France, Ire-
land, Netherlands and United Kingdom);
(b) as regards the actual conduct of the administrative
checks:
(i) absence of systematic verification of eligibility by
local management organisations (arable crops,
UnitedKingdom), orproducerorganisations (olive
oil, Spain; aid for citrus fruit processing, Greece);
(ii) inadequacy of certain cross-checks (between
stocks as shown in accounts and actual stock:
starch, France) between the application, land reg-
istry data and databases (cotton and citrus fruit
processing, Greece, and tobacco premium, Ger-
many);
2.49. The Commission acknowledges certain systemic weak-
nesses in some Member States but cannot agree with the
Court about their persistence. It is aware of these weaknesses,
or they are subject to flat-rate one-off financial corrections or
urgent recommendations are made to introduce the improve-
ments desired.
(a) as regards the data needed for carrying out administra-
tive checks:
(i) in the absence of reliable alternative checks, flat-rate
corrections are made;
(ii) Greek olive oil register: corrections have already been
made through the clearance of accounts;
(iii) lack of a reliable land register: corrections have already
been made;
(iv) shortcomings and inconsistencies in documents: cor-
rections will be made in proven cases;
(b) as regards the conduct of the administrative checks:
(i) the absence of systematic verification is penalised
through the clearance of accounts;
(ii) the inadequacy of certain cross-checks is verified and
conclusions drawn through the clearance of accounts.
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(c) as regards the execution of on-the-spot checks:
(i) non-respect of the minimum level of checks for
cotton (Greece), olive oil (Portugal), animal pre-
miums and fruit and vegetable withdrawal
(France) and public storage (free distribution,
France) and citrus fruit processing (Italy);
(ii) non-compliance with annual rotation of applica-
tions to be checked (olive oil, Spain) (30);
(iii) non-compliance as regards the random nature
of the checks (animal premium, United King-
dom);
(iv) non-compliance as regards completeness ofmea-
sures for olive oil (Portugal) or non-compliance
as regards tests on butter (France).
Conclusion
2.50. The audits did not provide evidence of improve-
ment in the situation remarked on previously. This con-
cerns the substantive errors (representing amounts
wrongly paid) (see paragraphs 2.31 to 2.44) and the
IACS measures in particular. In addition, formal errors
remain frequent (see paragraphs 2.45 to 2.49) and sig-
nificant.
2.51. All these errors highlight certain inadequacies in
some of the essential aspects of IACS (see para-
graphs 2.48 and 2.49). That ought to encourage the
Commission and the Member States to review and
improve the way in which IACS operates.
2.52. Finally, the Commission should consider the
question of unwarranted deductions at national level
from the aid paid to producers (see paragraphs 2.36 to
2.41) and should endeavour to find a final solution to
this problem, in the light of Council Regulation (EC)
No 1259/1999 (31) in particular.
(c) as regards the execution of on-the-spot checks, this is the
main cause of corrections through the clearance of accounts.
2.50. As it stated in point 2.31, the Commission does not
agree with the Court that a large number of substantive errors
have been detected. In fact it does not believe that the number
of errors has grown considerably.
2.51. The Commission has noted the Court’s invitation to
review and improve the operation of the IACS and will con-
tinue its efforts in this direction.
2.52. Regulation (EC) No 1259/1999 deals with much of
the question concerning unwarranted deductions from the aid
paid to producers since it requires payments to be made to the
beneficiaries in full. The other sectors are covered by their mar-
ket regulations. In the cotton and fruits and vegetables (with-
drawals) sectors, the Commission considers that the rules do
not forbid such deductions in 2000.
(30) At least two thirds of the checks must relate to applica-
tions that were not checked in the previous two years.
(31) Article 2 states that payments are to be made to benefi-
ciaries in full (OJ L 160, 26.6.1999, p. 113).
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CLEARANCE OF ACCOUNTS
Introduction
2.53. The Commission must take a financial clearance
decision no later than 30 April each year. The financial
decision shall cover the integrality, exactitude and verac-
ity of the accounts submitted for the preceding EAGGF
year. The Commissionmay also decide to exclude expen-
diture from Community financing because it does not
comply with Community rules. Such conformity (also
known as compliance) decisions are not subject to any
deadline and cover a number of years but the correc-
tions can only be applied retrospectively for a maxi-
mum of two years preceding written notification to the
Member State concerned.
2.54. In the course of 2000, the Commission took two
conformity decisions (fourth and fifth) to exclude expen-
diture from Community financing in respect of the
period 1996 to 1998 (32). The financial decision refer-
ring to 2000 was taken in May 2001 (33). These deci-
sions have been audited by the Court.
Conformity decisions
Corrections
2.55. The Commission has recourse to flat-rate cor-
rections only in cases where the actual financial impact
of systems weaknesses (one-off corrections) cannot be
established. The rate applied depends on the severity of
the failure of controls (see Table 2.3) although there is
an element of judgement involved. In practice, one-off
corrections are relatively low in value, for example, less
than 5 % of the total corrections under the fourth con-
formity decision. One-off corrections are typicallymade
for accounting-related ‘errors’ — payments after the
2.55. As mentioned by the Court, there is often an element
of judgement involved when establishing financial flat-rate
corrections. The table established by the Court (see
Table 2.3) is therefore in itself not enough to judge the level
of the proposed financial corrections. The guidelines for the
calculation of financial corrections are laid down in working
document VI/5330/97, which needs to be taken into consid-
eration in its entirety. Likewise under the heading ‘Further
consideration of the real financial losses’ (page 13 of the
guidelines), it is explained that the correction resulting from
(32) Commission Decision 2000/216/EC of 1 March 2000
(OJ L 67, 15.3.2000, p. 37) and Commission Decision
2000/449/EC of 5 July 2000 (OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 49).
(33) Commission Decision 2001/474/EC of 8 May 2001
(OJ L 167, 22.6.2001, p. 27).
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deadlines specified in the regulations, advance pay-
ments not followed by settlements, overclaims, failure
to respect ceilings, etc. Flat-rate corrections apply to
more general systems weaknesses that cannot be pre-
cisely quantified and are thus more controversial and
are often contested during conciliation. In several cases
the Court does not agree with the level of flat-rate cor-
rection applied. The following paragraphs explain why.
2.56. Table 2.4 shows the distribution of expenditure
excluded from Community financing per financial year.
In 2000, a total amount of 579,7 million euro (229,2
+ 350,5 million euro, fourth and fifth conformity deci-
sions respectively) was excluded, mainly for the finan-
cial years 1996 to 1998. The corrections principally
cover arable crops, animal premiums and the quality of
physical checksofproducts qualifying for export refunds.
2.57. It is still too early to compare the financial years
1996 to 1998 with the period preceding the reform of
the clearance of accounts procedure, as the Commis-
sion has taken further decisions in 2001 affecting the
financial years concerned.
Weaknesses in the procedure
Delays in notification of findings
2.58. The Court has previously noted delays in the
Commission’s issue of mission reports and notification
the application of the criteria as summarised by the Court in
table 2.3 should, like other criteria, be examined in the light
of other information. It also expressly mentions the opportun-
ity of the Member State, through additional verifications or
additional information, to demonstrate that the deficiency was
not as serious as it appeared. Hence, those elements need to
be taken into account by the Court when assessing the finan-
cial corrections made by the Commission.
Table 2.3 — Corrections: use of flat rates (1)
Criteria for a financial correction Significant weaknesses in the application of EC regulations which imply a real risk of
financial loss for the EAGGF.
Use of 2 % flat rate Key controls are satisfactory but secondary controls are partly or totally ineffective.
Use of 5 % flat rate Not all the key controls are executed in the number, frequency and with the rigour required
by the regulations. Therefore, the risk of loss for the Fund is significant.
Use of 10 % flat rate One or more key controls do not operate and it is thus not possible to determine the
eligibility of a claim and its regularity. Therefore, the risk of loss for the Fund is high.
Use of 25 % flat rate There is no system of controls for a measure, in a Member State or one of its regions, and
there are signs of frequent irregularities and frauds. There is a risk of high losses to the
Fund.
Use of higher flat rates If the weaknesses are such that most of the payments are irregular.
(1) Commission document VI/5330/97.
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Table 2.4 — Clearance of accounts corrections (1996-2000)
(Mio EUR)
Amounts 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Financial decisions
Expenses declared (including B1-3 7 0) 39 062,5 40 884,3 38 857,4 40 726,2 40 410,6
Expenses initially disjoined (1) 25 986,7 107,8 2 453,5 — 7 489,7
Expenses cleared 39 062,5 40 884,3 38 857,4 40 726,2 32 920,9
Corrections in the first financial decision 1,1 – 1,0 0,9 1,6 3,2
Corrections in the second financial decision 9,9 – 0,1 2,6 —
Total amount of corrections in the financial decisions 11,0 – 1,1 3,5 1,6 3,2
Conformity decisions Total
Taken in 1999
First conformity decision, 1999/186/CE 82,5 7,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 89,6
Second conformity decision, 1999/351/CE 12,7 17,4 2,6 0,0 0,0 32,7
Third conformity decision, 1999/603/CE 68,8 33,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 101,9
Taken in 2000
Fourth conformity decision, 2000/216/CE (2) 81,2 83,9 64,1 0,0 0,0 229,2
Fifth conformity decision, 2000/449/CE (3) 143,1 105,6 80,4 0,7 20,7 350,5
Total amount of corrections in the conformity
decisions 388,3 247,1 147,1 0,7 20,7
Total amount of corrections (4) 399,3 246,0 150,6 2,3 23,9
Corrections for late payments 25,2 27,2 15,6 0,0 0,0
Milk super levies 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Total amount of corrections net of late payments and
milk super levies 374,1 218,8 135,0 2,3 23,9
Percentage of corrections in the expenses cleared 1,0 % 0,5 % 0,3 % 0,0 % 0,1 %
(1) From 1996 to 1998, they correspond to the expenses of paying agencies whose accounts could not be cleared in the first instance after the conclusion of the
certification report or due to the insufficient work of the certification body.
These expenses were later cleared, during a second financial decision, after more work was done on paying agencies’ accounts.
In 2000, they correspond to the expenses of paying agencies which did not provide Table of X in due time.
(2) Corrections made for export refunds have been split between EAGGF years 1996 to 1998 by dividing them by 3 as there was no detail in the Commission’s
summary report.
(3) The correction of 20,7 Mio EUR for 2000 is related to a case of fraud in export refunds in France for EAGGF years 1988 to 1990.
(4) From 1996 on, this total is still provisional, there are still conformity decisions to be taken.
NB: — The amounts in italic are still provisional.
— Exchange rates: those used by the Commission in its summary reports.
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letters (34). A similar situation has also been found in
respect of this year’s conformity decisions, for example
concerning meat in Germany and France. In the light of
the ‘24-month rule’ (35), it is important that the notifica-
tion of findings is sent to the Member States in a timely
manner.
Member State failure to provide data
2.59. Once again (36) Spain has not supplied the Com-
mission with financial and statistical information (IACS
inspections). The results of the IACS on-the-spot inspec-
tions, coupled with independent confirmation by the
certifying body that the inspections have been correctly
executed, constitute an essential element in providing
assurance that IACS is being properly implemented.
Failure to supply this information is thus a very serious
matter, and undermines confidence in the operation of
the system. The Commission should therefore consider
making it obligatory that the requested statistical infor-
mation be provided to and be systematically verified by
the certifying body (37).
Individual corrections
Export refunds
2.60. In 1996 and 1997 the Commission conducted
an enquiry into the quality of physical checks on exports
attracting refunds. These physical checks, which should
be carried out without prior warning (38), constitute key
2.59. The Commission must emphasise that it also regrets
that Spain has often failed in its obligation to transmit reli-
able and timely data to the Commission, which was a major
factor in making transmission of claim, inspection and pen-
alty data in respect of IACS a regulatory requirement as from
2000 onwards. It is also stressed that such failings are
assessed in the clearance of accounts procedure.
As regards the suggestion that certifying bodies should verify
statistical information, this has previously been the case in
several Member States. Certifying bodies do report interest-
ing aspects concerning inspection targets, for example, and
these are indeed followed up in the clearance of accounts pro-
cedure.
The Commission will examine appropriate action.
(34) See paragraphs 2.45 in the Annual Report concerning
the financial year 1999 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000) and 2.77
in Annual Report 1998 (OJ C 349, 3.12.1999).
(35) The Commission may only exclude expenditure which
has been effected within 24 months prior to the Commis-
sion’s communication of its findings. Article 5(2)(c) of
Council Regulation (EEC) No 729/70 (OJ L 94, 28.4.1970,
p. 13), as amended by Regulation (EC) No 1287/95
(OJ L 125, 8.6.1995, p. 1).
(36) See comments in theAnnual Report concerning the finan-
cial year 1999, paragraph 2.47 (OJ C 342,1.12.2000).
(37) See Special Report No 22/2000, paragraph 49 (OJ C 69,
2.3.2001).
(38) Article 3(1) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 386/90
(OJ L 42, 16.2.1990, p. 6).
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controls and when a key control is applied but ‘not in
number, frequency or depth required by the Regulation’
(see Table 2.3), a 5 % correction should be applied.
2.61. The Commission found that Denmark (39) had
procedures which effectively meant that the exporter
knew in advance of lodging the export declaration if a
physical control was to take place (or not) and which
therefore thwarted the operation of a key control. In the
Court’s view, the application of the Commission’s cri-
teria could have implied a 10 % flat-rate correction (the
key control was completely ineffective, see Table 2.3),
an additional 29 million euro. In addition, the applica-
tion of sanctions, in the event of an exporter request-
ing a refund in excess of that applicable, has been com-
promised (40).
Overshoot of base areas
2.62. Under the 1992 reform, each Member State had
to draw up a regionalisation plan, including yields per
region (taking account of factors such as soil fertility
and irrigation) and determine ‘base areas’ (land used for
the cultivation of cereals, oilseeds and protein plants
during the period 1989 to 1991). If these base areas are
overshot, the aid paid to the farmers must be reduced
accordingly.
2.63. The Commission’s market services carry out
annual controls to check whether the base area has been
exceeded. In Spain, France and the United Kingdom, the
Commission found that the overshoot had not resulted
in a reduction of the amounts paid to farmers and
applied corrections of 7,7 million euro for the 1996
harvest year, which was equivalent to the amount over-
paid. However, this meant there were delays of several
years (1996 to 2000) before the Member States con-
cerned were penalised. As soon as an overshoot has
2.61. In its audit in Denmark the Commission found that
the physical controls had been carried out. Even though weak-
nesses were established, the Commission does not think those
controls can be considered thwarted as the Court states. The
weaknesses discovered did indeed limit the effectiveness of the
controls, but this is not to be compared with a situation where
no key control was carried out at all. In order to justify a
10 % flat-rate correction — following the guidelines on
financial corrections (document VI 5330/97) — one or more
key controls must not be operating at all which was not the
case in Denmark. Therefore the Commission is of the opinion
that the application of the 5 % flat rate correction was justi-
fied and is in accordance with the abovementioned guidelines,
which state that ‘when all key controls are applied, but not in
the number, frequency, or depth required by the regulations,
then a correction of 5 % is justified...’ (see also general com-
ment under point 2.55).
2.63. Member States are responsible for establishing if the
base area has been exceeded or not. The Commission’s market
departments carry out checks to see whether the areas com-
municated by the Member States are plausible. In cases where
the area communicated is considered not to be plausible, an
investigation in greater depth is instigated under the normal
clearance-of-accounts procedure and gives rise to financial
consequences by excluding expenditure from Community
financing. Infringements of Regulation (EEC) No 1765/92
are not treated differently under the clearance of accounts pro-
cedure compared to other infringements of Regulation (EEC)
No 3887/92, as the rate of correction is always based on an
assessment of the actual loss to the Community budget. The
Commission will consider whether it is legally possible to
introduce certain forms of penalties in these circumstances.
(39) In Denmark, customs physical checks were carried out on
the basis of a pre-announcement sent to customs before
loading. If customs establish that the information on the
pre-announcement is wrong, the trader can complete and
present a correct export declaration afterwards. The export
declaration is the legal document establishing the claim
for export refunds.
(40) Article 11 of Commission Regulation (EEC) No 3665/87
(OJ L 351, 14.12.1987) (applicable up to 30 June 1999) as
amended by Regulation (EC) No 495/97 (OJ L 77,
19.3.1997, p. 12).
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been established (41) (and where aid has not been
reduced) the Commission should consider introducing
some form of penalty for such cases (42).
2.64. The Commission also used the wrong rate of aid
to calculate the correction for Spain, which was conse-
quently 2,4 million euro too low,which represents about
1 % of the total correction of 206 million euro.
Integrated administration and control system area aid
2.65. The integrated administration and control sys-
tem (IACS) (43) was to be fully operational as of 1 Janu-
ary 1997. The Council stipulated that if any part of IACS
was operational before the dates laid down, Member
States should use it for their management and checking
activities (44).
2.66. The Court concluded in its Annual Report for
1999 (45), contrary to the position of the Commission,
that it considers the cross-checks and the on-the-spot
checks, provided for in the regulation, to be key con-
trols and that these two controls are complementary.
Hence, if a Member State fails to carry out any of these
checks, the Court considers that a 5 % flat-rate correc-
tion should be applied. The Court does not understand
the Commission’s attitude, which seems to treat the
cross-checks required to prevent double payments as an
ancillary control.
2.66. The Commission has already expressed disagreement
with the Court’s view in its reply to the Annual Report con-
cerning the financial year 1999.
Key controls are those physical and administrative checks
required to verify the existence of the subject of the claim. The
key controls in the arable crops sector are on-the-spot controls
and cross-checks to independent land registers.
Ancillary controls are those administrative operations required
to correctly process claims. A control to identify duplicate
claims for the same subject would therefore not be a key con-
trol, but an ancillary control in the arable crops sector, as it
does not verify the existence of the subject of the claim.
(41) With effect from the marketing year 2000/2001, this
information shall be forwarded to the Commission at the
latest by 31 October in the marketing year concerned
(Article 26 (1) of Commission Regulation (EC)
No 2316/1999) (OJ L 280, 30.10.1999, p. 43).
(42) The Court has also established that a similar framework
to that applicable for base areas does not exist for bovine
animals. See paragraphs 54(b) and 67 in Special Report
4/2001(OJ C 214, 31.7.2001).
(43) Introduced by Council Regulation (EEC) No 3508/92
(OJ L 355, 5.12.1992, p. 1) and implemented by Commis-
sion Regulation (EEC) No 3887/92 (OJ L 391, 31.12.1992,
p. 36).
(44) Article 13(2) of Council Regulation (EEC) No 3508/92
(OJ L 335, 5.12.1992, p. 1).
(45) See the Annual Report concerning the financial year
1999, paragraphs 2.50-2.51 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000).
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Integrated administration and control system — Animal pre-
miums
2.67. As from 1 January 1997, when IACS was to be
fully implemented, Member States were supposed to
have completed their identification and registration of
all animals in accordance with Council Directive
92/102/EEC (46). A complete identification and registra-
tion system (I & R) is the cornerstone of the control of
animal premiums, enabling Member States to carry out
administrative controls (cross-checks) as well as effec-
tive on-the-spot checks (47).
2.68. The corrections in relation to animal premiums
were mainly based on complete or partial failures in
establishing effective I & R systems.
2.69. In Portugal, a herd register (a key control) for
sheep and goats had not been established, which meant
an increased inherent risk to the EAGGF and the qual-
ity of on-the-spot checks was found not to be satisfac-
tory. While the Commission had applied a 5 % correc-
tion in respect of 1995, it only imposed a 2 % correction
on 1996 and 1997 expenditure.
2.70. The Commission (Directorate-General for Agri-
culture (DGAGRI)) had found that the quality of on-the-
spot controls had only improved slowly between 1994
and 1999. In the Court’s view, the progress was not suf-
ficient to justify the reduction from 5 % to 2 % from
1996 onwards according to the Commission’s criteria
(see Table 2.3). A 5 % flat rate (an additional 3,6 mil-
lion euro) should also have been applied for financial
years 1996 and 1997.
2.69 and 2.70. Portugal: Ewe premium
The Commission does not share the Court’s opinion because:
— the overall on-farm inspection level rose from 10,6 % for
1995 to 13,7 % for 1996 — an increase of 29 %, and
the proportion of animals subject to on-farm inspection
was 30 % for 1996, which was the result of a much
improved risk analysis procedure introduced after earlier
Commission criticisms,
— in 1995 Portugal had used, for the first time, a private
company to conduct its on-farm inspection programme,
which led to particularly deficient controls, whereas for
subsequent years evidence suggests that control perfor-
mance did improve,
— the clearance of accounts audit missions conducted in
1994 and 1995 led to a series of criticisms that, by
allowing time for INGA to fully reorganise its control
regime, reaped benefits in 1996. Indeed, this was the case
with, for example, themuch improved risk analysis applied
to select producers for inspection in 1996, leading to the
high proportion of inspected animals mentioned above.
Therefore, the Commission is satisfied that a lower flat-rate
correction for claim years subsequent to 1995 was indeed jus-
tified.
(46) OJ L 355, 5.12.1992, p. 32.
(47) See the Annual Report concerning the financial year
1996, paragraphs 4.45-4.55 (OJ C 348, 18.11.1997).
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2.71. In respect of suckler cow premiums, there was
no reason for considering the risk to the EAGGF lower
for the marketing year 1996 than for the marketing year
1997. For both marketing years the I & R system was
not operational and the error rate found by the Portu-
guese authorities was 18,3 % for 1996 and 19,7 % for
1997. Both rates indicate that key controls (howsoever
defined) failed and that a 5 % correction was justified.
The application of the Commission’s criteria (see
Table 2.3) would have warranted a 5 % flat-rate correc-
tion (an additional 1,7 million euro) for 1996 (a level
which corresponds to the correction for 1997) rather
than the 2 % applied.
Accompanying measures
2.72. Cross-checks to avoid double claims are also a
key control for accompanying measures. In Spain and
Italy, the Commission had found that aid claims under
accompanying measures had not been cross-checked
with the IACS database. In the Court’s view, the applica-
tion of the Commission’s criteria (see Table 2.3) would
have warranted a 5 % flat-rate correction for Spain (an
additional 5,7 million euro) and for Italy (an additional
12 million euro), rather than the 2 % applied.
2.71. Portugal: Suckler cow premium
The Commission considers that the situation regarding non-
compliance with governing rules in 1997 was clearly less sat-
isfactory than for 1996.
It should first be pointed out that a flat-rate correction of 5 %
was indeed applied in respect of certain high risk categories
(combat animals, suckler cow premium expenditure for claim
year 1996). Additionally, it must be mentioned that a flat-
rate correction of 5 % was applied for both years in respect of
special beef premium, emphasising the in-depth assessment by
the Commission services of the overall position concerning the
bovine premium sector.
In the context of the clearance of accounts guidelines for
assessing flat-rate corrections, ‘when the regulations explicitly
require a particular check, the Member State has no choice
other than to apply this check...’. Since the integrated admin-
istration and control system had to be completed only by
1 January 1997, it is from that date onwards that Portugal’s
implementation was deemed more seriously deficient.
In these circumstances, the Commission is satisfied that a
lower flat-rate correction for claim year 1996 was justified.
2.72. Regulations (EEC) No 2078/92 and (EC)
No 746/96 made no provision for the greater integration of
accompanying measures into the IACS, particularly as regards
area declarations. Since use of the IACS database is frequently
ill-suited to agri-environmental measures, the results of cross-
checks on areas could sometimes give no definite response as
regards the areas declared. Accordingly, cross-checks were
regarded as compulsory checks (in accordance with
Article 19(3) of Regulation (EC) No 746/96) although sec-
ondary from the point of view of risk since they had to be
supplemented by other types of checks. The context changed
from 2000 because Regulation (EC) No 1750/1999 pro-
vided for the greater integration of rural development mea-
sures into the IACS and the IACS itself had changed. To take
account of those changes, Annex 8 to document
AGRI/17933/2000 states that cross-checks in all appropri-
ate cases against IACS data on all parcels receiving support
in order to avoid any unjustified payment are key checks. This
provision applies from 1 January 2001.
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Fruit and vegetables
Inadequacy o f the documents jus t i f y ing the Commiss ion ’ s
pos i t ion
2.73. Following a DG AUDIT visit to France in Sep-
tember 1997, it became apparent that one undertaking
was receiving processing aid for peaches and pears in
syrup which it was incorporating into fruit salads and
compotes. However, aid can only be granted on peaches
and pears in syrup when these are end products (48).
Documents on the Commission file indicate that the
Commission suspected fraud but the case was not
referred to OLAF. The decision not to treat this irregu-
larity as a fraud case has not been documented. The cor-
rections implemented amounted to 2,3 million euro for
1996, 2, 6 million euro for 1997 and 1,8 million euro
for 1998.
Flax
Lack o f pre c i s ion in the regu la t ions
2.74. In the United Kingdom, two audit visits by the
Commission revealed that aid had been granted for
growing a variety of flax which is not normally eligible
for aid (49). The British authorities had treated it as an
experimental variety, which is allowed by the regula-
tion (50). From 1994/1995 onwards, it was grown over
vast areas: 1 903 ha in 1994/1995, 5 407 ha in
1995/1996 and 7 990 ha in 1996/1997, but no proof
It should also be noted that the obligation to carry out cross-
checks applied from 1 January 1997. The correction proposed
concerns 1997 and 1998, a period which should be regarded
as transitional when the Commission wished to show a degree
of understanding by applying a correction rate of 2 %. This
position was justified by the fact that the introduction of cross-
checks required a considerable effort, particularly since, for
example in Italy, the two measures were not managed by the
same paying agency.
2.73. The Commission accepts the Court’s criticism that
this case should have been better documented.
(48) Regulation (EEC) No 1558/91 (OJ L 144, 8.6.1991, p. 31).
(49) The Klasse variety does not feature in Annex A to Regula-
tion (EEC) No 1164/89 (OJ L 121, 29.4.1989, p. 4).
(50) Article 2 of Regulation (EEC) No 1164/89.
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was ever given to the Commission of tests which should
have been performed about the production of fibres.
2.75. The Commission considered that the areas grown
for experimental purposes were exaggerated and should
not be more than 100 hectares. Therefore it applied cor-
rections of 1,45 million euro for the financial year1995,
5, 9 million euro for 1996 and 8,1 million euro for1997.
The case was brought before the Court of Justice and
the resulting judgment, in November 2000, annulled
the corrections. The grounds were that the Commission
had no legal basis to limit the size of an experimental
area, neither in the regulations nor in a directive; there
was no evidence to show that the sowing was not in
proportion to the review envisaged (51) and that the
absence of tests was not relevant because the condition
of eligibility for aid was the sowing of the area, not the
processing of the crop harvested (52).
2.76. Aid for areas sown with varieties under review
was only abolished with effect from the 1998/1999
marketing year. Had the regulations been more precise,
most of the aid need not have been paid or the Com-
mission could havemade corrections. The EAGGF could
have saved around 15,5 million euro over the financial
years 1995 to 1997 (see also paragraphs 2.77 to 2.84).
Failure to act on the Court’s observations
Flax aid
2.77. In its Annual Report concerning the financial
year 1992 (53), the Court had recommended to the
Commission that any further encouragement of fibre
flax production should be avoided since, even at that
time, there was a production surplus for which no buyer
could be found. In 1993, the regulations concerning the
cultivation of fibre flax and hemp were amended. The
aid for the production of seeds was added to the aid per
hectare. This new rate effectively doubled the rate of aid
per hectare and was far more attractive than the aid for
other arable crops.
2.76. The United Kingdom authorities did not inform the
Commission in good time about the extent of the experimen-
tal areas sown with this variety. Only after the inspection visit
of the Commission’s clearance of accounts staff did the size of
the areas sown become evident. Thus financial corrections for
the total area exceeding the experiment were applied. Further-
more the Commission proposed a change of the legislation
which was decided by the Council with effect from the
1998/1999 marketing year.
2.77 to 2.84. The Commission first became aware of
problems when its staff noticed the increase in the cultivated
flax areas in Spain from 1994. Consequently DG AGRI
Clearance of Accounts undertook a mission in July 1995
which detected anomalies in the flax sector in Spain which
could be summarised under the term ‘premium hunting’.
(51) Case C-148/99, judgment of 9 November 2000.
(52) Articles 3 to 8 of Regulation (EEC) No 1164/89.
(53) OJ C 309, 16.11.1993.
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2.78. In its Annual Report concerning the financial
year 1995 (54), the Court observed a rapid growth in the
surface area devoted to fibre flax production and in the
related expenditure between 1994 and 1995, and noted
the emergence of two new large-scale producer coun-
tries, Spain and the United Kingdom. It noted that the
quantities produced far exceeded market requirements
and recommended that the Commission should take an
active interest in this market in order to remedy this
market surplus. Between the 1992/1993 and the
1999/2000 marketing years, the total area sown with
fibre flax in Spain rose from 0 to 126 000 hectares. In
Spain, control of the common market organisation for
flax is exerted by the regional governments.
2.79. The risk of a production for the sake of aid was
clearly highlighted as early as the Commission’s clear-
ance of accounts unit’s audit visit to Spain of
July 1995 (55). The audits conducted in June 1997 (56)
by the market division of the Commission responsible
for flax, followed by that of July 1998 (57), in conjunc-
tion with OLAF, confirmed this impression (58). A flat-
rate correction for weakness of management of the
measure was applied to Spain for the financial years
1994 and 1995 (59). This correction was not applied in
subsequent financial years because the Commission con-
sidered, on the basis of the joint audit conducted with
OLAF in1998, that theSpanish authoritieshad improved
the situation regarding compliance with the statutory
requirements.
2.80. The regulations did not require flax straw to be
processed, nor did they stipulate a minimum flax straw
yield per hectare, a minimum fibre yield per tonne of
flax straw processed, or a minimum quality standard
This was confirmed by further reports in June. In July 1998
UCLAF participated in a mission in Spain, mainly on hemp,
but some verifications were also carried out for flax which
showed the presence of anomalies in the flax sector. As a con-
sequence of the problems of the sector the Commission took
the following legislative measures.
— In February 1996, the Commission made a proposal for
a reform of the aid system, which basically consisted in
fixing a maximum guaranteed area and different levels of
aid for pulled and cut flax. The Council did not adopt
that proposal.
— In these circumstances, the Commission made a new pro-
posal in December 1996 for processing of the straw to
become compulsory. This proposal was adopted by the
Council and entered into force in 1997/1998.
— As the areas declared continued to increase, the Commis-
sion added a minimum yield requirement as from
1998/1999.
— In November 1998, the legislation was amended so as
flax and hemp had to be declared under the IACS and
controls and penalties became tighter.
— In November 1999, the Commission made a new pro-
posal for a reform in this sector, which was eventually
adopted by the Council in July 2000 and will enter into
force in July 2001.
(54) OJ C 340, 12.11.1996.
(55) Control Report (17-21 July 1995) 31.1.1996.
(56) Report on the flax production and processing industry in
Spain (11 and 12 June 1997), 97/2358a.
(57) Audit report (27-31 July 1997), 26.11.1998.
(58) It was even established that, between 1994 and 1996, it
was not possible to process any of the flax straw pro-
duced, since Spain did not possess the requisite process-
ing capacities. The flax straw appears to have subse-
quently been processed into fibre, but this was not
marketed because there were no sales outlets for it. More-
over, the yields recorded were substantially less than those
of the traditional producer countries and the quality of
fibre obtained was very mediocre.
(59) 10 % of the expenditure declared by Spain under budget
item 1400 for the financial years 1994 (PTA 2,3 million)
and 1995 (PTA 40,4 million).
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for flax straw. As early as 1996, the Commission decided
to propose amendments to the regulations in force at
that time. It attempted to put in place a maximum guar-
anteed area system, which would have meant that sur-
face areas could be limited, but this proposal was not
adopted by the Council. As from the 1997/1998 mar-
keting year, the granting of aid became conditional on
the purchaser or the producer providing an undertak-
ing to process, and all processors had to be approved.
By late 1998, it was clear to DG AGRI that the common
organisation of the markets (COM) in flax and hemp
required a complete overhaul in order to counter the
abuses detected in the field, particularly in Spain but
also, to a lesser degree, in other Member States. How-
ever, the only immediate measure taken was to set, with
effect from the 1998/1999 marketing year, a minimum
flax straw yield per hectare which varied according to
the harvesting method used. None of these provisions
had any effect either: surface areas continued to increase,
and flax straw was processed but was not marketed.
2.81. In 1999 some stocks of flax straw and fibre were
destroyed by unexplained fires, and the same thing hap-
pened again in 2000. These events were symptomatic
of serious irregularities in Spain. In July 1999, at the
request ofOLAF (EuropeanAnti-fraudOffice), the Span-
ish public prosecutor responsible for the prevention of
fraud opened a criminal investigation into the matter.
2.82. The clearance of accounts unit of the Commis-
sion did not conduct another audit in Spain but, on the
basis of meetings and information obtained from the
Spanish authorities, it suggested that, pursuant to
Article 4(3) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2988/95 on
the protection of the European Communities’ financial
interests, a flat-rate correction of 10 % of the expendi-
ture declared by Spain in the financial years 1996 to
1998 (7,2 million euro) be applied for premium hunt-
ing. The letter of notification of the correction, submit-
ted in March 2000 to the Commission’s legal service,
has not yet been sent. In April 2001, the legal service
stated that it could not give its approval to the correc-
tion because all the conditions stipulated in the regula-
tion had been fulfilled, which was true, and the correc-
tion could not be made on the basis of criteria that had
been ‘added as afterthoughts’ to the regulations. More-
over, by virtue of the 24-month time limit, a correction
could only relate to expenditure disbursed from July
1997 onwards, because the letter of notification of find-
ings was sent to the Spanish authorities in July 1999.
2.83. In July 2000, the clearance of accounts unit con-
ducted an audit concerning the management of the
measure in Spain, and in particular controls on
The problems of the flax sector in Spain became notorious
after several fires of stocks of non-processed and processed flax
had occurred (in April and May 1999) at the premises of
processing companies leading to suspicion of fraud. In conse-
quence the control bodies of the Spanish autonomous regions
made a comparison between the total declared production of
flax for the producers delivering to these processors and the
technical capacity of the processors which revealed many
inconsistencies. For the financial years 1996 to 1998 the
clearance of accounts procedure is still ongoing. For 1999 the
financial correction will take into account the findings of an
investigation which OLAF launched in 2000. Therefore, in
October 1999 the Spanish authorities (FEGA — as coordi-
nating body of the paying agency of the autonomous regions)
asked for further time (until 30 April 2000) to pay the aid
as they had to do further checks onseveral ‘cases of presumed
irregularities’. The Commission granted the extension.
DG AGRI undertook an audit mission in June 2000 together
with DG AUDIT (FEGA and Castile-Leon) in order to verify
expenditure in the marketing year 1998/1999. At the same
time OLAF performed several audit missions in Spain deal-
ing with the presumed fraud cases. In December 2000 the
Spanish ‘Fiscalia Anticorrupcion’ informed OLAF of the con-
clusions of the inquiry. OLAF finalised its report in March
2001. The clearance of accounts procedure is currently ongo-
ing on the basis of these findings. The Commission would like
to recall that the 24-month limitation for financial correc-
tions does not apply to the financial consequences of irregu-
larities and negligence attributable to administrative authori-
ties or other bodies of the Member States (Article 8(2) of
Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999). Therefore the Commission
considers the conclusions of the Court as regards the loss to
the EAGGF premature.
The Commission decided on a 10 % correction for weaknesses
in the control system for 1994 and 1995. For the financial
years 1996 to 1998 the clearance of accounts procedure is
still ongoing. For 1999 the findings of the OLAF investiga-
tion will be the basis for a financial correction. Therefore the
Commission considers that the weaknesses discovered in Spain
are and were addressed adequately by the Commission. As
explained above (points 2.84 to 2.91) the Commission made
efforts to propose changes to the regulation as early as Febru-
ary 1996, but these were rejected by the Council.
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processors. During this audit, it became apparent that
the Spanish authorities had not communicated in good
time (60), the significant irregularities that had come to
light at the time of the controls. This observation might
have been made a lot earlier and could have served as a
firm legal basis for corrections for the financial years
1996 to 1998. Moreover, by virtue of the 24-month
time limit, a correction for this omission could only
relate to expenditure disbursed from March 1999
onwards (the letter of notification of findings having
been sent to the Spanish authorities in March 2001).
2.84. As a result of the combined effects of particu-
larly weak regulations, indifference to the Court’s rec-
ommendations, insufficient follow-up by the Commis-
sion, premium hunting related to flax aid was the order
of the day in Spain between 1994 and 2000 and there
are indications that serious irregularities could have
becomewidespread. Had the regulatory provisions been
adequate, much of the aid to Spain (around 180 million
euro) need not have been paid for the EAGGF years
1994 to 2000 (see also paragraph 2.76).
Financial decision for 2000
Late submission of documents and payment data
2.85. The certifying body reports and accounts for
four paying agencies — Région Wallonne (Belgium),
FEGA (Fondo Español de Garantía), Navarra and La
Rioja (Spain) — were submitted after the deadline of
10 February 2001. One paying agency (FEGA) was not
able to produce the accounts on time due to a failure of
the FAUDIT-ED (Public Storage data system) hardware
supplied by the Commission. The other delays were due
to a failure to dedicate adequate resources to the certi-
fication. Nevertheless, these documents were available
in time for the Commission to take its decision.
2.86. However, by the time of the consultation with
Member States, 19 paying agencies had failed to provide
the Commission with the individual payment data
required under Community legislation (61).
(60) Article 6(2) of Regulation (EEC) No 1164/89.
(61) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2390/1999 (OJ L 295,
16.11.1999, p. 1).
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Consequently, the Commission proposed to disjoin (62)
the accounts of these paying agencies from the deci-
sion. In the event two paying agencies provided the data
immediately. The decision was taken on 8 May and all
the expenditure in respect of 17 paying agencies
(7 490 million euro) was disjoined.
2.87. The fact that paying agencies failed to provide
certain payment data does not call into question whether
the accounts are ‘true, complete and accurate’ (63). The
Court considers that these are not grounds for disjoin-
ing expenditure. The Commission should find alterna-
tive means to oblige Member States to submit the
required data on time and should avoid delays in taking
the financial decision.
Qualification of accounts and corrections made
2.88. Certifying bodies are required to obtain an over-
all confidence level of 95 %. Most did so from substan-
tive testing alone, but some reduced the level of assur-
ance required from substantive testing to 70 % and
obtained the balance of assurance from other
sources (64). Statistical sampling (MUS—monetary unit
sampling) was used for the vast majority of account
testing (65). The overall conclusion is that the level of
error detected by the certifying bodies in the paying
agencies’ accounts (66) in 2000 did not exceed 1 %
(412 million euro) of the total declared. Six paying
2.87. Member States are required by the regulations to sup-
ply individual payment data to the Commission. Two Mem-
ber States did not send the required information. This affects
the effectiveness of the overall clearance process as certain
checks cannot be carried out, or cannot be carried out fully,
in those Member States. It is manifestly unfair on those
Member States that have sent the necessary data. The Com-
mission therefore felt that it was wrong to accept the accounts
of paying agencies that had failed to provide individual pay-
ment data.
Nevertheless, the Commission notes the Court’s comments
and will consider carefully the action it should take in the
future in similar cases.
(62) A disjunction is a formal decision. It has no financial
implication. The disjoined expenses will be cleared later,
after additional work or information is provided to the
Commission.
(63) Article 3(1) of Commission Regulation (EC) No 1663/95
(OJ L 158, 8.7.1995, p. 6).
(64) See Special Report No 22/2000, paragraph 39 (OJ C 69,
2.3.2001).
(65) See Special Report No 22/2000, paragraphs 33 to 35.
(66) See Special Report No 22/2000, paragraph 24.
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agencies — Région Wallonne (Belgium), Baden-
Württemberg (Germany), Navarra (Spain), SDE (Service
déconcentré de l’Etat, France) and Ofival (Office Inter-
professionnel des Viandes, France) and Ifadap (Instituto
de Financiamento e Apoio aoDesenvolvimento da Agri-
cultura e Pescas, Portugal)—hadmaterial levels of error.
2.89. In total the accounts of 23 paying agencies were
qualified by the certifying bodies (see Table 2.5). Many
of these qualifications were of a minor technical nature,
but amounts of 89 million euro were identified for 10
paying agencies. If the paying agency takes appropriate
action to remedy the weaknesses found and to recover
overpayments, the Commission does not impose cor-
rections.
2.90. The total value of corrections made based on
the certification of the accounts is 3,2 million euro.
With regard to corrections based on the results of sta-
tistically determined samples, the Commission’s policy
is to correct for the most likely error (MLE). The correc-
tion should be based on the MLE extrapolated from the
overpayments only, and it should be made clear to the
certifying bodies that underpayments should be
excluded (67). The corrections based on the MLE have
not been included in the financial decision and will be
made during the conformity process (some 35 million
euro). They should have been made in the financial
decision.
Accreditation concerns
2.91. The accounts of the SDE (France) have been quali-
fied for the third successive year. Notwithstanding past
criticisms, the Frenchauthorities gave temporary respon-
sibility (68) for the rural development measures to the
SDE. Expenditure under the rural development mea-
sures was 187 million euro, of which 8,9 million euro
has been qualified. The certifying body qualified a total
of 43 million euro (4,69 % of the expenditure declared)
2.90. The Commission notes the Court’s comments that
corrections based on extrapolation of errors should have been
made in the accounting clearance. It will carefully consider
whether the current regulatory framework permits this to be
done in the future.
(67) CommissionGuideline No 8 refers only to overstatements
when calculating the MLE.
(68) From 2001 CNASEA will be responsible for rural devel-
opment measures.
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Table 2.5 — Paying agencies by expenditure declared in 2000
No Member States Paying agency Amounts declared in Mio EUR (1) % of total Qualified accounts (2)
1 I AGEA 5 077,38 12,32 x
2 F ONIC 4 302,99 10,44 x
3 EL Gedidagep (3) 2 611,06 6,34 x
4 UK MAFF 2 281,53 5,54
5 IRL DAF 1 628,21 3,95
6 E Andalucia (3) 1 598,26 3,88
7 DK EU-Direktoratet 1 336,59 3,24
8 F ONIOL 1 094,91 2,66
9 F SDE 919,59 2,23 x
10 A AMA 904,33 2,19
21 754,85 52,80
11 D Bayern Landwirtschaft 836,13 2,03
12 D Hamburg-Jonas 801,22 1,94
13 F Onilait 797,00 1,93
14 E Castilla y León (3) 757,05 1,84
15 S SJV 751,42 1,82
16 SU MMM 727,56 1,77
17 UK IBEA 707,01 1,72
18 F Ofival 700,57 1,70 x
19 E Castilla La-Mancha (3) 664,13 1,61
20 B BIRB 663,38 1,61
21 E FEGA 601,97 1,46
22 D Niedersachsen 596,57 1,45 x
23 F FIRS 564,18 1,37
24 D BLE 550,20 1,34
25 P INGA 538,03 1,31 x
26 UK SERAD 535,70 1,30
27 NL PZ 522,48 1,27
28 E Extremadura (3) 504,80 1,23
29 NL HPA 445,78 1,08 x
30 E Aragón (3) 381,41 0,93
31 D Baden-Württemberg 375,76 0,91 x
32 D Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 356,48 0,87
33 D Brandenburg 341,70 0,83
34 D Sachsen-Anhalt 339,04 0,82
35 I DCCC 319,82 0,78
36 D Sachsen 289,41 0,70 x
37 UK WOAD 282,66 0,69
38 B Ministerie van Landbouw (DG3) 277,02 0,67
39 F CNASEA 275,46 0,67
40 NL LASER 266,18 0,65
41 D Nordrhein-Westfalen LWK Munst 250,68 0,61
42 D Schleswig-Holstein 248,50 0,60 x
43 E Cataluna (3) 248,19 0,60 x
44 D Thüringen 242,17 0,59 x
45 F Oniflhor 230,75 0,56 x
46 UK DARD 226,18 0,55
47 D Hessen 184,19 0,45 x
48 F Onivins 174,56 0,42 x
49 D Rheinland-Pfalz 150,21 0,36 x
50 E Canarias (3) 142,45 0,35
51 P IFADAP 135,49 0,33
52 F Odeadom 135,16 0,33
53 I ENR 127,86 0,31
54 E Valencia (3) 125,23 0,30
55 E Navarra (3) 114,05 0,28 x
56 D Nordrhein-Westfalen LWK Bonn 92,81 0,23
57 E Galicia (3) 87,41 0,21
58 NL PVE 82,24 0,20
59 E Murcia (3) 81,49 0,20
60 A ZA Salzburg 70,84 0,17 x
61 IRL DMNR 53,08 0,13 x
62 NL DLG 50,96 0,12
63 E Madrid (3) 45,64 0,11
64 A BMLFUW Pras B10 42,15 0,10
65 NL PT 41,67 0,10
66 E Asturias (3) 41,17 0,10
67 E Pais Vasco (3) 38,87 0,09
68 E La Rioja (3) 29,13 0,07
69 F SAV 27,87 0,07
70 L Ministère de l’agriculture 20,64 0,05
71 E Baleares 18,55 0,05
72 E Cantabria (3) 18,50 0,04
73 D Bayern, St MLU 16,80 0,04
74 D Saarland 15,20 0,04 x
75 UK FC 13,52 0,03
76 B Vlaamse Gemeenschap 9,27 0,02
77 D Hamburg 9,17 0,02
78 F Ofimer 8,32 0,02
79 D Nordrhein-Westfalen LfBJ 7,93 0,02
80 B Organisme payeur de la Région wallone 5,57 0,01 x
81 D Nordrhein-Westfalen LfA 2,88 0,01 x
82 UK CCW 2,63 0,01
83 D Berlin 1,88 0,00
84 A BMLF Abt VI. B.8 (Wein) 1,37 0,00
85 D Bremen 1,24 0,00
86 E FROM 0,36 0,00
Total 41 199,78 100,00 23
(1) It should be noted that some of the Member States do not automatically deduct any negative amounts under the budget item B1-3 7 0 0 (clearance of accounts) from the amounts they declare.
However, the amounts shown in this table are the amounts actually declared by the Member States.
(2) Account qualified because of financial errors, scope restrictions or other reserves.
(3) Disjoined from the financial decision of 8 May 2001.
NB: Exchange rates for Member States outside euro zone:
Denmark: 7,4619, Greece: 340,75, Sweden: 9,0455, United Kingdom: 0,6156.
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and concluded that the SDE fails to meet key accredita-
tion criteria, is not viable and is unauditable. Both the
Court and the Commission (69) are of the opinion that
the French authorities should withdraw the accredita-
tion from SDE. Failure to do so should result in the
reduction of advances.
2.92. For the Région Wallonne, simplified accredita-
tion procedures have been applied since 1996. Given
the increase in expenditure managed by this paying
agency the Commission has demanded an accreditation
review.
2.93. In general, the situation with regard to debtors
remains unsatisfactory with particular concerns in
respect of Valencia (Spain), DCCC (Direzione Compar-
timentale delle Contabilità Centralizzate) and AGEA
(Agenzia per le Erogazioni in Agricoltura — Italy) and
Welsh Office (United Kingdom). The total value of
reported debt is 2 014 million euro. OLAF’s progress in
recovering debts has been limited. The total debt out-
standing according to OLAF data is 2 210 million euro.
It is not possible to reconcile this amount with the total
reported by the paying agencies because the latter is not
confined to communications under Regulation (EEC)
No 595/91 and there are timing differences. OLAF has
undertaken an exercise to clear all debt registered prior
to 1995. The amount concerned is 944 million euro.
With a view to making corrections in the conformity
decisions, OLAF must notify (under Article 8 of Regu-
lation (EC) No 1663/95) the Member States concerned
of the amounts it intends to charge them and what can
be written-off against the EAGGF. As at June 2001,
OLAF had notified 10 Member States of its intention to
propose a clearance of accounts decision charging
5,5 million euro to them and writing-off 63 million
euro. Italy, which has the largest share of reported debt
(68 %) was informed that 67 million euro might be
written off while an amount of up to 331 million euro
might have to be charged to the national budget. The
first conformity decision to include corrections for debts
charged to Member States is unlikely to be taken before
the end of 2001.
2.92. A full accreditation review of the paying agency for
the Walloon Region has now been carried out. The certifying
body considers, in its conclusions, that the structure of the
paying agency has been improved and is in compliance with
the EU legislation
2.93. The clearance of accounts unit has taken several ini-
tiatives to examine the management of debts held by the pay-
ing agencies and is carrying out a further enquiry in 2001. It
is accepted that the situation with regards to debtors remains
unsatisfactory at many agencies, but many improvements have
been made. Better management of debts is a major priority
for the clearance of accounts unit.
(69) See Annual Report 1999, paragraph 2.66 (OJ C 342,
1.12.2000) and Special Report 22/2000, paragraph 18
(OJ C 69, 2.3.2001).
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2.94. The certifying bodies for the majority of the
German paying agencies were not ‘operationally inde-
pendent of the paying and coordinating agencies’ (63).
Following a request from the Commission this problem
has been addressed by the German authorities and all
the certifying bodies should be independent by the time
they carry out the 2001 certification.
2.95. The Annex to Commission Regulation (EC)
No 1663/95 states that ‘no payments shall be made in
cash’ (70). In Greece, most farmers are effectively paid in
cash. Although they receive a cheque, if there is no bank
in or near the village where they live, they endorse the
cheque in favour of the cooperative whose representa-
tive cashes it at a bank. He distributes the cash to the
farmers who are supposed to sign the payments listing
to indicate that they have been paid. Amounts of less
than DRA 100 000 are paid directly in cash. The audit
trail disappears the moment the cheques have been
cashed.
2.96. The Greek authorities recognise the weaknesses
associated with this system and have undertaken to
introduce payment by bank transfer but little action has
been taken. The Commission has informed the Greek
authorities of the need to introduce direct payments for
all schemes for the next marketing year and has threat-
ened to impose financial penalties if they fail to do so.
The steps taken by the Commission are essential to pro-
vide an adequate audit trail.
Conclusion
2.97. Despite the introduction of the reformed clear-
ance of accounts procedure in 1996, the Commission
continued to find some significant weaknesses in the
underlying systems during the course of its conformity
audits covering expenditure in the EAGGF years 1996,
1997 and 1998 (see also paragraphs 2.17 to 2.19 con-
cerning reductions in advances). In the Court’s opinion,
in some instances, the Commission should have applied
higher flat-rate corrections in the conformity decisions
which as a result should have been higher (see para-
graphs 2.61, 2.64 to 2.70 and 2.72). The financial deci-
sion should have been taken on time, the fact that
2.97. As the Court stated in Special Report No 22/2000
and in point 2.194, the reform has increased transparency in
the Member States and has been a considerable achievement.
The Commission is convinced that the reform of the clearance
procedure, together with other developments such as the IACS
have considerably reduced the risk to Community budget. It
believes it has applied flat-rate corrections in accordance with
the fourth subparagraph of Article 7(4) of Regulation (EC)
No 1258/1999 and document VI/5330/97. As explained
in point 2.55, when making financial corrections, the Com-
mission takes into account all the elements of the guidelines
and does not base itself only on a summary of criteria.
(70) The text in the French version of the regulation is incor-
rect: ‘no payment shall be made immediately’.
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paying agencies failed to provide details of individual
payments is not sufficient grounds for disjoining expen-
diture. Moreover, despite repeated observations by the
Court, weaknesses in legislation governing flax were
not remedied until major irregularities had been discov-
ered. Had the regulatory provision been adequate, much
of the aid to Spain and the United Kingdom, around
195,5 million euro, need not have been paid for the
EAGGF years 1994 to 2000 (see paragraphs 2.76 and
2.84).
FOLLOW-UP OF PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS
Physical checks of agricultural products receiving export
refunds
2.98. In its Special Report No 20/98 (71) the Court
made recommendations aimed at improving the frame-
work for the control of export refund transactions. The
main recommendations related to:
— the more effective use of risk analysis for the selec-
tion of export consignments for physical checks,
— the recording, evaluation and reporting of the results
of such checks,
— the introduction of a strategic planning approach
tailored to the type of product exported,
— the need to test products systematically for sound
and fair marketable quality,
— the desirability of making risk analysis obligatory
and extending this to cover all measures and regimes
affecting the EUbudget, thus enablingMember States
to allocate their resources more effectively.
The disjunction of expenditure by certain paying agencies
complies with Article 4(6) of Regulation (EC)
No 1258/1999, Article 2(1) of Regulation (EC)
No 1663/95 and Regulation (EC) No 2390/1999.
As for flax in Spain, the Commission decided on a 10 % cor-
rection for weaknesses in the control system for 1994 and
1995. For the financial years 1996 to 1998 the clearance of
accounts procedure is still ongoing. For 1999 the findings of
the OLAF investigation will be the basis for a financial cor-
rection. Therefore the Commission considers that the weak-
nesses discovered in Spain are and were addressed adequately
by the Commission. As explained above (points 2.84 to 2.91)
the Commission made efforts to propose changes to the regu-
lation as early as February 1996, but these were rejected by
the Council.
(71) Special Report No 20/98 (OJ C 375, 3.12.1998) (herein-
after called ‘SR No 20/98’).
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2.99. The report also called upon the Commission to
speed up the follow-up of deficiencies it had detected in
the Member States’ systems.
2.100. The following paragraphs detail the consider-
ation by the European Council and Parliament of those
recommendations and the Commission’s actions in
response.
The Council of the European Union’s recommendations
2.101. The Council of the European Union, in its Agri-
fin Group report of 5 February 1999 on the Court’s
Special Report No 20/98, accepted the Court’s main
observations and recommended that the Commission
adopt the following measures:
(a) the Commission should bring together the relevant
data about practices in the Member States with the
objective of improving the quality of controls
throughout the Community by sharing experience;
(b) the improvement of controls should be pursued as
appropriate through analyses presented in the Trade
Mechanisms Committee, which should also reflect
the practices of the Directorate-General concerned
and of OLAF;
(c) the intensity of physical controls over export refund
transactions should be determined on the basis of a
prudent risk analysis, with lighter controls applied
to standard and less risky products.
The European Parliament’s proposals
2.102. In its report of 4 March 1999 on the granting
of discharge for the financial year 1997, the European
Parliament agreed with the Court’s main observations
and invited the Commission:
(a) to improve coordination between physical checks
and a posteriori controls (72) in the context of an
appropriate legal framework, as suggested by the
2.102.
(a) The following indents should be added:
— ‘by requiring Member States to submit annual evalu-
ations of the execution and effectiveness of physical
checks (SR No 20/98, paragraph 4.4, sixth indent),
(72) Council Regulation (EEC) No 4045/89 (OJ L 388,
30.12.1989, p. 18).
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Court. For the sake of efficiency, such coordination
should prevail over considerations relating to sub-
sidiarity;
(b) to pay greater attention to the effectiveness of the
procedures for the selection of consignments for
physical checks;
(c) to make it obligatory for the Member States to use
risk analysis and to submit annual evaluations of
the implementation and effectiveness of the checks;
(d) to impose systematic testing of the marketable qual-
ity of all samples submitted for laboratory analysis.
The Commission’s follow-up of the Court’s observations
2.103. The Commission has responded positively to
some of the Court’s observations and recommenda-
tions:
— by applying financial corrections (73) totalling
188 million euro on various Member States which
had not complied with stipulations concerning
physical checks (74) (Table 2.6) (SR No 20/98, para-
graph 2.6),
— by informing Member States about the use of risk
analysis via the Trade Mechanisms Committee
(SR No 20/98, paragraph 4.4, third indent),
— by permitting, for those Member States having opted
for risk analysis, a reduction in the level of laboratory
testing where positive assurance is available from
repeated satisfactory results (SR No 20/98, para-
graph 4.4, ninth indent)’.
(73) Commission Decision 2000/216/EC of 1 March 2000
excluding from Community financing certain expendi-
ture incurred by Member States under the Guarantee Sec-
tion of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guaran-
tee Fund (EAGGF) (OJ L 67, 15.3.2000, p. 37) and
Commission Decision 2000/449/EC of 5 July 2000
excluding from Community financing certain expendi-
ture incurred by Member States under the Guarantee Sec-
tion of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guaran-
tee Fund (EAGGF) (OJ L 180, 19.7.2000, p. 49).
(74) Council Regulation (EEC)No 386/90 of12 February 1990
on the monitoring carried out at the time of export of
agricultural products receiving refunds or other amounts
(OJ L 42, 16.2.1990, p. 6).
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Table 2.6 — Total corrections made following Commission Decisions No 2000/216/EC and No 2000/449/EC
Financial year Member State Sector Budgetary item Reasons Financial consequences(EUR) (1)
1996-1998 Belgium Export refunds 2100 Non-compliance with the minimum check rate in the beef/veal sector 186 173
1996-1998 Denmark Export refunds Various Shortcomings in the quality of the checks made by customs 29 077 014
1996-1998 Germany Export refunds Various Non-compliance with the minimum check rate, shortcomings in the qualitative
checks 21 872 394
1996-1998 Greece Export refunds Various Shortcomings in the quality of the checks made by customs 1 031 894
1996-1998 France Export refunds Various Shortcomings in the quality of the checks made by customs 99 083 770
1996-1998 Italy Export refunds Various Non-compliance with the check rates, shortcomings in the quality of the checks
made by customs 31 847 349
1996-1998 Luxembourg Export refunds Various Shortcomings in the quantitative checks (weighing) 5 466
1996-1998 United Kingdom Export refunds Various Shortcomings in the quality of the checks in the cereals sector 5 171 461
Total 188 275 521
(1) Correction equivalent to 5 % of the total expenditure on financing export refunds for agricultural products for all countries except Luxembourg, for which there was a correction equivalent to 2 % of the total expenditure on financ-
ing export refunds for agricultural& products.
15.12.2001
EN
O
fficialJournalofthe
European
Com
m
unities
97
— by asking Member States to apply a uniform clas-
sification of the risks attached to different goods
(SR No 20/98, paragraph 4.4, fourth indent),
— by encouraging the Member States to incorporate
into their national risk analysis system a monitor-
ing and feedback system to ensure that targeted
checks are carried out or satisfactory explanations
for not doing so are recorded (SR No 20/98, para-
graph 4.4, fifth indent),
— by permitting, for thoseMember States having opted
for risk analysis, a reduction in the intensity of
checks over standard goods (75) and at customs
offices concerned only with few operators and a
limited range of goods (76) (SR No 20/98, para-
graph 3.7),
— by obliging Member States to make annual evalua-
tions of their execution of physical inspections (SR
No 20/98, paragraph 4.4, sixth indent).
2.104. However, there has been a lack of action on
other points raised by the Court in that the Commis-
sion:
— has not proposed a requirement for the routine test-
ing (77) by customs laboratories of sound and fair
marketable quality of exports of agricultural prod-
ucts at the time of export (SR No 20/98, para-
graph 4.4, eighth indent),
2.104.
Article 5(5) of Regulation (EC) No 2221/95 was introduced
by Regulation (EC) No 2655/1999. However, routine test-
ing of all aspects of soundness of all samples taken under
Regulation (EEC) No 386/90 by laboratories designated for
customs checks would be impossible in some cases (e.g. hor-
mones in meat and glycol in wine).
(75) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2221/95 of 20 Septem-
ber 1995 laying down detailed rules for the application of
Council Regulation (EEC) No 386/90 as regards physical
checks carried out at the time of export of agricultural
products qualifying for refunds (OJ L 224, 21.9.1995,
p. 13).
(76) CommissionRegulation (EC)No 2655/1999of16 Decem-
ber 1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 2221/95 laying
down detailed rules for the application of Council Regula-
tion (EEC) No 386/90 as regards physical checks carried
out at the time of export of agricultural products qualify-
ing for refunds and amendingRegulation (EC)No 3122/94
laying down criteria for risk analysis as regards agricul-
tural products receiving refunds (OJ L 325, 17.12.1999,
p. 12).
(77) This would apply to all samples taken under Article 3(3)
of Council Regulation (EEC) No 386/90.
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— has not considered creating a legal framework pro-
viding for the best combination of physical and a
posteriori controls (SR No 20/98, paragraph 4.1),
— has not evaluated the effectiveness of arrangements
for selecting goods for physical inspection
(SR No 20/98, paragraph 4.3),
— has not made proposals to render compulsory the
use of risk analysis, given that Greece and Italy were
not in a position to implement risk analysis owing
to lack of computerisation (SR No 20/98, para-
graph 4.4, first indent),
— has not sought to oblige Member States to notify
physical inspection strategies annually, including
rates of inspection differentiated by assessed risk
(SR No 20/98, paragraph 4.4, second indent),
— has not obliged Member States to compile specific
databases of export refund irregularities
(SR No 20/98, paragraph 4.4, seventh indent).
Member States have been invited to describe in the annual
report the measures which have been taken in order to improve
coordination with Regulation (EEC) No 4045/89. The Com-
mission will examine with Member States how to better com-
bine the control efforts at the moment of export and a poste-
riori.
Within the framework of the clearance of EAGGF accounts,
audit visits were carried out in different Member States in
1999 and 2000 in order to evaluate specific customs proce-
dures. During these audits some attention was given in some
Member States to the topic of the selection of controls for
physical inspection. In the future this aspect will be taken
more into account in the annual reports.
Because of the criticisms of some Member States (e.g. Greece,
which is not in a position to apply a system of risk analysis
because of the lack of a computer system) risk analysis was at
least not made compulsory. However, in order to push Mem-
ber States to introduce such a system, the simplifications of
Article 5a of Regulation (EC) 2221/95 (e.g. reduction of the
control rate for NA-I products) applies only in those Member
States which use a system of risk analysis.
Following the remarks of several Member States, some flex-
ibility is required where physical checks are concerned. It is
sometimes necessary to amend strategic programmes in the
course of the year in order to adapt new circumstances.
Regulation (EEC) No 595/91 requires the Member States to
communicate to the Commission a list of irregularities which
have been the subject of primary or judicial findings of fact.
OLAF is currently making available an application which
will allow Member to establish and communicate the cases of
irregularity in electronic format. The output will enable Mem-
ber States also to create their own database with all the infor-
mation about theses cases, including the information as pro-
posed by the Court of Auditors.
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2.105. The Commission has partially followed the
Court’s recommendations. With regard to improving
checks, its approach has largely been to make this an
option rather than an obligation, by inviting Member
States to use risk analysis.
2.106. In order to improve the effectiveness of cus-
toms checks, the above recommendation, to make the
application of risk analysis obligatory, still needs to be
extended to all the areas of checks with a financial
impact on the EU budget (78).
Common organisation of the market in sheepmeat and
goatmeat
Introduction
2.107. The common organisation of the market (CMO)
in sheepmeat and goatmeat was introduced in 1980.
The payment of an annual premium to producers is its
main measure. There have been no major changes to
the regime since the introduction of individual limits on
premium rights in the 1993 marketing year.
2.106. The Commission agrees with the Court of Auditors
that risk analysis needs to be extended to all areas of checks
with a financial impact on the EU budget. Following the Cus-
toms 2000 seminar held with the Member States to examine
risk analysis, the Commission has been working with them on
a risk analysis implementation plan covering the risk man-
agement process. This plan is nowbeing implemented. Expected
results include:
— harmonised model for risk management process,
— inventory of risk parameters for economic operators,
— risk information exchange form to enable the Member
States to exchange information rapidly.
Given the Commission’s opinion on the risks inherent in
introducing risk analysis via legislation across a wide range of
controls, it has concentrated on this question via the above-
mentioned implementation plan.
(78) Forward (point 5) of Special Report No 13/98 concern-
ing the use of risk analysis techniques in customs control
and the clearance of goods and Special Report No 20/98
on the audit of physical checks of agricultural products
receiving export refunds (OJ C 375, 3.12.1998).
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2.108. Annual budgetary expenditure has fluctuated
considerably (2 210 million euro in 1993, 1 425 mil-
lion euro in 1997, 1 894 million euro in 1999). The
main factor which determined expenditure was the level
of market prices, while the number of animals on which
premiums were paid, in the 1993 to 1999 period, has
been stable at about 72,5 million.
2.109. For the period 1993 to 1998, sheepmeat and
goatmeat gross indigenous production and consump-
tion were almost stable at an average of 1,14 and 1,36
million tonnes respectively. The Community has, there-
fore, a self-sufficiency rate of about 84 %, and the sup-
ply deficit is met by imports from third countries. The
Commission does not have a stated position on the
desirable level of EU production, but limits on the indi-
vidual premium rights effectively act as a constraint on
indigenous production.
2.110. On 16 May 2001 the Commission announced
what it termed ‘a simpler and more market oriented
sheepmeat regime’ and made a proposal for a new
Council Regulation (79).
The Court’s audit
2.111. The management aspects of the sheepmeat and
goatmeat CMO were reviewed at the Commission and
in six main producer Member States (80) which together
account for over 90 % of relevant expenditure. The
objective of the Court’s audit was to examine the cur-
rent operation of the premium scheme and to verify the
extent to which the issues previously identified con-
tinue to persist. The Court also examined the extent to
which the latest proposal addressed the problems iden-
tified during the audit.
2.112. The results of the Court’s last audit work on this
market, covering the period up to the 1992/1993 mar-
keting years, were published in Special Report
No 3/95 (81). The Court, in this report, was particularly
critical of the lack of clear objectives for the CMO, the
mechanism used to determine the amount of the pre-
mium and the system used for collecting prices.
2.109. The overall stability of the sheepmeat market and
the balance that exists between domestic supplies and imports
on the one hand and consumption on the other demonstrates
that production in the Community is at an appropriate level.
2.110. Prior to drawing up its reform proposal the Com-
mission undertook an evaluation of the regime. The Commis-
sion presented its proposal on the basis of this study and its
own reflections on the operation of the ewe premium scheme
in particular.
(79) COM(2001) 247 final.
(80) Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy and the United King-
dom.
(81) OJ C 285, 28.10.1995.
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Performance is not measured
2.113. Theoverall goals of theCMOsetout inArticle 39
of the Treaty include, in particular, market stability and
a fair standard of living for the agricultural community
concerned (82). In this context, Council Regulation (EC)
No 2467/98 (83) provides compensation for ‘loss of
income’. Although the Commission has services and
statistical sourceswhichmeasure income and farm activ-
ity, it has not transformed the abovementioned goals
into specific objectives for the sector nor has it defined
any indicators against which the achievement of objec-
tives and performance could be measured.
Defective system for setting prices and premium
2.114. For the ewe premium scheme a basic price and
a weighted average market price for the Community are
determined. A premium is granted when the average
market price is below the basic price and it is calculated
as the difference between these two figures. It aims to
compensate producers for a notional loss of income.
2.115. Since 1989 until the provisions were changed
by Council Regulation (EC) No 1669/2000 (84), the basic
price was required to be fixed annually by the Council
on a proposal from the Commission taking account of
factors such as the situation in the market, production
and consumption prospects, production costs, the situ-
ation in the other livestock sectors and past experience.
No evidence was provided by the Commission of the
extent to which these factors were considered, if at all.
In fact, the basic price of 504,07 euro per 100 kg of car-
cass weight has not changed for the last six years and is
maintained for 2001 and the following years despite the
numerous changes in the factors which should influ-
ence this price. The Commission was unable to provide
any information as to how the basic price was calcu-
lated.
2.113. The lamb price is a market indicator and the ‘income
loss’ is an attempt to create a very simple derived indicator
that gives information about the level to which the income
falls. There are some income indicators in the statistical sys-
tems but they are very difficult to use since their estimates are
not available at the end of the marketing year when farmers
need the premium payment.
2.115. The Commission regularly prepares reports on the
situation and development of agricultural activities in the
Community, which normally includes the income of sheep
farmers. This is done using income indicators coming from
both FADN (Farm Accountancy Data Network) and Euro-
stat. Those reports are taken into account when examining
any amendments to agricultural policy.
The function of the basic price in so far as setting the pre-
mium is concerned is to provide a basis for calculating a level
which can ensure a reasonable income for producers. Further-
more, when fixing the basic price, account is taken of budget-
ary constraints, which in recent years have restricted any pos-
sible increase in expenditure.
(82) Third recital of Council Regulation (EC) No 2467/98 of
3 November 1998.
(83) OJ L 312, 20.11.1998, p. 1.
(84) OJ L 193, 29.7.2000, p. 8.
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2.116. In the Member States audited, the systems for
collecting, recording and transmitting market prices to
the Commission were examined. These prices are the
basis for determining the Community average market
price and consequently the level of Community sup-
port. A number of weaknesses and inconsistencies were
found which call into question the reliability of the sys-
tem and the accuracy of the data used:
(a) the weighting coefficients given to the various rep-
resentative markets and the categories of lamb used
for price reporting, both of which are fixed by
Regulation, do not reflect the actual situation and
prevailing selling patterns (85) in the Member States;
Community expenditure would be reduced if mar-
ket prices were collected for representative weight
categories and if coefficients reflecting throughput
were applied (86);
(b) in the Member States visited, there was little evi-
dence in support of the criteria used in selecting the
representative markets and the weighting coeffi-
cients; furthermore, the absence of adequate docu-
mentary evidence of how prices were calculated was
found to be an inherent weakness in the system;
national authorities do not check or review regu-
larly the source and accuracy of data supplied to
them;
(c) in Greece, Spain and Italy, the weight categories of
lamb used for price reporting (provided for in the
Regulation) are not representative of the market and
2.116. The Commission has evaluated the problem of price
reporting and has come to similar conclusions to the Court.
In order to obtain a truly representative price the relative
importance of the throughput on the various markets over
time should be weighted. Whilst it may be more accurate, a
system of this sort could only be made to work if up to date
detailed information on slaughterings were available. Such an
approach would render the regime far more bureaucratic than
it is at present, thereby increasing administrative costs.
The point made under (c) with regard to weight categories
highlights one of the difficulties of obtaining comparable price
information. For this reason the notion of standard quality
was established.
(85) Lamb is sold in different ways, for example, in live mar-
kets, directly to abattoirs, to dealers at the farm gate and
to cooperative organisations. Not all of these practices are
recognised in the Regulation. Furthermore, the coeffi-
cients applied to the markets which are stipulated in the
Regulation do not always reflect throughput. For instance,
in the United Kingdom the Regulation applies a weight-
ing coefficient of 97 % to live markets and 3 % to the
abattoirs. During the audit it was stated that 50 % of lamb
is sold in the live markets and 50 % is sold directly to the
abattoirs.
(86) On the basis of a sample of weeks randomly selected and
by applying adjusted coefficients to reflect the actual situ-
ation in only three Member States (United Kingdom, Ire-
land and France), it is estimated that the ewe/goat pre-
mium paid for the 1999 marketing year would be lower
by at least 52 million euro, i.e. about 3,4 % of the amount
paid.
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national production; in these countries the preferred
smaller lamb and goat carcasses, which attract higher
prices, are excluded from the reporting process (87);
this is borne out by Eurostat price figures which
show that these are up to 60 % higher than the
prices recorded under the CMO (88);
(d) with the exception of prices recorded in the live
markets, all other sources of market prices gener-
ally do not refer to the prices obtained by the pro-
ducers but instead to those obtained by traders and
wholesalers; reported prices should reflect those
received by the producers;
(e) there are differences in the administrative practices
in the Member States and even within Member
States (89), which affect the comparability of the
prices reported.
Late and incomplete premium statistics
2.117. In Commission Regulation (EEC) No
2700/93 (90), Article 2 requires Member States to
send to the Commission, by a certain date, statistical
information relating to premium applications. In the
period 1997 to 1999 only Germany, Ireland and
the United Kingdom submitted the information by the
2.117. The problem of obtaining statistics in a timely fash-
ion from Member States is not unique to the sheep and goat
sector. The situation is not helped in this sector by the fact that
the obligations to provide information are not set down clearly.
The reform of the regime will provide the opportunity to
improve texts and make the requirements much clearer.
(87) According to Eurostat statistics on lambs slaughtered in
1999, the average weight in kilos per carcass was 9,73 in
Greece, 11,07 in Spain and 6,62 in Italy. Commission
Regulation (EEC) No 1481/86 requires that market prices
for these three countries are reported for lambs weighing
between 12 and 16 kilos carcas weight.
(88) New Cronos data for fattening lambs between 2 and 12
months, which is the category comparable with that cov-
ered by the CMO, converted from live weight to carcas
weight.
(89) For example the prices recorded in the marché de Rungis
(France) refer to wholesale prices, while in the market of
Athens the recorded wholesale prices are reduced by 10 %
to eliminate the margin enjoyed by the wholesalers and
the prices reported by the market in Rome do not refer to
transactions within the market but to prices collected by
phone from slaughterhouses. In Spain for certain regions
the prices reported are indicative prices for the forthcom-
ing week and not actual prices. In some Member States
information about prices is collected by phone or set by
a committee while in other Member States the prices are
based on detailed documentary evidence obtained from
live markets and slaughterhouses.
(90) OJ L 245, 1.10.1993, p. 99.
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specified date. At the time of the audit, delays by the
other Member States ranged from three to eighteen
months. Furthermore, the Commission did not have at
its disposal complete information about the number of
applications for the ewe premium submitted in the last
three years. Information necessary for the management
and the control of the scheme is clearly not available on
a timely basis.
Unclear individual rights and unused quotas
2.118. The situation concerning the total of the indi-
vidual rights is unclear and it was not possible to obtain
confirmation by comparing the total number of rights
held in each Member State with those detailed in inter-
nal Commission documents. While global national ceil-
ings for premium rights are set for Austria, Finland and
Sweden respectively, no officially fixed ceilings exist for
the other Member States. The Commission’s latest fig-
ures indicate that in the United Kingdom the premium
was paid on a number of animals in excess of the total
of the individual rights in 1994 and 1996 (91).
2.119. From1993 to 1999 the average use of the quota
at Community level has been about 91,7 %. The admin-
istrative complexity of the system and the national pro-
cedures laid down are such that, regardless of demand,
100 % of quota will never be used.
Doubtful basis for additional ewe and goat premium in
less-favoured areas (LFA); absence of regular review of
areas classified
2.120. Sheep and goat farming is found predominantly
in LFAs (about 80 % of the animals) where few alterna-
tives exist. In addition to the ewe premium, specific aid
is available for producers farming in these areas. The aid
is a flat-rate premium per ewe/goat which has remained
2.118. The ceilings per Member State are the sum of rights
allocated to individual farmers calculated on the basis of
claims for the premium submitted during a reference year. To
clarify the situation, it is proposed under the reform of the
regime to publish the national ceilings in an annex to the
basic regulation.
2.119. Firstly a small percentage of quota can be kept in the
national reserve. In addition some producers may not use their
full entitlement. The reasons for this can be structural or eco-
nomic and not only due to the complexity of administrative
procedures. For example in 1999 quota usage ranged from
59 % in Finland and 70 % in Germany to 98 % and 99 %
in Spain and the United Kingdom respectively.
2.120. The flat-rate supplement for producers in less-
favoured areas, or rural world premium, was introduced ini-
tially as a means of protecting such producers from fluctua-
tions in the premium following the introduction of stabilisers.
It was acknowledged that these producers enjoyed less
(91) TheCommission’s clearance of accounts services are inves-
tigating this matter.
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unchanged since 1995 (92). During the audit, no evi-
dence was provided justifying the level of this premium.
Furthermore, the Commission does not have any data
on the differing costs of production and income between
producers farming in less-favoured areas and those farm-
ing in other areas.
2.121. The lists of less-favoured areas in each Member
State, first established in 1975, have been modified sev-
eral times. In all cases the modification has increased
the amount of land designated as less-favoured. The
total area classified as less-favoured, expressed as a per-
centage of the total utilised agricultural area (UAA), was
33,9 % in 1975, 49,2 % in 1988 and 55,2 % in 1998.
There is no evidence that the Member States or the
Commission conduct anyprogrammedor regular review
of the status of the areas classified as less-favoured.
Related Community measures
2.122. There are interactions between sheep and goat
farming and Community measures such as rural devel-
opment and environmental protection measures, espe-
cially for farming in the less-favoured areas. The eligibil-
ity conditions for these measures and the level of the
Community support have an impact on sheep farming
flexibility in responding to changing market conditions and
that the loss of income resulting from the stabiliser effect
would be likely to have unfavourable consequences. The evalu-
ation study found that producers in less-favoured areas had
generally fared better, when compared to the average, than
other producers. It can be concluded therefore that it has been
a successful instrument.
2.121. As regards the classification procedure, it must be
pointed out that in conformity with community legislation on
less-favoured areas (Regulation (EC) No 1257/1999, which
replaced Regulation (EC) No 950/97), the Commission is
responsible only for checking that amendments to the list of
less-favoured areas proposed by Member States respect the
Community classification criteria. This Regulation does not
provide for a regular review of the status of already classified
areas and does not allow the Commission to propose a modi-
fication of the approved list or to refuse a modification of the
list if the classification criteria are respected.
As for the increase of the percentage of LFA of the total uti-
lised agricultural area the increase between 1975 and 1988
is largely due to the accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal
and the increase between 1988 and 1998 is caused by the
enlargement with Austria, Finland and Sweden all six coun-
tries having a very high proportion of LFAs.
Mindful of the fact that the less-favoured areas may increase
in scope and lead to increases in the numbers of farmers eli-
gible to receive the supplement, the Commission in its pro-
posal to reform the regime proposed that additional criteria
be taken into account by Member States when they determine
the areas where the supplement may be paid. In any event
such areas may not be outside less-favoured areas.
2.122. The Commission is aware of the interactions between
sheep and goat farming and the Rural Development measures
part-financed by the EU. While the impact of some of these
measures (e.g. investment aid, setting up aid) on the economic
situation of sheep and goat farmers should not be underesti-
mated, the Commission wishes to underline that:
(92) 6,641 euro per ewe to producers of heavy lambs and5,977
euro per ewe/goat to producers of light lambs/goats.
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and on farmers’ income. The Court found that the
national and Commission services had not calculated
the impact the various schemes may have on budget,
production and farmer income.
2.123. The Court’s Special Report No 14/2000 (93) on
‘Greening the CAP’ reported on overgrazing issues in
the sheep and goat sector in certain regions of Greece,
Ireland and the United Kingdom (paragraphs 23 and
24). Article 9 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2467/98
provides that Member States may apply appropriate
environmental protection measures on the basis of the
specific situation of the land used for the production of
sheep and goats. Greece (for the region of Attica) and
the United Kingdom took some measures under this
provision, while Ireland, in order to address the prob-
lem of overgrazing on commonage land, introduced an
interim national framework plan in 1998 (94) pending
the preparation of commonage framework plans within
the rural environmental protection scheme (REPS).
The recent Commission proposal does not fully address
the shortcomings identified by the Court
2.124. The Commission’s proposal focuses mainly on
the setting of the premium. When it announced its new
proposal, it admitted that the method for calculating
the premium was flawed due, principally, to the com-
plicated nature of the system and the lack of uniformity
in the Member States’ approach.
2.125. The Commission proposed a flat-rate premium
of 21 euro per animal. This is based on the average of
the premiums from 1998 to 2000. While this flat-rate
premium will remove the ambiguities and uncertainties
of the old system, it does not reflect the situation in the
market.
(1) agri-environmental measures compensate farmers only
for the costs incurred or the income foregone, linked to the
fulfilment of commitments going beyond good farming
practices and
(2) compensatory allowances for less-favoured areas aim at
compensating the severity of any permanent natural
handicap affecting farming activities.
2.123. In drawing up its proposal for reforming the regime,
much consideration was given to the environmental effects of
sheep and goat farming. In the framework of the rules on
cross-compliance with environmental protection requirements
established in Regulation (EC) No 1259/1999, Member
States are obliged to analyse the impact of agricultural sec-
tors on the environment. They must draw up annual progress
reports on the implementation of the measures and penalties,
including an assessment of their effects.
In the proposal to reform the regime the Commission has pro-
posed that it draw up a report taking into account in particu-
lar reports presented by Member States, which should provide
a good basis for monitoring cross-compliance with environ-
mental requirements.
2.125. In fixing the level of the flat-rate premium the aver-
age of 1998, 1999 and 2000 was taken as a starting point.
This figure (EUR 20,6) and the Rural World supplement of
EUR 6,641 were rounded up to EUR 21 and EUR 7 respec-
tively. When making the proposal the Commission respected
the principle of budgetary neutrality and the need to remain
within the framework of the financial perspective for agricul-
tural expenditure agreed during the Agenda 2000 reforms.
(93) OJ C 353, 8.12.2000.
(94) With regard to certain commonages the interim national
framework plan provides for an immediate 30 % reduc-
tion in sheep numbers and for the years 1999 and 2000
the freezing of quota rights at 70 % of the 1998 entitle-
ment.
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2.126. Another element of the Commission proposal
is the introduction of specific national quotas. This
responds to the Court’s criticism of the existing situa-
tion (see paragraph 2.118) and is to be welcomed.
2.127. Weaknesses identified by the Court but not
covered by the new proposal are the absence of specific
and quantified objectives (see paragraph 2.113) and the
failure of Member States to communicate essential sta-
tistics concerning premium applications (see para-
graph 2.117).
Conclusion
2.128. In so far as the current regime is concerned, the
Court’s audit shows that many of the shortcomings
revealed in Special Report No 3/95 still persist. The rec-
ommendations made then were not followed, as is evi-
denced by the absence of clearly defined objectives and
periodic appraisal of their attainment (see para-
graph 2.113), the deficiencies in setting the basic price,
the market price and subsequently the level of the pre-
mium (see paragraphs 2.114 to 2.116), the failure of the
Member States to communicate premium statistics (see
paragraph 2.117), and the lack of regular review of the
status of the less-favoured areas (see paragraph 2.121).
Recommendations
2.129. Over and above its new proposal, the Commis-
sion should:
(a) determine specific and quantified objectives against
which the performance of the scheme can be mea-
sured,
(b) re-examine the basis of the flat-rate premium it
proposes to introduce,
(c) ensure that Member States fulfil their obligation to
supply statistics by the specified date,
2.128. As recommended by the Court in its Special Report
No 3/95, the Commission carried out a study of the regime,
which was completed in 2000. On the basis of the evalua-
tion study and its own reflections on the operation of the ewe
premium scheme in particular, the Commission decided to
present its proposal to reform the regime with the aim of cor-
recting the current deficiencies in the light of recent experience
and the perspectives for the sheepmeat market.
The Commission can agree with many of the observations
made by the Court, which also concur with some of the find-
ings contained in the report of this evaluation, in particular
with regard to price reporting and the methodology used for
the calculation of the premium. A number of shortcomings
identified in the Special Report No 3/95 have been addressed.
For example, it is proposed that the fattening regime be abol-
ished.
In conformity with Community legislation on less-favoured
areas the Commission competence consists in checking that
the modifications of the list of less favoured areas proposed by
Member States respect the community classification criteria.
2.129. In its conclusions, the evaluation study identified a
number of options, which included maintaining the status
quo, improving the present system or modifying the regime.
Given the findings of the evaluation study, it was not consid-
ered acceptable to maintain the status quo. The administra-
tive burden which would be imposed by trying to improve the
present regime was also considered to be unacceptable. The
results that could be obtained would be uncertain. The improve-
ment of the present system would involve obtaining a quality
of data and information, which is just not available, at least
in the short term.
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(d) review the continuing status of areas designated as
less-favoured and
(e) review the interaction between the different Com-
munity measures affecting the sheepmeat and goat-
meat sector, with a view to making proposals for
improving their impact.
The Commission’s management of the common organi-
sation of the market in fruit and vegetables
Introduction
2.130. In its 1994 Annual Report (95), the Court com-
mented on the increasing imbalance in the fruit and
vegetable markets for certain products and weaknesses
in control which resulted in high withdrawal costs to
the budget. In 1996 the Commission introduced a
reform of the Common Market Organisation (CMO)
which came into force on 1 January 1997 (96).
2.131. In its1998AnnualReport (97), theCourt assessed
the extent towhich the reform’s newmeasures addressed
its criticism. The actual implementation of the reform
was not part of the audit at this time. Modifications of
the CMO were introduced in December 2000 (98) and
entered into force for the 2001/2002 marketing year.
The draft proposal before the budgetary authorities recognises
that certain aspects of the regime have worked well, such as
individual limits, for example, in maintaining balance and
stability in the sector. It also acknowledges that, whilst it may
be cumbersome, the present mechanism has resulted in an
appropriate level of premium.
The main modification to the regime concerns the replacement
of the deficiency payment by a flat-rate payment. This will be
stable and predictable and, being a known fixed amount, will
allow forward planning and simplify farm management. It
will enable producers to respond more readily to market sig-
nals. By carrying out this modification it will also be possible
to simplify the administration of the premium regime and
avoid the need for burdensome price reporting procedures and
complex calculations. As the proposal removes the link between
the premium and prices and production it is more adapted to
the objectives of the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The
change to a fixed premium will also result in a greater degree
of budgetary certainty, as the fluctuations in the level of the
premium seen in the past would disappear.
(95) Annual Report of the Court of Auditors of the European
Communities concerning the financial year 1994, Chap-
ter 2 (OJ C 303, 14.11.1995).
(96) Council Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 of 28 October 1996
on the common organisation of the market in fruit and
vegetables; Council Regulation (EC) No 2201/96 of
28 October 1996 on the common organisation of the
markets in processed fruit and vegetable products; Coun-
cil Regulation (EC) No 2202/96 of 28 October 1996
introducing a Community aid scheme for producers of
certain citrus fruits (OJ L 297, 21.11.1996).
(97) Annual Report of the Court of Auditors of the European
Communities concerning the financial year 1998, Chap-
ter 2 (OJ C 349, 3.12.1999).
(98) Council Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000 of 4 December
2000 (OJ L 311, 12.12.2000, p. 9).
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2.132. This report examines the extent to which the
implementation of themeasures under the 1996Reform
have addressed previous problems. It also examines the
extent to which the latest modifications are intended to
address remaining shortcomings.
2.133. The audit concentrated on the key elements of
the reform intended to reduce structural imbalances, to
increase the role and membership of producer organi-
sations (POs), their funding and their operational pro-
grammes. It also examined the management of with-
drawals from the market and the processing of certain
fruit (peaches, pears and citrus fruits). The fieldwork
was carried out in the fivemain producerMember States
namely, Greece, Spain, France, Italy and the Nether-
lands, where EAGGF expenditure on operational funds,
operational programmes, withdrawals or processing is
most significant.
Production is concentrated in the South and remains
fragmented
2.134. Current annual EU fresh fruit and vegetable
production is about 30 and 55 million tonnes respec-
tively. EU production is concentrated mainly in the
southern Member States, Italy being the biggest pro-
ducerwith 25 million tonnes, followed by Spain (21 mil-
lion tonnes). In terms of production value, these two
Member States account for 50 % of total EU marketed
production (see Table 2.7). Since 1980, EU production
of fruit has increased in volume by 12 % and that of
vegetables by 20 %. Consumption of fresh fruit and
vegetables has remained stable at some 29 and 41 mil-
lion tonnes respectively but is increasing for processed
fruit, notably fruit-juice.
2.135. Production of fresh produce is characterised by
wide variations in volume reflecting climatic condi-
tions. While, on the demand side a small number of
large retailers have dominated the market, supply has
remained dispersed and fragmented.
2.132. The Commission would remind the Court that while
it was preparing its report under Regulation (EC)
No 2200/96, it presented proposals to the Council in July
2000, to tackle ‘four important issues (...) which need address-
ing urgently’. These issues were listed as the rigidity of the
arrangement for processed tomatoes; the level of the guarantee
quantities (quotas or thresholds) for processed tomatoes, pears
and citrus fruit; simplification of the operational fund system
and improvement in the management of export refunds.
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Regulatory framework and budgetary significance
2.136. The sector is governed by two CMOs, one for
fresh and one for processed products. They utilise the
following main measures:
(a) incentives for producers to join POs in order to
enhanceproductionandchannel sales through them;
(b) financing of withdrawals of surplus production to
stabilise prices;
(c) for a limited range of fresh fruit and vegetables
intended for processing, production aid paid to pro-
ducers; before the 2000 modifications, production
aid for peaches and pears was paid to processors on
condition that they paid contracted producers a
specified minimum price.
Table 2.7 — Value of marketed production of fresh fruit and vegetables of Member States; value of marketed
production via producer organisations
(Mio EUR)
Member states
Total marketed production Marketed production of all producer organisations
Average 1999/2000 value % Value % of total value of marketed production
(1) (2) (3) (4 = 3:1)
B 1 038,43 3 738,14 71
DK 167,50 1 48,54 29
D 1 735,84 6 593,97 34
EL 2 159,38 7 325,00 15
E 6 768,57 22 3 391,51 50
F 4 889,19 16 2 709,93 55
IRL 186,51 1 17,62 9
I 8 700,00 28 2 347,84 27
L 5,00 0 0,00 0
NL 2 279,00 7 1 618,61 71
A 344,11 1 59,88 17
P 782,49 3 61,13 8
FIN 174,61 1 22,51 13
S 166,22 1 67,02 40
UK 1 740,96 6 457,91 26
Total EU 31 137,81 100 12 459,61 40
Source: Report from the Commission to the Council on the state of implementation of Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 (COM(2001)36 final).
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2.137. Since 1996, annual Community expenditure on
fruit and vegetables (excluding bananas) (99) has been
about 1 300 million euro, some 3 % of total EAGGF
Guarantee expenditure (see Table 2.8). The value of
production represents some 15 % of total EU agricul-
tural production. Overall, the trend of expenditure for
withdrawals has been downward and has fluctuated
between some 100 and 300 million euro. It amounted
to 169 million euro in 2000. Expenditure for
(99) The CMO for bananas is the subject of a separate audit.
Table 2.8 — Total expenditure from 1994 to 2000 for the CMO for fruit and vegetables
(Mio EUR)
Budget line Title 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Fruit and vegetables - Fresh
1-1500 Export refund 187 203 73 67 41 23 33
1-1501 Withdrawals 390 360 164 294 138 91 169
1-1502 Operational fund of POs 2 0 0 6 239 256 270
1-1504 Hazelnut 0 0 0 0 4 5 10
1-1505 Grubbing up 0 127 108 0 67 20 0
1-1506 Promotion measures 9 6 7 0 0 0 0
1-1507 Nuts 89 75 80 77 110 94 107
1-1508 Bananas 138 116 203 206 208 178 235
1-1509 Other Interventions 9 11 21 19 34 15 9
1-150 Total fresh 824 898 656 669 841 682 833
Fruit and vegetables - Processed
1-1510 Export refund 30 36 25 17 18 17 13
1-1511 Production aid — Tomatoes 362 377 357 372 328 322 279
1-1512 Production aid — Fruit-based products 97 111 138 144 87 94 84
1-1513 Production aid — Dried grapes 109 122 130 121 115 128 122
1-1514 Production aid — Tinned pineapple 4 5 17 4 6 8 5
1-1515/1503 Compensation — Citrus fruits 130 282 235 244 113 203 215
1-1516 Production aid — Raspberries 1 1 1 1 0 1 1
1-1517 Specific measures (Asparagus) 0 0 0 0 3 2 1
1-1519 Other Interventions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1-151 Total processed 733 934 903 903 670 775 720
1-159 Other (=recoveries) 0 0 – 3 0 0 – 2
Total fresh and processed 1 557 1 832 1 559 1 569 1 511 1 457 1 551
Source: Sincom.
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operational funds managed by producer organisations,
created by the 1996 reform, rose from 239 million euro
in 1998 to 270 million euro in 2000.
The main problems reported previously by the Court
and the 1996 Reform
2.138. The 1996Reform addressed certain of the prob-
lems identified by the Court in 1994 with regard to:
(a) the absence or inadequacy of PO funds,
(b) the limited membership of POs,
(c) the unacceptably high level of withdrawals for cer-
tain products and weak procedures for withdraw-
ing,
(d) the ineffectiveness of the fixing of prices and aid
levels for processed products,
(e) the limited role of the threshold mechanism (100) as
a means of reducing surplus production,
(f) weak controls and inadequate monitoring.
The changes introduced are described in para-
graphs 2.139 to 2.142.
Enhancing the role of producer organisations (POs)
2.139. The 1996 reform sought to reduce withdrawals
by channelling a bigger part of production to the mar-
ket. For this purpose, it enhanced the role of POs and
gave incentives to farmers to join them. It introduced
operational funds for recognised POs, co-financed by
the Community and the producers themselves. They
2.139. The Commission would point out that the two pos-
sible uses of operational funds, i.e. to finance either opera-
tional programmes or withdrawals, are complementary mea-
sures, each with a role to play in market management, in the
one case affecting its short-term operation and in the other its
structural aspects.
(100) Withdrawal compensations and production aid are
reduced in the following year if the quantities withdrawn
or the quantities processed exceed the established limits
(intervention thresholds and processing thresholds). The
threshold mechanism was ineffective because it did not
have an immediate effect on production.
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were to be used mainly for implementation of opera-
tional programmes, approved by Member States, for
adapting production to demand and improving quality
and marketing. They could also be used to supplement
Community payments for withdrawals and to pay com-
pensation for the withdrawal of other products which
were not eligible for Community aid.
Reducing the levels of aid
2.140. The 1996 reform limited the quantities eligible
for withdrawals, reduced the level of aid and simplified
the scheme. The CMO also required produce to be
destroyed only as a last resort giving preference to free
distribution, disposal for animal feed, processing and
non-food use. Intervention thresholds were maintained
as a complementary measure for a transitional period
(up to 2002).
2.141. In order to encourage POs to present their prod-
ucts for processing rather than for withdrawals, produc-
tion aid for citrus fruits became payable directly to them
as opposed to the aid for processed peaches and pears
which continued to be paid to processors. For citrus
fruits, the reductions in aid (101) due to overshoots of
the processing threshold, applied to POs and for pro-
cessed peaches and pears, to processors.
Improving controls and achieving better monitoring
2.142. The changes adopted in order to improve con-
trols and achieve better monitoring were to include new
and stricter criteria for the recognition of producer
organisations. Formal approval of operational pro-
grammes at Member State level was introduced as well
as monitoring of their implementation. New rules for
withdrawals were put in place. A special corps of inspec-
tors, comprising national and Commission staff, was to
be introduced in order to supervise the uniform appli-
cation of controls in Member States. Finally, the reform
required the Commission to report to the Council on
the implementation of the 1996 reform by 31 Decem-
ber 2000.
(101) Proportional reductions in the following years aid level
follow overshoots of the threshold.
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The implementation of the 1996 Reform was only par-
tially successful
Performance of producer organisations has been variable
Prob l ems wi th the funding of produce r organi sa t ions
2.143. Community co-financing of POs’ operational
funds was subject to a double limit: the Community
contribution to an individual PO could not exceed 4,5 %
of the value of its marketed production (VMP) but the
total amount given to all POs could not exceed 2,5 % of
the total value of production marketed through all EU
producer organisations. Thus the amounts available
each year could only be notified to them after the
implementation of the programme for the financial year
concerned. The 4,5 % was therefore not guaranteed for
the individual POs and this created uncertainty with
regard to the amount of support they would get.
2.144. The value of productionmarketed through POs
varies greatly from one PO to another (see Table 2.7):
the average VMP by PO ranges from 1,46 million euro
in Portugal to 145 million euro in the Netherlands (see
Table 2.9). Moreover, some 10 % of the POs received
50 % of total EU aid with an average of nearly 2 mil-
lion euro per organisation. In contrast 47 % of POs
received less than 100 000 euro (102).
2.145. As a result, resources did not reach Member
States in proportion to the level and value of their total
production. This is due to the fact that both the number
of POs and the level of participation of farmers varies
between Member States, leading to big differences in the
proportion of total production being marketed through
POs. For example, the Netherlands, which accounts for
about 7 % by value of total EU production, received
15 % of the operational funds. Conversely Italy and
Greece which account for 28 % and 7 % of production
by value received 21 % and less than 1 % of the funds
respectively (see Table 2.10). At regional level within
2.144. The Commission did suggest in its communication
to the Council and Parliament of July 1994 on the develop-
ment and future of Community policy in the fruit and veg-
etables sector (1), that aid for producer organisations should
be based on a degressive sliding scale related to the size of the
PO concerned. This idea of paying particular attention to the
difficulties of small producer organisations came in for so
much criticism that the Commission dropped it from its pro-
posals in October 1995. It should also be noted that there is
no simple direct correlation between a producer organisation’s
turnover and how many members it has or its members’ indi-
vidual turnover. In other words, a ‘big’ producer organisation
may be made up of a very large number of small individual
producers.
2.145. One of the main principles underlying the reform
was to concentrate the bulk of Community financial assistance
for the fruit and vegetable sector on producer organisations. It
seems more appropriate therefore when judging the break-
down of Community aid by Member State to compare this aid
and the value of production marketed by producer organisa-
tions in eachMember State. The figures (average for the period
1997 to 2000) are as follows:
(1) COM(94) 360 final of 27 July 1994.
(102) Report from the Commission to the Council on the state
of implementation of Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 on
the common organisation of the market in fruit and
vegetables (COM(2001) 36 final), paragraph 2.5,
page 24.
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Table 2.9 — Average value of marketed production of fresh fruit and vegetables by producer organisation with an
operational programme
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N. B.: This chart shows that the average value of production marketed by producer organisation in Belgium and the Netherlands was at least between 6 and 7 times
greater than in other Member States.
Source: Report from the Commission to the Council on the state of implementation of Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 (COM (2001)36 final).
Table 2.10 — Fresh fruit and vegetables: proportion of the value of marketed production of the Member States
compared to proportion of operational funds granted to their producer organisations for the period 1997 to 2000
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N. B.: This chart shows that there is little correlation between the value of the marketed production of the Member States and the funding granted to their producer
organisations.
Source: Report from the Commission to the Council on the state of implementation of Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 (COM (2001) 36 final) and financial reports 1997
to 2000.
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Member States, the distribution of resources was also
disproportionate. For example, in Italy, 90 % of the
resources went to the POs in the North although pro-
duction is concentrated in the Centre and the South.
The complex i t y o f the regu la t ions has re su l t ed in measure s
wi th in the opera t iona l prog rammes which are inappropr ia t e
and incons i s t en t
2.146. The implementing procedures gave Member
States responsibility for approving the operational pro-
grammes put forward by the POs. However, the proce-
dures were complex and cumbersome. In some cases,
they left Member States and POs significant room for
manoeuvre and were susceptible to misinterpretation as
evidenced by the 130 plus explanatory notes which the
Member State
Member States producer
organisations’ share in total
Community production by
POs (%)
Member States share in Com-
munity aid to operational
funds (%)
Belgium 6 7
Denmark 0,5 0,4
Germany 5 4
Greece 2 0,9
Spain 25 26
France 22 22
Ireland 0,2 0,2
Italy 20 21
Netherlands 14 14
Austria 0,4 0,3
Portugal 1 0,2
Finland 0,2 0,0
Sweden 0,5 0,4
United
Kingdom 4 4
These figures show that a real difficulty arises only for Por-
tugal and Greece. In these two Member States, as the Com-
mission noted in its report of December 2000, the producer
organisations are in a weaker position in terms of marketed
production, and the percentage of POs applying for opera-
tional funds is also lower than in the rest of the Community.
However, this is true only for that part of production that is
marketed as fresh produce. In the case of processing and export
aid, the Mediterranean countries receive more Community
support than the other Member States.
In its communication of July 1994, the Commission advised
against the general introduction of area payments for fruit
and vegetables whereby financial aid would be directly linked
to each individual producer’s production. In deciding on and
approving the reform in October 1996, the Council and Par-
liament followed the Commission’s lead on this point.
2.146 to 2.149. The Commission reiterates that, in the
interests of subsidiarity and to avoid a technocratic approach
divorced from reality and enable the producer organisations to
make the best use of Community money to address the specific
local difficulties each one of them encountered, it was decided
to implement the rules for the application of operational pro-
grammes in stages. The first stage consisted of Regulation
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Commission issued in response to the numerous que-
ries from Member States (103).
2.147. The Commission did not specify sufficiently the
criteria for operational programmes. Two years after
their introduction, the Commission had produced only
a ‘non-exhaustive’ list of ineligible measures (104). Some
derogations relating to the ineligibility of general pro-
duction costs, overhead expenditure, individual actions
to the direct benefit of a limited number of members,
were also permitted. This has resulted in variations in
implementation between Member States and even
regions within them, and the approval of programmes
that were unclear.
2.148. Because the Commission did not specify how it
wanted PO expenditure to be classified, various prac-
tices were adopted in the Member States/Regions. Dis-
similar measures were put under the same heading, thus
making it difficult to extract reliable data for evaluation.
2.149. Owing to the imprecise nature of certain dero-
gations accorded by the Commission in Regulation (EC)
No 1647/98, certain inconsistencies were noted in the
Member States. POs visited in Spain, France and Italy
devoted a significant share of their programmes to
refunding overhead expenditure and general costs at the
expense of measures that would more directly improve
their competitiveness and performance. In particular,
there were examples of high expenditure on personnel
in Emilia-Romagna, representing in some cases more
than 50 % of the total programme expenditure. For the
four POs visited in Andalusia, general overheads and
personnel expenditure represented some 70 % of the
programmes. High reimbursements by POs to indi-
vidual members were noted in France. Furthermore,
although there was a clear need for increased invest-
ment in computer technology in the French POs, expen-
diture was very low in this area.
(EC) No 411/97, which merely contained a general frame-
work. This was followed by interpretative notes dealing with
specific points, then by Regulation (EC) No 1647/98, which
established a ‘non-exhaustive list of ineligible operations and
expenditure’ and lastly by Regulation (EC) No 609/2001,
which specifies what operations and expenditure are eligible
and which ones are not.
The Court says the Commission failed to classify the various
categories of expenditure by producer organisations precisely
enough or to pay sufficient attention to the ‘clear need for
increased investment in computer technology in the French
POs’. The Commission would point out that, with regard to
operational programmes, it wanted to avoid taking over the
producer organisations’ role without any guarantee that such
a move would be effective.
The Commission welcomes the Court’s criticism that there is
a contradiction between withdrawals and the construction of
new greenhouses or new plantations. Perhaps not enough
attention has been devoted to this point and it should now be
reviewed.
(103) Following requests by Member States concerning certain
provisions of the regulations, interpretative notes are
sent by the Commission to the latter. These interpreta-
tive notes are normally adopted by the Commission and
distributed to all Member States in the management
Committee’smeetings. Interpretative notes have no bind-
ing effects.
(104) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1647/98 (OJ L 210,
28.7.1998, p. 59).
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2.150. Some measures in operational programmes
were incompatible with the market situation. For
example, in Spain, some POs financed new orange
plantations and construction of greenhouses for toma-
toes although they had previously withdrawn 30 % and
40 % respectively of their production of oranges and
tomatoes.
Many produce r s a re s t i l l no t pe r suaded o f the bene f i t s o f
produce r organi sa t ions
2.151. The reform anticipated that membership would
increase through the new funding provided to POs.
However, in Greece and in Southern Italy, producers
continued to prefer to sell their production individually
rather than joining producer organisations. Moreover,
the limited use of operational programmes in these
regions by producer organisations illustrated that they
were content to claim compensation aid for withdraw-
als or processing, without making serious attempts to
adapt their production to the market.
2.152. Individual producers who did not join an
organisation and were not obliged to follow their rules,
were still permitted to claim withdrawal and process-
ing aid though at a slightly reduced rate of 90 %. More-
over, they were still able to sell their production on local
markets, sometimes at more favourable rates than those
offered by the local PO.
The propor t i on o f p roduc t i on mark e t ed th rough produce r
organi sa t ions i s s t i l l too low to ach i e ve the potent ia l ben-
e f i t s
2.153. At European level, the value of the production
marketed through POs (organised VMP) between 1997
and 1999 rose by only 5 % to 40 % of total production,
well below the target level of 60 % initially foreseen by
the Commission. In individual Member States the level
of the organised VMP varied from some 70 % for the
Netherlands, where producers are well organised, to as
low as 8 % for Portugal, where this is not the case (see
Table 2.7). At Regional level, the variations were simi-
lar. For example, in Italy, the organised VMP ranged
from some 62 % for the North to 31 % in the South and
as little as 7 % in the Centre.
2.151. The Commission regrets that some producer organi-
sations have not been very effective. It stresses that the prime
objective the common market organisation sets for producer
organisations is to bring production into line with market
demand, in terms of both quantity and quality. It emphasises
that responsibility for the recognition of producer organisa-
tions and for the withdrawal of recognition lies with the
Member States. The Commission will step up its controls to
improve the situation described by the Court.
2.152. Withdrawals are not designed to boost the incomes
of ‘good’ producer members of a producer organisation but as
a macro-economic measure to even out short-term fluctua-
tions in total production and help keep it in line with demand.
Excluding individual producers altogether would make them
overstock the market with manifestly surplus products. This
would adversely affect the market price to the detriment of all
concerned and, in particular, members of producer organisa-
tions, whose efforts would thus be penalised. The same applies
to processing aid.
2.153. The figure of 60 % of Community production of
fruit and vegetables marketed by producer organisations was
only an estimate on which calculations were based for the
financial statement accompanying the reform proposals in
1995, and it is referred to as a forecast in the proposal trans-
mitted to the Council in July 2000.
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The management of withdrawals continues to be weak and
reductions in aid for overproduction are ineffective
2.154. The 1996 reform has been successful in reduc-
ing expenditure on withdrawals. In 2000, it was 10 %
(169 million euro) of the CMO expenditure, compared
to 25 % (390 million euro) in 1994. At Member State
level, withdrawal expenditure remained high in those
countries where producers were not yet affiliated to
producer organisations. For example in 2000, with-
drawal aid in Greece and Italy was some 52 million
euro compared with only 1,7 million euro in the Neth-
erlands. The same products were involved as in 1994
namely: apples, peaches, nectarines, oranges and cauli-
flower which, together, consumed more than 75 % of
withdrawal aid in 2000. This indicates that there has
been insufficient adaptation of these markets. During
the 1999/2000 marketing year, withdrawals of peaches,
nectarines and cauliflower exceeded their intervention
thresholds. Structural surpluses continue to persist at
European level, especially for nectarines and peaches.
2.155. The reductions in aid, calculated by the Com-
mission (105) for exceeding withdrawal thresholds, were
too low to act as a deterrent. For example, in the case
of cauliflower, a 6,3 % overshoot of the intervention
threshold in 1997/1998 was followed by a reduction in
aid of only 0,34 %. This did not prevent a substantial
increase in the production the following year and sub-
sequent overshoots of the thresholds of respectively
7,8 % and of 51 % for 1998/1999 and 1999/2000. The
corresponding reductions in aid were only 0,4 % and
2,36 % respectively. The same was observed in the case
of nectarines where a 150 % overshoot in 1999/2000
generated a penalty of only 15 %. While this approach
2.154. The Commission takes the view that it may well be
too soon to draw conclusions about the impact of the 1996
reform on withdrawals after only three marketing years. For
these three marketing years withdrawals were limited to 60 %,
50 % and 40 % respectively of the quantities marketed,
whereas the final limit, applicable from 2002/2003 (per-
centages of the quantities actually marketed) will be 5 % for
citrus fruit, 8,5 % for apples and pears and 10 % for the
other products concerned. The adaptation of products such as
peaches and nectarines in particular needs to be judged over
the long term because these are perennial crops.
2.155. The Commission would stress that the two ways in
which the 1996 reform aims to reduce withdrawals are by
limiting the percentages eligible for withdrawal and by pro-
gressively reducing the amount of the Community compensa-
tion for withdrawal. The only reason why the intervention
thresholds were maintained during the transitional period
while the limit on quantities eligible for withdrawal remained
high (60 %, 50 %, 40 %) was to prevent the reform from
giving producers easier access to withdrawals in the first years
of application than was the case before the reform. The Com-
mission therefore logically continued to apply the intervention
thresholds in the same way as the Council had done in the
past.
(105) The Commission calculates the reductions in aid by
dividing the quantities of withdrawals above the inter-
vention threshold by total production. The result is then
applied to the following year’s aid as a reduction. For
example, for the 1998/1999 marketing year, the thresh-
old for withdrawals of cauliflower had been fixed at
111 300 tonnes. Withdrawals reached 120 064 tonnes
which represented an overshoot of 8 764 tonnes, i.e
7,8 % of the threshold. The aid should then be reduced
by 7,8 %. However, the reduction in aid calculated by the
Commission was much lower since it divided the over-
shoot (8 764 tonnes) by total production (2 226 908
tonnes), which represented a reduction in aid of only
0,4 %. Thus the following year aid was only reduced by
this percentage.
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is not irregular, it is highly inefficient for the purpose of
market management. This system of reducing aid was
in contrast to that applied by the Commission to pro-
cessing aid where the reductions were equal to the pro-
duction above the threshold. Had such a system applied
to cauliflower for the 1997/1998, 1998/1999 and
1999/2000 marketing years, aid would have been
reduced by 6,3 %, 7,8 % and 51 % respectively and the
EU budget would have benefited by some 1,8 million
euro.
2.156. Inconsistencies were found in the data for with-
drawals provided by the Commission. The Commission
published (106) figures for withdrawals of cauliflower of
118 908 tonnes, 120 064 tonnes and 170 502 tonnes
for 1997/1998, 1998/1999 and 1999/2000 respec-
tively. These figures had been supplied by the Member
States and were used without verification by the Com-
mission to calculate the overshoot above the threshold
and the corresponding reductions to be applied to the
following marketing year’s withdrawal aid. However, in
the event, the aid paid by the Commission for these
marketing years was 16 million euro, 10,3 million euro
and 15,4 million euro, based on actual withdrawals of
172 181 tonnes, 116 696 tonnes and 184 042 tonnes,
without the correct reductions in aid having been
applied. Indeed, if the processed aid method of reduc-
tion had been applied, the aid for cauliflower for
1998/1999 would have been reduced to 63,27 euro/
tonne instead of 88,49 euro/tonne, with a supplemen-
tary saving of some 2,9 million euro. For 1999/2000,
an additional saving of 3,5 million euro would have
been made, following the same method. Inconsistencies
also exist in the figures for peach and nectarine with-
drawals for the 1999/2000 marketing year.
2.156. A cut in Community withdrawal compensation
based on the threshold being exceeded can be applied only
before the marketing year has started. Failure to observe this
rule would entitle producers to consider that they had not been
notified in good time of measures affecting their investments,
giving the Court of Justice grounds for reproaching the Com-
mission.
Overrun of the threshold must be determined on the basis of
a period equivalent to the marketing year (in accordance with
Article 27(1) of Regulation (EC) No 2200/96) but not the
exact period of the marketing year. For instance, overrun of
the threshold for cauliflowers is determined for the period
1March to 28 February, whereas the marketing year for cauli-
flowers runs from 1 May to 30 April. The 118 909 tonnes
mentioned in the Official Journal quoted by the Court was the
figure for withdrawals reported to the Commission in April
1998 by the Member States for the period for 1 March 1997
to 28 February 1998. The 172 181 tonnes mentioned by the
Court was the figure for a different period: from 1 May 1997
to 30 April 1998.
Even if a period equivalent to a marketing year is taken, it
may happen, when the Commission checks whether or not the
intervention thresholds have been exceeded, that the Member
States, given the deadlines, transmit data on withdrawals of
one or the other product that have later to be corrected. As
stated above, for the sake of legitimate producer confidence,
the Commission cannot change the Community withdrawal
compensation once the marketing year has started, even if it
receives updated information. It has, however, initiated a
clearance of accounts procedure against one Member State
which reported figures that were too low.
(106) OJ L 151, 21.5.1998, p. 24; OJ L 124, 18.5.1999, p. 3;
OJ L 108, 5.5.2000, p. 8.
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2.157. Data provided by the Commission showed that
in the implementation period 1997 to 2000, some
24 million euro (3,6 %) was spent from the operational
funds of the POs to supplement Community payments
and compensate for withdrawals of products not cov-
ered by Community compensation. Information pro-
vided to the Court by Member States showed, in some
cases, different amounts to those recorded by the Com-
mission (107). This suggested inconsistencies in classifi-
cation and amounts of withdrawal expenditure which
may result in infringements of Regulation (EC)
No 2200/96 concerning quantities eligible for with-
drawal compensation.
2.158. Measures introduced by the Commission for
increasing free distribution of withdrawals were not
effective enough. Consequently, the bulk of withdraw-
als in the intervening period continued to be destroyed.
An evaluation by external consultants (108) employed by
the Commission, showed that free distribution
amounted to only two per cent, of apples and oranges
withdrawn.
There were inconsistencies in the management of aid for pro-
cessed peaches and pears
2.159. Before themodificationswhichwere introduced
in 2000, the regulation left the Commission room for
manoeuvre on fixing the minimum price processors
have to pay producers. However for processing aid,
which is paid to processors out of Community resources,
the regulation prescribed that it be based on the differ-
ence between the minimum price and the world price,
without exceeding this difference (109). Any variation in
the minimum price or the world price therefore had an
effect on the level of aid.
2.160. The criteria used by the Commission for fixing
the minimum price were not coherent and there was no
assessment of its impact on producers income. For
example, in 1997/1998, the Commission reduced the
minimum price of peaches by 2 %, just in order to fol-
low a similar evolution of the minimum price for
2.157. The Commission notes the Court’s comments. It will
check with the Member States whether the figures transmit-
ted were correct.
2.158. The Commission would emphasise that it has always
endeavoured, and will continue to do so, to ensure as far as
possible that products withdrawn from the market are not
destroyed. Free distribution of these products is and will
remain a priority, despite the inherent difficulties, primarily
the fact that fruit and vegetables are highly perishable. The
quantities withdrawn and distributed free of charge totalled
76 000 tonnes for the marketing year 1997/1998, 27 000
tonnes for 1998/1999 and 45 000 tonnes for 1999/2000.
2.160. The processed peach industry faced an exceptional
situation in 1997 and 1998, with very low production levels
in Greece and, consequently, marked price increases at both
world and Community level. This unprecedented situation jus-
tified the increase in the minimum price. The price rise in the
Community was a reality for processors, and the Commission
(107) COM (2001) 36 final, p. 25.
(108) Evaluation of the European Community’s food pro-
grammes, Final Report — December 1998, page 36.
(109) The actual amount is calculated by applying to the dif-
ference a yield coefficient in terms of raw material and
processed products. For 1998/1999, the yield coefficient
between raw material and processed peaches was fixed
at 0,847.
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tomatoes. Then, for 1998/1999, the Commission
decided to raise the minimum price for peaches by 15 %
from267,55 euro/tonne to 307,68 euro/tonne, to reflect
in part the increase in the world price of peaches which
had risen to 236 euro/tonne. This decision implied a
production aid of 60,65 euro/tonne instead of
26,7 euro/tonne which would have been obtained by
maintaining the minimum price at its previous level.
The decision to increase the minimum price was con-
trary to the general CAP trend of reduced direct aid and
prices and has prevented savings of some 14 million-
euro.
2.161. Processing thresholds are fixed in order to limit
Community expenditure. The threshold of
582 000 tonnes set for peaches in 1990 reflected aver-
age production of the three previous years. This was
well above the EU consumption level of some
300 000 tonnes. After 1997, the Commission did not
propose to adjust the thresholddownwards, even though
production fell in Italy. Therefore the threshold allowed
production of processed peaches to increase without
penalties in the other Member States (110).
2.162. For processed pears, the threshold of
102 000 tonnes fixed in 1989, also reflected the aver-
age production of the three previous years. However it
was well below the EU consumption level of some
125 000 tonnes. Since then, the threshold has not been
adjusted upwards to reflect increased production which
lasted until 1998/1999. The threshold has been system-
atically exceeded for the last three marketing years
(1997/1998 to 1999/2000) by 25 %, 34 % and 40 %
respectively.
had to take it into account. Failure to do so would indeed have
given grounds for reproaching the Commission.
For the 1998/99 marketing year the aid was cut by 25 %
(from 81,28 euro/tonne in 1997/98 to 60,65 euro/tonne in
1998/99). This cut in aid was also justified in the context of
the marketing year in question, when the economic situation
improved for Community processors. The Commission could
have set the aid at the level advocated by the Court
(26,7 euro/tonne), but the cut in aid would have been far too
severe: 67 %. When setting the aid and price levels, the Com-
mission must take into account the economic situation pre-
vailing in a given marketing year. Its decisions must not,
however, further accentuate fluctuations and destabilise a
whole sector of economic activity by making changes that are
too sudden.
The prices and aid set for the 1998/99 marketing year were
fully justified and did not lead to an excessive increase in the
minimum price or in expenditure.
2.161 and 2.162. The Commission takes the view that the
purpose of the Community support for the processing of cer-
tain fruit and vegetables introduced in 1969 is to ensure that
traditional production of the raw material in question has an
outlet, not to make the Community self-sufficient.
(110) Exports have increasedwhereas imports remained stable.
Production is concentrated in Greece with about 65 %
of total production.
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2.163. The penalties resulting from the overshoots of
the pear thresholds were applied by the Commission to
all EU processors, irrespective of the Member States
responsible for the overproduction. The Commission
calculated the reduction in aid, equal to the percentage
of the overshoot which resulted in significant reduc-
tions in processing aid. This was reduced from
180,87 euro/tonne in 1996 to 118,86 euro/tonne for
1999. Thus EU pear processors, who still had to pay a
high level of minimum price for their raw material
(356 euro/tonne), were placed at a disadvantage com-
pared with their non-EU competitors. Despite the aid
received, they still had to pay, net, some 237 euro/tonne
for the rawmaterial whereas their competitors paid only
160 euro/tonne. The low level of the processing thresh-
old and the high penalties applied might explain the fall
in the production of processed pears which occurred in
1999/2000 (111).
Payment of direct aid to certain producers has not achieved
the intended impact
2.164. From 1996, aid became payable directly to pro-
ducers of citrus for processing (112). Consequently pro-
duction aid to processors as well as the minimum price
for producers were abolished. In Italy and Greece where
producers are not well organised, processors paid very
low prices to farmers. For example, in Greece, some
processors paid producers as little as one drachma per
kilo of oranges (0,0030 euro/kilo), well under the pro-
duction cost. Even with the aid, producers received in
2.163. All the Commission did was to apply the Commu-
nity rules that had been in force for over thirty years, which
stated that the consequences of a Community threshold being
exceeded must be applied uniformly to the whole Community
sector concerned. There were no calls for changes to this policy
during the discussions preceding the 1996 reform. It was only
more recently that wishes were expressed for a change to this
practice, leading to the Commission’s proposals of July 2000
and to Regulation (EC) No 2699/2000. The cut in aid for
pears between 1996 and 1999 was mainly (two thirds) due
to the improvement in the economic situation (higher world
prices for the raw material).
The decline in pear processing in 1999/2000 followed several
years of substantial increases. The fall was thus relative and
could be regarded as a return to normal. There is no evidence
that the decline can be attributed to the cut in aid. The expla-
nation is more likely to be found in competition from the fresh
produce market. Prices on the fresh market are often more
attractive to pear growers, who thus shun the processing
industry. The difficulty of managing this scheme therefore lies
entirely in the twin needs of ensuring sufficient producer
incomes, and thus a sufficiently high minimum price, and
maintaining processor competitiveness, and thus keeping the
industry’s costs within reasonable bounds, all strictly in line
with WTO rules. This explains why the Commission cut the
minimum price, which, as the Court rightly points out,
had remained relatively high, for the 1999/2000 marketing
year.
2.164. Citrus growers obtain their incomes not only from
selling their produce for processing but also from sales on the
fresh produce market. It is thus the total income per hectare
or per kilogram, not just the income from processing that
must be compared with the cost of production. Only 20 % to
30 % of citrus production in the Community goes for process-
ing on average, i.e. the bulk of growers’ incomes and thus their
means of covering their production costs, is derived from the
fresh produce market.
That said, the situation described by the Court does reflect the
situation that exists when producers are not well organised or
when producer organisations lack dynamism. Growers are
then in a less strong economic position with regard to the pro-
cessing industry and some may be tempted to ‘dump’ their
produce for processing merely in order to obtain Community
aid. Such a situation is certainly not healthy from the eco-
nomic point of view. Here again tighter checks on producer
organisations may help to improve the situation. In
(111) Production of processed pears has decreased from
140 689 tonnes in 1996/1997 to 92 438 tonnes in
1999/2000 with a slight decrease in imports and rela-
tively stable exports. Production is concentrated in Spain
and Italy.
(112) In the citrus scheme, more than half of the expenditure
is being devoted to orange processing (130 million euro).
Expenditure was highest in Italy (70,3 million euro) fol-
lowed by Greece (31,3 million euro) and Spain (27,9 mil-
lion euro).
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this case a maximum of 0,076 euro/kg, whereas their
production cost was estimated at 0,25 euro/kg.
2.165. Processing thresholds for oranges, fixed well
under the level of EU consumption, have been exceeded
every year since the reform. The reductions in aid,
applied to the producers, were of 42 %, 32 % and 30 %
for eachmarketing year following the reform. Theywere
applied to all orange producers, irrespective of theMem-
ber States or producer organisation responsible for the
over production. The Greek authorities maintain that
producers’ income dropped by 50 %.
2.166. Following a record production of processed
oranges in 1997/1998 the orange processing aid was
reduced. The aid granted to producers, added to their
selling price of the processed oranges, became lower
than the Community compensation for withdrawal.
Therefore producers were encouraged to deliver their
production for withdrawals rather than for processing.
The gap between producers’ incomes has in some cases wid-
ened
2.167. Analysis of the Commission’s data on the Farm
Accountancy Data Network showed considerable varia-
tions in the farmers’ annual incomes, expressed as farm
Spain, on the other hand, the 1996 reform led to incomes
from deliveries to processors that were often higher than the
minimum price in force before the reform.
2.165. With regard to the level of the citrus processing
threshold and the penalties for exceeding it, see points 2.168
to 2.170.
The 1996 reform was designed to encourage the processing of
citrus fruit into products that would be more competitive on
the market. This change in production did come about in
Spain, but was less marked in Italy and scarcely perceptible in
Greece. The main reason for this was that a large proportion
of the varieties available in Italy and Greece were not suitable
for both the fresh market and processing. This situation was
further aggravated by weak producer organisations and, in
particular, their marketing structure. The result was that the
producer price fell in Greece but rose in Spain.
2.166. The 1997/98 marketing year was the first one after
the changes were made to the aid scheme for the processing of
citrus fruit. It had been decided as part of the reform, at the
Council’s request, that the penalty for overrunning the pro-
cessing threshold would be applied during the marketing year
of the overrun. The final aid for 1997/1998 could not there-
fore be calculated until after that marketing year. There can
therefore have been only a weak correlation between this aid
and withdrawals in the marketing year. It is also pointed out
that more than 1,9 million tonnes of oranges were processed
during the 1997/1998 marketing year, an all-time record
(the average in recent years had been around 1,5 million
tonnes). Withdrawals for that marketing year, 188 000
tonnes, represented only 4,82 % of production.
Drawing comparisons between the selling price of citrus fruit
for processing and the Community withdrawal compensation
is thus a delicate matter requiring great caution to be exer-
cised.
2.167. The Commission would point out that the common
organisation of the market in fruit and vegetables is based on
the premise that, faced with increasingly concentrated demand,
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net value added/annual work unit (113), between Mem-
ber States. They increased more in those countries that
already had a high organised VMP before the reform.
For example incomes in the Netherlands evolved more
favourably than in Greece and Italy, and, to a lesser
extent, than in Spain, even though the latter two are the
biggest producers. Between 1992 and 1998, vegetable
growers’ incomes in these Member States actually
decreased, thus widening the gap between them and the
better organised Member States. For example income
for vegetable growers in the Netherlands increased by
some49 % from1992 to 1998, to a level of 29 000 euro.
Also, the income of Dutch fruit growers increased by
138 % during the same period to a level of 10 432 euro.
In contrast Greek fruit and vegetable growers have seen
their revenue drop respectively by 32 % and 27 % to
2 892 euro and 3 957 euro for 1997.
The effectiveness of control systems in several Member States
remains weak
2.168. At the time of the audit (1998-1999), despite
Parliament’s request (114) that resources dedicated to
inspections be increased, the Commission had allocated
only two staff to the newly created special corps of
inspectors. With so few resources, this corps was not
fully operational and could only function in a limited
way.
2.169. The control procedures established in certain
Member States lacked effectiveness. For example, the
distribution of control tasks between various bodies in
France and Italy, resulted in inefficient and uncoordi-
nated checks. In Italy, the control authorities delegated
key control elements of payments to processors and
producers to their professional associations. This did
channelling supply through producer organisations is more
than ever an economic necessity to strengthen the market posi-
tion of producers and boost their incomes. Of course, this does
not mean that we should not look into the reasons why pro-
ducer organisations are not developing in some regions of the
Community. This issue will undoubtedly play a prominent
part in the Commission’s work in the months to come. And
the answer is certainly neither obvious nor simple.
2.168. The Council was also responding to the request from
Parliament when, on a proposal from the Commission, by
Regulation (EC)No 2200/96, it established a corps of inspec-
tors. The number of inspectors assigned to the corps was
increased in 2000 to three (the requirement had been assessed
at five in 1996, subject to the allocation of resources by the
budget authority). The Commission considers that the special
corps was operational, given that several investigations were
conducted in the Member Sates. These also involved, as pro-
vided for in the Council Regulation, work by national experts.
2.169 to 2.174. The Commission confirms that there were
some weaknesses in the organisation of controls in the Mem-
ber States. The findings of the Commission’s audits were simi-
lar to those of the Court. These shortcomings are being tack-
led in connection with the clearance of accounts, and financial
corrections will be made, where appropriate, for the Member
State concerned.
(113) The indicator chosenwas the farmnet value added/annual
work unit. This corresponds to the payment for fixed
factors of production (work, land, capital), which allows
holdings to be compared irrespective of the family, non-
family factors of production employed. The division by
annual work unit takes into account the differences in
labour force to be remunerated by the holding. All data
have been deflated to their first year of availability (1992,
except Austria, Finland, Sweden: 1995).
(114) European Parliament Decision 96/377/ECSC, EC, Eura-
tom of 17 April 1996 giving discharge to the Commis-
sion in respect of the implementation of the general
budget of the European Union for the 1994 financial
year (OJ L 148, 21.6.1996, p. 45, point 22).
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not achieve the degree of independence usually required
for the operation of internal controls.
2.170. The reinforced role given to POs is a key ele-
ment of the reform. Recognition of POs which qualifies
them for financial support, requires regulatory visits on
the spot. Also operational programme measures must
comply with the reform. Member States are required by
regulation to make annual visits to at least 10 % of the
POs and to ensure coverage of 30 % of Community
assistance.
2.171. Recognition was granted to producer organisa-
tions in France and Italy without the required checks
being carried out. Operational programmes were also
agreed without prior visits in France, Italy and the Neth-
erlands. Final payments for 1997 (Spain and France) and
part of 1998 (France) were made without the benefit of
the required annual inspections, although some of these
were made at the end of the programmes. Moreover, in
a French PO, final payment was made without the nec-
essary adjustments resulting from a previous inspec-
tion.
2.172. Generally, expenditure was difficult to monitor
because of the classification of non homogenous expen-
diture under varying headings. Several non eligible items
of expenditure had to be disallowed following theCourt’s
audits in Spain, France and Italy. In particular, the audit
revealed errors in the VMP declared by POs, which led
to errors in EU funding of some POs in Spain and Italy.
2.173. The required 100 % inspection of destruction
was not carried out in Spain, France and Italy. More-
over, some cases of destruction which did not comply
with environmental criteria were detected in Spain and
France. Because of the ineffectiveness of the checks on
withdrawals in Greece, Spain and France, the quality
and quantities of products eligible for withdrawal pay-
ments is uncertain.
2.174. Community aid is payable for the quantities of
peaches and pears presented for processing. Every year,
Member States are required to check on the spot, 25 %
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of all quantities processed and to analyse samples of fin-
ished products in order to test their quality. At the same
time, payment of the minimum price to POs should be
verified. The checks of processed fruit were weak as
regards:
(a) sampling of processors (Spain);
(b) sampling of finished products or raw material
(Greece, France);
(c) quality and quantity of raw material or quality of
finished products and stock taking (Greece, France,
Spain, Italy);
(d) payment of the minimum price to the producers
(Greece, Spain, Italy);
(e) areas under cultivation by citrus producers (Greece,
Spain and Italy).
2.175. Aid for environmental measures under the
CMO, paid through POs to producers, has to be cross-
checked with agri-environmental aid paid out directly
to individual producers under Regulation No 2078/92.
Effective cross-checks were not being carried out in
Spain, France and Italy, exposing the Community to
duplication of payments. The same risk of double financ-
ing applies for grubbing-up aid paid to individual farm-
ers and grubbing-up aid paid from POs to its members.
Monitoring by the Commission is impaired by the lack of reli-
able data and the inadequacy of its analysis
2.176. The Commission lackedmuch of the basic infor-
mation for monitoring the market effectively. For
example, it did not possess complete data on the num-
ber of POs and their members, the withdrawals financed
by operational funds or even the EU production of fruit
and vegetables for all products. Numerous inconsisten-
cies in the figures for withdrawals, provided by the
Member States and not corrected by the Commission
were noted (see paragraphs 2.156 to 2.157). Likewise,
figures were inaccurate for production. For example,
figures concerning total production of nectarines and
cauliflower were consistently undervalued in the Com-
mission’s preliminary draft general budgets for the years
2.175. The development of IACS, as concerns its use for
checking aid claims other than those managed under IACS,
as well as the introduction of a cross-check obligation, has
permitted a number of improvements since the Court started
its audit of the CMO.
2.176. The availability of statistics depends first and fore-
most on the ability of the Member States to obtain the infor-
mation, process it and transmit it to the Commission. Given
the large number of individual products in the fruit and veg-
etable sector (nearly 100) and the relative importance of the
sector, the statistics are bound to be selective.
Annex II to Regulation (EC) No 609/2001 lists the require-
ments to be met by the reports which Member States have to
send the Commission each year on producer organisations and
operational programmes, inspections carried out and their
results. The Member States were even notified of the form
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1994 to 1998, by quantities varying from 8 000 tonnes
to 190 000 tonnes.
2.177. On the 24 January 2001 the Commission pro-
duced a report for the Council on the implementation
of the regime (115). However it did not analyse how the
funds had been spent or their impact on the market’s
objectives, in particular those relating to the balance of
the market and farmers’ income.
2.178. The Commission was neither proactive in pre-
venting failings in the implementation of operational
programmes in the Member States nor did it take imme-
diate corrective action when informed of these failings.
While regulations were modified, this was too late to
influence the content of the programmes.
The 2000 modifications do not fully address the short-
comings identified by the Court
2.179. The Commission proposed further modifica-
tions of the reform to the Council in 2000 which have
been accepted for implementation from 2001. It
addresses some of the preceding issues as follows:
these reports should take. The Commission hopes in this way
to improve its statistics on producer organisations and opera-
tional programmes in the near future.
As far as information on production and withdrawals is con-
cerned, the Commission relies on data from the Member
States. It points out that it has initiated a clearance of accounts
procedure against one Member State which under-reported
withdrawals.
2.177. As indicated in the foreword, the aim of the Com-
mission’s report of 24 January 2001 was ‘to describe the cur-
rent situation’ to provide ‘background for policy proposals that
might be made at a later stage’ in a debate on the market
organisation.
2.178. The Commission takes the view that a distinction
needs to be made between misinterpretations of the rules in
force and Member States’ decisions under the powers assigned
to them by those rules to examine the operational programmes
submitted by producer organisations. In the first case the
Commission initiates the appropriate infringement or clear-
ance of accounts procedures. In the second case the Commis-
sion amends the rules where it sees fit. But such amendments
must be in accordance with the acquired rights of the producer
organisations and the principle of legitimate confidence. They
are not therefore as a rule retroactive.
Of course, the amendments the Commission constantly makes
to the rules for the application of the CMO generally originate
from and always take account of the results of inspection visits
to Member States. This is particularly true of Regulation (EC)
No 609/2001, which concerns operational funds and pro-
grammes, and Regulation (EC)No 1148/2001, which relates
to checks on compliance with marketing standards. Prepara-
tions are also under way for a revision of Regulation (EC)
No 412/97 on the recognition and operation of producer
organisations.
(115) Report from the Commission to the Council on the state
of implementation of Regulation (EC) No 2200/96 on
the common organisation of the market in fruit and
vegetables (COM(2001) 36 final of 24 January 2001).
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(a) simplification of the Community co-financing sys-
tem of operational funds and adoption of a uniform
rate of co-financing should reduce financial uncer-
tainty and enable POs to give higher priority to
long-term collective strategies rather than measures
that yield short term gains (see paragraph 2.144);
(b) replacing the yearly fixed minimum price to pro-
ducers with a fixed direct aid and abolishing pro-
cessing aid for peaches and pears should ensure that
errors and/or lack of transparency in the annual fix-
ing of minimum price and aid are avoided (see
paragraphs 2.159 and 2.160);
(c) increasing the processing thresholds for pears and
citrus should allow greater processing in these areas
(see paragraphs 2.161 to 2.163 and 2.165 and 2.166);
d) reducing the quantity of citrus fruits eligible for
withdrawal aid should limit the use of withdrawals
by POs (see paragraph 2.166);
e) setting thresholds at national rather than at Commu-
nity level should sensitise Member States to overpro-
duction (see paragraphs 2.163 and 2.165).
2.180. The 2000 modifications do not, however,
address the following matters:
(a) despite the importance of the POs to the success of
the regime, no additional measures have been intro-
duced to attract greater membership; aids to indi-
vidual producers remain (see paragraph 2.152);
Community financing is still linked to the VMP of
the POs which favours the better organised produc-
ers to the detriment of new POs (see para-
graph 2.144);
2.180.
(a) The common organisation of the market in fruit and veg-
etables is based on the principle of freedom of choice for
producers as to whether or not to join a producer organi-
sation, and it makes them responsible for their choice. If
the majority of producers in some regions prefer not to
join an effective PO, they must also take the consequences
of their decision. A comparison of the income of those
belonging to POs and that of non-members will show
which choice was better. In any case, the Commission is
convinced that a decision to join a producer organisation
must be motivated by economic considerations, not sim-
ply a desire to gain access to Community subsidies.
The Commission is also convinced that Community aid
schemes should be geared not to attracting new members
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(b) Community funding is still not geared to actual pro-
duction in Member States/Regions (see para-
graphs 2.145);
(c) although overall withdrawals have reduced signifi-
cantly, they remain high in those Member States
with a low degree of organisation; overproduction
still persists for some products (see para-
graph 2.154);
(d) justification for the new aid rates to producers in
terms of producers’ income and market balance has
not been presented by the Commission.
Conclusion
2.181. The changes made to the CMO in 1996 and
2000 have provided some response to issues raised pre-
viously by the Court and those resulting from its more
recent examination. However important problems
remain.
2.182. The CMO is not achieving equitable results
across Member States: market balance and substantially
improved revenues have been generated principally in
those Member States/Regions which were well organ-
ised before the reform; in the other Member
States/Regions however, some of which are the main
producers, progress has been slow and in some cases
to producer organisations but to sustaining the efforts of
those who submit to the rules and disciplines to the ben-
efit of the sector as a whole.
It is pointed out that Article 14 of Regulation (EC)
No 2200/96 provides for special start-up aid for pro-
ducer organisations.
(b) As indicated above, the Commission considers that the
suggestion that Community financial support should be
geared to the scale of production in each Member State
or region is not economically justified. It has no plans to
do so.
(c) The Commission sees the Court’s comment that with-
drawals ‘remain high in those Member States with a low
degree of organisation’as encouragement to pursue the
policy followed for forty years in the fruit and vegetable
sector, which gives high priority to producer organisa-
tions.
(d) The Commission takes the view that the whole range of
market organisation mechanisms is designed to ensure
that the objectives set for the common agricultural policy
in Article 33 of the EC Treaty are fully achieved. The
purpose of the changes to the common market organisa-
tion proposed in July 2000 and approved by the Council
in December 2000 was to make the rules applicable to
tomato processing less rigid; adjust certain processing
thresholds to take account of the strong growth in demand,
simplify the way in which operational funds function and
improve the management of refunds. These changes are
bound to improve the overall operation of the market
organisation and thus prove beneficial for producer
incomes and market equilibrium.
2.182. The Commission is fully aware of the differences
between Member States as regards the situation of their fruit
and vegetable growers. It is convinced that a structural improve-
ment in the situation and incomes of these producers will
come first and foremost from better gearing of their produc-
tion, in terms of both quality and quantity, to effective market
demand. This is true both for fresh products and for those
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has been reversed as far as income is concerned. For
these Member States, enhancing the role of producer
organisations has not been a success (see para-
graphs 2.151 to 2.154 and 2.167). If, as the Commis-
sion believes, prospects for significant improvement in
their level of organisation are low, othermeans of achiev-
ing the CMO’s objectives should be considered.
Recommendations
2.183. Before presenting any further proposal for
reform to the Council, the Commission should improve
the data it maintains on the market so as to prevent the
type of inconsistencies noted during the audit (see para-
graphs 2.156, 2.157 and 2.176). A more comprehensive
evaluation of the impact of Regulation (EC)
No 2200/96 needs to be carried out by the Commis-
sion than that done recently (see paragraph 2.177). The
Court recommends that the Commission carry out
objective economic analyses and market reviews, by
product, Member State/Region and by type of grower.
This should examine aid levels, thresholds and ceilings
in terms of their expected and actual impact. The results
should be compared with alternative aid scenarios, in
particular those which have been adopted with greater
success elsewhere.
2.184. If, on the other hand the role to be played by
POs is to be maintained, further incentives to encour-
age membership should be explored. The uneven dis-
tributionof theCommunity funding shouldbe addressed
by the Commission. This means that the capacity of the
weak POs has to be strengthened. The Commission
could consider making membership of recognised POs
a condition for receiving aid, as is the case in other mar-
kets (e.g. bananas). This could improve the effectiveness
of POs and discourage excessive production. Themethod
of reducing aid following overshoots of the withdrawal
threshold should be revised so as to become more dis-
suasive (see paragraph 2.155).
2.185. As far as management and control of the CMO
is concerned, theCommission shouldmonitor the imple-
mentation of operational programmes more carefully
and, where necessary, intervene in order to ensure that
the measures introduced by POs are directed to
intended for industrial processing. The Commission remains
convinced that channelling supply through producer organisa-
tions, which enables it to be controlled, and a policy of con-
tracts with processors are powerful instruments for improve-
ment. It does not dispute that the general instruments of
market organisation such as standards, operational funds,
withdrawals, import measures and export refunds sometimes
need to be supplemented by ‘special measures’ to help in cer-
tain particular situations. This is why special support arrange-
ments have in the past been introduced for nuts and soft fruit.
The Commission constantly considers possible improvements
or adjustments to the market organisation.
2.183 to 2.185. Even if it cannot accept them all, as indi-
cated above, the Commission welcomes the Court’s recom-
mendations. It shares the Court’s concern about statistics and
will not fail to inform the Member States accordingly. Mem-
ber States are often reluctant to respond to the Commission’s
requests, but the Commission is obliged to rely on them in
such matters. It acknowledges that ‘objective economic analy-
ses and market reviews’ are essential and will undertake them
as far as the human resources at its disposal permit. It would
point out lastly that the main objective of Regulation (EC)
No 609/2001, even before the Court made its request, was
to define more clearly the categories of measures and expen-
diture that may be included in an operational programme and
those that are to be excluded.
The Commission accepts that improving the situation in the
fruit and vegetable sector is tied up with increasing the con-
centration of supply through producer organisations. The
Commission would point out that since the 1996 reform and
the changes introduced in 2000, virtually all the Community
financial support for this sector is provided via producer
organisations. It takes the view, finally, that checks on exist-
ing organisations must be stepped up to ensure that those that
are not economically and commercially effective and have no
ambition beyond benefiting from Community aid do not slow
the sector down and deter producers from joining forces.
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achieving improvements in competitiveness and perfor-
mance (see paragraph 2.151) and respond more directly
to the actual needs of the market (see para-
graph 2.152). It should ensure that the special corps of
inspectors has sufficient resources to fulfil its control
responsibilities and interveneswhere necessary to ensure
that Member States’ control procedures are reliable (see
paragraphs 2.168 to 2.175). Finally, it is essential that
the Commission amend and simplify Regulation (EC)
No 1647/98 in order to clarify the concept of eligible
items to be financed by producer organisations in order
to avoid misinterpretation of the Regulation leading to
inefficient use of the funds (see paragraphs 2.147, 2.149
and 2.150) and specify how expenditure should be clas-
sified so that reliable data can be extracted for evalua-
tion (see paragraph 2.148).
PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS IN SPECIAL
REPORTS
2.186. The following paragraphs contain a summary
of principal observations of special reports on EAGGF-
Guarantee subjects adopted by the Court since the 1999
annual report and which have not been taken into
account during the discharge procedure on the 1999
accounts.
Reform of the clearance of accounts
2.187. In addition to paragraphs 2.53 to 2.97 which
refer to the clearance of accounts for a specific year,
Special Report No 22/2000 (116) examined the reform
of the clearance of accounts procedure introduced in
1996. It concluded that the reform had resulted in
improved accountability at Member State level and
should be regarded as a considerable achievement, even
though it had not accelerated the overall time needed
for clearing expenditure in both financial and confor-
mity terms for a given EAGGF year.
2.186. The Commission has acted on the Court’s com-
ments.
2.187. Concerning the overall timescale for the conformity
procedure, the Commission accepts that the last corrections for
1996 will not be made any quicker than under the old pro-
cedure. However, the new procedure has resulted in consider-
able amounts of corrections being imposed at a much earlier
stage than in the past (see paragraphs 54 and 55).
1996 was the first year of the reformed procedures for the
clearance of accounts. The Commission expects the final cor-
rections for later years to be introduced considerably earlier
than would have been the case under the old system. The full
effects of the reform have not yet been seen. In this context,
the Commission considers that the conciliation procedure has
contributed to this global improvement.
The Commission welcomes the Court of Auditor’s conclusion
that the reform of the clearance of accounts process has resulted
in improved accountability and is a considerable achievement.
(116) Special Report No 22/2000 on the evaluation of the
reformed clearance of accounts procedure (OJ C 69,
2.3.2001).
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2.188. There were still, however, an excessive number
of paying agencies, too many of which failed to meet all
of the required accreditation criteria. The Commission
had, as a result, resorted to clearance of accounts cor-
rections for two Member States.
2.189. Although technical weaknesses needed rectifi-
cation, the Certifying Bodies had generally succeeded in
producing reports and certificates within deadlines. For
almost one third of total expenditure declared by pay-
ing agencies for 1998, certificates were issued with res-
ervations (which did not necessarily mean that the
expenditure was irregular).
2.190. Recourse to the Conciliation Body had led to
an overall reduction of about 10 % in financial correc-
tions imposed on Member States, but the Commission
needed to address the delays in the procedure and fail-
ure, in many cases, to conciliate the views of the Com-
mission and Member States.
Integrated administration and control system (IACS)
2.191. Special Report No 4/2001 (117) concluded that
IACS provided a sound basis for controlling arable crops
and animal premium expenditure (some six million aid
applications each year). The Court’s main recommenda-
tions to the Commission concerned the development of
an efficient management information system and the
simplification and harmonisation of the regulatory
framework (see also paragraph 2.48).
Milk quotas
2.192. Special Report No 6/2001 (118) considered the
effectiveness of the quota regime in controlling EU milk
production and achieving market equilibrium. Produc-
tion was restricted to the target level and the previously
increasing trend of budgetary cost of the CMO was
reversed. Nevertheless, the overall level of quota set did
not bring milk production into line with unsubsidised
internal consumption and export. Moreover, despite the
subsidised surplus, costing almost 3 billion euro a year
to finance, decisions reforming the CMO for milk and
milk products provided for a 2,5 % increase in the
2.188. The legislative authority decided that the number of
paying agencies should be decided by the Member States.
While the Commission would welcome a reduction in the
number of paying agencies its influence is limited. The Com-
mission has however encouraged the Member States to reduce
this number and some have done so. The number of paying
agencies was reduced to 86 in September 2000.
2.189. The Commission believes that it is far too simplistic
to take the amount of expenditure declared by certifying bod-
ies with qualified accounts and use this as a performance
measure. It is important to examine each qualification indi-
vidually before making judgements on this point.
2.190. Procedural delays in conciliation are not a matter for
the Commission and conciliation of its views with those of the
Member States is not always the correct solution for the par-
ties concerned.
2.191. The Commission is currently engaged in consolida-
tion of all the rules on this subject.
2.192. The current level of quotas is the result of political
decisions and its cost to the budget, as the Court states, about
EUR 3 billion per year, not only ensures market balance but
is in line with all the objectives of the common agricultural
policy such as producers’ incomes and rural development, plus
other economic aspects such as employment in processing
plants.
The quotas scheme has been a vital tool for restraining expen-
diture in the milk sector and in that sense the cost to the tax-
payer has fallen considerably since its introduction in 1984.
(117) OJ C 214, 31.7.2001.
(118) OJ C 305, 30.10.2001.
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national reference quantities between April 2000 and
April 2005.
2.193. Some 17 years after its introduction in 1984,
the quota regime was still not fully implemented. Italy
continued not to enforce the levy on individual produc-
ers, while improvements made in Spain and Greece left
outstanding levy debt problems. Although the Com-
mission recovered levy debt from the Member States
where milk producers did not pay the levy, its dissua-
sive effect on producers was lost and the national sub-
sidy effect distorted competition.
2.194. In the short term, the Commission should
examine the possibility of allowing transfer of quota
between producers operating in differentMember States.
In the medium term, the Commission should make
proposals aiming at bringing overall milk production
into line with unsubsidised internal consumption and
potential unsubsidised exports, while ending the quota
regime.
The Commission believes that, in the present circumstances,
fixing quotas at a level which secures a balance between pro-
duction on the one hand and consumption and non-subsidised
exports on the other would require a fall in production of
about 20 %. It considers that this would require the scrap-
ping of production capacity and hence of processing capacity.
The decisions taken by the Council as part of Agenda 2000
were the result of intense political negotiations and the increase
in quotas was the price paid for the extension of the scheme
beyond 31 March 2000, the date when it would have fin-
ished under the 1992 rules. In any case, the fall in institu-
tional prices planned from 2005 made this increase possible.
The specific increases should not contribute to greater imbal-
ances since, in large part they correspond to quantities already
produced.
2.193. With regard to the incomplete implementation of
the regime, the Commission, in addition to imposing finan-
cial corrections, opened infringement proceedings against Italy
(reasoned opinion 97/2228) and Spain (reasoned opinion
97/2227) for incorrect application of the milk quota regime
and failure to collect the levy. In the case of these two Member
States these problems are partly due to the fact that the pro-
ducers and purchasers have challenged the levy before the
national courts and that those legal proceedings are very
lengthy.
2.194. The Commission considers that contemplating the
transfer of quotas between the Member States would call into
question the basis for the rules on quotas as set out in Council
Regulation (EEC) No 3950/92 because the system was
designed on the basis of a national quota. It also believes that
such a major change in the administrative system for quota
management would not seem appropriate in view of the
Court’s desire to abandon the system.
As noted in the reply to point 2.198, quotas were fixed hav-
ing regard to factors other than the budget. The Commission
considers that bringing milk production into line with unsub-
sidised consumption and exports, as request by the Court,
would entail a reduction of about 20 % in the present quota
level. Furthermore a reduction of production on such a scale
could entail compensation for producers and so does not
appear consistent with the phasing out of the quota scheme
advocated by the Court.
As regards the future, the Council has agreed to undertake a
mid-term review in 2003 on the basis of a Commission report
with a view to allowing the current supplementary levy scheme
to expire after 2006. The Commission will consider various
options when preparing its report.
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Special report on BSE (bovine spongiform encephalopa-
thy)
2.195. The main recommendations concerning the
control of BSE in the Court’s Special Report
No. 19/98 (119) were that the Commission should
develop a strategy to manage the crisis, and that proper
animal identification and registration systems should be
enforced. The Court’s follow up (Special Report
No. 14/2001 (120) on the Report focused on the action
taken by the Commission to identify and eradicate BSE.
2.196. The follow up found that the Commission’s
strategy for dealing with BSE is basically sound, but its
effectiveness is severely limited by the following factors:
(a) the institutional procedures for passing legislation
have restricted and delayed the implementation of
key BSE control measures, such as the EU-wide ban
on removal anduseof specified riskmaterials (SRMs);
(b) implementation of BSE related legislation by Mem-
ber States has been inadequate in several key areas;
the ban on feedingmammalianmeat and bonemeal
to ruminants has not been properly implemented
by most Member States, and the true incidence of
BSE has been under-detected by several Member
States in the past. Consumers and animals are there-
fore exposed to different risks in different Member
States, through a combination of poor implementa-
tion of BSE control measures, and a lack (until
recently) of an EU definition of SRMs;
(c) the measures currently available to the Commission
to enforce the implementation of BSE legislation by
Member States are insufficient;
(d) animal identification and registration systems are
still not fully operational in all the Member States,
despite the 1 January 2000 deadline.
2.195. The Commission considers the report in general a
fair objective analysis of the BSE measures introduced and
implemented since 1998. In general the Commission endorses
the report’s conclusions and recommendations.
2.196. The reflections of the Court on re-orienting subsi-
dies and encouraging extensification constitute the major part
of the decision proposed by the Commission and adopted by
the Agricultural Council of 20 June 2001. The decisions
taken (covering 2001 to 2003) include, for both premium
schemes, a progressive reduction of the stocking density from
2 LU/ha to 1,8 LU/ha, for the special beef premium a sub-
stantial reduction of the national ceilings and, with regard to
the suckler cow scheme, the introduction of a compulsory
minimum number of heifers to be kept under this scheme and
a suspension of reallocating premium rights from the national
reserves.
(119) Concerning Community financing of certain measures
taken as a result of the BSE crisis (OJ C 383, 9.12.1998).
(120) OJ C 324, 20.11.2001.
136 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.12.2001
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS COMMISSION’S REPLIES
2.197. The follow-up draws attention to other issues
such as modern livestock production and marketing,
especially feeding and rearing methods, the problems of
production linked CAP support schemes for cattle and
whether the Commission needs specific additional pow-
ers to enforce action on Member States.
Refunds for the use of potato and cereal starch and
potato starch aid
2.198. Special Report No 8/2001 (121) examined the
operation of the production refunds system, as modi-
fied in 1992, and the payment of direct aids to growers
of potatoes for starch production and to potato starch
producers. The aim of these subsidies, which cost the
Community budget about 900 million euro in 2000, is
to maintain the competitiveness of Community produc-
ers and users of cereal starch and potato starch.
2.199. The threeMember States (Germany, France and
the Netherlands) which together receive about 70 % of
expenditure were visited and the Court made observa-
tions on the quality of controls, the method of calculat-
ing the production refund, the monitoring of modified
starch and the management of the quota system for
production of starch potatoes.
2.200. The Commission had never assessed whether
the basic objectives of the system were being achieved:
key issues were the competitiveness of the cereal and
potato-starch user-industries, income of farmers receiv-
ing direct aid and compensation for the specific struc-
tural disadvantage of potato starch producers.
2.198. — 2.200. From the comments of the Court, the
Commission concludes that this scheme does not cause major
difficulties in its implementation. The Court revealed certain
deficiencies but those do not, apart from the problem in one
Member State, seem to be serious. Every system is perfectible
and the Commission will of course draw the attention of the
Member States to the conclusion of the Court in this report.
2.199. With regard to the monitoring of modified starch,
the Commission, which is aware of the possibility of abuse
and irregularities, has regularly checked the application of
special measures for this product and discussed them with the
Member States and those working in the sector. Some statu-
tory provisions have been adjusted, including the introduction
of declarations committing manufacturers to guarantee cor-
rect utilisation of the product, which the Member States are
required to respect and check. It is also ready, if necessary, to
look at the conditions in force and, if necessary, Regulation
(EEC) No 1722/93.
2.200. The Commission monitors the situation in the sec-
tor regularly and consults the relevant departments of the
Member States and those working in the sector. As part of its
systematic evaluation of sectoral agricultural policies, DG
AGRI included in its programme for 2000 the commission-
ing of a study on the ‘evaluation of Community policy on
starch and starch products’. The main points to be considered
were:
— the effectiveness and efficiency of the measures applied in
the starch and starch products sector including produc-
tion and export refunds, and specific measures in the
potato starch sector including the premium for potato-
starch producers and production quotas;
— a number of points regarding agricultural incomes and
the development of the regions concerned.
(121) OJ C 294, 19.10.2001.
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Export refunds — Destination and placing on the mar-
ket (Special Report No 7/2001) (122)
2.201. The export refund system, costing the EU tax-
payer some 5 billion euro each year, provided for refund
rates for certain products to be differentiated by destina-
tion, as long as satisfactory evidence (proof of arrival)
was presented that the goods had been placed on the
market at the declared destination.
2.202. In 1992 the Commission provided a catalogue
of model proofs to assist Member States in checking
proofs of arrival, but this was not subsequently updated.
Large disparities were found between Member States as
regards these checks.
2.203. Although the Commission had not undertaken
a general audit of the proof of arrival system, it had
identified major weaknesses in Member State checks at
the time of export, resulting in financial corrections
amounting to 188 million euro.
2.204. Some Member States had not carried out
required audits of approved supervisory companies.
Where such audits occurred, serious shortcomings and
irregularities were detected, although these were not
always satisfactorily followed-up.
The results of the study should be available at the end of
2001. A number of points being prepared could prove useful
in preparing the report required by Regulation (EC)
No 1868/94 which the Commission will present to the
Council by 31 October 2001. The report will cover the allo-
cation of the potato starch quota in the Community and any
proposals required.
2.202. The system selected to prove importation from a
non-member country is basedmainly on documentation issued
by the public authorities, such as customs import documents.
In 1992, a catalogue of forms and customs stamps valid in
59 non-member countries was made available to the Member
States. The Commission supports the idea of considering
whether a catalogue could be prepared, at least for certain
countries, and kept permanently up to date.
2.203. Although the Commission has not undertaken a
general audit of the proof of arrival system, it has undertaken
a specific audit of proofs of arrival issued by supervisory com-
panies in Germany, which de facto was the only Member
State accepting such certificates on a large scale. This resulted
in a financial correction of some EUR 20 million.
2.204. Approval of and checks on the operations of surveil-
lance companies are a matter for the Member States. How-
ever, if a Member State decides to withdraw the approval it
had granted to a surveillance company, the Commission noti-
fies the other Member States, explaining the reasons which led
the Member State to withdraw its approval, if it knows them.
Furthermore, when the Commission was informed that a
Member State has withdrawn approval of a surveillance com-
pany which was part of a group, it asked the other Member
States which had subsidiaries of that group approved on its
territory to check whether the same shortcomings existed there.
The approval conditions for surveillance companies will be
evaluated during the ongoing audit (started in May 2001) on
differentiated refunds carried out under the clearance of
accounts.
(122) OJ C 314, 8.11.2001.
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2.205. Although a key role in monitoring arrival of
the exported goods was assigned to Member States’
embassies in third countries, Member States did not
issue guidelines on checks to be carried out before issu-
ing certificates of unloading. Physical checks at the time
of unloading were rarely performed.
2.206. OLAF and DG AGRI had detected or caused to
be detected a number of serious irregularities and sus-
pected frauds in some of the most important export
destinations. Supervisory companies were implicated in
some cases. The Court’s audit uncovered further sus-
pected irregularities and instances where the justifica-
tion for payment of refunds to certain destinations is
questionable. The suspected irregular payments referred
to in this report amount to some 100 million euro.
2.207. The system of proofs of arrival includes a com-
pliance cost burden on administrations and trade alike,
and provides minimal assurance. The Court recom-
mended that proofs of arrival should only be required
in cases of doubt, or for high risk destinations but that
a posteriori checks by Member States on placing on the
market should be intensified and should include con-
sultation of shipping and container movement data-
bases and records held by hauliers for all transactions
selected for audit. If the requirement for the systematic
presentation of proofs of arrival were maintained, the
Court recommended that the existing system for vali-
dating proofs of arrival and for authorising supervisory
companies and Member States’ embassies to issue such
proofs should be considerably strengthened.
2.205. Unloading certificates issued by the embassies are
just one of the proofs allowed by the rules for obtaining pay-
ment of the refund. Article 16 of Regulation (EC)
No 800/1999 contains an exhaustive list of the various
proofs which may be used.
2.206. According to the information received from the
Court, the amount relates basically to suspected irregularities
established in one Member State in the period 1994-1996
(EUR 60 million) and to irregular exports to Iraq after the
introduction of the embargo in 1991 (about EUR 40 mil-
lion). The cases are pursued by the Commission, and they are
followed up in accordance with the rules. In the other cases
appropriate action will be taken by the Commission.
2.207. Relaxing the conditions for presenting proofs of
arrival in the way recommended by the Court is not workable,
because, requiring proof of arrival only in cases of doubt, or
for high risk destinations, would create a potential risk of los-
ing control of exports to countries for which an export refund
is not fixed. Furthermore, it would entail increasing risks of
fraud and irregularities. It would also expose the Community
to fundamental criticism in the way the EU monitors and
controls its subsidised trade with third countries, particularly
taking into consideration the international undertakings to
refrain from granting an export refund for specific markets.
The Commission will discuss with the services responsible for
a posteriori checks how to include consultation of shipping
and container movement databases in the audit programmes.
The Commission will also consider a system which would
make the surveillance companies assume their responsibilities
more fully. In this regard, it will discuss with the Member
States the possibility of making approval of such companies
subject to provision of a guarantee
2.206 to 2.211. The special report on export refunds does
not use the words ‘serious abuse’; it refers to ‘suspected irregu-
larities and instances where the justification for payment of
refunds is questionable’.
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Common elements among findings and conclusions in
the above reports
2.208. Four of the six special reports mentioned above
include significant positive findings. The reformed clear-
ance of accounts system and the IACS had both con-
tributed to improved management of large amounts of
EU funds, while the milk quota regime had restricted
production to the target level. The Commission strategy
for dealing with BSE was basically sound. The fifth
report, on potato starch, is less positive, while the sixth
confirmed that differentiated export refunds were open
to serious abuse.
2.209. Certainmajor objectives had not been achieved.
The reform had not decreased the overall time needed
to complete both financial and conformity clearance of
expenditure for a given year. The milk quota system had
not brought production into line with unsubsidised
demand. Action to deal with BSE was limited by insti-
tutional procedures for passing legislation and inad-
equate Member State implementation in several key
areas. For potato starch aids and for differentiated export
refunds, the achievement of basic objectives had not
been evaluated by the Commission.
2.210. Persistent weaknesses in Member States’ check-
ing of Community operations were noted in the IACS
and for export refunds. The milk quota system was still
not fully implemented 17 years after its introduction.
2.211. Simplification and harmonisation could, in gen-
eral, facilitate better management, reduce administrative
cost and ease the burden on beneficiaries of aid.
As for the special report on ‘potato starch’, it can be concluded
from the comments of the Court that this scheme does not
cause major difficulties in its implementation. The Court
revealed certain deficiencies but those do not, apart from the
problem in one Member State, seem to be of serious nature.
Special report ‘Clearance of accounts’
Concerning the overall timescale for the conformity procedure,
the Commission accepts that the last corrections for the 1996
year will not be made any quicker than under the old proce-
dure. However, the new procedure has resulted in considerable
amounts of corrections being imposed at a much earlier stage
than in the past.
1996 was the first year of the reformed procedures for the
clearance of accounts. The Commission expects the final cor-
rections for later years to be introduced considerably earlier
than would have been the case under the old system. The full
effects of the reform have not yet been seen. In this context,
the Commission considers that the conciliation procedure has
contributed to this global improvement.
Special report ‘Milk Quotas’
The Commission believes that, in the present circumstances,
fixing quotas at a level which secures a balance between pro-
duction on the one hand and consumption and non-subsidised
exports on the other would require a fall in production of
about 20 %. It considers that this would require the scrap-
ping of production capacity and hence of processing capacity.
Special report ‘BSE’
The Commission welcomes the positive assessment on the
strategy it developed to deal with the BSE crisis.
Special report ‘Starch’
The Commission has undertaken an in-depth study, whose
results will be available at the end of 2001.
The Court describes in general terms the main control defi-
ciencies established in some Member States. The Commission
agrees that, even for those Member States where IACS has
been implemented, weaknesses still exist and are treated accord-
ingly in the context of the clearance of accounts procedure.
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In respect of export refunds it must be added that Member
States were corrected for the persistent weaknesses in checking
Community operations. Commission ad hoc Decisions 4, 5
and 6 refer to financial corrections of about EUR 230 mil-
lion.
With regard to the incomplete implementation of the milk
quota regime, the Commission, in addition to imposing finan-
cial corrections, opened infringement proceedings against Italy
(reasoned opinion 97/2228) and Spain (reasoned opinion
97/2227) for incorrect application of the milk quota regime
and failure to collect the levy. In the case of these two Member
States these problems are partly due to the fact that the pro-
ducers and purchasers have challenged the levy before the
national courts and that those legal proceedings are very
lengthy.
The Commission will continue its efforts to simplify and har-
monise the relevant regulatory framework.
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INTRODUCTION
3.1. This chapter deals with heading 2 of the financial
perspective concerning structural measures. It examines
the implementation of the four Structural Funds (SFs):
the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the
European Social Fund (ESF), the European Agricultural
Guidance and Guarantee Fund, ‘Guidance’ Section,
(EAGGF-Guidance), the Financial Instrument for Fisher-
ies Guidance (FIFG) and the Cohesion Fund.
BUDGETARARY MANAGEMENT
Introduction
3.2. The year 2000 was the first financial year of the
new financial perspective and of the Structural Funds’
programming period 2000 to 2006. Important features
of the financial year were the new budgetary nomen-
clature, considerable underutilisation of commitment
and payment appropriations due, in particular, to the
slower than anticipated implementation of this new
period, and large-scale recourse to carry-overs of appro-
priations.
3.3. A new budgetary nomenclature was adopted in
the budget for the year 2000. Title B2-1, Structural
Funds, was no longer subdivided by Fund but into
chapters, and, in particular, according to the priority
objectives of the Structural Funds. This new organisa-
tion has the advantage of improving identification of
the appropriations for the new programming period
and it is consistent with the cofinancing by objective of
multi-Fund programmes. However, with regard to the
preceding periods, one result of the new nomenclature,
for example, is that the entire payment appropriations
for the completion of previous Objective 1 programmes
under the four Structural Funds (12 000 million euro)
are grouped under one article (B2-1 0 4). As the Court
has already pointed out in its Opinions No 2/2001 and
No 4/97 (1), for budget headings covering such amounts
3.2. The year 2000 was mainly devoted to programming
as was the case in the first years of previous Structural Funds’
programming exercises. The uptake of funding consequently
failed to reach the rate expected. This situation was envisaged
in the Inter-institutional Agreement of 6 May 1999 on bud-
get discipline. The Commission considers that given the scale
and complexity of the programming work required, the delays
were lengthy but reasonable.
3.3. As a result of changes in the budget breakdown from
2000, there is now a heading for each Structural Funds’
chapter entitled ‘Completion of earlier programmes’ showing
all the payment appropriations for the relevant Funds. Under
the Commission’s computerised accounting system for the
general budget (Sincom), there is a subdivision for this head-
ing identifying the payments made by each Fund.
The structure of the budget serves, primarily, to determine the
specific allocations of appropriations according to their pur-
pose. The larger the number of budget items, the more com-
plicated the management of appropriations becomes and the
larger the number of appropriation transfers needed to ensure
their optimal implementation. It can be concluded that the
amount of funding allocated to budget headings is not a fun-
damental criterion in determining the structure of the budget
but rather the adoption of uniform decisions on expenditure.
(1) Opinion No 2/2001 on a proposal for a Council Regula-
tion on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general
budget of the European Communities (submitted pursu-
ant to Article 279 of the EC Treaty), point 6 (OJ C 162,
5.6.2001, p. 1). Opinion No 4/97 on the proposal for a
Council Regulation (Euratom, ECSC, EC) amending the
Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 applicable to
the general budget of the European Communities,
point 15 and Annexes 1.20 and 1.21 (OJ C 57, 23.2.1998,
p. 1).
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the budgetary principle of specification is divested of
meaning at the very moment the budget is drawn up.
The result is the coexistence of budget headings to
which huge amounts in appropriations have been allo-
cated and of others covering only a few thousand euro.
3.4. Structural measures accounted for 25,3 % of the
commitments and 33,1 % of the payments against the
total appropriations available in 2000 (for more details,
see Tables 3.2 and 3.3). Commitments under the new
programming period 2000 to 2006 for the SFs
amounted to 15 446,2 million euro; payments totalled
5 906,7 million euro. Transactions in respect of previ-
ous periods amount to 2 397 million euro in commit-
ments made, mainly against appropriations carried over
from the previous financial year; the figure for pay-
ments is 19 998,9 million euro. As regards the Cohe-
sion Fund, transactions totalled 2 246,4 million euro in
commitments and 1 685,2 million euro in payments.
3.5. Budget estimates turned out, once again, to be
very far removed from actual implementation and the
budgetary information exchange network between the
Commission and the finance ministers in the Member
States proved to be ineffectual. With regard to the pay-
ment appropriations, the fact that 7 % of Fund inter-
ventions were paid in instalments, instead of the 3,5 %
anticipated when the budget was drawn up, and that
requests for payment for the previous periods amount-
ing to 6 500million euro, whichwere awaiting appraisal
and payment at the end of 1999, were settled late, meant
that it was possible to avoid under-implementation on
an even greater scale (2).
3.5. The Commission is aware of the relatively wide dis-
crepancy as compared with the budget estimates for 2000,
especially in the case of the payment appropriations.
In the case of commitment appropriations, the estimates for
2000 depended on the uncertainty regarding the adoption of
programmes before the end of the financial year and to a lesser
extent on the share-out between the different Funds of the
assistance granted to programmes.
The late adoption of the assistance packages prevented funds
being disbursed in compliance with the financial perspectives
at the end of the financial year and during the first quarter of
2001.
As regards the payment appropriations, delays in the adop-
tion of new programmes resulted in the under-utilisation of
the appropriations for payment of the initial advance. In view
of the situation regarding the availability of appropriations,
the Commission decided to pay the entire amount of the
advance in accordance with the regulation.
Where programmes are under way, payments are made on the
basis of applications submitted by the Member States at
irregular intervals. The system based on the budget informa-
tion exchange network referred to by the Court can be ques-
tioned only in relation to the forecasts for these latter opera-
tions.
However, the Commission considers that the new arrange-
ments for preparing forecasts based on Article 32(7) of
Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 will mean that
forecasts will gradually be improved, as and when the
(2) See the Annual Report for 1999, paragraphs 3.13 and
3.14 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000).
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3.6. 160 million euro of the Communities’ legal obli-
gations for the programming period 1994 to 1999 had
no budget cover (3). As no commitment appropriations
were entered in the budget for the year 2000 for comple-
tion of the measures for the period 1994 to 1999, this
shortfall had to be covered, in the end, by a matching
reduction in those allocations to the new programming
period which had originally been earmarked, in accor-
dance with the provisions of the regulation, for innova-
tivemeasures and technical assistance (4). This was done
by a transfer made by the budgetary authority.
Implementation of the appropriations
3.7. Table 3.1 traces the implementation of the appro-
priations for the structural measures in accordance with
the presentation of heading 2 of the financial perspec-
tive. The available commitment appropriations, taking
reconstituted appropriations and appropriations car-
ried over from 1999 into account, totalled 32 252 mil-
lion euro for the Structural Funds and 2 662 million
euro for the Cohesion Fund. In total, the respective utili-
sation rates were 55,3 % and 84,4 %. The available
authorities responsible for the 2000 to 2006 programmes
are established and get organised.
Regarding the EUR 6 500 million, a significant proportion
of these payments were made only when the conditions for
payment were met (i.e. when the decision to amend the pro-
grammewas adopted and the request for payment was received),
which only occurred in 2000.
3.6. In 2000 the Commission satisfied the financial com-
mitment obligations for certain programmes for the 1994 to
1999 period which had met the requirements for commitment
in full but were not covered in 1999 as there were insufficient
appropriations in the 1999 budget.
In order to finance these obligations a transfer of EUR 160
million had to made from the allocation in the 2000 budget
for measures for the period 2000 to 2006 whose implemen-
tation was delayed.
In accordance with the Inter-institutional Agreement of
6 May 1999, the Commission began by making the adjust-
ments that were possible to the budget as adopted and then
submitted a proposal for the revision of the financial perspec-
tives to the budgetary authority, which adopted the proposal.
3.7. While implementation of the budget in 2000 was
indeed as described by the Court, if account were taken of the
disbursement of commitment appropriations carried over to
2001, the rates of implementation of Structural Funds and
Cohesion Fund appropriations entered in the 2000 budget
would be 80,8 % and 100 % respectively.
(3) See paragraph 3.6 of the Annual Report concerning the
financial year 1999 and the 1999 Statement of Assurance
(OJ C 342, 1.12.2000).
(4) Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999,
laying down general provisions on the Structural Funds
(general regulation) breaks down the allocation of
resources to the Structural Funds as follows: 69,7 % for
Objective 1 (135 900 million euro), 11,5 % for Objec-
tive 2 (22 500 million euro), 12,3 % for Objective 3
(24 050 million euro), 5,35 % for the Community Initia-
tives and 0,65 % for innovative schemes and technical
assistance.
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payment appropriations were 32 621 million euro for
the Structural Funds and 2 959 million euro for the
Cohesion Fund and the utilisation rates were 79,4 %
and 57,0 % respectively.
3.8. Tables 3.2 and 3.3 show in detail the implemen-
tation of the appropriations in Subsection B2 of the
budget (Structural operations, financial mechanism,
other agricultural and regional operations, transport
and fisheries) covered by heading 2 of the financial per-
spective (5). The utilisation rate for the majority of head-
ings for the new period, 2000 to 2006, was very poor
(see paragraph 3.17). In particular, the utilisation rates
of commitment appropriations for Objective 1 and
Objective 2 for the new period alone are 56,8 % and
4,5 %, and the utilisation rates for payment appropria-
tions are 53,7 % and 7,2 %. All payments made in 2000
correspond to the initial instalment, as no intermediate
payment has yet been made. When the budget was
drawn up, intermediate payments had been estimated at
1 300 million euro. For the new Community Initiatives
(Leader, Interreg, EQUAL and URBAN) budget imple-
mentation was 0 % both for commitments and appro-
priations, as no measure had been approved.
3.9. The Commission decided to carry over to the
financial year 2001, in respect of heading 2, commit-
ment appropriations amounting to 8 639 million euro
(including 1 034 million euro for approved measures,
see paragraph 9.16) and 1 470 million euro in payment
appropriations (including 1 027 million euro for mea-
sures for which commitments had already been made,
see paragraph 9.17). This decision has had the effect of
extending the financial year, de facto, by three months
and robs the principle of annuality of all meaning. The
Court recommended abolishing carry-overs of appro-
priations in its Opinion No 2/2001 (6). Moreover, the
Commission should have provided better evidence to
back up the explanations it gave (7) to justify these
carry-overs. The poor rate of implementation in 2000
will have consequences for the management of the bud-
get during the remainder of the programming period
2000 to 2006. The forecasts for the development of
3.8. If account were taken of the disbursement of commit-
ment appropriations carried over to 2001, the rates of imple-
mentation of appropriations entered in the 2000 budget for
Objectives 1 and 2 would be 82,7 % and 76,5 % respectively.
3.9. The Commission takes the view that it adopted the
decision on carry-overs in compliance with the Financial
Regulation and that the explanations for the decision are fully
in line with the conditions laid down in the Regulation. The
re-entry in the budget of EUR 6 152 million in commitment
appropriations was proposed by the Commission and adopted
by the budgetary authority in accordance with point 17 of the
Inter-institutional Agreement of 6 May 1999. This Agree-
ment envisaged delays in programming in the 2000 to 2006
period, and hence the annulment of part of the appropriations
and the possibility of re-entering them subsequently for the
period 2002 to 2006.
The impact of re-entry in the budget is limited to a maximum
increase in the annual allocation of 5,5 % in the program-
ming for the period 2002 to 2006. The Commission consid-
ers that the likelihood of budget operations being concentrated
(5) Titles B2-5 to B2-9 of Subsection B2 of the budget do not
concern structural measures. The new budget nomencla-
ture has not yet resolved this inconsistency.
(6) Opinion No 2/2001, paragraph 7 (OJ C 162, 5.6.2001,
p. 1).
(7) Commission Decision: Carry-over of appropriations from
2000 to 2001 (differentiated appropriations) (SEC (2001)
449 final, 14 February 2001).
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commitments and payments for the period have now
been distorted, with effect from the first year, and an
amendment of the financial perspective should have
been proposed by the Commission (8) in application of
the Interinstitutional Agreement (9). The transfer of the
unused allocation of commitment appropriations
(6 152 million euro) to the financial years 2002 to 2006
will lead, as in the previous period, to an even greater
concentration of budgetary operations in the final years
of the programming period.
in the final years of the programming period is small, espe-
cially as only the appropriations for 2000 may be re-entered.
With regard to the payment appropriations, the carry-over is
justified for payment of the 7 % advance for programmes
approved in 2000 where this payment could not be made
before the end of 2000.
(8) COM(2001)149 final, 13 March 2001. Proposal for a deci-
sion of the European Parliament and of the Council on
the adjustment of the financial perspective to take account
of implementation.
(9) Interinstitutional Agreement of 6 May 1999 between the
European Parliament, the Council and the Commission
on budgetary discipline and improvement of the budget-
ary procedure (OJ C 172, 18.6.1999, p. 1).
Table 3.1 — Development and implementation of the 2000 budget
(Mio EUR)
Financial perspective heading: 2. Structural measures
Total heading
Of which
Structural Funds Cohesion Fund
Commitment
appropriations
Payment
appropriations
Commitment
appropriations
Payment
appropriations
Commitment
appropriations
Payment
appropriations
Financial perspective ceiling 32 678,00 30 019,00 2 659,00
Budget development
Initial appropriations (1) 32 678,00 31 801,57 30 019,00 29 001,57 2 659,00 2 800,00
Final available appropriations (2) 34 913,97 35 579,78 32 252,27 32 621,09 2 661,70 2 958,69
Budget implementation
Appropriations used 20 089,53 27 590,79 17 843,17 25 905,57 2 246,36 1 685,22
% of final available appropriations 57,54 77,55 55,32 79,41 84,40 56,96
Appropriations carried over to 2001 8 638,85 1 470,00 8 225,30 1 170,00 413,55 300,00
% of final available appropriations 24,74 4,13 25,50 3,59 15,54 10,14
Cancelled appropriations 6 185,59 6 518,99 6 183,80 5 545,52 1,79 973,47
% of final available appropriations 17,72 18,32 19,17 17,00 0,07 32,90
(1) Budget finally approved by the European Parliament on 16 December 1999 (OJ L 40, 14.2.2000).
(2) Budget appropriations amended after taking into account the supplementary and amending budgets and transfers, including appropriations carried over from
1999, the appropriations from revenue relating to contributions from third parties and other revenue corresponding to a specific use as well as appropriations
made available again.
For further information on the implementation of the budget please turn to Diagrams III and IV in Annex I to the report.
Source: Revenue and expenditure account 2000.
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Table 3.2 — Budgetary implementation for measures and Structural Funds during the 2000 financial year
(Mio EUR)
Budget
refer-
ence
Appropriations
Total
appropria-
tions available
(c) + (d) + (e)
Implemen-
tation of
appropria-
tions avail-
able
Rate of
implemen-
tation of
appropria-
tions avail-
able (%)
Appropria-
tions car-
ried over to
financial
year 2001
Appropriations
cancelled at year-end
Initial
budget
Final
budget
after SAB
and
transfers
Carry-overs
from
previous
financial
years
Appropria-
tions made
available
again
Amount
(f) - (g) - (i) % (j)/(c)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) = (g)/(f) (i) (j) (k)
C
Objective 1 B2-1 0 20 781,00 20 787,31 862,31 17,72 21 667,33 12 703,91 58,63 5 374,80 3 588,63 17,26
Objective 2 B2-1 1 3 668,00 3 742,21 472,87 7,97 4 223,04 709,89 16,81 2 648,75 864,40 23,10
Objective 3 B2-1 2 3 505,00 3 505,78 55,91 0,00 3 561,69 3 373,37 94,71 187,76 0,57 0,02
Other structural measures
(outside O1) B2-1 3 161,00 171,46 18,80 0,13 190,39 171,89 90,28 14,00 4,50 2,62
Community initiatives (1) B2-1 4 1 743,00 1 755,58 786,40 4,22 2 546,20 851,02 33,42 1 695,18 96,56
Innovative measures and
technical assistance B2-1 6 161,00 56,67 6,96 0,00 63,62 33,10 52,02 30,52 53,87
Subtotal ‘Structural Funds’ B2-1 30 019,00 30 019,00 2 203,23 30,04 32 252,27 17 843,17 55,32 8 225,30 6 183,80 20,60
Cohesion Fund B2-3 2 659,00 2 659,00 0,00 2,70 2 661,70 2 246,36 84,40 413,55 1,79 0,07
EEA Financial Mechanism B2-4 p.m.
Total 32 678,00 32 678,00 2 203,23 32,74 34 913,97 20 089,53 57,54 8 638,85 6 185,59 18,93
P
Objective 1 B2-1 0 17 378,42 17 728,42 2 357,25 17,72 20 103,39 15 485,17 77,03 1 020,00 3 598,22 20,30
Objective 2 B2-1 1 4 209,18 4 359,18 496,30 7,97 4 863,45 3 859,54 79,36 150,00 853,91 19,59
Objective 3 B2-1 2 2 894,81 3 343,83 0,00 0,00 3 343,83 3 094,14 92,53 249,69 7,47
Other structural measures
(outside O1) B2-1 3 1 056,70 1 056,70 0,00 0,00 1 056,70 980,59 92,80 76,11 7,20
Community initiatives (1) B2-1 4 3 091,68 2 289,66 733,52 3,14 3 026,32 2 301,39 76,05 724,93 31,66
Innovative measures and
technical assistance B2-1 6 370,77 223,77 3,62 0,00 227,39 184,74 81,24 42,65 19,06
Subtotal ‘Structural Funds’ B2-1 29 001,57 29 001,57 3 590,69 28,82 32 621,07 25 905,57 79,41 1 170,00 5 545,52 19,12
Cohesion Fund B2-3 2 800,00 2 800,00 157,79 0,99 2 958,69 1 685,22 56,96 300,00 973,47 34,77
EEA Financial Mechanism B2-4 p.m.
Total 31 801,57 31 801,57 3 748,38 29,82 35 579,78 27 590,79 77,55 1 470,00 6 518,99 20,50
(1) Including the appropriations entered in Chapter B-0 4 0 ‘Provisional appropriations’ (Equal CI: Cas – 544,812; PAs – 140,901).
NB: C = Commitments; P = Payments.
Source: Sincom and revenue and expenditure account.
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Table 3.3 — Implementation of appropriations, broken down by Structural Funds
(Mio EUR)
Budget item Description
Commitments Payments
Appropria-
tions
available
Implemen-
tation %
Appropria-
tions
available
Implemen-
tation %
B2-1 0 0 Objective 1 — EAGGF-Guidance 2 618,47 1 239,28 47,33 1 010,01 587,57 58,17
B2-1 0 1 Objective 1 — FIFG 403,22 324,49 80,47 157,77 157,77 100,00
B2-1 0 2 Objective 1 — ERDF 12 761,18 8 175,55 64,07 5 330,12 2 714,52 50,93
B2-1 0 3 Objective 1 — ESF 4 978,13 2 058,26 41,35 1 605,21 894,95 55,75
B2-1 0 4 Objective 1 — Completion of earlier programmes 906,33 906,33 100,00 12 000,28 11 130,37 92,75
Total ‘Objective 1’ 21 667,33 12 703,91 58,63 20 103,39 15 485,18 77,03
B2-1 1 0 Objective 2 — ERDF 3 016,08 143,60 4,76 495,49 36,85 7,44
B2-1 1 1 Objective 2 — ESF 663,92 23,25 3,50 175,81 11,55 6,57
B2-1 1 2 Objective 2 — Completion of earlier programmes 543,04 543,04 100,00 4 192,16 3 811,14 90,91
Total ‘Objective 2’ 4 223,04 709,89 16,81 4 863,45 3 859,54 79,36
B2-1 2 0 Objective 3 — ESF 3 505,00 3 316,67 94,63 1 474,20 1 433,53 97,24
B2-1 2 1 Objective 3 — Completion of earlier programmes 56,70 56,70 100,00 1 869,63 1 660,61 88,82
Total ‘Objective 3’ 3 561,70 3 373,37 94,71 3 343,83 3 094,14 92,53
B2-1 3 0 FIFG (outside Objective 1) 161,00 142,50 88,51 59,89 59,89 100,00
B2-1 3 1 Completion of earlier programmes — FIFG 0,00 0,00 0,00 146,23 117,61 80,43
B2-1 3 2 Completion of earlier programmes — EAGGF-Guidance 29,39 29,39 100,00 850,59 803,09 94,42
Total ‘other structural measures (outside Objective 1)’ 190,39 171,89 90,28 1 056,70 980,59 92,80
B2-1 4 0 Leader 291,70 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
B2-1 4 1 Interreg 818,00 0,00 0,00 139,00 0,00 0,00
B2-1 4 2 EQUAL 467,90 0,22 0,05 90,00 0,00 0,00
B2-1 4 3 URBAN 117,40 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,00
B2-1 4 4 Completion of earlier programmes 851,20 850,80 99,95 2 797,32 2 301,39 82,27
Total ‘Community Initiatives’ 2 546,20 851,02 33,42 3 026,32 2 301,39 76,05
B2-1 6 0 Technical assistance and innovative measures — EAGGF-
Guidance 1,18 0,00 0,00 4,78 0,00 0,00
B2-1 6 1 Technical assistance and innovative measures — FIFG 1,10 0,79 71,82 1,03 0,42 40,78
B2-1 6 2 Technical assistance and innovative measures — ERDF 35,56 12,15 34,17 16,76 3,76 22,43
B2-1 6 3 Technical assistance and innovative measures — ESF 14,84 9,41 63,37 16,72 5,86 35,05
B2-1 6 4 Completion of earlier programmes 10,94 10,74 98,17 188,11 174,70 92,87
Total ‘Technical assistance and innovative measures’ 63,63 33,10 52,02 227,39 184,74 81,24
Total ‘Structural Funds’ 32 252,27 17 843,17 55,32 32 621,09 25 905,57 79,41
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Indicative distribution of the appropriations available
for the 2000 to 2006 period
3.10. Fixing the allocation of appropriations for the
Structural Funds for the 2000 to 2006 period and their
indicative distribution between the three Objectives, the
Community Initiatives and the Member States repre-
sented a technical and political operation on a consider-
able scale and resulted in a globalmethodological frame-
work defined in the conclusions of the Berlin European
Council, in the new general regulation (Article 7) and in
theminutes of the Councilmeeting of 21 June 1999 (10).
3.11. It was possible to carry out an initial distribution
of the appropriations between the Member States for
the three priority Objectives on the basis of the applica-
tion of objective criteria (11). Subsequently, allocations
based on the ‘special situations’ of the Member States
were added to them by political decisions taken during
the Berlin European Council (2 800 million for Objec-
tive 1; 160 million for Objective 2 and 650 million for
Objective 3).
3.12. With regard to the indicative distribution by
Member State of the appropriations for the Community
Initiatives, clearer procedures than those applied for the
preceding periods were drawn up by the Commission.
For URBAN, only objective criteria were used. For Inter-
reg, EQUAL and Leader, 40 % of the appropriations
were distributed on the basis of the relative share of
each Member State in the corresponding Community
Initiatives for the period 1994 to 1999, 40 % on the
basis of objective criteria specific to each Community
3.12. The indicative distribution of funding from the Struc-
tural Funds for the current programming period, including the
Community Initiatives, was made on the basis of objective cri-
teria, other than for some adjustments involving small
amounts. This represents a major step forward, as the old
rules applying in earlier periods did not allow it. Furthermore,
while it is true that the methodology adopted for the distribu-
tion of overall funding for the Initiatives has not been made
public at this stage, it has however been explained in detail to
each Member State.
(10) Document 9431/99 ADD 1 PC/CONS 40 of 2 July 1999.
Addendum to the draft minutes of the Council’s 2192nd
meeting (General Affairs) which took place in Luxem-
bourg on 21 June 1999.
(11) For Objective 1, these are regional prosperity (difference
between per capita GDP in the eligible regions and the
Community average), national prosperity (per capita GDP)
and the level of unemployment; for Objective 2, it is the
population and, for Objective 3, long-term unemploy-
ment, youth unemployment, the rate of employment, dis-
parities between men and women, the level of qualifica-
tions and poverty. Commission Decisions
Nos 1999/500/EC, 1999/501/EC, 1999/504/EC and
1999/505/EC of 1 July 1999, fixing an indicative alloca-
tion by Member State of Structural Funds commitment
appropriations under the FIFG (outside Objective 1) and
Objectives 1, 2 and 3 respectively for the period 2000 to
2006 (OJ L 194, 27.7.1999, pp. 47, 49, 60 and 63).
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Initiative and 20 % taking into account the Berlin Euro-
pean Council’s decisions (covering 900 million euro),
the commitments given by the Member States and their
special situations. Nevertheless, neither the methodol-
ogy applied nor the reasons for the amendments made
on the basis of non-objective criteria, other than those
decided in Berlin in respect of special situations in
Member States, have been made public.
Review of the Commission’s comments on financial
management (12)
3.13. With regard to structural measures, the informa-
tion provided by the Commission in Volume I of the
revenue and expenditure account for the financial year
2000 is more comprehensive than in previous years.
However, the Commission does not provide a satisfac-
tory explanation there of why the programmes which,
according to the Commission, were ready at the end of
2000 were not adopted, when it is delays in the adop-
tion of programmes that are responsible for entitle-
ments being under-used and for the large amount of
carry-overs of appropriations. Except in the case of the
FIFG, the Commission does not indicate that automatic
commitments and advance payments were not made in
2000 once the programmes had been adopted.
3.14. The Commission provides tables which show
quite substantial transfers, but it provides no explana-
tion of the non-utilisation of the majority of the appro-
priations allocated to certain budget headings. By way
of example, the allocation for the ‘Objective 1 ERDF’
heading was increased by 1 750 million euro in terms
of payment appropriations. In the end, these transfers
proved useless, as the appropriations were not used.
Moreover, these ultimately unnecessary transfers
between headings relating to different programming
periods reduce the significance of the declared rates at
which available appropriations were implemented.
3.14. It is true that substantial transfers were made in
2000, some of which ultimately proved unnecessary given the
overall level of under-utilisation in that year.
In the case of old programmes, the under-utilisation of pay-
ments for certain headings in 1999 created an imbalance in
the budget for 2000. Some chapters (for example, the old
programmes for Objectives 2 and 5(b)) had insufficient pay-
ment appropriations in 2000 and consequently had to be
boosted.
In the case of the new programmes, as indicated in point 3.5,
the requirements for payment appropriations depended on the
programmes being adopted in sufficient time and this remained
unknown up to the end of the financial year. At the end of the
year, in circumstances which suggested significant under-
utilisation for several budget headings, the Commission
re-allocated the available funds to headings which might need
them if the programmes were adopted in sufficient time for the
advances to be made.
(12) The Court has reviewed the information presented by the
Commission in Volume I of the revenue and expenditure
account. The purpose of this volume is to provide a com-
mentary on budgetary management for the year and, in
particular, explanations of variations between the initial
approved budget and the appropriations finally available
as well as between the appropriations finally available and
those utilised. This review did not seek to provide assur-
ance as to the reliability of its contents. Rather, it sought
to identify any significant variations for which explana-
tions are not provided and to identify any explanations
that might be considered misleading.
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3.15. Approximately 59 % of payment appropriations
carried over from the financial year 1999 (3 748 million
euro) were used, a figure which led to the cancellation
of appropriations corresponding to the Structural Funds
and to the Cohesion Fund totalling 1 380 and 158 mil-
lion euro respectively. The Commission does not com-
ment on this abnormal situation, which is the conse-
quence of the inappropriate use of carry-overs of
appropriations (see paragraph 3.9). Lastly, the explana-
tions given for each Structural Fund vary considerably.
For example, with regard to Objective 1 no specific
mention is made of the ERDF and two-and-a-half pages
of comments on the implementation of the EAGGF-
Guidance are followed by two paragraphs on the imple-
mentation of the ESF.
Implementation of the programmes
3.16. Themanagement of the Structural Funds in 2000
concentrated on measures concerning four program-
ming periods, i.e. the new period 2000 to 2006, the
preceding period, 1994 to 1999, the period 1989 to
1993 and the period before the reform in 1988.
The 2000 to 2006 period: implementation slower than
anticipated
3.17. The adoption of the new forms of assistance
proved much slower than anticipated. The five-month
deadline laid down in the regulation was exceeded in
the case of virtually all applications for assistance. The
new rules, which were designed to accelerate and sim-
plify the programming procedures (13), did not produce
the expected results. On 31 December 2000 the Com-
mission adopted forObjective 1 (development and struc-
tural adjustment of regions whose development is lag-
ging behind), the seven CSFs (Community support
frameworks) and 18 of the 19 SPDs (single program-
ming documents) planned, but only 49 of the 101 OPs
(operational programmes) submitted by the Member
States. For Objective 2 (economic and social reconstruc-
tion of areas experiencing structural difficulties), only
eight of the 96 OPs/SPDs submitted were approved.
This situation is attributable, in part, to delays in the
adoption of the lists of areas eligible under Objective 2,
in particular for Italy, whose list was not adopted until
July 2000. Within the framework of Objective 3 (adap-
tation and modernisation of educational, training and
employment policies and systems), which is financed
3.15. The Commission indeed made a large carry-over of
payment appropriations from 1999 to 2000. The reason for
this was the existence of requests for payments submitted to
the Commission late in the year but not paid, which could not
in any way be regarded as late payments. This build-up of
payment requests suggested significant pressure on payment
appropriations in 2000 which was only partly borne out, and
this explains the partial under-utilisation of the appropria-
tions carried over.
3.17. As indicated above in points 3.4 and 3.8, the under-
utilisation of the budget in 2000 was the result of delays in
adopting programmes.
These were due, partly, to the Commission’s late adoption of
certain decisions, even though these were justified by the need
to comply with the rules (adoption of eligible areas, addition-
ality) or on grounds of sound financial management (guide-
lines, negotiation of CSFs, SPDs, programmes).
Secondly, as the Court states, there was a failure in many cases
to meet the deadlines set in Article 15 of Regulation (EC)
No 1260/1999. It should be borne in mind nevertheless that
the programming exercise for 2000 to 2006 was superim-
posed on the final adjustment of the programming for the
period 1994 to 1999 and that these two exercises, by their
nature political, were conducted within very complex decision-
making frameworks.
(13) Recital No 34 of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999
of 21 June 1999 laying down general provisions on the
Structural Funds (OJ L 161, 26.6.1999, p. 1).
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solely by the European Social Fund, the majority of
forms of assistance planned (all except four) were
approved. No Community initiative (CI) programme
was adopted.
3.18. In the case of several programmes adopted in
2000, commitments and the corresponding payment
instalments, although automatic, were not made by the
Commission in 2000 but in 2001 after the relevant
appropriations had been carried over (see para-
graph 3.9). In view of the new provisions in the regula-
tionconcerning total orpartial decommitmentofunused
appropriations (14) by the end of the second year fol-
lowing the year of commitment, the consequences for
programmes for which the relevant commitment was
formalised at the end of the year 2000 in comparison
with programmes for which the commitment was fina-
lised at the beginning of 2001 are considerable: in the
first case, automatic decommitments would commence
in 2002 while in the second case they would be carried
out in 2003.
The comment by the Court on the slower-than-anticipated
start to this new programming period is accurate, particularly
in relation to Objectives 1 and 2. This delay was justified,
however, by the need to ensure better integration of the Struc-
tural Funds (a point criticised by the Court in relation to the
1994 to 1999 period) and the reflection in Structural Funds
programming, particularly for the ESF, of the European
employment strategy. In some cases, the operational pro-
grammes and/or SPDs presented by the Member States were
entirely recast following the first phase of the negotiations.
This was the case particularly for Spain, which presented
regional single-fund programmes for Objective 1 which were
‘converted’ into multi-fund programmes with a broader range
of objectives.
In other cases, especially that of Greece, the delay was due to
the Commission’s requirement that satisfactory management
structures be put in place before the assistance measures were
adopted.
The task of defining (in partnership) both quantified targets
and monitoring, outcome and impact indicators with the
quality required for the necessary evaluations that comply with
the rules in some cases also took considerable time, which was
difficult to reconcile with the five-month deadline.
3.18. The Commission is aware of this situation and is
examining the consequences for the n + 2 rule in cases where,
for a given programme, the 2000 tranche was committed for
one Fund in 2000 out of appropriations for that financial
year and for another Fund in 2001 out of appropriations car-
ried over.
However, the Commission considers that in practice the prob-
lem will be limited given that:
— for most programmes, payments made since 1 January
2000 are eligible,
— in the case of the tranche for 2000, almost half has been
used up by the advances, and consequently the other half
only should be used within the deadline set by the n + 2
rule, i.e. the end of 2002 for the commitment for 2000
and the end of 2003 for the commitment for 2001,
— in the case of the tranche for 2001, the deadline in all
cases is the end of 2003.
This problem is confined to multi-Fund programmes which
have been partly committed in 2000 and for which difficul-
ties would arise in using up half the commitment made in
2000 before the end of 2002, when all the commitments for
2000 and 2001 should have been used up before the end of
2003.
(14) Article 31(2) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999.
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3.19. The financing plans for new measures reproduce
the annual distribution set out in the Community finan-
cial perspective (15). These plans are not accompanied
by real forecasts of the measures’ progress. This imposes
limits on the effectiveness of the programming, moni-
toring and evaluation instruments which are applied to
the interventions.
The 1994 to 1999 period
3.20. With regard to finalising commitments for the
1994 to 1999 period, amendments had to be carried
out during the financial year 2000 to correct inconsis-
tencies discovered at the end of 1999 between the legal
commitments and the budget commitments, although
some had still not been dealt with at the end of 2000.
In 1999, in particular at the end of the year, the moni-
toring committees for many forms of assistance used
their powers to decide on amendments to the financ-
ing plans (16). These amendments must be confirmed by
the Commission in the form of a formal decision within
20 working days, but this deadline was never adhered
to. At the end of 2000, numerous amendments had still
not been confirmed, which causes uncertainty in the
management of the measures because two financial
plans now coexist, the one actually in force and the one
adopted by the monitoring committee. Moreover, there
is still no global information on the state of progress of
the measures for the period 1994 to 1999. As for
Objective 2 in the period 1994 to 1996, only 12 of the
72 ERDF interventions have been closed (two in 1999
and 10 in 2000). For the 73 ESF interventions, all the
requests for payment of the balance, except one, have
been submitted to the Commission, which, however,
did not carry out the relevant decommitments, for a
total of 74,4 million euro, in 2000.
3.19. Under Articles 18 and 19 of Council Regulation
(EC) No 1260/1999 assistance packages are the subject of a
financing plan specifying for each year and each priority the
different sources of financing.
The Commission emphasises the tightening of budgetary dis-
cipline arising from the provisions adopted regarding pro-
gramming (financial perspectives) and commitment, which
involve a close link between the financing plans for assistance
measures and the financial perspectives.
Regarding the implementation of programmes, the n+ 2 rule
imposes a framework on the national authorities establishing
close links between their implementation plans and the financ-
ing plans for programmes, while giving them considerable
flexibility in planning and implementing measures.
3.20. Concerning amendments to programmes, the Com-
mission adopted the majority of final decisions concerning
assistance packages for 1994 to 1999 in 2000. This is logi-
cal since the Member States had until 31 December 1999 to
make their final amendments to programmes, in order to
align the assistance measures on the final implementation
forecasts.
It should be borne in mind that amendments made by the
Member States must be forwarded to the Commission, which
adopts them in the form of amendments to the decisions
granting aid. In many cases, requests from Member States
were forwarded to the Commission several months late and,
in some cases, with errors that had to be corrected. The Com-
mission regrets the excessive delay in the updating of the final
decisions amending programmes.
By contrast, under the new regulation this procedure is simpli-
fied as the Member States themselves will adopt amendments
of this type within priorities by adjusting programme comple-
ments for assistance packages, which will be sent to the Com-
mission for information. Provided the adjustments do not
affect the total financing for each Fund and priority, no
amendment to the decision will be needed.
Regarding the Objective 2 programmes in the 1994 to 1996
sub-period, more have been terminated and the number of
assistance operations completed up to the end of June 2001
is 24 out of 72.
(15) Articles 31(1), 28(2) and 17(2)(c) of the general Regula-
tion.
(16) Procedures for amending the forms of assistance, annexed
to the SPDs and OPs for the 1994 to 1999 period.
156 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.12.2001
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The periods prior to 1994: closure of the measures
3.21. On 31 December 2000, the amounts outstand-
ing for the periods prior to 1994 came to 934 million
euro, 100 million euro and 42 million euro respectively
for the ERDF, the ESF and the EAGGF-Guidance, com-
pared to 1 481 million euro, 170 million euro and
80 million euro as at 31 December 1999. In several
cases, amendments to the financing plans for the mea-
sures, which should have been closed several years
before, were approved by a Commission decision in
2000.
3.22. In 2000, progress in the closure of interventions
was still slow even if an improvement was noted in the
case of certain Member States (in particular Italy and
the United Kingdom). The Court can only reiterate the
observations made in its previous Annual Reports and
in its Special Report No 14/98 (17) which reported the
shortcomings, at the level of the Member States and the
Commission, which were at the root of the delays in the
closure of the measures. Above all, the inability of the
Commission to give due consideration to the findings
of the audits carried out by the various Commission
departments and by the Court remains one of the main
causes for delays in closure.
Concerning the ESF, the Commission accepts the Court’s com-
ment. However, it should be noted that in June 2001 the
amount mentioned by the Court had been reduced by over
EUR 12 million: all the decommitments for Germany total-
ling EUR 6 894 717 had been made and the amount still
not closed for Italy had been reduced by EUR 5 307 620.
The other cases remaining open are being studied very closely
in order that they can be finalised rapidly during the 2001
budget year.
3.21. The figures given by the Court bear out the progress
made by the Commission in winding up assistance operations
for the period before 1994. This has been carried out in com-
pliance with the rules applying in each specific case, the most
litigious situations being, of course, those presenting the
greatest difficulty.
At the end of June 2001, the number of ERDF assistance
operations still to be wound up was 94 with total outstand-
ing commitments of EUR 632 million.
3.22. The Commission is doing everything it can to wind
up all the assistance operations for the period before 1994. As
and when the circumstances of programmes allow, it closes
them. This position is mentioned in the work programmes
adopted by the Commission.
Having said that, the winding up of assistance operations is
a matter not solely for the Commission. It involves third par-
ties and must, in addition, be carried out in compliance with
the rules and requirements of sound financial management.
Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 states that, even upon auto-
matic decommitment under Article 52, final payment (clo-
sure) must be made giving rise ‘to the repayment of amounts
unduly paid’. It should be noted also that Article 52(5) of
Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 extended the deadline for
submitting applications for final payment to 31March 2001.
Lastly, the account taken of the results of checks carried out
by the various Commission departments and the Court pro-
longs the discussions with Member States.
(17) Special Report No 14/98 (OJ C 368, 27.11.1998).
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3.23. In its Special Report No 14/98, the Court had
recommended the use of provisional closures where
one or more measures were still to be examined (18), in
order to avoid entire programmes remaining in abey-
ance when problems identified during audit only con-
cerned a very limited number of projects, or even only
one.Whatever the case, the Commission should decom-
mit automatically, no later than 30 September 2001,
the amounts committed for operations or programmes
approved before 1 January 1994 in respect of which no
application for final payment has been received (19).
SPECIFIC APPRAISAL IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE
Introduction
3.24. The financial data relating to commitments and
payments made in 2000 concerning the 2000 to 2006
and previous programming periods for structural mea-
sures are presented in paragraph 3.4 of this report.
3.25. The Court based its work towards issuing the
Statement of Assurance on an examination of the
accounts and on an analysis of certain control systems
introduced by the Commission in the area of structural
measures. For the financial year 2000, the Court evalu-
ated the implementation of Regulation (EC)No 2064/97
on the financial control of SF measures by the Member
States, the implementation of new provisions for the
programming period 2000 to 2006, the procedures for
the closure of measures and the checks carried out by
the Commission in respect of SF measures.
3.23. The Commission considers that provisional closures,
by suspending payment for one or more projects in an assis-
tance operation, are not always practicable since:
(1) the amounts of the operations in question are frequently
not properly determined if the scale of the problem is not
itself properly determined first;
(2) the national authorities are often reluctant to cooperate
in determining the amount to be suspended.
The procedure for suspending payments is lengthy as it involves
entering into discussions with the beneficiary Member State
as provided for in Article 24 of Regulation (EEC)
No 4253/88.
The Commission is endeavouring firstly to complete examina-
tions now in hand and to make the necessary corrections
rather than embark upon provisional closures whose legal
basis is unclear.
(18) Paragraphs 4.3 (c) and 3.17 of Special Report No 14/98
on the closure of the forms of ERDF assistance
(OJ C 368, 27.11.1998, p. 1).
(19) Article 52(5) of Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999.
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3.26. In addition, the Court directly examined certain
commitment and payment transactions listed in the
accounts. Payments corresponding to the closing bal-
ances for measures also gave rise to thorough checks in
respect of all expenditure declared for a sub-programme
throughout the period of assistance (two ERDF pay-
ments and a Cohesion Fund project). As closure in
respect of the ESF occurs in annual instalments, thor-
ough checks were made in this area regarding the 1998
instalment of an operational programme.
3.27. Observations on the reliability of the Commu-
nity accounts and general observations on the legality
and regularity are set out in Chapter 9 of this year’s
Annual Report (see paragraphs 9.13 to 9.15 and 9.56 to
9.60). Observations on the legality and the regularity of
transactions concerning structural measures and on the
systems examined are set out below.
Analysis of the underlying transactions
Commitments
3.28. Legal commitments corresponding to the 2000
instalment for programmes in the new period which
had been covered by Commission decisions prior to
31 December 2000 were not subject to budgetary com-
mitments in 2000 (see paragraph 9.16 of this report).
3.29. Inmore general terms, the Court wishes to point
out that the payment of commitments in instalments
for multiannual transactions, as envisaged by SF legisla-
tion, is nevertheless incompatible with the definition of
differentiated appropriations given in Article 1(4) of the
Financial Regulation. In Opinion No 2/2001 on the
recasting of the Financial Regulation, the Court pointed
out that the incorporation of this exception into the
Financial Regulation itself was not likely to eliminate
this incompatibility.
3.30. The Court’s examination of the commitments
entered in the accounts did not give cause for any fur-
ther remark concerning their legality and their regular-
ity. Nevertheless, the Court did find some occasional
anomalies which would indicate that there are a num-
ber of weaknesses in the internal control procedures.
For example, there is an ERDF budget commitment
which was validated before the decision to approve the
3.28. The Commission is aware of this problem which is
the outcome of differences in approach to the programme
adoption procedure (see reply to point 9.15).
3.29. The Commission has noted the Court’s objections
concerning the payment of commitments in annual instal-
ments. In its reply to the Court’s Report for 1999 (see points
3.21 and 3.22) the Commission outlined the benefits that
commitments of this kind could have in certain cases. In any
event, since the Regulation was adopted on that basis, the
commitments will be paid in annual instalments during the
period 2000 to 2006.
3.30. The Commission considers that the errors identified
by the Court are formal errors of minor character which are
insufficient to justify the conclusion of weaknesses in the inter-
nal control procedure. All three cases cited are ‘one-off’ errors
which had no financial impact.
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measure was taken by the Commission, a Cohesion
Fund project which was the subject of two separate
approval decisions, an ERDF commitment for which
the final deadline does not take into account the two-
year limit imposed by the regulation.
Payments
3.31. For the programming period 2000 to 2006 of
the Structural Funds, the payments made in 2000 entail
the transfer of an initial advance of 7 % of the total cost
of a measure. This transfer takes place when the first
instalment is committed. Subsequent payments will
entail the reimbursement of expenditure incurred on
the basis of declarations certified by the Member States.
No payment of this kind was made in this first year of
the programming period.
3.32. Transfers of instalment payments for measures
decided upon in 2000 did not take place, however, dur-
ing the financial year (see paragraph 9.17 of this report).
3.33. In the case of previous programming periods,
payments take the form of advances, intermediate bal-
ances or a final balance. They are contingent upon a
declaration of expenditure certified by theMember State,
provided that the declared volume reaches a pre-defined
threshold specified in the measure’s financing plan.
Requests for payment of the balance must be accompa-
nied by a report on the implementation of the instal-
ment concerned.
3.34. Since 2000, Cohesion Fund payments have con-
sisted of a 20 % advance followed by refunds of expen-
diture, the disbursement of which depends on the
project’s status and are based on declarations by the
national authorities describing progress made in rela-
tion to physical and financial indicators which are speci-
fied in the Commission’s decision to grant approval.
Payment of the balance of 20 % (or 10 % in duly sub-
stantiated cases) of theCommunity contribution requires
the Member State to submit a report confirming that
the project has been completed in line with its objec-
tives.
3.35. Whether in the case of the Structural Funds or
of the Cohesion Fund, the size of Community payments
is not necessarily equivalent or proportional to the vol-
ume of expenditure declared by the Member States. As
the Court has stated in all of its reports in support of
3.32. The reason for the absence of transfers of advances in
2000 for programmes approved in that financial year is,
firstly, the fact that the budget commitment for certain pro-
grammes was not made in 2000 and, secondly, that the com-
mitment for a few programmes was made at the end of the
year (see reply to point 9.21).
3.35. Any impact on the Community budget of the prema-
ture payment of advances would be very limited and transi-
tory, since the issue is not the amount paid but the timing,
and because rectification of any anomalies in the declaration
could take place at or before closure. With regard to final
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previous Statements of Assurance, the majority of the
errors detected in declarations of expenditure do not in
themselves necessarily affect the amounts disbursed by
the Commission. In view of possible over-declarations,
the level of eligible expenditure after detected errors
have been deducted, could still justify payment of the
advance or the transfer of the balance concerned. How-
ever, the frequency of the anomalies observed in decla-
rations of expenditure shows that the potential impact
on the Community budget of the early transfer of
advances or of the payment of excessive balances (see
paragraph 3.39) is real.
3.36. Legality and regularity errors which directly
affect the amounts of the underlying transactions (sub-
stantive errors) occur mostly in the Member States, at
the level of the final beneficiaries, which also include
public authorities that manage programmes or mea-
sures where projects are self-managed. The level of
errors observed in declarations which give rise to inter-
mediate payments did not vary significantly when com-
pared with previous financial years. The most frequent
errors are the same as those observed previously in
various Member States, namely:
(a) expenditure ormeasureswhich are ineligible accord-
ing to the general regulations or specific provisions;
(b) expenditure which is declared eligible but which
exceeds the amount actually incurred;
(c) expenditure which is not justified by any adequate
supporting information or documentation;
(d) the inclusion of costs unrelated to the projects
approved;
(e) the failure to take account, when calculating the rate
of Community financing, of estimated revenue gen-
erated by the project;
(f) over-estimation of the final request for payment.
payments of programmes from the 1994 to 99 period (apart
from Objective 2 programmes for 1994 to 96) will be subject
to all the provisions laid down in Regulation (EC),
No 2064/97, and in particular the requirement in Article 8
concerning a closure statement by an independent body, which
will provide increased assurance that non-eligible expenditure
has been excluded from the final expenditure declaration.
3.36 and 3.38. The Commission has not been able to
complete its in-depth examination of all the cases in the lim-
ited time available, and for some cases replies from Member
States have not yet been provided. The analysis carried out
shows that the majority of errors concern the inclusion by the
final beneficiary in expenditure declarations of ineligible or
unjustified elements. The other principal category concerns the
incorrect application of Community rules by the managing
authority. However, in a number of cases, the Commission
does not share the Court’s interpretation. The Commission
will in any event conclude its investigation of the cases identi-
fied by the Court and ensure that the necessary financial cor-
rections are made.
In the context of the disbursement of billions of euros of public
expenditure to support many thousands of individual projects
of wide diversity, it is inevitable that there will be certain cases
of expenditure items being inadequately justified by the ben-
eficiaries, of errors in expenditure declared and of non-
compliance with eligibility rules or other implementation
requirements. It is inherent in the system of implementation
of the Structural Funds that a number of final beneficiaries,
for some items of expenditure, will fail to meet the detailed
technical requirements and the high standards laid down. The
concern of the Commission is to ensure that where expenditure
has been incurred in clear breach of the applicable rules, it is
not co-financed by the Structural Funds. For that reason, for
the programming period 2000 to 2006, the procedure of cer-
tification of expenditure by the Member States has been
strengthened and made more precise in Regulation (EC)
No 438/2001, so that ineligible expenditure is excluded from
the declaration made to the Commission. Other requirements
relating to financial management and control have also been
reinforced by that Regulation, and the obligations regarding
financial corrections where irregularities are detected are set
out in Regulation (EC) No 448/2001.
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3.37. Furthermore, the question of the VAT paid by
the central authorities, which is regarded as a real cost
but the eligibility of which is not established (see para-
graph 3.46 of the Annual Report concerning the finan-
cial year 1999), has not met with an answer, notwith-
standing that in its reply the Commission undertook to
clarify the matter (see the Commission’s reply to para-
graph 3.46).
3.38. Other types of error are also of the same kind
and frequency as those observed previously, namely:
(a) the Commission’s failure to observe regulatory dead-
lines, in particular the two-month deadline for mak-
ing a payment after an eligible request has been
received;
(b) the inadequacy of the checks carried out by the
national authorities in respect of the eligibility of
expenditure declared;
(c) the failure to keep supporting documentation in
respect of declared expenditure or the inability to
reconstitute the audit trail;
(d) the failure to observe procedural arrangements for
public-works contracts;
(e) the unreliability of the financial breakdown for
national programmes at the regional level;
(f) the lump-sum declaration of expenditure without
presentation of the appropriate supporting docu-
mentation.
3.39. The detailed checks carried out by the Court in
respect of measures closed in 2000 showed that signifi-
cant errors continue to be made in declarations leading
to payment of a final balance:
(a) in the case of one Objective 1 ERDF sectoral OP for
the period 1989 to 1993 (Italy — ‘Industry and ser-
vices’), the checks in respect of a sub-programme
found that only 39,9 % of declared expenditure was
eligible; this error does not affect the Community
payments only because of a very significant over-
declaration of 239 %;
3.37. With regard to the question of eligibility of VAT
incurred by public administrations, the Commission indicated
in its reply to point 3.46 of the annual report for 1999 that,
whilst admitting the Court’s restrictive interpretation was pos-
sible, it followed a different interpretation for the reasons set
out in that point. The Commission maintains its interpreta-
tion of datasheet No 15, whose provisions have now been
incorporated into rule 7 of Regulation (EC)
No 1685/2000. Nevertheless, in order to ensure that the
application of the new rule is clearly understood by those con-
cerned, an explanation of this point will be provided in the
information document on the eligibility rules to be produced.
3.39.
(a) The expenditure found to be ineligible by the Court arises
from a number of separate findings for different projects.
Information which has been provided by the national
authorities will be examined in detail. However, it is
noted that there is in any event no financial impact for
the Community budget.
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(b) in the case of one Objective 2 ERDF regional SPD
for the period 1994 to 1996 (Italy — Piedmont), the
share of expenditure which was not eligible for the
sub-programme examined represented 31,1 % of
the expenditure declared, with the result that Com-
munity funds financed surplus payments of 9,8 mil-
lion euro, i.e. 33,3 % of the ERDF contribution to
this sub-programme;
(c) in the case of one Cohesion Fund project (Greece —
distribution and purification of water in Chalcis), a
combination of ineligible expenditure at the rate of
7,2 % of the amount declared and of a rate of finance
which did not make adequate allowance for the rev-
enue generated by the project led to an excess pay-
ment of 0,8 million euro, i.e.19,6 % of the Cohesion
Fund contribution to this project;
(d) concerning the ESF, an intensified audit of the 1998
closure for one region (North Rhine–Westphalia) of
an Operational Programme (CI Employment 1994
to 1999, Germany) has identified a proportion of
ineligible expenditure of 15,7 % for this region, rep-
resenting 2,7 % of the 1998 ESF contribution for
the whole national programme. This error was due
to the declaration of advance payments instead of
actual expenditure, overstatement of expenditure by
the use of flat rates and the lack of documentation
concerning parts of the public co-financing.
Outstanding commitments
3.40. Commitments for structural measures are
intended to remain open, at least in part, for several
years, and until final closure in the case of commit-
ments concerning the last instalment for a measure.
Nevertheless, justification for keeping commitments
open applies only to amounts which may give rise to
payments. The Court therefore verified the validity of
old commitments still outstanding at the end of 2000.
(b) The Court’s findings concerned three separate measures in
one of the sub-programmes of the SPD. The two main
issues, which concern a major part of the expenditure
found by the Court to be ineligible, are whether the legal
and financial commitment at national level was effected
before the deadline for certain projects, and the lack of
proof that the benefits of the programme were limited to
enterprises in the Objective 2 area. Further information
is required before the Commission can complete its enqui-
ries on these points. Nevertheless it is accepted that an
amount of ineligible expenditure was included in the final
declaration, and necessary recovery action will be carried
out.
(c) The rate of co-financed grant took account of the Com-
mission concern for the equality of treatment between
Member States with differing policies for charging for
water supplies. These differing policies are addressed in a
directive due to come into effect in 2004. With regard to
the ineligible expenditure the Commission will take action
to recover any undue payment when all the information
is available and its enquiries have been completed.
(d) DG EMPLOI accepts the principle of the error uncovered
by the Court. Contact has been made with the competent
authorities to rectify the situation described by the Court.
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3.41. A number of commitments concerned files
which had already been closed and where the unused
balance had not been cancelled immediately. The Com-
mission should ensure that a final payment or recovery
cannot be authorised before a cancellation is made.
3.42. Cases where a commitment seems technically
justified very often concern old measures which could
not be closed due to very slow and inefficient proce-
dures. However, in certain cases it is clear that the full
commitment is no longer necessary, in particular where
the payment request submitted does not match the
amount available. In such cases, the Commission should
make the corresponding cancellation without delay.
3.43. Overall, the Court noted that in 10 % of the
cases examined at least part of the commitment should
not have given rise to any payment. In order to ensure
that unjustified commitments do not remain in the
accounts, the Commission should take greater care to
adjust commitments to actual requirements.
Analysis of the control systems
Implementation of Regulation (EC) No 2064/97
3.44. In 2000 the Court audited the implementation
by the Commission and Member States of Regulation
(EC) No 2064/97 (20). This regulation sets out a system
of checks by Member States on expenditure incurred on
projects co-financed by the European Union
(Article 3) (21) and requires that a closure statement be
provided by an independent body no later than at the
time of the request for final payment and the final dec-
laration of expenditure for each form of assistance
(operational programme, single programming docu-
ment, Community initiative) (Article 8).
3.41 to 3.43. The Commission agrees with the Court that
the balance of commitments should be de-committed follow-
ing closure of the form of intervention and payment of the
final balance and procedures now applied should ensure that
this will happen. With regard to old programmes which have
not been closed, the Commission is giving priority to efforts
to achieve closure of those programmes. By the end of 2001,
the Commission expects to have reduced the commitments for
pre-1994 projects and programmes to a few contentious cases
and to have made substantial progress on commitments
related to later periods.
(20) OJ L 290, 23.10.1997, p. 1.
(21) Article 3 requires that Member States verify the effective-
ness of the management and control systems in place and
the expenditure declarations made at the various levels.
The checks, which must be carried out before the closure
of each form of assistance, must cover at least 5 % of the
total eligible expenditure.
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3.45. The findings of this audit were published in Spe-
cial Report No 10/2001 (OJ C 314, 8.11.2001), together
with findings from the audit of the implementation of
Regulation (EC) No 1681/94 (22) (see paragraphs 3.130
to 3.131). The audit work took place in the Commission
and in Germany, Spain, France, Italy and the United
Kingdom. A preliminary visit was carried out in Portu-
gal.
3.46. In addition, in the course of examining the legal-
ity and regularity of a sample of underlying transactions
as part of the Statement of Assurance 2000 audit, the
Court also examined the progress made in complying
with Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 for the forms of assis-
tance in that sample. This allowed the Court to obtain
more up-to-date information and to cover an additional
four Member States (Greece, Ireland, Sweden and the
Netherlands), as well as more regions in the six Member
States visited initially. Thus progress in implementing
the regulation was assessed for a wider selection of
forms of assistance and in ten Member States. The find-
ings from this further testing confirm those in Special
Report No 10/2001.
Problems of implementation
3.47. The Special Report found that, although Regula-
tion (EC) No 2064/97 represents an important initia-
tive by the Commission to improve financial control of
Structural Funds expenditure byMember States and that
the checks made and the resultant closure statements
should help to avoid the European Union co-financing
ineligible expenditure, Member States were not apply-
ing the regulation correctly (Special Report, para-
graphs 42 to 84). The report stated that, despite the
useful guidance given in two appendices in the Struc-
tural Funds Audit Manual, the Commission had not
given sufficient clear and timely guidance and that it
carried out little assessment of Member States’ imple-
mentation of the regulation by the end of 2000.
3.47. The issues raised by the Court regarding the imple-
mentation of Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 are all set out in
its Special Report to which the Commission has given detailed
replies. The essential elements of those replies are therefore
repeated here. Since the entry into force of Regulation (EC)
No 2064/97, the Commission has made great efforts to give
detailed guidance to Member States on the implementation of
its provisions, notably through the Structural Funds audit
manual, first presented in June 1998 and through the sys-
tematic treatment of questions relating to the regulation in the
framework of the bilateral coordination meetings with Mem-
ber States, in the annual meeting of EU Financial Controllers
in 1998, 1999 and 2000 and on other occasions.
As regards assessment of the application of the regulation,
since 1999, a number of audit missions have been carried out
by Structural Funds’ services covering compliance with certain
aspects of the regulation. In preparation for the closure of
programmes from the 1994 to 99 period, a full enquiry was
launched at the beginning of 2001 into the implementation
of the regulation by all Member States. Where problems are
identified in the course of this enquiry, the national authori-
ties are informed so that they are able to take remedial action.
(22) OJ L 178, 12.7.1994, p. 43.
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3.48. The Special Report (paragraph 33) further stated
that there have been delays in the execution of the 5 %
checks by Member States which must be completed by
June 2002 (final date for closure). The additional test-
ing in the context of the Statement of Assurance found
that in Italy and Greece checks in some OPs audited by
the Court had still not started by the spring of 2001.
This was also the case for one OP in Germany. It is a
matter of concern that Member States may not be able
to carry out checks of sufficient quality in the time
remaining.
3.49. The Commission had given conflicting explana-
tions of the provision which allows a proportional
reduction in the 5 %minimumpercentage to be checked
for forms of systems approved before the entry into
force of this regulation and confusion was noted in
Member States as to its implementation (Special Report,
paragraphs 75 to 79). The further testing in the context
of the Statement of Assurance revealed confusion over
the application of the proportional reduction in the
sample size in Greece, and in Italy, Ireland and Sweden
the Member States authorities interpreted the reduction
to mean that checking of expenditure incurred prior to
1998 was not required.
3.50. A common weakness reported upon in the Spe-
cial Report was the inclusion of expenditure which had
not been incurred at the time of the check, particularly
where projects were checked at an intermediate stage.
In such cases the Member States’ authorities counted
the entire authorised eligible expenditure as checked
(paragraphs 70 to 72). The additional testing carried
out by the Court showed further examples of this in
France and Sweden.
3.51. The Special Report (paragraph 69) found weak-
nesses in the content of the reports resulting from the
checks. In many cases few details were provided of what
work had actually been carried out and what had been
tested. Quantified results were rarely given. Checks
should be fully documented and there should be a writ-
ten report of the work undertaken (see Special Report,
paragraphs 40 to 41). The further testing showed that
documentation of the checks carried out was poor in
OPs examined in Ireland, France, Spain andGreece, with
little evidence of the work done.
3.48. The Commission shares the Court’s concern about the
delays in some Member States in carrying out the checks
clearly required under Regulation (EC) No 2064/97. Member
States must ensure that the control provisions of the regula-
tion are complied with before closure and, if necessary, must
apply for an extension of time for this purpose. As a result of
its own audit work, the Commission has specifically drawn
the attention of Member States to the consequences of failing
to comply fully with the control requirements of the regula-
tion.
3.49. The regulation allows the proportional reduction to
be applied in different ways and does not specify whether it
should be pro rata expenditure or pro rata temporis. Whilst
the Commission has indicated how the provision may be
interpreted it cannot impose one uniform basis for applying
the reduction. The Regulation does not permit pre-1998
expenditure to be excluded from all checks. This is now the
common position of the Commission. Based on the findings
of the Commission’s audit work in 2001, only in one Mem-
ber State, Ireland, is it still maintained that checking of
expenditure incurred prior to 1998 is not required.
3.50 to 3.52. The Commission has not yet visited all the
Member States mentioned by the Court for all Funds in the
course of the audit work on the application of the regulation
which it is currently carrying out. However, from the audits
that have been completed, examples of many of the weak-
nesses identified by the Court have been found, and appropri-
ate recommendations have been made.
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3.52. The Special Report (paragraph 66) states that
many checks were limited to the operation of systems
rather than substantive checking of individual projects’
expenditure declarations. The further testing carried out
showed that in OPs audited in Germany and Ireland
those performing the checks carried out few or no visits
to the final beneficiary. In the Netherlands, for the ERDF
all projects are audited on the spot at an intermediate
stage. At the closure stage, reliance is placed by the
checker on the work of the project’s own external audi-
tors, who do not necessarily check compliance with
ERDF rules.
Conceptual problems with the Regulation
3.53. The Special Report highlighted some conceptual
problems in the regulation. The method by which the
checks should be applied was not clearly defined at the
time the regulation was issued, although advice was
subsequently given on selection of the sample in Appen-
dices 2 and 5 of the Commission’s Structural Funds
audit manual. The fact that the regulation requires the
sample of expenditure declarations to be checked to be
representative and risk-based has led to questionable
practices in the Member States. One approach could be
to combine the two methods in a logical framework in
which a risk analysis is undertaken, identifying items
for exhaustive checking, in order to detect and correct
errors, complemented by the checking of a representa-
tive sample from the remaining populationwhichwould
show whether or not this is indeed low risk and unaf-
fected by a material incidence of error (Special Report,
paragraphs 19 to 21).
3.54. The report also highlighted Member States’ con-
cern that by carrying out thorough checks and systems
audits and reporting a high frequency of irregularities,
they might be penalised by a reduction in European
Union co-financing. This could discourage Member
States from issuing critical statements. Nevertheless, if
the 5 % sample leads to a high frequency of irregulari-
ties, it would indicate that a significant level of irregu-
larities still remained in the 95 % not tested. If the
irregularities identified during checks are systemic,
Article 7 of the regulation requires Member States to
correct those cases which have not been individually
identified by these checks. It is essential that the use to
which the Commission will put the closure statements
should be addressed now and Member States informed,
particularly in respect of the irregularities found which
are non-systemic. It is not clear to the Court what legal
3.53. The Commission is currently reviewing the Structural
Funds audit manual and will take account of the findings of
its own audit work in relation to Regulation (EC)
No 2064/97, as well as the observation of the Court, and
will discuss the detailed methodology with Member States.
3.54. The body designated under Article 8 of Regulation
(EC) No 2064/97 is required to indicate in the closure state-
ment any irregularities that have not been satisfactorily dealt
with and the amount of Community aid affected. The Com-
mission will therefore have a basis for excluding such amounts
from co-financing. If the irregularity is systemic, Member
States should have extended checks to cover all operations
likely to be affected.
The body providing the closure statement has to give its opin-
ion, on the basis of all the checks carried out and the correc-
tive action taken under Article 7, as to the validity of the
request for final payment and the legality and regularity of the
underlying operations. It is expressly provided in Article 8(2)
of the regulation and in the indicative model for the closure
statement that if the frequency of errors found is high, the
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basis would be available to the Commission to make
financial corrections (Special Report, paragraphs 81 to
84).
3.55. The regulation does not set out in detail how
Member States should carry out the checks. However,
in the Court’s view, internationally accepted auditing
standards should be applied. These require inter alia that
those undertaking the checks should be independent of
those implementing the project. The Court’s audit
showed that this principle is not always respected by
the Member States (Special Report, paragraphs 37 to 41
and 61 to 62).
3.56. TheSpecialReport concluded that unlessprompt
action is taken to ensure correct application of the regu-
lation by Member States, there will not be sufficient,
reliable information to form the basis upon which to
close the forms of assistance. Accordingly the Special
Report recommended that the Commission should carry
out a detailed review of Member States’ implementation
of the regulation and provide additional guidance and
that the Commission should urgently and systemati-
cally issue advice to Member States on the adequacy of
the checks undertaken and the reports made.
Implementation of the new provisions in respect of the
programming period 2000 to 2006
3.57. The Structural Funds Regulations for the period
2000 to 2006, which were adopted by the Council of
the European Union on 21 June 1999, are characterised
in particular by greater decentralisation and a determi-
nation to manage the Community budget with greater
rigour.
body designated pursuant to Article 8 will indicate that it is
not in a position to give an unqualified opinion even if such
errors have been satisfactorily dealt with.
In such a case, the Commission service will discuss with the
national authorities the action to be taken. The second sub-
paragraph of Article 8(2) provides that the Commission may
require further checks to be carried out and the Commission
is responsible for making financial corrections.
The Commission considers that Article 24 of Regulation
(EEC) No 4253/88 provides a legal basis for extrapolated or
flat-rate financial corrections as indicated in the internal
guidelines on financial corrections of 15 October 1997.
3.55. The Commission agrees regarding the importance of
ensuring the independence of those carrying out checks.
Nevertheless, account has to be taken of the administrative
structures of the Member States, the resources available hav-
ing regard to the size of the programme, and the risks involved,
when applying this standard and assessing whether the degree
of independence is sufficient. It is clearly not acceptable that a
check be carried out by the person responsible for implement-
ing the project.
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3.58. The preparation of structural measures for this
new period occurs in two distinct phases: firstly, the
contents of the CSFs, SPDs or OPs and their financing
plan must be approved by the Commission and, sec-
ondly, the additional programming, which concerns the
project-selection process, is sent to the Commission for
information. The Member States could thus expect to
receive an advance of 7 % (or a fraction) of the total
Structural Funds contribution within five months of
sending their proposal for a structural programme to
the Commission, pursuant to Article 28(1), of the Struc-
tural Funds Regulation. Due to the late adoption of the
programmes, only a few of the Member States received
this payment within the stipulated time once they had
sent their first proposal (see paragraph 3.17).
3.59. As regards Community payments, the ‘n + 2’
rule contained in Article 31(2), second subparagraph,
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June
1999 stipulates that the Commission shall automati-
cally decommit any part of a commitment which has
not been settled by a payment on account, or for which
it has not received an acceptable payment application
by the end of the second year following the year of
commitment; the contribution from the Funds to that
assistance is also reduced by that amount.
3.60. The application of this automatic decommit-
ment rule is unclear as regards the link with the date of
the commitment, in particular in cases where a decision
to make a contribution from the Funds under
Article 28 of the aforementioned regulation is taken at
the end of a year, whereas the corresponding budget-
ary commitment is made only at the beginning of the
following year. The link with the budgetary commit-
ment, as laid down in Article 31 of the Structural Funds
Regulation, may lead to unequal treatment due to a
change of financial year attributable to the Commis-
sion. The fact is that programmes where adoption and
the budgetary commitment of the first instalment took
place in the same financial year are penalised when
compared with programmes where the Commission
made the budgetary commitment in the year after the
programmes were adopted (see paragraphs 3.18 and
3.28).
3.61. In so far as those concerned do not always know
why the ‘n + 2’ rule has been applied, for the sake of
administrative simplicity and legal certainty the Com-
mission should ensure that theMember States and other
interested parties are officially informed of the commit-
ment date chosen by the Commission and of the date
3.58. In its reply to point 3.17 the Commission set out the
main reasons for the failure to observe the five-month dead-
line, including the overlap with the final adjustments to the
programmes for the preceding period, the extended negotia-
tions with the Member States and the requirement that
adequate management structures be put in place.
3.60 to 3.61. The effect indicated is a consequence of the
provisions of Article 31(2) of the Council Regulation, but, as
indicated in the reply to point 3.18, the Commission consid-
ers that in practice this problem will be of limited scope. The
Commission provided Member States with information on
commitments made for ERDF in 2000 at the meeting of the
Committee on the Development and Conversion of Regions
on 21 February 2001.
15.12.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 169
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS COMMISSION’S REPLIES
on which the resulting automatic decommitment is to
be checked.
Procedures for the closure of measures
3.62. The Structural FundRegulations contain few spe-
cific rules for closing measures. The only applicable
provision in the coordinating regulation sets a deadline
of six months after the physical completion of the mea-
sure for submitting the payment request and the related
implementation reports. Regulation (EC) No 2064/97
also requires a declaration of validity for measures in
the period 1994 to 1999, a requirement which does not
apply to the 1989 to 1993 period and from which 1994
to 1996 measures under Objective 2 are exempt de
facto. Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 governing the
programming period 2000 to 2006 states that the
Commission will decommit, by 30 September 2001 at
the latest, sums corresponding to measures decided
upon prior to 1994 in respect of which a final request
for payment has not been made by 31 March 2001, and
will decommit by 30 September 2003 at the latest sums
relating to measures in the 1994 to 1999 period in
respect of which a final request for payment has not
been made by 31 March 2003, except for transactions
or programmes which have been suspended on legal
grounds.
3.63. Owing to the lack of binding provisions in the
regulations, the Commission departments responsible
for managing the various Funds have had to develop
their own closure arrangements. These arrangements
occasionally converge, as in the case of the authorisa-
tion, at budgetary and physical implementation level, of
off-setting between measures within a given sub-
programme. On the other hand, practice differs as
regards the payment of instalments, with only the ESF
closing the various annual instalments, whilst the other
Funds settle subsequent commitments when total
declared expenditure reaches the required level.
3.64. In September 1999, the Commission also
adopted the decision ‘Guidelines for the financial clo-
sure of operational measures (1994 to 1999) of the
Structural Funds’ (23), a document which codifies vari-
ous obligations stemming from the regulations in force
and sets limits on the flexibility of financial
3.63. Any divergence in practice between the Funds for the
1994 to 1999 period was limited since all final closures were
subject to the same financial implementing provisions. For the
2000 to 2006 period, detailed internal financial rules have
been drawn up which will be applied for all the Funds.
(23) Document SEC(1999) 1316 final of 9 September 1999.
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implementation. The innovations include closure in the
absence of a request for a final balance and/or a final
implementation report, the restriction of Community
financing to amounts actually allocated to final benefi-
ciaries and details of possibilities for partial closure in
the event that aid is suspended or a financial adjustment
is made.
3.65. These guidelines couldmake it possible, to some
extent, to compensate for the fact that failure to submit
final documents does not entail debarment. As regards
closure where final documents are lacking, the Com-
mission is considering issuing formal notification six
months after the deadline for payments has expired, a
step which would enable it to close a measure on the
basis of the most recent available data. However, there
is a danger that the present deadline for automatic
decommitments would mitigate the effects of the for-
mal notification procedure.
3.66. However, this group of provisions and guide-
lines does not constitute a clearly defined and rigor-
ously applicable closure procedure which would guar-
antee the legality and regularity of the transactions
underlying contributions from the Community budget
for all completed programming periods. The detailed
checks carried out by the Court revealed the persistence
of a high level of errors in the measures closed in 2000
(see paragraph 3.39) following the pattern of the find-
ings for the previous years (see paragraphs 3.49 to 3.51
of the Annual Report concerning the financial year
1999 and paragraphs 3.29 to 3.30 of the Annual Report
concerning the financial year 1998).
3.67. For example, the limitation of aid for amounts
actually allocated to beneficiaries is a requirementwhich
stems directly from existing legislative principles. The
need for a reminder may be ascribed to the Commis-
sion’s practice of applying the planned intervention rate
to eligible expenditure even when the actual rate was
lower, as the Court pointed out in its 1998 Annual
Report (24). It should be pointed out that the Commis-
sion ought to apply this rule equally to measures for the
period 1989 to 1993 which are still to be closed and
re-examine closed measures in respect of which an
excess payment may have been made (see also para-
graph 3.114 of this report).
3.65. The Commission considers that the procedure referred
to by the Court will be useful in accelerating the closure of
programmes in certain cases.
3.66. The purpose of the guidelines is to formalise the
treatment of certain aspects of closure where procedures may
have been divergent. They do not seek to set out the checks
which should be made by the responsible services to ensure, for
example, that all audit findings have been properly dealt with
or that the final reports are complete and satisfactory. These
procedures form part of the internal financial circuits laid
down by each Directorate-General. Furthermore, the basis for
the assurance as to the legality and regularity of the opera-
tions co-financed will be the closure statement which has to
be submitted under Article 8 of Regulation (EC)
No 2064/97 and which will be the subject of checks by the
Commission. The requirement of closure statements should
give greater assurance that ineligible expenditure of the type
identified by the Court in its controls of closed programmes is
excluded prior to submission of final declarations to the Com-
mission.
3.67. The guidelines adopted by the Commission in 1999
on the winding-up of programmes for 1994 to 1999, which
are now applied for the final payment for those programmes,
are in line with the Court’s requirements.
(24) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1998, para-
graph 3.30.
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3.68. The procedure for partially closing measures
where projects have been suspended for legal reasons
was not consistently applied, as shown by various cases
within the ambit of the EAGGF-Guidance.
3.69. In addition, the Commission closed Objective 2
measures for 1994 to 1996 in respect of which the
Member States had not carried out theminimum checks
required by Regulation (EC) No 2064/97. Although the
regulation does not require a declaration of validity to
be submitted for these measures, it does lay down that
the minimum prescribed checks (5 % of eligible expen-
diture, with the possibility of a lower rate in the case of
measures approved before the regulation came into
force) should be carried out in respect of the entire
period 1994 to 1999.
3.70. The Commission appraises final payment
requests using standard procedures, which very often
take the formof inter-departmental consultationswhere
each unit acts in accordance with its own powers and
no primary responsibility is clearly established. The
consultations aim, in particular, to establish whether
any previous checks in respect of the measures in ques-
tion have given rise to observations. Various databases,
which aim to keep a record of any observations made,
including the Court’s, have been set up without any
genuine coordination. Where no previous problems
have been reported, closures do not give rise to more
thorough checks, for example in situ, based either on
random sampling or on risk analysis. In actual fact, the
Commission’s checks when a measure is closed have
not been intended, until now, to constitute efficient
verification of the legality and regularity of the expen-
diture declared (see also paragraph 3.72).
3.68. The winding-up of assistance operations by the Com-
mission where projects have been suspended for legal reasons
is a complicated issue frequently representing a disproportion-
ate workload for the departments responsible for financial
management. In actual fact, the description ‘suspended for
legal reasons’ covers a wide range of situations that differ
according to the Member State concerned, the type of project
involved and the nature and progress of the legal procedures
in hand. Point 10 of the Commission guidelines for the clo-
sure of operational measures for the period 1994 to 1999
(Document SEC(1999) 1316) simply contains general rules
and the departments must continue, within that framework,
to deal with individual cases in partnership with the authori-
ties responsible for implementing an operation.
The Commission is drawing up more detailed guidance on the
point in order to ensure a uniform approach.
3.69. For programmes ending before 1 January 1997, the
Commission has not systematically required information on
the controls carried out by the national authorities either under
Article 23 of Regulation (EEC) No 4253/88 or under Regu-
lation (EC) No 2064/97 as a precondition of closure.
3.70. As part of the financial reform undertaken within the
Commission, new financing channels have been put in place
which identify responsibilities for effecting payment transac-
tions, including final payments for Structural Funds pro-
grammes.
Prior to closure of programmes a check is carried out in rela-
tion to the follow-up of audit findings by Commission audi-
tors and, as far as possible, by the Court’s auditors. A new
data base is under development to facilitate this process which
should be operational by early part 2002.
It is not possible for the Commission to carry out on-the-spot
checks on a high proportion of measures at the time of their
closure. Substantially increased resources would be needed for
such an undertaking. The purpose of Article 8 of Regulation
(EC) No 2064/97 (taken over in Article 15 of Regulation
(EC) No 438/2001 for the new programming period) is pre-
cisely to confirm the responsibility of Member States for veri-
fying the accuracy of their declarations, through the work of
an independent body.
Prior to closure of the 1994 to 1999 programmes in 2002,
a selection of programmes will be subject to in-depth checks.
The precise methodology for selecting the programmes for
audit is currently under discussion.
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3.71. When inspection findings have been issued, the
consultation procedures between departments and with
the Member State often prove to be too lengthy. Thus,
the Court checked a number of measures in respect of
which it had made observations in various reports. In
the case of two ERDF measures checked in 1995 and
1996, where the outstanding balance totalled 7,4 and
2,6 million euro, the final payment requests were sub-
mitted in 1997. Procedures were initiated only occasion-
ally by the Commission and the files had still not been
closed at the end of 2000. In the case of two measures
checked in 1994, where the outstanding balance totalled
3,1 million euro, in spite of a large volume of corre-
spondence, an UCLAF enquiry carried out in 1996 and
a financial adjustment procedure initiated in 1998, final
payment requests submitted in 1995 and 1997 had not
yet been settled at the end of 2000.
Checks carried out by the Commission
3.72. The Court has pointed out on several occasions,
in particular in its Annual Report concerning the finan-
cial year 1999 (paragraph 3.75), that the on-the-spot
checks carried out by the Commission are inadequate.
The financial year 2000, during which the Commission
embarked upon its internal reform procedure, saw the
transfer of the Directorate-General for Audit inspection
units to the operational DGs responsible for the man-
agement of structural measures. The incorporation of
these new units, together with the introduction of leg-
islation for the new programming period, took its toll
of the Commission’s overall inspection capacity. Thus,
in the case of the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund, the two
units responsible for inspections carriedout fewer checks
in 2000 than in previous years. These units planned to
emphasise the audit of management and inspection sys-
tems in 2001 and therefore envisage carrying out only
a small number of checks in respect of OPs/SPDs and
of projects.
3.71. The Commission accepts that the procedures for clos-
ing programmes where problems have been identified have
been too slow. High priority is being given to completing the
closure of such programmes and by late 2001 the Commis-
sion expects to have reduced the commitments for pre-1994
projects and programmes to a few contentious cases and to
have made substantial progress on commitments related to
later periods.
3.72. The Commission’s internal reform process involving
the transfer of the Financial Control Directorate-General con-
trol unit to the operational Structural Funds DGs necessarily
caused some disruption in audit work planned. Control unit
B.3 in the Financial Control Directorate-General nevertheless
carried out 16 audit missions in 2000 (compared with 19 in
1999). Regarding the Cohesion Fund, control unit B.4 in the
Financial Control Directorate-General carried out one audit
mission in 2000 compared with three in 1999. In addition,
the Regional Policy Directorate-General audit unit carried out
36 audit missions relating to ERDF and Cohesion Fund in
2000 (compared with 42 in 1999).
For 2001, the principal objectives in the work programme of
the Regional Policy Directorate-General audit units are the
systems audit of Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 and the audit
of the management and control systems being implemented
for the programming period 2000 to 2006, together with a
systems audit of the management and control systems for the
Cohesion Fund which are being implemented in order to com-
ply with Council Regulations (EC) No 1264/1999 and (EC)
No 1265/1999 amending Regulation (EC) No 1164/94.
However, a number of Cohesion Fund projects will be audited
in 2001 in the context of the systems audit referred to. In
addition, an enquiry relating to Article 10 projects, which
involves on-the-spot audits of up to 100 individual contracts,
will be completed with the assistance of external auditors.
Lastly, a number of other ad hoc audits of programmes has
taken place.
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3.73. The inspection departments responsible for the
ERDF and the Cohesion Fund nevertheless implemented
a number of measures to improve the preparation,
scope, quality and monitoring of their checks in the
Member States. These measures produced no tangible
results in the course of 2000.
Conclusions and recommendations
Conclusions
3.74. The Court did not note a reduction in the level
of errors contained in the declarations of expenditure
regarding completed programming periods. As in the
past, the persistence of a significant level of errors
observed in respect of closed measures shows that the
likelihood of errors being detected and rectified remains
small. The financial control systems, which were
strengthened in 1997 (eligibility forms and Regulation
(EC) No 2064/97), together with more accurate closure
procedures and the control protocols with the national
authorities, have not yet proved to be effective.
3.75. The number of checks carried out by the Com-
mission while measures were being implemented and at
the time of closure fell in 2000. The follow-up to obser-
vations made as a result of checks, in particular the
Court’s, reveals shortcomingswhich prevent established
problems from being resolved quickly. In addition, the
Commission cannot content itself with resolving the
periodic cases reported without extending its checks to
similar situations.
3.76. The budget transactions for the financial year
2000 do not afford all of the requisite guarantees of
legality and regularity. No comments are called for
regarding the commitments entered in the accounts,
although a significant proportion are actually charge-
able to the previous financial year. On the other hand,
a significant number of legally-binding decisions were
taken without the corresponding budgetary commit-
ments. Payments for the financial year corresponding to
the transfer of advances in respect of measures covered
by the new programming period reveal no anomalies.
The number of substantial and formal errors concern-
ing intermediate and final payments in respect of previ-
ous programmes is comparable to the number in previ-
ous financial years.
3.74. It is premature to assess the impact of the closure
statements required under Article 8 of Regulation (EC)
No 2064/97 and the closure guidelines until a representa-
tive number of programmes from the 1994 to 1999 period
have been closed. The Commission is of the opinion that the
correct application of these provisions should significantly
reduce the risk of ineligible expenditure being co-financed by
the Structural Funds.
3.75. There was a temporary drop in the number of checks
carried out in 2000 as a result of the internal reform process.
It is expected, however, that the concentration of auditing
capacity in the operational Directorates-General will lead to
an improvement in the number and quality of checks. New
systems being put in place should improve the follow-up of all
audit findings, including those of the Court. This will mean
that the Commission will be able to take account more sys-
tematically of previous audit findings in its risk analysis, par-
ticularly in relation to errors which may be systemic.
3.76. The Commission accepts that there are cases where
the budgetary commitment of programmes approved in 2000
took place in 2001. This was the result of differences in prac-
tices in the procedure for adopting programmes (see reply to
point 9.15). The Commission has not been able to complete
its in-depth examination of all the cases of error identified by
the Court within the limited time available, and in some cases
replies from Member States have not yet been provided. The
analysis carried out shows that the majority of errors concern
the inclusion by the final beneficiary of ineligible or unjusti-
fied amounts in expenditure declarations. The other main cat-
egory concerns the incorrect application of Community rules
by the managing authority. However, in a number of cases,
the Commission does not share the Court’s interpretation. The
Commission will in any event conclude its investigation of the
cases identified by the Court and ensure that the necessary
financial corrections are made.
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Recommendations
3.77. The Commission should therefore strive to make
the inspection systems introduced in recent years more
effective. In particular, it should ensure that the man-
agement procedures employed by national bodies and
the inspection procedures implemented under Regula-
tion (EC) No 2064/97 do indeed guarantee the legality
and regularity of the transactions funded by the Com-
munity. To this end, where the closure of measures is
concerned the Commission should also introduce more
effective standardised procedures entailing a sufficient
number of checks carried out by its own inspectors.
FOLLOW-UP TO PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS
Measure to support small and medium-sized enterprises
(SMEs)
Introduction
3.78. The Court examined the action taken by the
Commission in response to past observations (25) on
the implementation of measures to support entreprises,
particularly SMEs, within the framework of the Struc-
tural Funds. The Court noted shortcomings, in particu-
lar in respect of evaluation, the regulatory framework,
identification of measures, verification of compliance
with the rules concerning competition and the coordi-
nation and also the implementation of the measures,
particularly in the context of financial engineering and
services provided to the enterprises. When granting dis-
charge for the financial year 1994, the Council recom-
mended that the SMEs’ access to existing instruments
should be facilitated, that actions in support of the SMEs
should be reorganised in order to take their needs into
account and that evaluation of the resources and results
of Community action in this field should be
3.77. The Commission reiterates its view set out in the reply
to paragraph 3.76 of the Annual Report 1999 that the main
priority must be to maintain progress in improving the finan-
cial management and control systems in Member States. The
adoption of Regulations (EC) No 438/2001 and (EC)
No 448/2001 provide the detailed legal framework neces-
sary to ensure that this objective can be achieved. The result
of the systems’ audits currently being undertaken mainly by
the ERDF on the implementation of Regulation (EC)
No 438/2001, as well as on the application of Regulation
(EC) No 2064/97, will provide a basis for drawing conclu-
sions as to the adequacy of the framework management sys-
tems and for taking appropriate action where necessary.
The programme of audits on the 1994 to 1999 programmes
in view of their closure, undertaken by all Structural Funds
during 2001 and 2002 will provide further assurances con-
cerning the final payments.
(25) This concerns, in particular, the Annual Reports concern-
ing the financial years 1994 (paragraphs 5.66 to 5.104),
1996 (paragraphs 6.43 to 6.104) and 1998 (para-
graphs 3.54 to 3.59).
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improved (26). In 1998, during the discharge for 1996,
the Council recommended that aid procedures should
be rationalised and simplified, that aid for SMEs should
be made more accessible and that the Commission
should ensure that the services offered to the SMEs were
in response to actual requirements (27). For its part, the
Parliament was alarmed by the Court of Auditors’ rev-
elation that funds had been made available in the Com-
munity budget to finance a certain number of measures
which were intended to promote small and medium-
sized enterprises butwere potentially unmanageable (28).
Confirmation of the failings identified by the Court
3.79. In 1997, in response to the Court’s observations,
the Commission launched a macro-assessment of the
impact of the Structural Funds on the SMEs and, sub-
sequently, thematic evaluations of financial engineering
and the European Community business and innovation
centres (EC-BIC) (29). These evaluations confirmed the
Court’s main observations concerning aid to the SMEs,
particularly in respect of the failure to comply with the
3.79. While it is true that this thematic evaluation high-
lights a number of aspects that could be improved in terms of
Structural Fund operations for the benefit of SMEs, it also
finds that ‘... Overall it is clear from the research that Struc-
tural Funds’ measures have had a significant impact on the
SME sector and in so doing have made an important contri-
bution to wider regional policy aims...’.
(26) Council Recommendation of 11 March 1996 concerning
the discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of
the implementation of the general budget of the Euro-
pean Union for the 1994 financial year.
(27) Council Recommendation of 9 March 1998 concerning
the discharge to be given to the Commission in respect of
the implementation of the general budget of the Euro-
pean Union for the 1996 financial year.
(28) European Parliament Resolution of 31 March 1998
informing the Commission of the reasons for the post-
ponement of the discharge in respect of the implementa-
tion of the general budget of the European Union for the
1996 financial year (OJ C 138, 4.5.1998, p. 43).
(29) ‘Thematic Evaluation of Structural Funds Impacts on
SMEs’, EuropeanCommission, Ernst andYoung, July 1999.
‘Evaluation of Community measures in support of Euro-
pean Community business and innovation centres (EC-
BICS)’, Madrid, Karlsruhe, February 1999, Dr-Ing Jürgen
Wüst.
‘Evaluation of Financial Engineering Measures in Struc-
tural Policies’, European Commission, Ernst and Young,
April 1998.
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rules on information and publicity (30), the poor vis-
ibility of the measures, the shortcomings affecting the
coordination of measures (31), deficiencies in the evalu-
ation of the impact of the measures, weaknesses in the
ex ante assessments and the absence of adequate indica-
tors, particularly in the context of financial engineer-
ing (32). The evaluations also confirmed the necessity of
improving systems for supplying services to the SMEs,
such as the EC-BICs, to speed up the development of
‘one-stop shop’ systems, and to simplify the existing
measures in order to facilitate SME access to Commu-
nity financing.
Taking the failings identified into account in the regula-
tions
3.80. TheCourt’s recommendations influenced the leg-
islative proposals submitted by the Commission for the
new period and the guidelines for programmes in the
period 2000 to 2006 (33). As the number of aid
The simplifying of procedures and the improvement of the
arrangements for delivering services to SMEs are objectives
that are shared by the Commission. The ‘one-stop shop’
approach referred to by the Court is one of the ways that could
be used to help attain these aims.
3.80. The thematic evaluation on the impact of the Struc-
tural Funds on SMEs drew a range of conclusions. As regards
the conclusion quoted in this point, the Commission clearly
recognises that objectives for the 1994 to 1999 period were
not sufficiently clear and quantified. It was partly for this rea-
son that the thematic evaluation was commissioned, with a
view to assessing the impact of the Structural Funds on SMEs
and analysing the most effective means of assisting SMEs.
The results of the evaluation have been fed into the program-
ming of the Structural Funds for the 2000 to 2006 period,
in particular on the question of how to ensure better tar-
geting of aid on SMEs. In addition, because this was a the-
matic evaluation undertaken mid-way through the program-
ming period, it was inevitable that it would not be possible to
draw definitive conclusions on the impact of the Structural
Funds on SMEs in the 1994 to 1999 period.
In addition to the estimate of expenditure on SMEs, the the-
matic evaluation also estimated the number of beneficiary
companies and the employment created. It concluded that
between 1989 and 1999 over one and a half million SMEs
were assisted by the Structural Funds, representing 21,2 % of
eligible SMEs. Between 1994 and 1999, it estimated gross
jobs created of 2,3 million, with net jobs estimated at 2 mil-
lion.
(30) More than a quarter (25,6 %) of the SMEs covered by the
thematic evaluation of SMEs which received SF assistance
were unaware that the funds they had received came from
Community sources. In its 1996 Annual Report (para-
graphs 6.53 to 6.59), the Court drew attention to a num-
ber of practices which would explain this lack of informa-
tion.
(31) The survey carried out in 1998 amongst those SMEs
which had benefited from a number of Community sub-
sidies shows that 69,7 % of them consider the relevant
systems to be ‘not integrated at all ’. This percentage rises
to 85,1 % for the SMEs which received ERDF and ESF aid.
The authors of the evaluation conclude that ‘At an EU
level, there is a need to improve the overall coherence of
different Commission programmes that have a bearing
on SME development’, which confirms the Court’s obser-
vations (Annual Report concerning the financial year
1996, paragraphs 6.98 to 6.99).
(32) ‘Financial engineering’ is understood to be SF contribu-
tions to implementing measures other than the non-
repayable assistance described under Article 28(3) of
Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999. This covers, in particular:
repayable assistance, interest-rate subsidies, guarantees,
equity holdings, venture-capital holdings or another form
of finance.
(33) (OJ C 267, 22.9.1999, p. 2). These guidelines stipulate
that ‘Assistance under the SFs to stimulate the productive
sector must focus in particular on small and medium-
sized enterprises’.
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measures has been reduced and the SME CI abol-
ished (34), the strategy for aid to SMEs should become
more straightforward and more consistent. The new
regulatory framework should allow improvements in
the management of aid measures in support of SMEs, in
monitoring and evaluation, provided that the provi-
sions become operational as soon as possible. The new
regulatory framework for the management and control
systems for the Structural Funds was adopted by the
Commission in March 2001 (35). Moreover, Commis-
sionRegulation (EC)No1159/2000 (36) of 30 May 2000
on information and publicity measures to be carried
out by the Member States concerning assistance from
the Structural Funds should improve the visibility of the
aid measures. In addition, a new regulatory framework
was also drawn up in the field of competition policy
rules (37). With regard to the period 1994 to 1999, with
the exception of the adoption in 1997 of the datasheets
on eligibility of expenditure (38) and of Regulation
(EC) No 2064/97, the measures taken could not have
any significant impact on the programmes already
adopted and in progress.
A further concern of the evaluation was to identify the extent
of deadweight in aid schemes for SMEs. As a result of the
findings of the evaluation and in order to enhance the impact
of Structural Fund support to SMEs, the Commission has
given greater priority to indirect support for SMEs as opposed
to direct aid and this is reflected in the programmes for the
2000 to 2006 period.
The European Employment Strategy emphasises the impor-
tance of the role played by SMEs in providing jobs within the
European Union. The combined assistance from the Member
States, the different Structural Funds and the EIB is aimed at
meeting the various needs experienced by SMEs upon setting
up and in the context of their activities in the market place
(financing, hiring of staff, providing skills for employees, etc.).
The late adoption of the new regulation on management and
control had a limited impact on the management of the Funds,
given thatmost operational programmes were adopted between
the end of 2000 and March 2001, and that the Commis-
sion’s main requirements were made known to the Member
States in March 2000, and discussed in great depth in the
Fund Committees between then and the vote in the Manage-
ment Committee in December 2000.
(34) In particular, with regard to the SME Initiative, the Court
found (Annual Report concerning the financial year1999,
paragraphs 6.86 to 6.91) that the programmes under this
Initiative either covered measures which were identical or
similar to the ones in the CSFs or the SPDs or created new
measures with the same objectives as the existing ones.
(35) Commission Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 of 2 March
2001 laying down detailed rules for the implementation
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 as regards the
management and control systems for assistance granted
under the Structural Funds (OJ L 63, 3.3.2001, p. 21).
(36) OJ L 130, 31.5.2000, p. 30.
(37) These are Council Regulation (EC) No 659/1999 of
22 March 1999 laying down detailed rules for the appli-
cation of Article 93 of the EC Treaty (OJ L 83, 27.3.1999,
p. 1) and Council Regulation (EC) No 994/1998 of 7 May
1998 on the application of Articles 92 and 93 of the
Treaty establishing the European Community to certain
categories of horizontal State aid (OJ L 142, 14.5.1998,
p. 1), and also the Commission Regulations concerning
State aid on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the
EC Treaty to training aid, de minimis aid and aid to SMEs:
Regulations (EC) No 68/2001, (EC) No 69/2001 and (EC)
No 70/2001 of 12 January 2001 (OJ L 10, 13.1.2001,
p. 20, 30 and 33).
(38) Commission Decisions 97/317/EC to 97/331/EC of
23 April 1997 modifying the decisions approving the
CSFs, the SPDs and the Community Initiative programmes
(OJ L 146, 5.6.1997, p. 1).
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3.81. The eligibility of expenditure sheets allowed clari-
fication, as from 1 May 1997, of some of the problems
raised by the Court (Annual Report concerning the
financial year 1996, paragraphs 6.73 to 6.76 and 6.84),
in particular in respect of financing from other sources
for co-financed projects and financial engineering. For
theperiod2000 to2006, these sheets havebeen replaced
by rules contained in Commission Regulation (EC)
No 1685/2000 (39). However, the eligibility conditions
governing financing from other sources have not been
retained in the new rules and those regarding financial
engineering were substantially amended (40), which has
produced uncertainty (see paragraph 3.91).
3.81. During the 1994 to 1999 programming period,
‘alternative financing’ or ‘alternative payment,’ covered by
datasheet 16 of the SEM 2000 eligibility sheets, was used as
a management facility aimed at using as efficiently as pos-
sible the funding made available on different dates by all the
financial partners: Community, national government and
public sector entities.
For the 2000 to 2006 programming period, automatic
annual commitments as well as a system of advances and
speedier payments, have been introduced into financial pro-
cedures. For this reason the Commission saw no need to
maintain the old datasheet 16 when reviewing the eligibility
rules. None of the Member States challenged this and the
Committee for the Development and Conversion of Regions
approved the new eligibility rules before they were adopted by
the Commission.
The absence of a specific rule does not imply that this cash-
flow management tool must no longer be used. Obviously,
Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999, and in particular
Article 29, must be complied with in full. This means that
all projects, independent of the physical source of public funds,
are considered to be Community co-financed within the limits
set by Article 29 and that grant letters must specify the exact
amount of Structural Fund aid. In order to underline its char-
acter as a cash-flow management tool, the Commission pre-
fers to call it ‘alternative payment’ rather than alternative
financing.
The Directorate-General for Regional Policy has explained
this position to Member States’ authorities on various occa-
sions, both orally and in writing.
(39) Commission Regulation (EC) No 1685/2000 of 28 July
2000 laying down detailed rules for the implementation
of Council Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999 as regards eli-
gibility of expenditure of operations co-financed by the
Structural Funds (OJ L 193, 29.7.2000, p. 39).
(40) The key element justifying Community co-financing was
clearly set out in the forms for 1997: ‘the involvement of
the Community in financial engineering should be lim-
ited and, in any event, it should avoid substituting for or
overlapping with the financial sector, unless it can be
shown that the latter is not suited to the development
needs of the region in question’. However, this basic prin-
ciple was no longer retained in the rules for 2000.
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3.82. A number of provisions in the new general
Regulation tackle difficulties which were pointed out by
the Court. For instance, the new provisions concerning
differentiation of the rates of intervention (41) define
precisely how to deal with projects which generate sub-
stantial net revenue, reduce the Funds’ contribution
where there is investment in the enterprises (from 50 %
to 35 % and from 30 % to 15 % for Objectives 1 and 2
respectively) and introduce positive discrimination in
favour of SMEs (possibility of increasing assistance by
not more than 10 % for forms of finance other than
direct assistance).
3.83. An obligation has been included in the regula-
tion to ensure that, from now on, the assistance repaid
to the managing authority or to another public author-
ity is reallocated to the same purpose (42). Rules have
also been incorporated both to ensure that, for at least
five years, SF assistance will not be diverted away from
its initial objective and to prevent firms or public bod-
ies gaining undue advantage (43). This gives the Com-
mission new instruments to avoid situations which are
open to dispute, such as failure to recover amounts
which should have been recovered, retention by the
managing authorities of the amounts recovered, changes
in the location of the investments benefiting from assis-
tance or the sale of the co-financed infrastructures (for
example by privatisation) and to which the previous
provisions in the regulations do not offer an appropri-
ate response. However, the provisions mentioned in the
preceding paragraphs raise problems of interpretation
and the Commission should define more precisely the
manner in which it intends to implement the general
principles set out here in order to make these provi-
sions operational and enable appropriate monitoring
and checks to be carried out.
Improving identification of measures to support SMEs
3.84. Thematic evaluation in respect of the SMEs
allowed better identification of those measures which
offer support to the SMEs and of the resources devoted
to them, as requested first by the Court (Annual Report
3.82 and 3.83. The Commission considers that a dis-
counted cashflow calculation is the most appropriate method
to determine the net revenue of an operation. Under that for-
mula and considering recital 40 of the General Regulation,
substantial net revenue would be deemed to be present when
the net present value of the future flow of revenue, less operat-
ing costs, resulted in a figure of at least 25 % over the cost of
the investment. Operating costs are the costs incurred for the
operation of an investment, including costs of maintenance,
but excluding depreciation or capital costs. The Commission
is presently preparing a guidance note for Member States on
a practicable and reasonable application of Article 29(4).
3.84 and 3.85. The Commission agrees that the availabil-
ity of better information depends on the improvement of
monitoring systems in the Member States. In view of the cur-
rent early stage of implementation of the 2000 to 2006 pro-
grammes, the Commission does not believe that progress has
been particularly slow. Putting new information systems in
place takes time, particularly for Member States where the
implementation of measures is highly decentralised. Moreover,
information collected must contribute to the management of
projects at local level, and must also be meaningful in the
(41) Recital 40 of the preamble and Article 29 of Regulation
(EC) No 1260/1999 of 21 June 1999 laying down general
provisions on the Structural Funds.
(42) Article 28(3) of the general Regulation and Article 8 of
the new regulation on the management and control sys-
tems, which obliges the managing or paying body to keep
accounts of amounts recoverable and to ensure that the
amounts concerned are recovered without unjustified
delay.
(43) Article 30(4) of the general Regulation.
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1996, paragraph 6.96), then by the Council (44) and the
Parliament (45). In the absence of an inventory, a global
estimate of the expenditure on SMEs (21 353 million
euro, i.e. 18,2 % of the entire SF for the period 1994 to
1999) had to be made. In order to discover the situa-
tion at another date, such as, for example, the end of the
period, this exercise would have to be repeated, which
demonstrates that the fundamental problem is still the
absence of reliable data systems which allow adequate
monitoring of the measures to be carried out, as the
Court has pointed out on several occasions. (46)
3.85. On the basis of Article 36 of the General Regu-
lation, the Commission proposed a new system of cat-
egorisation of the fields of SF intervention (47). The
information which, according to the provisions, is to be
forwarded to the Commision should allow the Com-
mission to draw up summaries of the Fund’s activities
on the basis of the various assistance measures. More-
over, Article 34 (1)(a) stipulates that a system to gather
reliable financial and statistical information and for for-
warding this data is to be set up using, where possible,
computer systems. In addition, the Commission has
proposed a methodology in respect of the monitoring
and evaluation indicators (48) which specifically take the
SMEs into account. The Member States are now begin-
ning to make efforts to adapt to these new initiatives. A
context of the national or European synthesis on horizontal
issues (SME, equal opportunities, etc.). The Commission is
confident that the effort put into developing those systems will
pay off in better-quality information in the annual reports
and particularly in the mid-term evaluation, which is due to
be completed at the end of 2003.
3.85. Member States must report on the operation of these
data-collecting mechanisms, administered on the responsibil-
ity of the managing authorities, in particular in their annual
implementation reports.
(44) Council Recommendation concerning the discharge to be
given to the Commission in respect of the implementa-
tion of the general budget of the European Union for the
1996 financial year.
(45) EuropeanParliamentResolutionof31March1998 inform-
ing the Commission of the reasons for the postponement
of the discharge in respect of the implementation of the
general budget of the European Union for the 1996 finan-
cial year, paragraphs 22 and 23 (OJ C 138, 4.5.1998,
p. 43). The Parliament notes ‘that significant funds were
allocated in the SFs for helping SMEs in the programming
period 1994 to 1999, but the Commission until now was
totally unable to explain how this money has been allo-
cated’.
(46) See the recent 1999 Annual Report, paragraph 3.27.
(47) This allocation was in the ‘Vademecum: Plans and pro-
gramming documents for the Structural Funds 2000-
2006’ (Commission, DG REGIO, July 1999) and is also
included in the new management and control regulation.
(48) Indicators for Monitoring and Evaluation: An indicative
methodology. The new 2000 to 2006 programming
period: methodological working documents. Working
Document No 3, European Commission, DG REGIO, July
1999.
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real improvement in the overall information available
on programming, monitoring and evaluation of struc-
tural measures depends on the smooth working of these
new systems.
Initiatives taken to improve verification of compliance
with competition policy rules
3.86. The Court found shortcomings in the procedures
to verify competition policy rules (Annual Report con-
cerning the financial year 1996, paragraphs 6.46 and
6.53 to 6.68; Annual Report concerning the financial
year 1998, paragraphs 3.58 to 3.59). Initiatives have
recently been taken, both at Commission level and in
the Member States, to improve the information avail-
able on the aid granted. In addition, in 2001 following
a request by the European Parliament (49), the Commis-
sion set up a register of decisions concerning State aid.
The new regulatory framework concerning State aid
contains provisions on controls which reinforce the
obligations in respect of the recording and forwarding,
on an annual basis, of information on the assistance
granted. It is too early to evaluate the impact of the pro-
visions, which aim to simplify and enhance transpar-
ency in the field of State aid. Nevertheless, the new rules
in this field should allow the Commission to improve
its procedures for verifying compliance with competi-
tion policy rules, provided it allocates the necessary
resources to this subject.
3.87. The Court recommended that, in order to make
it easier for the economic operators to comply with the
rules and the relevant procedures, the texts of the pro-
grammes should contain specific references to the leg-
islative texts and other legal instruments which are
designed to ensure strict application of the Community
policies. In 2000, the Commission drew up a document
setting out the principles and the procedures to be fol-
lowed during implementation of the Structural Funds
with regard to compliance with competition law on
state aid for the new programming period (2000 to
2006) (50). The salient characteristic of the procedures
is that managing charts on State aid are to be drawn up
and form part of every programme. In future. It is abso-
lutely essential for the Commission to give appropriate
monitoring to the development of these tables and for
3.86 to 3.88. The obligations concerning the monitoring
of state aid imposed on the national authorities in the new
programmes and covering both de minimis aid and aggrega-
tion with other aids ensure compliance with the rules govern-
ing, and the limits on, State aid. The implementing Regula-
tion on the management and control systems attaches
considerable importance to the arrangements for ensuring
compliance with Community rules, including State aid rules.
This is one aspect of systems which the Commission will be
verifying closely.
(49) European Parliament Resolution on the Commission’s
XXVIIIth Report on Competition Policy, 18 January 2000,
Report PE A5-0078/99. European Parliament Resolution
on the Commission’s XXIXth Report on Competition
Policy, 24 October 2000.
(50) Structural Funds and State aid. Implementing procedures
(DG REGIO G1, 15 May 2000).
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the managing authorities to keep them up to date and
supplement them by inserting specific references to the
relevant national and regional arrangements.
3.88. In some cases of infrastructure investment, in
particular in the telecommunications, transport and
energy sectors, the counterpart of the Community
financing is made up of a contribution by a firm or
body and the amounts involved do not pass through
national budget channels. Measures should be taken to
guarantee that this Community assistance is subjected
to the same rules and the same checks as national
aid (51).
Specific aspectswhich concern the European Social Fund
3.89. The summary of the final ESF evaluations for the
period 1994 to 1999 (52) does not supply any indica-
tion of the assistance for SMEs in the part devoted to
Objective 1. It only contains heterogeneous details in
the part concerning Objective 4, in spite of substantial
references to the contributions by the SMEs included in
the national evaluation reports concerning this objec-
tive. With regard to the period 2000 to 2006, the Com-
mission referred, concerning Objectives 1 and 3, to ESF
financial resources reserved for the ‘development of
entrepreneurship’ pillar of the European employment
strategy, which came to 8 000 million euro, i.e. 13 % of
the overall ESF budget. In addition, for the Structural
Funds, the obligation in the regulation (53) to take the
specific needs of SMEs into account in actions imple-
mented under the old Objective 4 has not been retained
for the new period. It should be noted that the Com-
mission adopted, in January 2001, within the
3.89. The ESF contributes to integrated measures and
actions to promote economic development in programmes
which have not all undergone a final evaluation within the
framework of the partnership but which have been examined
as part of thematic evaluations carried out on behalf of the
Commission (thematic evaluations of SMEs, R and D).
Their ‘heterogeneous’ character is linked to the variety of cir-
cumstances in which final evaluations are made, including
programming, timetable, terms of reference for those making
the evaluations. Concerning SMEs, an important outcome is
the general finding of an increase in the number of SMEs par-
ticipating in Objective 4.
(51) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1996, para-
graph 6.84, and the Court’s recommendations in its opin-
ion on the proposals for new regulations on structural
expenditure (paragraph 7.3 of Opinion 10/98, (OJ C 401,
22.12.1998), on certain proposals for regulations within
the Agenda 2000 framework).
(52) Conclusions of the final evaluations of the 1994 to 1999
period, 28 September 2000, document submitted to the
ESF Committee.
(53) Article 1 of Council Regulation (EEC) No 4255/88 of
19 December 1988 laying down provisions for imple-
menting Regulation (EEC) No 2052/88 as regards the
European Social Fund (OJ L 374, 31.12.1988, p. 21), as
amended by Regulation (EEC) No 2084/93 (OJ L 193,
31.7.1993, p. 39).
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framework of its competition policy (paragraph 3.86),
a regulation (54) which is designed to facilitate SME
access to assistance for vocational training.
3.90. Coordination betweenDG Employment andDG
Enterprise is still inadequate and this means, in practice,
the continued existence of cumbersome procedures and
hinders the operation of the ‘one-stop shop’ which
should facilitate the creation and development of SMEs.
This shortcoming was also underlined by the Economic
and Social Committee in its Opinion No CES 592/2000
of 24 May 2000. Moreover, the Commission commu-
nication on the analysis of the special Community finan-
cial instruments for SMEs (55) devotes no space to the
ESF.
Financial engineering and services for enterprises
3.91. With regard to Community support for financial
engineering techniques, including global subsidies, the
Court found deficiencies in the implementation of the
measures concerned due to the absence of a precise
definition of the objectives to be achieved and of the
methods of implementation (Annual Report concern-
ing the financial year 1996, paragraphs 6.75 to 6.80).
In 2000 the Court also found, for example, that reim-
bursements of co-financed loansmay be used as national
counterpart funds for the Structural Funds. In addition,
the implementation of the global subsidies continued to
be hampered by difficulties, particularly in respect of
the definition of how they are to be used, which led to
considerable delays in the adoption of decisions, the
signature of agreements between the Commission and
the intermediaries and the payment of advances. In par-
ticular, an examination by the Commission of new
financial engineering techniques to be implemented in
the period 2000 to 2006 still reveals considerable dif-
ficulties concerning the compatibility with the other
3.90. In March 2001, the Commission published a com-
prehensive review of the activities of the European Union for
SMEs (Report on the activities of the European Union for
SMEs from 1997 to 2000, COM(2001) 98 final of
1.03.2001).
Regarding the Opinion of the Economic and Social Commit-
tee on the ’European Charter for Small Businesses’, the Com-
mission presented a first annual report on progress achieved
by Member States and the Commission on the Charter at the
Stockholm Summit. For this year only, the report was in sum-
mary form. From 2002 onwards, it will contain a more
detailed evaluation of progress by Member States and the
Commission.
Progress on the Charter was also covered in the ‘BEST’ Imple-
mentation Report, presented at the Council meeting of Indus-
try Ministers on 5 December 2000. This report addressed the
issue of ’one-stop shops’ under the headings of ’Improved vis-
ibility of support services’ and ’Improved public administra-
tion’.
3.91. The Commission will publish a ‘Guide to financial
engineering techniques’ only when it is clear that assistance
for venture-capital firms is compatible with the rules on com-
petition. The compatibility of State aid for SMEs in the form
of venture capital with the competition rules is a sensitive issue
affecting not only the regions receiving assistance under the
ESF, but the whole of the EU. The Commission will be pre-
senting a paper on this matter shortly.
The Guide will therefore contain these new rules and obviously
take account of the Commission documents referred to in
point 3.85. In addition to the work mentioned in point 3.85
and work on the application of the State aid rules to public
support for the development of venture-capital activities,
referred to in point 3.82, the Commission has recently
launched a study on the methods of co-financing, with the
ERDF, the arrangements for subsidised loans the public con-
tribution to which is paid retroactively, and whose funding
needs consequently go beyond the programming period.
(54) Commission Regulation (EC) No 68/2001 of 12 Janu-
ary 2000 on the application of Articles 87 and 88 of the
EC Treaty to training aid (OJ L 10, 13.1.2001, p. 20).
(55) COM (2000) 653 final, 18 October 2000.
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Community policies of SF assistance for risk capital
funds and companies. The Stockholm European Coun-
cil at last asked the Commission to clarify how State aid
rules would be applied to measures designed to pro-
mote risk capital to improve the financial environment
of SMEs (56).
3.92. With regard to support structures for SMEs and,
more particularly, the European Community business
and innovation centres (EC-BICs), the Court found
(Annual Report concerning the financial year 1996,
paragraphs 6.69 to 6.71) that the expenditure declared
matched, for a large number of these measures, the
financing of existing or newly created structures, or net-
works, and their operating costs, but this was not the
result of a consistent approach. In 2000 the Commis-
sion published a guide defining the basic conditions for
the creation of EC-BICs and the provisions for financ-
ing them under the ERDF (57). The general principles
laid down in the guide are, at last, a response to the
observations and recommendations which the Court
has been making since 1993 in respect of the
EC-BICs (58). However, the Commission must allocate
the necessary resources to ensure that they are actually
complied with.
Special Report No 22/98 on equal opportunities for
women and men
3.93. In its discharge recommendation for the finan-
cial year 1997 (59), the Council underlines the
The Guide will have to reflect the most recent developments
in financial engineering and help the regional authorities and
development bodies to apply these instruments more effec-
tively. The Guide will offer models ‘of best practice’ on how to
prepare, target and apply venture capital funds, loan funds,
guarantee funds and other similar measures.
Preparation of the Guide will go hand in hand with the prepa-
ration of a plan to foster awareness of the opportunities for
public funding of venture capital companies tailored to the
different regions, based on the dissemination of best practice,
especially between assisted regions. The practices of SMEs in
those regions as regards obtaining venture capital financing
vary considerably.
3.92. Based on the evaluation carried out independently,
the Commission has stated clearly in the European Guide for
business and innovation centres (BICs) for 2000 that BICs
will be able to continue receiving funding from the ERDF,
within Community support frameworks and on the initiative
of the relevant public authorities on the basis of the principle
of subsidiarity. They will also be able to receive through the
ERDF payment for services provided by the BICs. The Com-
mission will consider on that basis what further action needs
to be taken on the Court’s recommendations.
(56) Presidency Conclusions Stockholm European Council, 23
and 24 March 2001, p. 21.
(57) Guide to the European Community business and innova-
tion centres. A tool at the service of regional and business
development, European Commission. (ISBN 92-828-
9300-6).
(58) See the Court’s Special Report No 5/93 on the business
and innovation centres (OJ C 13, 17.1.1994).
(59) Council Document No 5911/99, 19 February 1999.
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importance it attaches to the Community policy to sup-
port equal opportunities for men and women, asks for
the weaknesses (in particular the cost of the technical
assistance office) of the Community programme to be
remedied in the mid-term, and calls on the Commission
to avoid duplication between the mainstream ESF and
the Community initiative NOW. In the operational pro-
grammes adopted by the Commission for structural
measures in the period 2000 to 2006, the amounts
devoted to special measures between 2000 and 2006
concerning equal opportunities total 3 537 million euro,
i.e. 6 % of total ESF expenditure. This percentage is
above the 1,6 % achieved during the 1994 to 1999
period but still below the objective of 15 % set by the
Commission in 1998 and requested by the European
Parliament (60) (paragraph 78 of Special Report
No 22/98).
3.94. The financial allocation for the Employ Com-
munity initiative for the entire 1994 to 99 period was
1 846,3 million euro, of which 27 % was for the NOW
(New Opportunities for Women) strand. Only 78 % of
the amounts committed were paid by the end of 2000.
The Employ CI was replaced by the EQUAL CI for the
new programming period. The management system set
up by the Commission for implementation of this new
initiative and the cumbersomeness of the procedures
meant that the problems of delays previously noted in
respect of the Employ CI could not be resolved and the
programming period was thus reduced by at least one
year. With regard to the transnationality strand of the
projects, a strand which is the principal special feature
of the Community Initiatives when compared with the
normal Operational Programmes, the Commission has
not yet adopted instructions for the definition and man-
agement of eligible expenditure. Moreover, in its EQUAL
Communication, the Commission has not set a mini-
mum financial framework for this strand. The Special
Report on this strand had underlined that this mini-
mum financial framework was of marginal dimensions
(paragraphs 33 to 41 of Special Report No 22/98).
3.94. The majority of decisions concerning the Employ
Community initiative make provision for an eligibility period
for expenditure beyond 31 December 2000. The correspond-
ing programmes will only be closed during 2001 and at the
latest in June 2002. The rate of cover of 78 % referred to by
the Court will increase as programmes are wound up. The
Commission will continue in the intervening period to encour-
age Member States to make the best use of appropriations
allocated to them for this purpose.
In addition, the Commission will complete in 2001 a set of
factsheets on transnationality dealing with the rules on eligi-
bility, the minimum requirements for a transnational coopera-
tion agreement, the administrative rules and the requirements
for exchanges of good practice.
The Commission did not consider it appropriate to fix a mini-
mum transnational budget in its communication containing
guidelines for the EQUAL Community initiative, preferring to
discuss it with the individual Member States and work it out
jointly, in the light of specific national situations. During the
negotiations on the EQUAL programmes, all the ESF heads
of mission received information regularly about the budgets
planned by the other Member States for the transnationality
strand, in order that a certain degree of uniformity could be
achieved.
(60) Document COM(98) 131 of 19 March 1998. European
Parliament Resolution of 4 May 1999 on the Commis-
sion’s interim report to the European Parliament, the
Council, the Economic and Social Committee and the
Committee of the Regions on the implementation of the
medium-term Community action programme on equal
opportunities for men and women (1996-2000): ‘11. [...]
emphasises that the European Paliament has called for at
least 15 % of the appropriations allocated to the ESF to be
devoted to the promotion of projects to benefit women’
(OJ C 279, 1.10.1999, p. 88).
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3.95. With regard to the implementation of the Com-
munity mid-term action programme to promote equal-
ity of opportunities (1996 to 2000), the financial refer-
ence amount, 30 million euro (61), was exceeded by
18 million euro, i.e. exceeding programming by 60 % of
the amount for which provision was made. Budgetary
implementation only achieved 43,1 million euro (90 %)
in commitment appropriations, of which 34 million
were paid (79 %). Under this programme 342 projects
were implemented, of which 138 were managed by a
technical assistance office outside the Commission’s
departments. The cost of the technical assistance con-
tract (from 19 July 1996 to 31 March 1999) came to
7,4 million euro in commitment appropriations, which
included 2,9 million for staff and operating costs, and
5,8 million euro in payment appropriations, which
included 2,6 million for staff and operating costs. The
cost of this external structure set up to manage this pro-
gramme therefore represents 6,7 % and 7,6 % respec-
tively of the commitments and payments carried out.
These amounts are out of all proportion to the work
carried out by the technical assistance office (para-
graphs 54 to 65 of Special Report No 22/98).
The Leader Community initiative
The audit of Leader I
3.96. The Commission first launched the Community
initiative ‘Leader’ (Liaison entre actions de développement de
l’économie rurale) in 1991 as a complement to the rural
development measures in the mainstream operational
programmes. The overall objective was to find ‘innova-
tive solutions’ for rural development which might serve
as models for rural areas based on proximity to localities
(area-basedapproach), to citizens (‘bottom-up’ approach)
and to activities (decentralised interventions and financ-
ing) (62).
3.95. The Commission has implemented a policy of ratio-
nalisation concerning the use of a technical assistance office.
This plan has resulted in the tasks that were previously
assigned to the technical assistance office referred to by the
Court under the Equal Opportunities programme being trans-
ferred back over the last two years to DG EMPLOI.
(61) Article 10 of Council Decision 95/593/EC of 22 Decem-
ber 1995 on a medium-term Community action pro-
gramme on equal opportunities for men and women
(1996-2000) (OJ L 335, 30.12.1995, p. 37).
(62) See the Commission’s Notice to Member States (OJ C 73,
19.03.1991, p. 33) as well as the Court of Auditors’
Annual Report concerning the financial year 1995, Chap-
ter 7 (OJ C 340, 12.11.1996).
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3.97. In 1995, audits of Leader I were conducted in
Italy, Spain and Germany. As a reaction to the audit
findings (63), the Council invited the Commission ‘to
implement measures to improve the management of
this Community Initiative...’ and asked the Commission
‘to draw conclusions from the Court’s comments, in
particular as regards evaluation, for all Community ini-
tiatives’ (64). In its reply (65), the Commission pointed
out that the general audit findings have been addressed
by the notification on Leader II (see paragraph 3.98) or
were taken into account during the development of
SEM 2000 and its data sheets (66) (e.g. the problem of
bank guarantees and interest earned). Some of the weak-
nesses however remain unchanged (see para-
graph 3.103).
The follow-up audit of Leader II
3.98. The Commission decided to continue the Leader
Community initiative (hereinafter referred to as Leader
II) (67) for the programming period 1994 to 99. As part
of an overall policy to stimulate rural development, Lea-
der II was designed to help rural operators in the disad-
vantaged rural areas under Objectives 1, 5 (b) and 6 and
their adjoining areas in developing strategies to exploit
their socio-economic potential based on a bottom-up
approach.
3.99. The main type of final beneficiaries that were eli-
gible as rural operators under Leader II were the so-called
local action groups as defined for the purposes of the
3.97. The Commission took account of the Court’s remarks
on Leader I when launching Leader II. For example, innova-
tion was introduced as an eligibility criterion for selecting
Leader Local Action Groups (LAGs). Most issues the Court
refers to as weaknesses of Leader II correspond to certain risks
which are inherent in the extremely decentralised implementa-
tion systems such as applied under Leader and to the testing
of less bureaucratic approaches to accessing Community funds
in order to respond to the repeated criticisms of the EU made
by citizens on this point. The Commission and the Member
States are aware of these risks when monitoring the pro-
grammes and controlling that their implementation follows
the principles of sound financial management.
The Commission recognises that reinforcing the ex-ante con-
trol of the implementation of the programmes might improve
financialmanagement. TheCommission attachesmuch impor-
tance to the bottom-up and participative nature of the Leader
Initiative, which are key features distinguishing the Leader
approach from the more classic ‘top-down’ mainstream pro-
grammes.
(63) See the Annual Report concerning the financial year
1995, Chapter 7 (OJ C 340, 12.11.1996).
(64) Council Recommendation concerning the discharge to be
given to the Commission for the 1995 financial year,
Document 5441/97.
(65) Report by the Commission on action taken on the com-
ments accompanying the Council recommendation on
the discharge for the 1995 financial year (COM(97) 571).
(66) OJ L 146, 5.6.1997.
(67) See the Commission’s Notice to Member States
(OJ C 180, 1.7.1994, p. 48).
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Leader I Initiative, i.e. groups of public and private part-
ners jointly devising strategies and innovative measures
for the development of a local rural area. There were
almost 1000 local action groups in the CSF II period
compared to 217 under Leader I.
3.100. In 1999 and 2000, audits on Leader II were car-
ried out in Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Portugal and
Spain. The Member States and the groups were chosen
for financial, demographic and geographic reasons.
Audits were also carried out at the Commission as well
as at the technical assistance office providing the Com-
munity rural development network.
Financial allocations
3.101. The financial allocations for the three Structural
Funds (ERDF, about 46 %; EAGGF-Guidance, about 45 %
and ESF, about 9 %) for 1994 to 99 (see Table 3.4)
amounted to about 1 790 million euro of commitment
appropriations of which more than 1 070 million euro,
i.e. 60 %, had been allocated to the Objective 1
regions (68).
3.102. As Table 3.4 indicates, the budgetary execu-
tion of Leader II was concentrated in the second half of
the programming period. The delay was mainly due to
the late approval of the guidelines (69) and subsequent
delays concerning the approval of the operational pro-
grammes, the selection and establishment of local action
groups, action plans and the project selection (70). Pro-
gramme implementation in terms of payments
amounted to just 52 % of the funds available by the end
of the programming period (31 December 1999). By
the end of the year 2000, additional payments of 71
3.102. The Commission recognises that earlier adoption of
the Community Initiative guidelines would have assisted the
implementation of Leader II in the first part of the 1994 to
1999 period. However, the guidelines for each of the Com-
munity Initiatives have as their legal base the mainstream
Structural Fund Regulations. It was therefore necessary for all
the Community Initiatives to wait until the mainstream regu-
lations were adopted (July 1993) before the procedure could
be launched for adoption of the proposed CI guidelines by the
Commission, their subsequent submission for opinion to the
European Parliament, Committee of the Regions and Eco-
nomic and Social Committee, followed by their final adop-
tion by the Commission.
This situation was compounded by the need for lengthy nego-
tiation of certain programmes, and by the difficult selection
of local action groups in certain Member States/regions, as
the pressure from the grassroots to participate in the pro-
gramme was very high.(68) The initial Community contribution for Leader II was
estimated at 1 400 millon euro in 1994 prices, of which
900 million euro were for the Objective 1 regions. The
difference results mainly from the allocation of a reserve
in 1999 as well as from the indexation.
(69) The Commission’s Notice to Member States (OJ C 180,
1.7.1994).
(70) The Court noted on several occasions back-loaded pro-
gramme execution in the area of structural funds, e.g.
Annual Report concerning the financial year 1997 (para-
graphs 3.24 to 3.34) and Annual Report concerning the
financial year 1999 (paragraph 3.3 and paragraphs 3.18
to 3.22), as well as Special Report No 16/98 on the imple-
mentation of appropriations for structural operations for
the programming period 1994 to 1999, paragraph 6.19.
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Table 3.4 — Community initiative Leader II 1994 to 1999, EAGGF-Guidance, ERDF and ESF
(Mio EUR)
Member State/region Financialplan
Commitments Payments
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total as % ofplan 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 Total
as % of
plan
Objective 1 Belgium 4,18 0,00 0,00 0,00 4,09 0,00 0,08 4,17 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 2,05 0,00 0,02 3,07 0,49
Objective 1 Germany 95,68 0,00 75,61 7,50 0,00 7,96 4,57 95,64 1,00 0,00 22,90 11,75 9,48 20,19 3,01 68,33 0,70
Objective 1 Greece 167,65 0,00 22,56 0,00 0,00 36,55 107,98 167,09 1,00 0,00 11,28 0,00 3,49 21,23 64,10 101,10 0,60
Objective 1 Spain 340,83 0,00 69,46 4,74 46,40 68,08 136,14 324,82 0,95 0,00 24,09 5,61 17,85 46,27 87,99 182,76 0,53
Objective 1 France 5,09 0,00 3,05 0,79 1,25 0,00 – 0,25 4,84 0,95 0,00 0,55 0,66 0,38 0,00 0,28 2,82 0,37
Objective 1 Ireland 87,23 0,00 7,50 0,00 1,13 53,11 5,91 67,65 0,78 0,00 3,75 0,00 0,34 24,66 23,23 52,76 0,60
Objective 1 Italy 208,33 0,00 23,09 22,30 8,14 11,09 125,37 189,99 0,91 0,00 11,54 10,95 4,07 4,54 11,77 43,78 0,21
Objective 1 Netherlands 2,90 0,00 2,02 0,00 0,09 0,00 0,22 2,33 0,80 0,00 0,61 0,00 0,03 0,34 0,00 1,78 0,34
Objective 1 Austria 3,50 0,00 2,01 0,25 0,00 0,61 0,62 3,49 1,00 0,00 0,33 0,37 0,18 0,35 1,04 3,27 0,65
Objective 1 Portugal 133,20 0,00 6,74 4,01 39,86 46,51 34,54 131,66 0,99 0,00 3,59 4,85 20,46 36,69 21,96 88,54 0,66
Objective 1 United Kingdom 28,48 0,00 18,54 4,78 0,00 2,64 2,53 28,49 1,00 0,00 1,91 4,81 3,28 5,86 1,84 18,70 0,62
Total 1 077,07 0,00 230,58 44,37 100,96 226,55 417,71 1 020,17 0,95 0,00 80,55 39,00 61,61 160,13 215,24 557,48 0,52
Objective 5b Belgium 6,36 0,00 0,00 0,00 3,32 2,72 0,32 6,36 1,00 0,00 0,00 0,00 1,66 1,36 0,02 3,04 0,48
Objective 5b Denmark 8,16 0,00 0,00 6,53 1,63 0,00 0,00 8,16 1,00 0,00 0,00 1,96 0,49 0,00 0,00 2,45 0,30
Objective 5b Germany 118,57 0,00 48,96 8,39 3,21 4,25 47,69 112,49 0,95 0,00 15,92 2,50 4,37 17,18 14,94 54,91 0,46
Objective 5b Spain 74,60 0,00 42,64 4,78 1,12 22,40 3,66 74,60 1,00 0,00 10,77 4,22 0,33 15,47 25,43 56,22 0,75
Objective 5b France 232,33 0,00 92,51 91,95 36,12 1,89 9,87 232,33 1,00 0,00 14,98 44,94 19,42 29,83 27,21 136,38 0,59
Objective 5b Italy 123,23 0,00 5,53 26,99 5,17 1,00 75,12 113,81 0,92 0,00 2,45 11,35 3,43 0,00 5,94 23,17 0,19
Objective 5b Luxembourg 1,27 0,00 1,01 0,00 0,00 0,00 0,26 1,27 1,00 0,00 0,41 0,00 0,25 0,00 0,00 0,66 0,51
Objective 5b Netherlands 9,02 0,00 6,16 0,00 0,08 2,16 0,51 8,91 0,99 0,00 1,85 0,00 0,03 1,30 1,07 4,25 0,47
Objective 5b Austria 24,10 0,00 0,00 17,86 0,36 2,35 2,86 23,42 0,97 0,00 0,00 5,36 2,22 7,18 0,34 15,10 0,63
Objective 5b Finland 16,66 0,00 0,00 16,15 0,00 0,00 0,50 16,66 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,85 0,00 1,37 5,50 11,72 0,70
Objective 5b Sweden 12,48 0,00 0,00 10,03 2,05 0,00 0,00 12,09 0,97 0,00 0,00 3,01 0,62 1,21 1,82 6,66 0,53
Objective 5b United Kingdom 52,92 0,00 37,63 5,25 0,00 0,00 8,66 51,54 0,97 0,00 2,91 9,99 6,52 0,45 15,52 35,39 0,67
Total 679,70 0,00 234,44 187,93 53,06 36,77 149,45 661,64 0,97 0,00 49,29 88,18 39,34 75,35 97,78 349,94 0,51
Objective 6 Finland 12,60 0,00 0,00 11,94 0,00 0,25 0,42 12,60 1,00 0,00 0,00 3,58 0,00 3,49 2,09 9,16 0,73
Objective 6 Sweden 4,41 0,00 0,00 3,34 0,93 0,00 0,11 4,38 0,99 0,00 0,00 1,00 0,21 0,07 2,01 3,29 0,75
Total 17,01 0,00 0,00 15,28 0,93 0,25 0,53 16,98 1,00 0,00 0,00 4,58 0,21 3,56 4,10 12,45 0,73
Networking 26,04 0,29 3,46 4,09 2,90 6,93 8,37 26,02 1,00 0,00 2,88 1,84 2,88 3,07 3,32 14,00 0,54
Total 1 799,82 0,29 468,48 251,66 157,85 270,48 576,05 1 724,80 0,96 0,00 132,71 133,61 104,01 242,11 320,45 932,88 0,52
Source: Commission, DG Agriculture.
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million euro were completed. The bulk of the available
funds (more than 90 %) was spent on the projects under
measure (B) (71).
Management weaknesses of Leader II
3.103. In all regions visited projects had been approved
under Leader II that would also have been eligible under
the mainstream activities (apart from the projects in
adjoining rural areas outside the 5 (b) regions (72), as the
Court’s audit of Leader I had already established (73). In
several regions projects were funded under the Leader II
programme because they were considered too ‘small’
for the mainstream operational programme, or because
the relevant funds in the main operational programme
had already been used up. Supporting these projects
under the mainstream activities would have simplified
the administrative efforts required by the creation of
management bodies for programme completion (local
action groups, rural collective bodies).
3.104. As every co-financed action may generate
receipts, the corresponding revenue has to be taken into
consideration when determining the subsidy (74). In
those cases where projects had produced income, a
To address this issue for the 2000 to 2006 period, the Com-
mission has introduced a new requirement in the guidelines
for Leader+ for Member States to select all LAGs no later
than two years after the programme has been approved. This
should ensure that local action groups have at least five years
in which to implement their strategy.
3.103. The Commission reacted to the Court’s remarks on
Leader I by adding innovation as an eligibility criterion for
Leader II. However, innovation is to be assessed in Leader in
the light of the whole approach of the programme and the
method of implementation of the local action group strategy,
and not only in terms of the final nature of individual projects
supported by local action groups. So, it may be appropriate
to finance under Leader certain individual projects that when
viewed in isolation should be eligible under the mainstream
programmes, where these projects are an essential element for
the realisation of a particular local action group’s innovative
development programme.
That said, the Commission recognises that the demarcation
between Leader and mainstream programmes was a weakness
in some regions under Leader II and is seeking to improve this
demarcation during the examination of programmes for the
period 2000 to 2006.
The search for innovation and the bottom-up Leader approach
are two elements justifying the additional administrative efforts
required for implementation of Leader, and must be demon-
strated in the programme of any selected local action group
which should be assessed in a wider context. The capacity-
building and empowerment of the local population achieved
under Leader should be seen as generating additional value
added for rural communities.
3.104. The Commission encourages Leader groups to grant
a level of aid which is appropriate to the circumstances of each
project, including their revenue-generating potential.
Leader groups are, typically, not a well-adapted structure for
the granting and management of loans. The follow-up of
these grants over several years (potentially beyond the lifetime
of the local action group) and the complexity of their control
goes beyond the financial management capacity of most local
action groups.
(71) The eligible actions were spread over four measures:
acquiring skills, rural innovation projects, transnational
cooperation and networking/technical assistance.
(72) As provided in the Notice to the Member States, point 8.
(73) See the Annual Report concerning the financial year
1995, paragraphs 7.25, 7.30 and 7.59 (OJ C 340,
12.11.1996).
(74) See Article 17 of Council Regulation (EC) No 4253/88 on
coordination, as amended, in connection with data sheet
No 9.
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number of local action groups ignored the receipts
related to the co-financed projects. In the context of
profitable investments supported by Leader II, the pos-
sibility of granting loans rather than subsidies should
have been taken into consideration as provided in
Article 5(4) of the framework regulation.
3.105. Under Leader I about 450 million euro of Com-
munity funds were available for a four-year period for
217 beneficiaries, i.e. an arithmetic mean of about
520 000 euro of Community funds per group and per
year. Under Leader II the average available budget per
group and per year was reduced to about 290 000 euro
of Community funds (1 750 million euro for six years
and about 1000 beneficiaries). This has necessarily led
to a thin scattering of Community resources contrary to
the guiding operating principle for Structural Funds’
interventions, which requires the concentration of funds
on a limited number of priority measures and areas in
order to increase their efficiency.
3.106. Flows of funds for Leader II moved extremely
slowly. In one region, Lazio in Italy, the time that elapsed
as measured from the date of the request for payment
to the receipt of it by the beneficiaries for forwarding of
Community payments to the final beneficiaries was
more than two years for all projects.
3.107. Structural weaknesses in the financial manage-
ment of the Leader II Initiative were evident in a num-
ber of regions. This was due to the lack of
national/regional guidelines and/or instructions on the
management of European Union funds forwarded to
local action groups.
3.108. Extreme variations in the overhead charges of
the different local action groups have been noted. While
in certain regions all non-operational expenditure,
including management fees etc., was excluded from eli-
gible expenditure, in other regions overhead charges
accounted for more than 80 % of the available budget
of the local action group (see Annual Report 1999,
paragraph 3.68). Moreover, in contradiction of
Article 21(3) of the coordination regulation (75), in one
region, Alentejo in Portugal, there were ineligible
3.105. Unlike Leader I, where the Commission was respon-
sible for the selection of Leader groups, under Leader II the
selection was made by the Member States, which in many
cases were faced with a very large number of applications fol-
lowing the success of Leader I.
The Commission shares the Court’s concern that each local
action group should have an adequate budget (Community
and other financial sources) to have any impact. During the
discussions with Member States and other EU institutions on
the draft Leader+ guidelines the Commission emphasised the
need for the selection process under Leader+ to be more selec-
tive. This point is taken up in point 9 of the Leader+ guide-
lines. Member States have also been required to indicate the
number of local action groups they envisage selecting and this
number has been a point for negotiation with some Member
States.
3.106. As for all Community funds in certain regions,
Leader II suffered from weaknesses in the financing channels
that seriously hampered the implementation of the local action
groups rural innovation projects. The Commission raised these
difficulties in the Monitoring Committees for the programmes
concerned, with varying degrees of success among the Member
States and regions.
3.108. As indicated by the Commission in its reply to the
Court’s 1999 report, the share of operating and technical
assistance costs in the local action groups’ total expenditure
tends to be higher at the beginning of the period when the
local action group is being set up, but diminishes once exter-
nal projects start to be financed by the local action group.
In the negotiations with Member States for the approval of
Leader+ programmes the Commission has invited Member
(75) Article 21(3): ‘the payments shall be made to the final
beneficiaries without any deduction or retention which
could reduce the amount of financial assistance to which
they are entitled.’
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overhead costs because the beneficiaries had to repay a
certain amount of the subsidy to the local action group
that approved the project.
3.109. In several cases projects were selected without
a formal procedure; other projects were selected with-
out any comparative analysis of predefined, objective
(quantifiable) parameters. Moreover, the objectivity and
transparency of the project-selection process is doubt-
ful in those cases where applicant and authorising insti-
tution are closely interrelated. In a number of cases close
personal or professional relationships existed between
the project promoter and the approving authority.
3.110. In many cases support for projects has been
backdated. According to the Commission, this is cov-
ered by Article 15 of the coordination regulation (and
data sheet No 2 respectively), since such projects are
carried out within the period of eligibility fixed in the
operational programmes. However, structural policy is
meant to give incentives to realising projects which
would not otherwise be carried out. To subsidise (pro-
ductive) investments, for which the project applications
are submitted only after they have been completed (in
some cases years afterwards), creates nothing but dead
weight effects.
Conclusion
3.111. Notwithstanding the abovementioned weak-
nesses, however, Leader II has fulfilled its role as a ‘pio-
neer’ programme. The lessons learned from Leader II
must influence the content of the mainstream pro-
grammes. Certainmeasures that Leader II has supported
until now can hardly be considered ‘pilot projects’ any
more but should be supported by mainstream policies
in the future.
States/regions to include in their programmes a ceiling on
operating costs as a proportion of a local action groups’ total
budget. The Commission has insisted that this ceiling should
be not more than 15 %.
As a result of the comments of the Court and follow-up action
by the Commission, sums unduly collected by the local action
group in the case of the Alentejo were reimbursed to the final
recipients.
3.109. The Commission and the Member States are aware
that project selection is a sensitive issue in Leader implementa-
tion. The Commission considers that the establishment of
appropriate project selection arrangements is an issue that
should be resolved at local level between the Member
State/region and the local action groups. The Commission, in
Monitoring Committees, encourages the use of open and
transparent procedures by the local action groups for the selec-
tion of projects.
3.110. Most Leader I groups were re-selected under Leader
II. These groups started project selection at their own risk
before the Commission approved the national or regional pro-
gramme concerned, and before themanaging authority selected
them as Leader II groups. In the absence of any legal provi-
sions which would exclude their financing, projects financed
in this way are to be considered eligible. Their impact on
attaining the Leader objectives is not undermined by this fact.
The Commission does not support the retroactive financing of
projects which have already been completed before the applica-
tion for aid was submitted. In order to avoid this possibility,
for the current programming period, Article 9(2)(b) of Com-
mission Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 limits eligibility to
operations selected for co-financing under the assistance con-
cerned.
3.111. The Commission agrees that it is important to
transfer those aspects of the Leader approach, which have
demonstrated their worth, into the mainstream programmes.
This is a process the Commission actively encouraged for the
2000 to 2006 programming period and it is already clear
that a growing number of Member States have adopted
Leader-type approaches, either within their mainstream Struc-
tural Fund programmes (e.g. Spain, Sweden, Ireland, Greece)
or with national financing (e.g. Finland).
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3.112. The Court acknowledges the efforts by the
Commission and the Member States to strengthen the
innovation aspect, the regional and bottom-up oriented
approach, the partnership aspect, networking and the
decentralised management of funding of projects in
rural areas. However, several problems remain unre-
solved: in particular there is still no sufficient measure
of the monitoring and control of individual projects;
these aspects should be taken into consideration for the
new programming period 2000 to 2006 for the new
Community initiative Leader +.
Observations made in the context of the 1998 DAS in
respect of the ERDF and the Cohesion Fund
3.113. The Court verified whether the Commission
had given adequate follow-up to the observations made
in the context of the 1998 DAS in respect of 15 ERDF
cases, of which five had been closed, and one Cohesion
Fund case which had been closed. In view of the finan-
cial impact of the substantive errors found, all these
cases required action on the part of the Commission.
Although many of the Court’s observations reveal defi-
ciencies in the management and controls, which are
common to many programmes, the Commission did
not carry out supplementary investigations, in addition
to the examination carried out by the Court on its
sample, in order to identify errors in the declarations of
expenditure, particularly in view of their foreseeable
impact on expenditure under the Community budget.
3.114. With regard to the five closed ERDF sub-
programmes, the audit carried out in the context of the
1998 DAS revealed errors which had a direct impact, in
the five cases, on the amounts paid by the Commission.
Thus, out of a total of 182,1 million euro paid for the
five sub-programmes, an estimate of the amount over-
paid came to 47,5 million euro (see paragraph 3.29 of
the Annual Report concerning the financial year 1998).
In one case, despite the numerous irregularities noted,
the Court could not find evidence of any follow-up on
the part of the Commission. In one case the Commis-
sion has initiated application of Article 24 of Regula-
tion (EEC) No 4253/88 and intends to apply it in three
other cases in order to recover part of the amounts
paid. Nevertheless, no recovery order had been issued
by the end of 2000. Furthermore, in several of these
cases the Commission did not carry out in-depth checks
on the expenditure declared; in one case the Commis-
sion failed to take steps to initiate recovery of an excess
amount paid although its decision, taken in September
1999, recognises the necessity of avoiding payment to
a Member State of an ERDF contribution which is
greater than the total received by the final beneficiaries.
3.112. To be approved, the Leader+ programmes must con-
tain detailed administrative provisions on the management
(including financial management) and monitoring of the dif-
ferent actions: territorial development strategies, cooperation
and networks. The programmes are carefully examined in this
respect. In order to better monitor the implementation of
Leader+ at Community level, the Commission is also estab-
lishing a series of common monitoring indicators, both finan-
cial and physical, to be used in all Leader+ programmes.
3.113. The Commission does its best to act on the Court’s
observations when exercising its role of managing and moni-
toring programmes, despite the limited funds and resources at
its disposal. Looking into cases — often the more complex
ones — which involve contacting the responsible national
authorities and gathering data which the Commission does
not automatically possess (since the audit has not been done
by its own staff) is likely to take considerable time. The Com-
mission has found it difficult with the staff available to con-
duct inquiries into instances of errors identified by the Court
as well as carrying through its own audit programme and fol-
lowing up its own audit findings and DAS cases. However,
as indicated in the reply to point 3.75, new systems being
introduced should lead to improvements in this area.
3.114. Correction procedures are now in hand in the case of
the five ERDF measures referred to by the Court. The closure
arrangements introduced in 1999 do not apply to earlier clo-
sures. The Commission nevertheless is considering ways of
recovering amounts paid to the Member State.
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3.115. In the case of the closed Cohesion Fund project,
the Commission had taken no steps to recover the funds
from the beneficiary although the national authorities
had admitted in the meantime that the VAT declared
was not eligible.
3.116. With regard to those measures which were not
closed, the corrective action taken can be considered
satisfactory in six cases but these actions were some-
times taken tardily. In two cases, the steps taken by the
Commission proved inadequate for various reasons,
such as a minimal reduction in the subsidy where the
entire project concerned is ineligible, failure to take into
account those cases singled out by the Court in the con-
text of a Commission appeal before the Court of Justice
concerning another similar case from the same group,
failure by the Commission to check the new expendi-
ture figures submitted. Finally, in two cases, no evidence
could be found of any follow-up action by the Commis-
sion.
SUMMARY OF SPECIAL REPORTS
Special Report No 1/2001 (76) on the URBAN Com-
munity initiative
3.117. The URBAN Community initiative helped to
implement many projects with the objective of assist-
ing urban development in 118 areas of the European
Union and making access to Community co-financing
easier for local authorities. However, the Court consid-
ers that these projects could also have been carried out
within the framework of the Community measures
already in existence, thus avoiding the creation of new
procedures and costly management structures.
3.118. The Commission’s communications laying
down guidelines for the URBAN initiative focused on
numerous projects which were ambitious but vague.
The programmes adopted therefore lack precise and
specific objectives. For ex ante assessments, monitoring
3.115. The Commission issued a recovery order for the
amount in question in July 2001.
3.116. Regarding the first two cases cited by the Court,
where the steps taken proved inadequate, the Member State
concerned by one of them has already agreed to make a com-
plete correction, while the Commission is obliged to await the
judgment of the Court of Justice in the other. In the former
case the necessary corrections have since been made. As to the
second, the Commission will be taking further action if it is
required.
3.117. The real value added of URBAN is to make neigh-
bourhood partnerships and the involvement of residents the
linchpin of the regeneration of targeted areas. While it is true
that this approach is not excluded by the general rules for
Structural Funds assistance, the Court acknowledges that the
URBAN Community initiative has made access to Commu-
nity co-financing for local authorities easier.
The positive aspects of this local partnership were among the
factors underlying the wish, especially in the European Parlia-
ment, to retain an URBAN Community initiative programme
in the period 2000 to 2006.
3.118. This Initiative could not hope to resolve entirely what
is in effect a major problem facing society today, i.e. depressed
neighbourhoods and in some cases actual ‘ghettos’ in many
European cities.
(76) OJ C 124, 25.4.2001.
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and evaluation, to have a real impact on the conception
and implementation of the measures, precise objectives
must be set for the measures beforehand.
3.119. In spite of a typology of very different prob-
lems in urban areas, the measures proposed in the
Operational Programmes to attempt to remedy them
are very similar. Taking the scale of the programmes
into account, this strategy has led to a thin sprinkling
of finance which is extremely difficult to manage. The
new measures, financed in future solely by the ERDF,
should be simpler and more accurately targeted at the
main problems of the areas concerned.
3.120. The implementation of URBAN was character-
ised by considerable delays, which led to a concentra-
tion of operations at the end of the period. This is the
consequence of an ex ante assessment which went into
scarcely any detail, in fact it was almost non-existent, of
programmming which had little to do with reality and
of poor monitoring. Furthermore, questionable tech-
niques were applied to allow the measures to be com-
menced before the deadline on 31 December 1999.
The aim of the Initiative was to provide support for a number
of exemplary projects in order to demonstrate that even in
neighbourhoods like those it was possible to restore hope to
residents and to give the local economy a boost.
To ensure that goals are better identified when URBAN II
programmes are adopted, the Commission will promote the
use of a common scale of priorities and a small number of
common indicators among the measures to enhance effective-
ness and simplification.
3.119. While it is true that the degree of seriousness of
problems differs from place to place, there are nevertheless
some whose socio-economic repercussions in general are fairly
similar, such as economic stagnation, a deterioration in trans-
portation and the environment, lack of security for residents,
etc.
The value added of URBAN consists mainly in its integrated
approach, which gives priority to focusing on this multi-
sectoral array of problems and in so doing tackles not merely
the symptoms but rather the causes of residents’ disquiet.
This, of course, brings with it a special level of difficulty but
is justified as ‘simpler’ programmes were being implemented
commonly as part of the ‘mainstream’ Structural Funds, pre-
viously during the 1994 to 1999 programming period, and
will be in the 2000 to 2006 period in which an urban strand
has been identified within Objective 2.
The Commission agrees with the Court that the new URBAN
II Initiative should be simplified as much as possible provided
that this is not at the expense of the integrated approach
which is its distinguishing feature.
In this respect the single source of funding to be provided in
future by the ERDF marks a considerable step forward.
3.120. One of the difficulties associated with the URBAN
initiative was the key role local authorities were called upon
to play, in many cases for the first time, in preparing pro-
grammes and implementing them.
While this may have been responsible in some cases for delays
or inefficiency, it is equally true that this drawback has been
largely offset by the experience gained, through URBAN, by
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3.121. The URBAN programmes ran independently of
other Community and national measures implemented
simultaneously in the areas concerned. Concrete action
should be taken to ensure there is awareness of the
measures being carried out in urban areas, that they are
consistent with one another and can be integrated.
3.122. The poor quality of the indicators, particularly
the impact indicators, and the delays in or even absence
of annual implementation reports reveal poor monitor-
ing of the measures in spite of the volume of the
co-financing granted for technical assistance. An
improvement in the statistical data at local level is
those authorities which in future will be able to turn it to
advantage in order to become more closely involved in the
whole range of Structural Fund assistance operations in their
regions.
This learning function has already paid off in that the time
taken to adopt programmes submitted in 1996 was less than
half that required for programmes presented in 1994.
The use of these techniques does not necessarily imply that
irregularities have been committed. The Commission will see
to it as part of the management and control of URBAN
Community initiative projects that all the legal arrangements
applicable to the Structural Funds are observed.
3.121. The Commission considers that the programmes
adopted under URBAN take account of other Community
assistance operations, in particular those co-financed under
the Structural Funds, and other mechanisms to promote urban
regeneration at national level.
Monitoring all the measures co-financed by the Structural
Funds in urban areas is very difficult and covers all Commu-
nity activities undertaken in a given geographical context.
However, for a number of local authorities, URBAN has
made it possible for the first time for various measures to be
planned and implemented in a coordinated way in one area
of a city.
In any case, the Commission is aware of the difficulty and has
therefore provided that under the new Structural Funds pro-
grammes, including the new URBAN II initiative, the system
of coding expenditure will make it possible for spending on
urban regeneration, i.e. urban transport and investments for
restoring urban areas, to be identified.
3.122. The Commission acknowledges that some weak-
nesses were uncovered during monitoring of the URBAN pro-
grammes. In future these should be prevented as a result of
steps taken by the new URBAN II initiative. The Commis-
sion considers that in spite of these shortcomings the monitor-
ing of the programmes has not been affected but has pro-
ceeded in a satisfactory way.
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necessary and the efforts already made, as in the con-
text of the Urban Audit (77), should be continued.
Special Report No 12/2001 (78) on structural measures
to improve the employment situation
3.123. A Community employment policy has been
taking shape for some years on the basis of the Euro-
pean employment strategy derived from the European
summits of Luxembourg and Amsterdam and, in par-
ticular, from the employment chapter of the Treaty of
Amsterdam. This strategy may be based on the eco-
nomic and social cohesion policy given concrete form
in the structural measures. It is also given adequate sup-
port in the methods used to evaluate the impact of the
structural measures on employment.
3.124. The Court notes that the European employ-
ment strategy primarily concerns measures to prevent
unemployment and does not take sufficient account of
the remedial measures needed to deal with the problem
of long-term and very long-term unemployment. In
addition, the employment guidelines drawn up each
year by the Council do not mention the ERDF explicitly,
even though the effect of this instrument on employ-
ment is not exactly negligible. As the ERDF, unlike the
ESF, is overlooked, potential synergies are not or may
not be exploited.
3.125. In the area of the ERDF, the Court notes that,
with regard to Objective 1 assistance for the program-
ming period 1994 to 1999, the desired effects of employ-
ment objectives and targets are often imprecise, except
as regards support for productive investments. Progress
reports ran into difficulties, in particular as regards the
anticipated effects on employment, arising from the
unreliability or lack of data and problems with the com-
pilation of inspection findings at regional and national
levels in cases where such a compilation would have
been appropriate. The reprogramming of measures
The Urban Audit, as the Court says, is an example of the
efforts the Commission is making to upgrade the quality of
comparative data about urban areas and will be continued in
cooperation with Eurostat.
3.124. The balance between the two types of measures at a
given moment is determined by the long-term unemployment
situation. Account has to be taken also of the range of differ-
ent situations in the Member States.
The guidelines for Member States’ employment policies are
based on all the Structural Funds which contribute to the
implementation of the European Employment Strategy.
3.125 to 3.126. In relation to the difficulties that the Court
has highlighted regarding heterogeneity of concepts used and
practices, the Commission’s work in developing guidance docu-
ments and working in cooperation with the Member States
aims to achieve greater understanding and agreement on such
methodologies and practices. However the Commission can-
not impose methodologies on the Member States. The regula-
tions require that those responsible for programmes examine
and consider the effects and the impacts of Structural Inter-
ventions in order to improve their effectiveness and impact in
their regional or national context. The primary objective is not
(77) Urban Audit is a pilot project financed by the ERDF which
aims to draw up a survey of European Union towns. The
results of the first phase cover 58 of the largest cities in
the Member States and were published in 2000 (Refer-
ence, Volume 1: ISBN 92-828-9242-5 and Volume 2:
ISBN 92-828-9244-1).
(78) OJ C 334, 28.11.2001.
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jointly financed by the ERDF was based only in excep-
tional cases on an analysis of the effects on employ-
ment.
3.126. As regards measures involving aid for produc-
tive investments:
(a) even when they are linked to the fulfilment of job
maintenance and creation criteria, these measures
generally also support economic objectives for pro-
ductivity and production which may lead, at least
temporarily, to the reduction of the work factor. In
this context, the importance accorded to employ-
ment within the framework of these measures is not
always specific or appears limited;
(b) the importance of the dead-weight and displace-
ment effects was evaluated to varying degrees and,
in the majority of cases, no proposal was made as
to how these problems could be avoided;
(c) the evaluation of the impact on employment of
ERDF aid for these aid schemes is complicated and
may be distorted by the fact that the financing of a
national aid scheme enables the national authorities
either to request joint financing for an eligible project
or to finance it completely from national resources.
This evaluation is also influenced by the possibility
of replacing jointly financed projects which prove
problematical by other eligible projects.
3.127. Concerning ESF measures to combat long-term
unemployment, although there were improvements in
the overall EU unemployment situation in recent years,
progress in the long-term unemployment field has been
slower. The implementation in the Member States of
ESF co-financed measures in favour of long-term unem-
ployed lacked a clear definition of target groups, and
was given a lowpriority by national and regional admin-
istrations and in national regulatory and management
provisions, thereby incurring dead-weight costs and
suffering delays in implementation. As for the ERDF,
the results of the assessments were not sufficiently taken
into account in the reprogramming measures.
to feed into a uniform exercise across the entire territory of the
Union. Where we can aggregate or compare data across
Member States, this is useful. However, it is not the primary
purpose of the programme evaluations undertaken at ex-ante,
mid-term or ex-post stage.
The results of mid-term evaluation in relation to the measure-
ment of effects on employment reflect the fact that program-
ming in 1994 was not sufficiently focused, hence making it
difficult to measure results. In addition, 1996, the year of the
mid-term evaluation, was generally too early in the program-
ming period to measure employment effects. Some useful work
was undertaken, however, in refining macro-economic model-
ling techniques to enhance forecasts of likely employment
effects by the end of the programming period. The ex-post
evaluation of Objective 1 for 1994 to 1999 should demon-
strate the appropriateness of the models used and further
improvements which may need to be pursued.
3.127. The Court notes that progress in long-term unem-
ployment has been slower than in overall unemployment. This
underlines the difficulty in finding work faced by the long-
term unemployed. As regards the need for a clearer definition
of target groups, the Commission agrees with the comment of
the Court but points out that the definition of long-term
unemployed is a matter for each Member State.
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3.128. Information about the management and con-
trol systems relating to successful pilot and demonstra-
tion projects (Article 6 of Council Regulation (EC)
No 4255/88 as amended) was not made available to the
Commission and Member States, with the result that
similar projects were not incorporated in mainstream
ESF actions.
3.129. The Court recommends that:
(a) the administrative mechanisms of the ESF should be
clarified and the procedures should be simplified;
(b) employment strategy should be made more consis-
tent with the ESF and the ERDF;
(c) greater synergies should be sought between mea-
sures jointly financed by these Funds;
(d) consistent objectives should be defined during the
programming phase at the various levels, i.e. poli-
cies, programmes and sub-programmes;
(e) for every measure (or group of measures), the tech-
niques for gathering data on the impact of measures
on employment, and aggregation methods, should
be standardised;
(f) the Commission should ensure that:
— employment is systematically accorded due
importance in the joint financing process;
— national mechanisms for avoiding the dead-
weight and displacement effects are improved
and the necessary procedures stepped up;
— the surveillance needed to ensure that jobs are
created or safeguarded in a long-lasting way is
intensified.
3.128. The Commission is prepared to recognise that evalu-
ation, follow-up and mainstreaming of the results of projects
financed in 1994 to 1997 should have been more effective for
the purposes of incorporating them in mainstream European
Social Fund measures.
Since then, the Commission has improved and is currently
improving this transfer of information, namely by developing
the description of successful projects on the Web.
3.129. The guidelines forMember States’ employment poli-
cies should be based on all the Structural Funds which con-
tribute to the implementation of the European Employment
Strategy;
the programming of structural measures for 2000 to 2006
has appreciably improved the synergies between the ESF and
the ERDF in support of jobs, in accordance with the guide-
lines in Regulation (EC) No 1260/1999;
with the new regulatory environment for the 2000 to 2006
programming period the weaknesses identified in the 1994 to
1999 period have been tackled, particularly in the clarifica-
tion of the respective responsibilities of the Commission and
Member States;
the Commission’s work in developing guidance documents
and working in cooperation with Member States aims to
achieve greater understanding and agreement in these meth-
odologies and practices. However, the Commission cannot
impose methodologies on the Member States;
the Commission agrees with the Court’s recommendations
and has already taken steps to reduce dead-weight and dis-
placement effects, particularly its stronger emphasis on pro-
viding indirect support to SMEs.
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Special Report No 10/2001 (79) on financial controls
in the context of the Structural Funds
3.130. The Court’s Audit concerned the implementa-
tion by the Commission and Member States of two
regulations which aim to improve financial control in
the Structural Funds: Regulation (EC)No1681/94,which
introduced a system of communicating information by
Member States of detected irregularities and Regulation
(EC) No 2064/97, which sets out a system of checks by
Member States of expenditure incurred on projects
co-financed by the European Union. The main findings
and observations concerning the implementation of the
latter regulation are presented in the specific DAS
appraisal (paragraphs 3.44 to 3.56).
3.131. According to OLAF’s statistics, detected irregu-
larities are increasing in the Structural Funds. Weak-
nesses were found in the application of Regulation (EC)
No 1681/94 at every level; regional, national, OLAF and
other Commission services. Data on irregularities were
incomplete, out of date and only of limited use, partly
because the OLAF database was not working for three
years in the period 1998 to 2000 and partly because
what information was available was not properly fol-
lowed up by the Commission.
(a) The Commission should examine the operation of
the systems for the detection and communication of
irregularities within and byMember States, and then
monitor them with a view to ensuring timeliness,
completeness and relevance, and give guidance
where necessary.
(b) Member States need to review their own systems to
ensure that cases detected are communicated and
progress reported.
3.131. The continued action to improve the quantity and
quality of the information received under Regulation (EC)
No 1681/94 has been successful, as is reflected in the increased
number of communications received from Member States.
OLAF actually works closely with other Commission depart-
ments and Member States in order to improve persistent
weaknesses.
Since December 2000, OLAF has been using the new soft-
ware developed for reporting under Regulation (EC)
No 1681/94. The new software has been tested by some
Member States and is ready for use in all Member States.
(a) The Commission White Paper on Commission reform
contains details of a series of measures for ‘Protecting the
Community’s financial interests’ aimed at improving
detection and cooperation systems. In addition, coopera-
tion among Commission departments and between the
Commission and Member States, particularly in the area
of the Structural Funds will need to be better defined to
ensure that more effective action is taken to improve the
prevention and detection of irregularities, fraud and cor-
ruption. This objective of the Structural Funds has been
included in Action 97 ‘Improving monitoring of Struc-
tural Funds’ of the White Paper Action Plan. A Com-
mission communication on this topic has been adopted.
(b) The Commission departments share the views expressed
by the Court on this point.
(79) OJ C 314, 8.11.2001.
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(c) OLAF and other Commission services should jointly
define their respective responsibilities and deter-
mine whether a more effective follow-up would be
ensured if communications were sent to and exam-
ined initially by the new financial units being set up
in the Structural Funds DGs.
(d) The Commission should formulate proposals to
combine the various aspects of Regulations (EC)
No 1681/94 and (EC) No 2064/97 to provide effec-
tive and cohesive control and reporting systems on
a clear and consistent basis throughout the Euro-
pean Union.
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
3.132. The management and budgetary implementa-
tion of structural measures during the past years reveal
several anomalies. On the one hand, the commitments
are of no real significance as they only serve to forma-
lise the annual breakdown of estimated appropriations
in the financial perspective and to set out in a random
fashion, over the successive years of the programming
periods, the legal commitments already entered into by
the Communities when the CSFs and the programmes
were adopted. On the other hand, and in spite of vari-
ous attempts aiming to improve the budgetary esti-
mates, the Commission has no control over the devel-
opment of payments. This explains why one financial
year is affected by substantial shortfalls in appropria-
tions whereas the following financial year is character-
ised by under-implementations on a matching scale.
Recommendation: the Court has pointed out on several
(c) Regarding cooperation between OLAF and the Structural
Funds DGs, the Commission’s newly adopted Action
Plan for 2001 to 2003 on ‘Protecting the Communities’
financial interests — Fight against fraud’ (1) clearly rec-
ognises the need for clarification of the different depart-
ments’ responsibility as regards follow-up of reported
irregularities and fraud cases and recovery of amounts
unduly paid. The Action Plan therefore envisages that
protocols will be drawn up between OLAF and the DGs
responsible for the Structural Funds with regard to the
follow-up of irregularities notified by the Member States
under Regulation (EC) No 1681/94. It is expected that
these protocols will be concluded before the end of 2001.
(d) The procedures for reporting by Member States have been
harmonised at Commission level for all sectors. A uni-
form presentation is imposed to facilitate computer pro-
cessing. All information notified on the basis of Regula-
tion (EC) No 1681/94 is entered in the Office database.
The question of combining proposals has been addressed
in Action 97 Improved Financial Monitoring and Con-
trol of Structural Funds which gives details of actions to
be taken and for which a communication is in prepara-
tion. Important steps have already been taken with the
adoption of Commission Regulations Nos 438/2001
and 448/2001. The latter provide a clear link to Regu-
lation No 1681/94. However, OLAF will be able to
obtain maximum benefit from the deployment of the new
software across the Member States.
3.132. A distinction should be made between the Court’s
observations on the regulatory framework and those that con-
cern implementation.
As in previous years, the Court questions commitments by
annual instalments as provided for in the financial provisions
of the general Structural Funds Regulation. The Commission
has explained already, in its reply to the Court’s Report last
year, the advantages that commitments of this kind may offer.
Since that regulation was approved by the Council, with the
assent of Parliament, in 1999, it will apply for the whole of
the 2000 to 2006 period and commitments will have to be
made in annual instalments in the period ahead in accordance
with the financial perspectives adopted by the two arms of the
budgetary authority.
(1) Document COM (2001) 254 final adopted on 15 May 2001,
in particular point 1.2.2.
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occasions that budgetary commitments by annual instal-
ment should be abolished as they destroy any interest in
differentiating appropriations (80). In addition, the Com-
mission should provide itself with appropriate instru-
ments to improve its budgetary forecasts (para-
graphs 3.2 to 3.8).
3.133. The implementation of the budget in 2000was
very poor. A large volume of appropriations was car-
ried over and the financial perspective had to be
amended. This reflects the difficulties in the implemen-
tation of the programming period 2000 to 2006, in
particular because of the cumbersomeness of Commu-
nity and national procedures. Likewise, closure of the
measures of the preceding periods is very sluggish.
Recommmendation: the Commission should rationa-
lise and simplify the implementation procedures for
structural measures (paragraphs 3.16 to 3.23).
3.134. With regard to aid to enterprises, particularly
the SMEs, the Commission hasmade considerable efforts
in the field of evaluation by improving the overall
methodological framework for 2000 to 2006 and by
carrying out several in-depth thematic evaluations. A
new regulatory framework will give the Commission, in
future, more appropriate instruments to remedy the
weaknesses found. Recommendation: the instruments
recently put in place must become operational as soon
as possible, the Commission must clarify all the tech-
nical aspects associated with their implementation and
the managing authorities in the Member States must
intensify their efforts to apply the new provisions. In
particular, as the new initiatives for the collection of
The Commission broadly supports the observations of the
Court concerning payments forecasts from Member States
and the advantages they could have, if their quality were bet-
ter, for the preparation and management of the Community
budget. For that reason the Commission took the initiative,
some years ago, of establishing an informal network with the
Finance Ministries to collect data on payments forecasts. In
view of the voluntary nature of this network, the number of
Member States participating has risen gradually and all
Member States took part for the first time in 2000. It was
on the basis of that experience also that the new Structural
Funds Regulation transformed this forwarding of data on
payments into a requirement for the Member States. This
should result in more detailed forecasts for each programme.
The Commission will study the action to be taken as a result
of this new regulatory provision in the light of the contribu-
tions from Member States in order to improve budget fore-
casts.
3.133. Budget implementation in 2000 was indeed low in
this first year of the new Structural Funds programming
period. Starting up new programmes is, of necessity, a com-
plex procedure which cannot be rushed since it will establish
the framework within which Community cohesion policy is
conducted for seven years. That is why the possibility of delays
was foreseen by the three institutions which are parties to the
Inter-institutional Agreement (Parliament, Council and Com-
mission). The revision of the financial perspectives which had
to be made is based on a specific provision included for that
purpose, from 1999, in the Inter-institutional Agreement.
Once this new programming period has got under way, a
progress report should be given; something the Commission
has begun to do by presenting a communication on the
Objective 1 programmes, and lessons should be learned for
the future about the procedures for setting up programmes.
3.134. The Commission agrees with the Court on the appli-
cation of the new rules.
Regulation (EC) No 438/2001 on the management and
control systems attaches considerable importance to arrange-
ments for ensuring compliance with Community rules, includ-
ing those on assistance. This, moreover, is one aspect of the
arrangements the Commission is planning to check very closely.
(80) See the recent Opinion No 2/2001, paragraphs 6, 29 and
30 (OJ C 162, 5.6.2001, p.1).
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data on the public sector aid granted represent tools
which are likely to improve the management of aid to
enterprises, they should be generalised and implemented
in a coordinated manner (paragraphs 3.78 to 3.92).
3.135. The management of the Community initiatives
for the period 1994 to 1999 proved particularly cum-
bersome and complex because of the relatively small
amounts involved and the overlapping of these inter-
ventions with other Community programmes. For the
period 2000 to 2006, the number of Community ini-
tiatives was reduced from 13 to four (81). Recommenda-
tion: the programmes must be better coordinated and
integrated with other Community measures in the same
regions, both in terms of programming and in terms of
management, control and evaluation, in order to avoid
a repetition of the difficulties noted in the period 1994
to 1999 (see paragraphs 3.96 to 3.112 and 3.117 to
3.122).
3.136. Special Report No22/98 revealed certainweak-
nesses in respect of Community action in favour of
equal opportunities for men and women. The Court
notes that for the period 2000 to 2006 the amounts
devoted to relevant special measures only represents
6 % of the ESF, a share halfway between the 1,6 %
achieved during the period 1994 to 1999 and the objec-
tiveof15 %set by theCommission in1998and requested
by the European Parliament (paragraph 3.93). The
medium-term Community programme (1996 to 2000),
made up of direct-expenditure projects, outside of the
Structural Funds, suffered from a disproportionate rate
of its payments (7,6 %) being spent on the operations of
the technical assistance office (paragraph 3.95). Recom-
mendation: the Commission should ensure that greater
consideration is given to the financing of equality of
opportunities in the new programming period (2000 to
2006) of the ESF. In addition, the implementation of
the medium-term Community programme should be
supported by adequate resources to limit recourse to
external bodies for the management of these projects.
3.135. In the period 2000 to 2006 the number of initia-
tives has been cut in order to target their specific goals better,
and with the aim also of achieving better coordination and
integration with other Community assistance.
3.136. The appropriations for technical assistance have
been substantially reduced in the Equal Opportunities Pro-
gramme for 2001 to 2005. The tasks assigned to the techni-
cal assistance office referred to by the Court have been reas-
signed to DG EMPLOI during the last two budget years. This
policy will have to be backed up by adequate resources to allow
the Commission to carry out the work concerned in optimal
conditions.
Special attention has been focused on equal opportunities in
the programming process for 2000 to 2006 in part two of
the Commission Communication on ‘Guidelines for pro-
grammes in the period 2000 to 2006’.
(81) These are Leader, Interreg, EQUAL and URBAN. PEACE
was reincorporated in the relevant Community Support
Frameworks for the period 2000 to 2006.
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INTRODUCTION
4.1. The European Union’s internal policies focus in
particular on the implementation and development of
the single market. They cover four complete subsections
of the budget and several headings in another subsec-
tion. The responsibility for implementing the internal
policies and managing the corresponding budgets is
spread across 13 Directorates-General (DG).
4.2. The internal policies measures concern:
(a) training, youth, culture, audiovisual media, informa-
tion and other social operations (subsection B3);
(b) energy, Euratom nuclear safeguards and environ-
ment (subsection B4);
(c) consumer protection, internal market, industry and
trans-European networks (subsection B5);
(d) research and technological development (subsec-
tion B6); and
(e) other agricultural operations, other regional opera-
tions, transport as well as other measures concern-
ing fisheries and the sea (Titles B2-5 to B2-9 of sub-
section B2).
BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT
4.3. Tables 4.1a and 4.1b give an overview of how
available appropriations were used during the financial
year 2000.
4.4. Internal policies account for a global amount of
6 583 million euro in final commitment appropriations
(see Table 4.1b). The largest part, 4 055 million euro,
relates to research and technological development and
most of this to the fifth Framework Programme (fifth
FP), 3 464 million euro.
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Table 4.1a — Evolution and implementation of the 2000 budget
(Mio EUR)
Heading of the financial perspective: internal policies and research
Total internal policies and research
Of which
Research and technological develop-
ment (B6)
Consumers, internal market, labour
market, TEN (B5)
Education, youth, culture, informa-
tion and social operations (B3)
Others = energy, environment and
agricult. operat. (B4 and parts of B2)
Commitment
appropriations
Payment
appropriations
Commitment
appropriations
Payment
appropriations
Commitment
appropriations
Payment
appropriations
Commitment
appropriations
Payment
appropriations
Payment
appropriations
Commitment
appropriations
Financial perspective ceiling 6 031,0
Evolution of the budget
Initial appropriations (1) 6 027,0 5 674,2 3 630,0 3 600,0 1 162,2 997,1 831,1 708,0 211,7 286,8
Final appropriations available (2) 6 104,1 (4) 5 767,4 (4) 3 710,6 3 552,8 1 179,0 1 032,3 853,3 816,0 348,3 355,3
Implementation of the budget
Appropriations used (3) 5 751,8 5 124,6 3 667,2 3 222,9 1 080,4 867,5 807,5 747,2 196,7 287,1
% of final appropriations available 94 89 99 91 91 84 94,5 91,5 56,5 81
Appropriations carried over to 2001 223,3 57,5 20,1 0,0 43,5 7,2 23,3 21,2 136,4 29,2
% of final appropriations available 4 1 0,5 0 4 1 3 2,5 39 8
Appropriations cancelled 129,1 (4) 585,2 (4) 23,3 330,0 55,2 157,5 22,5 47,6 15,1 39,0
% of final appropriations available 2 10 0,5 9 5 15 2,5 6 4,5 11
(1) Budget as finally adopted by the European Parliament on 16 December 1999 (OJ L 40 of 14.02.2000) including the relevant provisional appropriations for Heading 3 written in Chapter B0-4 0.
(2) Budget appropriations amended after taking account of supplementary and amending budgets and transfers, but excluding appropriations carried over from 1999, re-use of revenue and revenue made available as a result of
participation of third parties, other earmarked revenue and appropriations made available again.
(3) Appropriations utilised, excluding appropriations carried over from 1999, re-use of revenue and revenue made available as a result of participation of third parties, other earmarked revenue and appropriations made available
again.
(4) Including chapter B0-4 0 (reserve).
Source: Revenue and expenditure account and balance sheet — volume II; section [III-SEC(2001) 529-FR].
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Table 4.1b — Implementation of the 2000 budget
(Mio EUR)
Title/Subsection of
the budget Heading
Commitment appropriations Payment appropriations
Initial budget (1)
Final budget after
SAB (2) and
transfers (2)
Appropriations
utilised (3)
Rate of imple-
mentation of
initial budget (%)
Rate of imple-
mentation of
final budget (%)
Initial budget (1)
Final budget after
SAB (2) and
transfers (2)
Appropriations
utilised (3)
Rate of imple-
mentation of
initial budget (%)
Rate of implemen-
tation of final bud-
get (%)
B2-5 Other agricultural operations 51,500 51,500 49,051 95,2 95,2 82,000 84,010 76,329 93,1 90,9
B2-6 Other regional operations p.m. 15,000 15,000 n.a. 100,0 7,477 17,677 16,824 225,0 95,2
B2-7 Transport 20,500 20,500 18,885 92,1 92,1 18,700 16,700 11,926 63,8 71,4
B2-9 Other measures concerning fisheries and the
sea 44,450 45,550 45,500 102,4 99,9 34,700 41,350 41,294 119,0 99,9
Total in B2 116,450 132,550 128,436 110,3 96,9 142,877 159,737 146,373 102,4 91,6
B3-1 Education, vocational training and youth 481,500 572,279 547,996 113,8 95,8 392,700 547,584 483,730 123,2 88,3
B3-2 Culture and audiovisual media 111,500 136,592 118,943 106,7 87,1 102,800 115,363 88,196 85,8 76,5
B3-3 Information and communication 93,500 109,259 97,620 104,4 89,3 86,900 99,600 90,177 103,8 90,5
B3-4 Social dimension and employment 144,615 149,742 137,164 94,8 91,6 125,645 127,326 107,270 85,4 84,2
Total B3 831,115 967,872 901,723 108,5 93,2 708,045 889,873 769,373 108,7 86,5
B4-1 Energy 36,800 40,672 2,434 6,6 6,0 35,100 36,735 28,424 81,0 77,4
B4-2 Euratom nuclear safeguards 16,700 16,700 16,674 99,8 99,8 15,400 19,400 18,919 122,9 97,5
B4-3 Environment 41,700 161,797 49,211 118,0 30,4 93,400 150,934 102,996 110,3 68,2
Total B4 95,200 219,169 68,319 71,8 31,2 143,900 207,069 150,339 104,5 72,6
B5-1 Consumer policy and consumer health protec-
tion 22,500 22,912 21,660 96,3 94,5 20,000 20,107 15,066 75,3 74,9
B5-2 Aid for reconstruction 1,698 3,698 1,697 99,9 45,9 1,698 3,698 1,697 99,9 45,9
B5-3 Internal market 145,445 139,911 121,143 83,3 86,6 151,390 155,699 128,476 84,9 82,5
B5-4 Industry 2,000 2,000 2,000 100,0 100,0 88,644 103,772 103,670 117,0 99,9
B5-5 Labour market and technological innovation 213,493 225,726 193,672 90,7 85,8 106,600 108,010 46,317 43,4 42,9
B5-6 Statistical information 31,400 32,512 32,418 103,2 99,7 30,130 30,541 27,911 92,6 91,4
B5-7 Trans-European networks 688,000 676,030 663,373 96,4 98,1 536,500 565,513 507,607 94,6 89,8
B5-8 Area of freedom, security and justice 52,000 86,818 49,502 95,2 57,0 56,700 69,804 56,612 99,8 81,1
B5-9 Measures to combat fraud & support
expenditure for internal policies 5,650 5,650 4,845 85,8 85,8 5,400 5,400 3,325 61,6 61,6
Total B5 1 162,186 1 195,257 1 090,310 93,8 91,2 997,062 1 062,544 890,681 89,3 83,8
B6-1 Joint Research Centre — Staff and Resources 206,900 255,160 242,245 117,1 94,9 207,934 261,901 236,270 113,6 90,2
B6-2 Joint Research Centre — Direct Operating
Appropriations — EC Framework Programme
1998 to 2002 38,550 51,500 36,669 95,1 71,2 35,021 39,133 25,820 73,7 66,0
B6-3 Joint Research Centre — Direct Operating
Appropriations EAEC Framework Programme
1998 to 2002 14,550 18,923 14,078 96,8 74,4 10,885 12,940 8,529 78,4 65,9
B6-4 Joint Research Centre — Direct Action-
Completion of Previous Joint & Supplementary
Programmes [...] p.m. 114,549 12,411 n.a. 10,8 7,160 94,146 16,948 236,7 18,0
B6-5 Indirect Action (Shared-Cost Projects) —
Completion of Earlier Projects [...] p.m. 150,639 89,931 n.a. 59,7 1 215,000 1 521,348 1 258,873 103,6 82,7
B 6-6 Indirect Action (Shared-Cost Projects) [...] Fifth
Framework Programme 1998 to 2002 3 370,000 3 463,914 3 424,151 101,6 98,9 2 124,000 2 156,273 1 857,519 87,5 86,1
Total B6 3 630,000 4 054,685 3 819,485 105,2 94,2 3 600,000 4 085,741 3 403,959 94,6 83,3
B0-4 0 Provisional appropriations = reserve 192,098 13,000 82,348 11,000
Total 6 027,049 6 582,533 6 008,273 99,7 91,3 5 674,232 6 415,964 5 360,725 94,5 83,6
(1) Budget as finally adopted by the European Parliament on 16 December 1999 (OJ L 40 of 14 February 2000).
(2) Budget appropriations amended after taking account of supplementary and amending budgets and transfers, but including appropriations carried over from 1999, re-use of revenue and revenue made available as a result of participation of third parties, other earmarked
revenue and appropriations made available again.
(3) Appropriations utilised, including appropriations carried over from 1999, re-use of revenue and revenue made available as a result of participation of third parties, other earmarked revenue and appropriations made available again.
NB: p.m.= token entry; n.a.= not available.
Source: Revenue and expenditure account and balance sheet — volume II; section [III-SEC(2001) 529-FR].
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Review of the revenue and expenditure account (1)
4.5. The revenue and expenditure account (2) showed
significant improvements in form and content com-
pared to the document provided for the 1999 closure of
accounts.
4.6. There has been an effort to harmonise the presen-
tation of the analysis of financial management. This is,
however, mainly limited to the budgetary implementa-
tion tables.
4.7. The output implementation tables are a new fea-
ture which could provide very useful information, and
in some cases do. However, there is a definite need for
harmonisation regarding content and level of detail.
4.8. In the case of the DG Education and Culture (EAC)
budgets (Socrates, Youth for Europe, Leonardo), due to
the specific nature of the mobility activities of the pro-
gramme, there are a large number of figures missing in
the output implementation tables. In addition, figures
are reported as ‘realised’ although they are only esti-
mates.
4.9. The selection criteria used by the Commission for
a detailed review of the management of a budget line
are appropriations exceeding 30 million euro and/or
budget lines of particular importance and interest. How-
ever, some budgetary items representing appropriations
4.5-4.7. The Commission welcomes the positive remarks of
the Court on the revised form and content of the ‘Compte de
gestion’.
As indicated in the Foreword to the ‘Compte’, the year 2000
is the first annual reporting occasion on which the budget
implementation output, as shown in the document, has been
attempted: as such it is considered by the Commission to have
been a useful preparatory exercise for the fuller and systematic
presentation of the budgetary output information which will
be produced in future years. The Commission is now examin-
ing to what extent the presentation of output data can be
harmonised for the 2001 exercise, while nevertheless taking
into account the fact that, by their nature, not all budget lines
lend themselves to quantifiable outputs.
4.8. The three programmes share two characteristics (they
make it possible to support mobility projects and activities;
some aspects are decentralised and require management to be
delegated to national agencies) the effect of which is that when
the Commission establishes the compte de gestion, it cannot
know exactly which outputs will be obtained from the appro-
priations in the budget to which it refers.
In future the Commission will endeavour to be more explicit
in its comments on this situation, which means that the stan-
dard table is not perfectly applicable in the specific case of
these three programmes.
4.9. It is true that certain budget lines whose appropria-
tions are drawn from third parties were not included in those
reported on. The Commission will shortly discuss this aspect
with the Court in the context of the selection criteria to be
applied for the 2001 exercise.
(1) The Court has reviewed the information presented by the
Commission in Volume 1 of the revenue and expenditure
account. The purpose of this volume is to provide a com-
mentary on budgetary management for the year and, in
particular, explanations of variations between the initial
approved budget and the appropriations finally available
as well as between the appropriations finally available and
those utilised. The review did not seek to provide assur-
ance as to the reliability of its contents. Rather, it sought
to identify any significant variations for which explana-
tions are not provided and to identify any explanations
that might be considered misleading.
(2) SEC(2001) 528-FR.
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resulting from income from third parties of amounts
over 30 million euro are not mentioned, e.g. B6-4 3 1,
B6-4 4 3 and B6-5 5 1.
4.10. In several budget lines, particularly in subsec-
tion B6, the percentages given as ‘total budget imple-
mentation in 2000 in % of initial budget’ are in fact
those of the ‘total available budget for 2000’.
SPECIFIC APPRAISAL IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE
Introduction
Scope of the audit and audit approach
4.11. The objective of the audit for the 2000 Statement
of Assurance (DAS) in the internal policies budgetary
area was to obtain sufficient, relevant and reliable audit
evidence on the reliability of the accounts as at
31 December 2000 and the legality and regularity of
the underlying transactions in order to contribute to the
Statement of Assurance on the general budget for 2000
(see Chapter 9 of this Annual Report) as well as, through
additional work, to formulate a specific assessment of
the strengths and weaknesses in internal control appli-
cable to the fifth Framework Programme (fifth FP) for
Research and Technological Development (RTD).
4.12. The system audit of the fifth FP was based on an
evaluation of the system design and a verification as to
the consistent, continuous and effective operation of
the system. For this purpose a system description of the
administrative and control procedures in the thematic
and horizontal programmes of the EC section (see 4.15)
as at December 2000 was established, walk-through
tests on the basis of files selected by the five Research
DGs concerned, namely DG Research (RTD), DG Infor-
mation Society (INFSO), DG Energy and Transport
(TREN), DG Enterprise (ENTR) and DG Fisheries (FISH),
were performed and tests of key controls on the basis
of 45 contracts were carried out.
4.10. The Court’s observation is correct. All the informa-
tion is provided to calculate total budget implementation in
2000 as a percentage of initial budget as well as a percent-
age of the total available budget for 2000.
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4.13. The first calls for proposals for indirect RTD
actions under the fifth FPwere published inMarch 1999.
Given a period of about 348 calendar days from the
publication of the call and about 263 calendar days
from the reception of the proposal until the contract
signature by the Commission, most contracts, with the
exception of the Information Society Programme oper-
ated by DG INFSO, the section of the Growth Pro-
gramme operated by DG TREN and the section of the
Quality of Life Programme operated by DG FISH, were
signed only in 2000. Since for most fifth FP actions the
first cost claims are submitted after a period of
12 months, the payments for indirect RTD actions in
2000 consisted primarily of advance payments.
Nature of the expenditure
4.14. There are two distinctive fifth FPs: the European
Community (EC) Framework Programme covering
research, technological development and demonstra-
tion activities; and the Euratom Framework Programme
covering research and training activities in the nuclear
sector.
4.15. Research activities financed under both fifth FPs
consist of indirect actions (about 93 % of the budget)
carried out through contracts with third parties partly
financed by the Community budget and direct actions
(about 7 %) financed entirely from the Community bud-
get and carried out by the DG Joint Research Centre.
4.13. 1999 was the first year of implementation of the new
framework programme which was inevitably confronted with
a number of running-in problems at almost every stage, in
particular with regard to a new evaluation procedure.
The need to ensure the fairness and the equal treatment of all
the applications together with the need for comprehensive
technical evaluation and the subsequent assessment of appli-
cations and selection of projects means that the process can-
not be compressed at will:
— for specific actions and programmes a longer publication
period is justified,
— a transparent and correct evaluation procedure takes time
and is a function of the number of proposals submitted,
— a serious negotiation effort will save problems later.
Some aspects of the internal procedures have been improved
over the last two years and a number of simplification mea-
sures have been introduced.
In addition, fast track pilot actions have been carried out for
the IST programme and CRAFT proposals in 2001 signifi-
cantly bringing down the time to contract. The experience
gained from the pilots is being used to review the planning for
future calls in order to bring down the time to contract.
15.12.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 211
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS COMMISSION’S REPLIES
4.16. The budget lines of the four thematic and three
horizontal programmes (indirect actions) in the Euro-
pean Community section of the fifth FP correspond to
payment appropriations of 1 742 million euro in the
2000 budget, which represents almost half of the pay-
ment appropriations in subsection B6 Research and
Technological Development and approximately 31 % of
the payment appropriations for the whole Internal poli-
cies budgetary area. The fifth FP is therefore, in financial
terms, the most important management system in this
budgetary area.
4.17. The EC section of the fifth FP is operated by five
Research DGs with three of the thematic programmes
and one of the horizontal programmes being operated
by more than one DG.
4.18. According to statistics provided by the Commis-
sion, 6 115 contracts for fifth FP indirect RTD actions
with an EU contribution of 5 324 million euro were
signed by the Commission before the end of Decem-
ber 2000. More than 90 % of these contracts are man-
aged by DG RTD and DG INFSO with 4 701 contracts
(accounting for approximately 64 % of the total EU
contribution) and 1 038 contracts (accounting for
approximately 29 %of the total EU contribution) respec-
tively.
Limitations of a system based on cost reimbursement
4.19. In the Research Framework Programmes finan-
cial contributions are granted on the basis of costs actu-
ally incurred. The high level of detail and the complex-
ity resulting from contractual arrangements based on a
system of cost reimbursement demand a significant
administrative effort both from the contractors and the
Commission with regard to the proposal, contract and
project management for indirect RTD actions.
4.20. In addition, the possibilities for verification by
the Commission services of costs claimed, when sup-
porting documentation such as certified invoices for
specific costs is not submitted by the contractor, are in
practice limited to checks for plausibility and for formal
4.19. The funding system of the Research Framework Pro-
grammes has both strengths and limitations. The Commis-
sion has progressively addressed the limitations. Given the
nevertheless evolutionary character, the participants and the
Commission services are quite familiar with the system.
For the next framework programme the funding system is
again being reviewed to make it simpler for project partici-
pants, to improve controls further within the limits of the
financial and human resources of the Commission, to be
focused on results and to be even better able to discourage
overcharging and fraud.
4.20. The costs claimed are reviewed in the context of the
scientific and technical reports which indicate the work car-
ried out in accordance with the tasks identified in the techni-
cal annex and in relation to the estimated costs as identified
during contract negotiation. When there are significant
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consistency (i.e. non-eligibility of specific categories of
expenditure andnumerical correctnessof declared costs).
4.21. Therefore, unless an audit is done on the spot, a
verification of the reality and accuracy of the costs
claimed is only partially possible. As suggested by the
Court in the DAS 1998 (3), the Commission has intensi-
fied its ex-post audit activities. The overall target defined
by the Research DGs is to audit 10 % of the contractors
during the fifth FP (4). Also following recommendations
of the Court in the DAS 1998 (), the Commission has
introduced in the IST and CRAFT programmes pilot
actions requiring audit certificates for most contractors
of RTD projects. However, measurable impact will only
be noted in the medium term, in fact this certificate will
only be required for payments of contracts launched in
2001.
4.22. As in the previous Framework Programme, the
Commission has insufficient means of sanctioning legal
entities which overstate their costs, apart from reduc-
ing its financial contribution and charging interest on
the amounts overpaid. No contractually-defined sanc-
tions (for instance automatic fines in relation to costs
overcharged) or administrative penalties are provided
for in the model contracts of the fifth FP.
inconsistencies between the costs reported and the evidence of
the work carried out, the Commission services may ask for
additional detailed supporting documents. If necessary a major
review of the costs, including on-the-spot controls, can be
undertaken.
4.21. In 1998 the Research DGs jointly formulated a new
and coherent audit strategy for all the framework programmes
(see points 4.69 and 4.70). In addition, the Commission is
exploring complementary measures (e.g. audit certificates).
The recommendation of the Court in the 1998 DAS encour-
aged this effort.
4.22. The legal framework for direct expenses and particu-
larly contracts under the fifth Framework Programme of the
European Community already includes measures to protect the
financial interests of the Community. In the event of suspected
fraud or serious financial irregularity, Articles 3.2 and 7.6,
Annex II of the contract, explicitly allow the Commission not
only to reduce its financial contribution but also to recover the
totality of the contribution.
In addition to the above, the possibility to compensate between
contracts has made it easier to recover the amounts due to the
Commission.
If fraud is suspected, the Commission services refer the case to
OLAF, who will take further action (Commission Decision of
2 June 1999 (1999/396/EC, ECSC, Euratom)).
If the overstatement is caused by error or misunderstanding
then the most appropriate redress is unlikely to be a sanction.
Explanation and education on an ongoing basis is more likely
to be effective.
(3) Annual report concerning the financial year 1998,
OJ C 349, 3.12.1999.
(4) Annual report concerning the financial year 1999, Com-
mission’s reply, point 4.23, OJ C 342, 1.12.2000.
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Implementation problems with the fifth FP
Lack of documentation for operational procedures
4.23. The complexity of the organisational structure
of the fifth FP, with several programmes and key actions
operated by different DGs, makes efficient coordination
within the Framework Programme even more impor-
tant. The need for a harmonised set of procedures for
all DGs operating the fifth FP was addressed by the
Council and the European Parliament when asking the
Commission in their Decision 182/1999/EC to ‘[...]
establish and publish [...] a detailed manual of opera-
tional procedures and guidelines for the selection of
actions’.
4.24. The description of procedures in the ‘Evaluation
Manual’ adopted by the Commission in response to the
above mentioned Decision is, however, insufficiently
detailed to be used as a manual of operational proce-
dures. Furthermore some procedures leading to the
selection of RTD actions, for instance the negotiation of
proposals, are only partially covered by the ‘Evaluation
Manual’.
4.25. With the exception of DG Energy and Transport
and DG Information Society, where the development of
DG-specific operational manuals commenced in 2000,
the administrative procedures and responsibilities were
not sufficiently documented in the Research DGs oper-
ating the fifth FP.
Nevertheless, strengthening of provisions on controls is of
high priority for the Commission. This is why the OLAF
work-programme includes the integration of administrative
measures and sanctions in the domain of direct expenditure.
In addition to the already existing provisions for the reim-
bursement of the Community financial contribution, a comple-
mentary financial penalty clause is under discussion in the
event of excessive expenses being claimed deliberately or by
negligence in the area of direct expenditure.
4.23. All DGs concerned must implement the Research
Framework Programme. according to a common set of prin-
ciples and procedures. However, in line with the basic orienta-
tion of the Commission Reform, each DG and programme is
to remain responsible for its detailed design and implementa-
tion of internal control.
4.24. The ‘Evaluation manual’ has been adopted by the
Commission in order to make the process from the pre-
proposal checks to the preparation and finalisation of the con-
tract more transparent and harmonised. On the basis of the
Manual, the specific programmes derived more detailed docu-
ments relevant to the preparation and finalisation of the con-
tracts for the use of both the Commission and the contractors.
4.25. DGRTDoperational procedures are extensively docu-
mented. In addition to the ‘core’ of the existing documenta-
tion, the Evaluation manual, there are manuals detailing other
aspects of the procedures. In application of standard 15 for
internal control, ‘Documentation of procedures’, work has
been undertaken to remedy the shortcomings identified and to
make the manuals generally accessible on the Intranet. A
working group has been set up to achieve this.
The Research DGs have reorganised the documentation of
responsibilities to boost and complete the decentralised man-
agement of operational resources. Inevitably, this process has
led to the revision of administrative procedures and some reas-
signment of responsibilities.
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4.26. Formal jobdescriptionsoutliningdifferent activi-
ties and responsibilities, as advocated by the Action Plan
for the White Paper ‘Reforming the Commission’, were
developed by all Research DGs during 2000 and com-
municated to the staff. However, the present form of
the job descriptions does not yet appear to be as detailed
as necessary to prevent the risk of a dirigent under-
standing of shared responsibilities, for example between
scientific project officer, negotiator and financial officer,
in managing indirect RTD actions.
Inadequate IT-support for proposal, contract and project
management
4.27. Although themanagement system for all Research
DGs operating the fifth FP is essentially the same, the
Commission has not developed a single IT system for
the proposal, contract and project management of indi-
rect RTD actions in the fifth FP. As of the end of 2000,
DG Enterprise had not yet implemented an IT system
for contract and project management. Furthermore the
DG-specific IT systems in operation are not integrated
with each other, and only the IT systems of DGResearch
and DG Information Society are partly integrated with
SINCOM. This prevents, for example, automatic con-
solidation of information with regard to the legal and
financial viability of contractors, cross-checks of the
declaration of durable equipment by the same contrac-
tor under several contracts, or effective verification of
the early warning system in SINCOM operated by
DG Budget.
4.28. In addition, the IT systems are incomplete in
some DGs: for instance, there is no information on the
availability of certain model contracts at DG Research,
the processing of contract amendments at DG Research
and DG Information Society, and important functions
such as the recording of project deliverables and due
dates are lacking, except in the case of DG Energy and
Transport and DG Fisheries.
4.26. The Commission is currently embarking on a new
human resources management system which includes more
elaborate job descriptions. Research DGs are cooperating with
DG ADMIN to ensure that the specific features of research
are well incorporated in the different profiles that will be
embedded in this new job description system. Actual imple-
mentation is scheduled for the first half of 2002.
4.27. The Research DGs have introduced a common IT sys-
tem for proposal submission, an expert database and the
evaluation service provider. Building upon this experience an
Inter-service Working Group was established in April 2001
to develop an integrated IT system and a common database
for the next Framework Programme, which will become opera-
tional on 1 January 2003.
The Working Group is also developing a new electronic pro-
posal submission system aimed at improving the quality of
proposal, and hence participant, data.
With regard to an effective verification of the early warning
system, the Research DGs have used the existing system in
SINCOM operated by DG Budget at different stages of the
process.
4.28. For DG RTD during the first part of 2001 all con-
tract types, with the exception of high level conferences, became
available together with modules for proposal evaluation, the
vetting of potential contractors (a priori control) and an early
warning system similar to that of SINCOM. Contract data
for earlier FPs were also uploaded into the system. The con-
tract amendment module entered into service in mid-July
2001 and the project management modules (échéancier) are
due to be introduced progressively between September and
November 2001. Training schemes have been introduced on
a monthly basis, particularly for new entrants into DG RTD,
improving the efficiency of the use of the system.
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Insufficient internal control activities
4.29. A formal risk assessment exercise, facilitated by
DG Audit, identifying and evaluating the relevant risks
which might impair the achievement of management
objectives for the fifth FP, was conducted separately
within each of the five Research DGs and completed in
2000.
4.30. Control activities helping to ensure that policies
decided by the management are carried out and that
necessary actions are implemented to address the iden-
tified risks were not coherently defined by the Commis-
sion for the whole Framework Programme. Important
steps in the control system, for instance regarding the
verification of the appropriateness of the contractor’s
accounting system, a check for the consistent and coher-
ent application of a cost system across the Framework
Programme or the verification of the legal and financial
viability of the entities participating, were lacking or
were not applied coherently and consistently by all DGs
or programmes. Except for DG Information Society and
DG Fisheries, the negotiation outcome was in general
not subject to an authorisation.
Completion and improvement of DG INFSO IT systems have
progressed for contract production for all types of model con-
tracts, and support for amendments and payments has been
in place since mid-2001.
4.30. With the fifth Framework Programme, the Commis-
sion has introduced significant improvements to address poten-
tial risks, in particular with regard to the selection of propos-
als, a new strategy to reinforce on-the-spot controls and more
effective measures in case of financial irregularities.
Internal controls were strengthened, in some DGs along with
new organisation charts, decentralising the financial manage-
ment, while at the same time formalising the financial circuits
and reinforcing financial management and internal audit
activities.
For the a priori verification of the legal and financial viability
of the participating entities a more elaborate methodology has
been developed in order to assure consistency of application of
standard criteria for determining financial risk.
With regard to the contractor’s cost systems, the ‘Participant’s
choice of the cost reimbursement system for research, develop-
ment and demonstration projects’ provides guidelines for the
participants. On-the-spot audits are the only means of verify-
ing the appropriateness of this choice. The check on a consis-
tent cost reimbursement model for each contractor is under-
taken as part of the legal and financial viability verification
within each programme. This verification will be extended
beyond a specific research programme with the implementa-
tion of a common database (as referred to in the reply to
4.27).
The negotiation outcome is subject to an authorisation, some-
times implicit, as the agreement of different scientific and
financial departments within the Directorate-General is
required in order to launch the Commission selection decision
for each project.
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4.31. The tests of the operational key controls revealed
that some have not been effectively operated by all DGs
and all programmes. For example, deficiencies were
identified with regard to the eligibility check of propos-
als submitted, in particular at the beginning of the
Framework Programme, and the verification of the eli-
gibility and numerical correctness of costs declared in
cost statements, leading in some cases to overpayments
by the Commission.
4.32. Except for DG Information Society, DG Energy
& Transport and DG Fisheries, the formal documenta-
tion of the controls operated was found to be inad-
equate.
Conclusions
4.33. Given the inherent limitations of the current sys-
tem based on the reimbursement of costs, in particular
with regard to the limitations of the controls operated,
the partial coverage of ex-post financial audits and the
absence of contractually-defined sanctions, there is only
a minor detection risk to beneficiaries when overstat-
ing their actual costs.
4.34. The audit work done indicates that only a lim-
ited assurance can be derived from the internal control
procedures in place for the whole of the Framework
Programme.
4.32. While a full documentation system of controls is not
yet in place in DG RDT and ENTR, it is evident that the
controls are exercised by functioning administrative/financial
circuits. Some programmes operate with check lists identify-
ing a number of successive steps in execution including veri-
fications and controls.
Further progress is being made with regard to formal docu-
mentation.
4.33. The Commission has progressively addressed limita-
tions of the current system of cost reimbursement by measures
such as increasing audits and introducing audit certificates.
For the next framework programme, further far-reaching
improvements are under consideration in the context of dis-
cussions on the legislative proposals.
In the meantime, the Commission has expanded its explana-
tory efforts, including via its website, hasmultiplied its ex-post-
financial audits and can now make financial adjustments
immediately. As far as the limitation of internal controls is
concerned, not all of them have significant implications for
the financial risk of the research programme.
For the future, the funding system is again being reviewed to
make it simpler for project participants, to improve controls
further within the limits of the financial and human resources
of the Commission, to be focused on results and to be better
able to discourage overcharging and fraud.
4.34. The audit work done by the Court of Auditors is
valuable in that it points to some problems which the Com-
mission will address.
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4.35. Given the lack of formally binding documen-
tation of operational procedures and guidelines for the
FrameworkProgramme, andpending the effectiveopera-
tion of the internal audit service, the Commission lacks
the assurance that internal procedures and working
methods are applied consistently.
4.36. The level and quality of the IT support for the
administration of the fifth FP proposals and contracts
showed serious, although diminishing, inadequacies.
This has impaired the execution of the Framework Pro-
gramme and diminished the reliability of the Commis-
sion’s internal statistics in this area.
Recommendations
4.37. Internal control activities should be strengthened
across the Framework Programme and a set mandatory,
minimum level of key controls to be implemented
should be clearly defined by the Commission.
4.35. Although there is scope for some improvements, the
Evaluation manual formally approved by the Commission
continues to be an important reference document for compli-
ance with relevant procedures. Guidelines or manuals on other
aspects are maintained within the operational directorates
which apply them.
DG INFSO and DG TREN have documented their opera-
tional procedures for evaluation and negotiation of proposals
in a vade mecum, available on the intranet for their staff.
Documentation, Frequently Asked Questions, and Help Desk
functions are available for both contractors and Commission
staff.
4.36. The execution of the framework programme, particu-
larly in its initial stages, would have been facilitated by better
IT support. The late adoption of the legal basis and the bud-
getary need to launch calls for proposals without further delay
imposed inadequacies from the outset. Since then, the IT sys-
tem has been developed and now provides complete data bases
and management modules for all contracts for each DG.
In DG INFSO budget execution and programme statistics
were not affected by shortcomings in IT support in FP5, as
basic central tools were available from 1999 onwards.
An Inter-service Working Group has been established to
examine statistical requests and to define standard data sets
for the framework programme as a whole, covering data origi-
nating in different DGs.
4.37. The 24 Internal Control Standards adopted by the
Commission on 13 December 2000 (SEC(2000)2203) pro-
vide a reinforced framework for control activities, also with
regard to the framework programme.
All the Research DGs have made strenuous efforts to achieve
the objectives set by the Commission (priority objectives for
financial management) by 30 June 2001.
DG INFSO and DG TREN have implemented a set of check-
lists for processing both commitments and payments. These
checklists, which are mandatory in every transaction file and
are signed by both the file-handler and the management, list
the key controls that need to be ensured for each individual
transaction.
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4.38. Also, the Commission is encouraged to develop
and implement, in a joint effort by all Research DGs, a
standardised documentation of the control activities
performed.
4.39. Furthermore, these control activities need to be
monitored periodically to assess whether all feasible
controls have been instituted and whether the controls
are functioning effectively.
4.40. As recommended in the DAS 99 (5), the Com-
mission is invited to introduce a legal basis for
contractually-defined sanctions in the model contracts
for RTD actions. If necessary, a sectoral Regulation pro-
viding for penalties should be proposed by the Com-
mission.
4.41. Since all Research DGs operate on the same legal
base and face essentially similar administration and
management tasks, the Commission is invited to har-
monise its administrative and financial procedures and
working methods as far as possible across all pro-
grammes in order to ensure a standardised implementa-
tion of the fifth FP by all DGs involved.
4.42. The Commission should develop a cross-DG
manual describing the operational procedures covering
all stages of the fifth FP.
4.38. In the framework of the Commission reform, in par-
ticular Internal Control Standard 15 on the documentation of
procedures, the Research DGs are working to complete the
documentation of their procedures, including key controls to
be performed. This work is building on best existing practises.
Access for all services will be facilitated via Intranet.
4.39. In the framework of the Commission reform, surveil-
lance of the implementation of control activities is being sys-
tematically strengthened. Annual self assessments and audits
by the newly created internal audit capacities will monitor
their effective functioning.
4.40. An additional financial penalty clause may be intro-
duced for excessive amounts of direct expenditure declared
deliberately or accidentally. The matter is being examined
seriously. Discussions are currently taking place between the
Commission departments concerned, including OLAF, to
assess the content of a draft sectoral anti-fraud regulation on
the basis of Article 280 of the EC Treaty (codecision). The
Commission is examining the scope of a regulation of this
type, including the possibility of applying it to ongoing con-
tracts.
4.41. The research framework programme is today charac-
terised by a large degree of standardisation of procedures and
standard contracts. Excessive harmonisation of internal admin-
istrative procedures and working methods may not be required,
and could even be counter-productive in a dynamic process of
innovation, reform and constant search for new best practice.
4.42. In particular, the Research DGs have set themselves
the long-term goal of developing a basic structure which,
while retaining the various procedural steps of the fifth frame-
work programme, would refer back to the descriptions drawn
up previously and would still safeguard its own specific fea-
tures. The description of the fifth framework programme sys-
tems produced by the Court of Auditors should prove extremely
useful in that task. In any case, the objective is to develop a
consistent but adaptable reference model for internal proce-
dures.
(5) Annual report concerning the financial year 1999,
OJ C 342, 1.12.2000.
15.12.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 219
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS COMMISSION’S REPLIES
4.43. The description and definition of activities and
responsibilities in the management of indirect RTD
actions should be more clearly stated in the job descrip-
tions.
4.44. The essential functions of the current IT systems
used for the proposal, contract and project manage-
ment which are as yet missing or incomplete should be
implemented as quickly as possible.
4.45. Furthermore, with regard to future FPs, the Com-
mission is invited to develop a single or integrated
IT system based on clearly established user require-
ments. As far as possible the design of such an IT sys-
tem should also allow for an integration of non-research
programmes operated by the DGs concerned.
FOLLOW-UP OF PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS —
SPECIAL REPORT NO 10/2000 ON THE
MANAGEMENT OF THE PUBLIC CONTRACTS
AWARDED BY THE JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE
Summary of main observations
4.46. Over the period covered by the report (1995-98)
the contracts awarded by the Joint Research Centre of
the Community (6) (referred to below as ‘the JRC’ or ‘the
Centre’) represented an amount of 494 million euro.
The report showed that the management systems were
unable to provide appropriate information for the
board’s needs and that there was insufficient control
over the contracting cycle on the part of the manager
departments.
4.43. The Commission is currently embarking on a new
human resources management system, which includes more
detailed job descriptions. The Research DGs are currently
cooperating with DG ADMIN to ensure that the specific fea-
tures of research are well incorporated in the different profiles
that will be embedded in this new job description system.
Actual implementation is scheduled for the first half of 2002.
4.44. Completion and improvement of IT systems have
progressed for contract production for all types of model con-
tracts, amendments and payments.
4.45. The Research DGs have introduced a common pro-
posal submission system, expert database and evaluation ser-
vice provider. Building upon this experience an Inter-service
Working Group was established in April 2001 to develop a
common IT system for the next framework programme which,
it is planned, will enter into service on 1 January 2003.
4.46-4.48. The Commission would point out that the Joint
Research Centre launched far-reaching reforms to iron out the
weaknesses noted by the Court without waiting for the finali-
sation of special report No 10/2000. The Court welcomed
these moves in the report itself. The Commission fully intends
to continue and extend these reforms with a view to consoli-
dating the situation as indicated by the Court.
(6) OJ C 172, 21.6.2000.
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4.47. Over the years the cumulative effect of these
limitations was to foster the development of some ques-
tionable practices. The following were highlighted:
(a) the misuse of service contracts to cover the continu-
ing employment within the JRC of people whose
contracts of employment could not be extended;
(b) excessive use of the private treaty procedure;
(c) questionable management of the vehicles contract.
Recommendations of the discharge authority
4.48. In order to mitigate these shortcomings and pre-
vent any recurrence of such malfunctions, the JRC fol-
lowed the recommendations of the Council and the dis-
charge authority and initiated a set of reforms that has
started to bear fruit, but still has to be consolidated.
Audit findings
The overall management system: real improvement
4.49. The JRC organises its activity around work pro-
grammes which set out the details of the scientific
projects placed with the various institutes making up
the Centre. It would therefore appear to be essential for
the board of the Centre to have the means of linking
any given transaction to the project for whose benefit it
is being funded. That was not the case when Special
Report No 10/2000 was published. Since then an inter-
face has been established between the personal accounts,
the contracts database and the records of commitments
and payments in the Sincom II accounting system, thus
making it possible to keep subsidiary project accounts.
4.50. These new arrangements have the added advan-
tage of adapting the information provided to the vari-
ous management requirements and thus providing the
key information required for management purposes.
For example, it is possible to produce on demand and
in real time a breakdown of the contracts awarded, not
just by project but also by institute, by nature of con-
tract (supply of goods or services), according to the
award procedure followed (tendering/private treaty), or
4.49-4.51. The Commission is pleased that the Court has
appreciated the progress made with regard to the management
tools used by the JRC. New developments have been set in
train to improve the integration of the computer programmes.
The Infima software will be used throughout the JRC, an
interface with Sincom 2 will be set up and the information
contained in Infima will also be available through the data
pool.
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in terms of the legal basis (contract or simply a pur-
chase order). A module known as Datapool, which is
accessible via the Intranet, completes the facility and
likewise offers full and detailed information.
4.51. However, the data which the latter is capable of
providing on the matter of contracts are complete only
in the case of transactions handled by the Ispra site. The
purchasing handled by the other sites (Geel, Karlsruhe
and Petten) is, in fact, tracked by means of a software
system known as Infima which, although it is efficient,
has the major drawback of being available only in local
mode for the time being. For that reason it is impossible
for tables that are produced in real time to include full
information on all the contracts awarded by the JRC.
Control of the contract cycle: some improvement
4.52. Control of the contract cycle presupposes that
there aremechanisms for identifyingneeds, programmed
purchasing, procedures for drawing up tender docu-
ments and preparing specifications/technical annexes
and transparent and well-documented procedures for
awarding contracts. Lastly, it requires systematic checks
on the service rendered, before payment is made.
4.53. In overall terms, control of the contract cycle
was unsatisfactory and the inquiry carried out before
the publication of Special Report No 10/2000 discov-
ered many irregularities. Despite the unprecedented,
and sometimes difficult, efforts made by the JRC in
endeavouring to rectify the situation (see para-
graphs 4.60 and 4.61 below), as far as the Ispra site is
concerned, the improvements that have been made are
still quite modest.
4.54. Firstly, the description of the management pro-
cedures had been neither completed nor, a fortiori, for-
mally adopted by the board of the Centre, for the Ispra
site. The checks carried out during the follow-up also
showed that there were descriptive errors in the draft
manuals. Annual programming of requirements in the
form of a summary document for each of the
institutes/services was intended to provide the starting
point for the JRC’s implementation of a purchasing
policy. Checks showed, not only that some
institutes/services did not prepare such a document, but
also that the quality of the documents that were pro-
duced varied widely from one institute to another.
4.52-4.53. The Commission confirms that work will con-
tinue on documenting and harmonising procedures relating to
public contracts awarded by the Joint Research Centre. As
regards paragraphs 4.60 and 4.61, the Commission consid-
ers that any problems that might have existed in the past have
been resolved, and this also applies to Ispra.
4.54-4.55. The description of all the Joint Research Cen-
tre’s management procedures is well on the way, but it clearly
takes time to harmonise and document the whole organisa-
tion. The approach adopted is to introduce best practice and
the systems developed in the various institutes across the board.
This is one of the main objectives for 2001.
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4.55. The Infima management system that was cre-
ated at Petten has gradually been improved and extended
to Geel and Karlsruhe during 2000. Once the interface
with Sincom II and the contracts database has been
completed it should be possible to provide full informa-
tion on the contracts awarded, to relate them to the rel-
evant projects and to monitor the management flows in
real time. The double interface with the software for
monitoring the budget accounts and the contracts data-
base should be ready for 2002. These three sites have
also prepared manuals documenting their management
procedures.
4.56. Secondly, the Centre had introduced an innova-
tive approach that was specially adapted for its own
particular form of management. It is based on a funda-
mental distinction between the functions, or, more spe-
cifically, the professional roles, of scientists and admin-
istrators. The former are responsible for specifying the
content of a contract, in terms of requirements and the
drafting of the technical specifications, and then for
checking the service provided in order to ensure that
the contract has been properly carried out. The latter,
the administrators, select the award procedure to be fol-
lowed and verify the quality of the contract in terms of
its administrative, financial and legal characteristics. A
double line of authorisation, scientific on the one hand
and administrative on the other, has been drawn on the
basis of this distinction. The reform has been blocked
by the Commission, however, on the grounds that the
authorising officer’s powerswould thus be split between
two officers. This seems regrettable, because a reform of
this type allows everyone concerned to exercise clearly
defined responsibilities and to perform well, since the
responsibilities are within the scope of the individual’s
professional role.
4.57. The scientific managers must be able to concen-
trate exclusively on the execution of the projects for
which they are responsible. In order to do so they must
say what is required for projects to succeed and verify
that services provided or goods supplied by contractors
are up to specification. On the other hand, the scientists
do not have the legal, financial and administrative skills
to specify the purchasing procedures that are to be fol-
lowed. Furthermore, leaving aside the technical aspects,
it is preferable for the scientific work to be shielded
from market pressures in order to safeguard its inde-
pendence, by giving the responsibility for organising
the tendering procedures to staff in the administrative
and financial units who are not involved in the defini-
tion of requirements.
4.56-4.57. The financial circuits being set up by the Joint
Research Centre as part of the reform of the Commission
include a system of double signatures as described in para-
graphs 4.55 and 4.56 of the Court’s annual report. In this
way, at least two people will handle each dossier indepen-
dently and in a complementary manner. Their respective
responsibilities are clearly set out in the documentation of the
financial circuits. The final signature in the circuit is that of
the operational manager, in line with the guidelines for the
reform of the Commission. The authorising officer is therefore
responsible for this last signature.
The Commission’s current accounting system (Sincom) does
not officially use a double signature financial circuit as
described here. However, it is planned to adapt the workflow
and safety checks to enable these circuits to be set up and
computerised by the end of 2001.
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Contracts awarded by private treaty/negotiation
4.58. Special Report No 10/2000 highlighted the vol-
ume of contracts awarded under these procedureswhich
did not comply with the conditions mentioned in the
Court of Justice’s case law on the use of such proce-
dures. In 1999, 403 contracts totalling slightly more
than 10 million euro were awarded by private
treaty/negotiation (7). These figures represent 70,1 % by
number and 23,2 % by total value of the contracts for
the financial year. In 2000 the value of the contracts
awarded in this way declined, to 7,5 million euro, but
the number increased, reaching almost 25 % by value
and nearly 76 % by number (see Tables 4.2a and 4.2b
and Diagrams 4.1 to 4.4).
4.58-4.59. The Joint Research Centre now implements the
Directives on public procurement and the Financial Regula-
tion correctly. These two legal bases make it possible to employ
a simpler consultation procedure for public contracts involv-
ing amounts below certain thresholds. It is true that the Joint
Research Centre’s consumption profile includes many small
purchases of material and services. However, the JRC will act
on the Court’s suggestion that it should conduct a more
detailed analysis as part of its Internal Audit Unit’s audit
programme.
(7) The term private treaty is used where the transaction is
covered by the Financial Regulation and negotiationwhere
it is the directives on public contracts that are applicable.
In both cases the managers award the contract by means
of a procedure that does not include any obvious com-
petitive element.
Table 4.2a — Amount and number per contract award procedure 1999
Award procedure Amount(in euro) Number of contracts % amount % number
P 7 474 961 393 17,3 68,3
N 2 541 002 10 5,9 1,7
O 17 793 769 92 41,2 16,0
R 15 429 304 80 35,7 13,9
Total 43 239 036 575 100,0 100,0
Total P+N 10 015 963 403 23,2 70,1
P= private treaty, N= negotiated procedure, O= open procedure, R= restricted procedure.
Source: Commission JRC Ispra.
Table 4.2b — Amount and number per contract award procedure 2000
Award procedure Amount(in euro) Number of contracts % amount % number
P 7 350 553 557 24,2 74,1
N 171 448 12 0,6 1,6
O 19 118 024 108 63 14,4
R 3 700 027 75 12,2 10,0
Total 30 340 052 752 100 100,0
Total P + N 7 522 001 569 24,8 75,7
P= private treaty, N= negotiated procedure, O= open procedure, R= restricted procedure.
Source: Commission CCR Ispra.
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Diagram 4.1 — Amount per contract award procedure 1999 (in euro)
10 015 963
17 793 769
15 429 304
Private treaty +
negotiated procedure
Open procedure
Restricted procedure
Diagram 4.2 — Distribution by number of contracts per contract a,ward, procedu,re 1999.
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negotiated procedure
Open
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Restricted procedure
Diagram 4.3 — Amount per contract award procedure 2000 (in euro)
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negotiated procedure
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Diagram 4.4 — Distribution by number of contracts a,nd, ord,er .forms per contract award procedure
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4.59. The board of the JRC must carry out a more
detailed analysis, in order to ascertain why the percent-
age is so high and, especially, to check that there were
valid reasons for choosing this method of awarding
contracts.
Use of contracts for the provision of services
4.60. In Special Report No 10/2000 the Court com-
mented on the use of service contracts as a way of con-
tinuing to employ people whose contracts of employ-
ment could not be extended under the current rules.
Even before its report was published, the Court was
able to comment favourably on the effort being made
by the JRC in trying to put an end to these practices.
When the exercise was finished, it was possible to see
the extent of the phenomenon: it was possible to iden-
tify some 300 cases of people benefiting from this mis-
use of contracts for the provision of services.
4.61. The first impression is that the figure is high,
although the numbers are spread over several years and
the contracts vary in duration. On further consider-
ation it also highlights the board’s determination to put
an end to such practices. Apart from that, the extent of
the numbers involved suggests that the Commission
ought to examine whether this was a device for confer-
ring undue benefits or whether it was simply an expedi-
ent for obtaining the human resources that the Centre
needed in order to carry out its mission. In the first case
severe sanctions are called for, in order to prevent the
recurrence of such a phenomenon. In the second, it is
thepersonnel policy as awhole that needs tobe reviewed,
in order to ensure that the JRC has the human resources
to carry out the work entrusted to it.
Management of vehicle contracts (8)
4.62. The vehicles contract had been awarded to the
same contractor without interruption since 1979, so
that, in fact, the contractor had a virtual monopoly. The
Court’s report pointed out that:
4.60-4.61. The problem raised by theCourt can be explained
by the fact that the establishment plan at the time did not
reflect the needs of the Centre and, in part, by the absence of
reserve lists of candidates with the right profile. These two
main sources of the problem have largely been overcome.
The weakness of the establishment plan for the JRC in the
years covered by the special report was that it contained too
many B and C posts and too few A posts. For a certain time
this made it almost impossible to recruit researchers with the
right profile. The situation was rectified in the 1999 budget,
where 57 B and 56 C posts were swapped for 113 A posts.
A major effort has already been made on reserve lists of can-
didates with the right profile and this work will continue over
the coming months.
As regards the possible penalties referred to by the Court, the
Commission has already responded to special report
No 10/2000 indicating the administrative investigations and
disciplinary proceedings that had been carried out, as well as
the penalties imposed. The JRC’s Internal Audit Unit will
organise a follow-up audit.
(8) This matter is currently under examination by the Euro-
pean Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF).
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(a) the regularity of the procedure was open to ques-
tion because of the conditions under which the con-
tract had been awarded;
(b) the authorising officer had not actually verified the
service provided;
(c) the number of kilometres invoiced was excessive.
Examination of the supporting documents showed
that 540 km/calendar day had been billed per vehicle
supplied.
4.63. In June 2000, the JRC did not renew the contract
with the company that had held it for 20 years and con-
cluded a contract with a new supplier on terms that are
more favourable for the Centre. The new contract was
concluded following an open call for tenders. In paral-
lel with this a management system for monitoring per-
formance has been in operation since the beginning of
the 2000 financial year. The system is based on soft-
ware which includes the distances for all possible com-
binations of the 400 or so destinations covered by the
contract. It gives the department concerned a total over-
view of operations. In effect it is possible to check the
validity of the transport applications made, to arrange
group transport wherever possible, to check the dis-
tance invoiced and to verify the reality of the service
provided.
4.64. In monthly terms, the introduction of the new
arrangements and the application of the new contract
have made it possible to reduce the invoice amount by
62 %. In 1999 the previous contractor billed for
49 060 km/month, whereas the new service provider
has billed only 26 903 km/month since the entry into
force of the new contract, in June 2000, even though
there has been a slight increase of 1,05 % per month in
the number of people carried.
SUMMARY OF SPECIAL REPORT NO 9/2001
ON THE TRAINING AND MOBILITY OF
RESEARCHERS PROGRAMME (9)
4.65. The Court’s audit was focused on analysing the
management systems used by the administrative
(9) Currently being published in the Official Journal.
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services both at the Commission and at contractor level
in pursuing the Training and Mobility of Researchers
(TMR) programme and on examining the quality of the
way they were managed. The audit of the programme,
which was allocated a budget of 792 million euro for
the duration of the Fourth Framework Programme,
comprised auditing the procedures in place for select-
ing contracts, following-up on weaknesses noted in an
earlier report by the Court (10) and, by means of on-the-
spot audits and a postal survey, determining the level of
satisfaction with the service provided by the Commis-
sion to the contractors/beneficiaries.
4.66. The main results of the audit may be sum-
marised as follows :
(a) in the evaluation of proposals the procedures fol-
lowed sometimes lacked transparency and, in the
allocation of proposals to evaluators, potential con-
flicts may arise;
4.66.
(a) The lack of transparency referred to by the Court relates
only to the level of documentation of the minutes of the
panel’s meetings. While it is true that the minutes have
not always detailed the various stages leading to the deci-
sions, they have always set out the results correctly, rank-
ing the panel’s proposals for Commission funding in order
of priority. Thus the Court’s observation is merely a ques-
tion of form, which had no bearing on the results of the
evaluation or financing of the projects. In the fifth FP the
quality of the reporting of the panel’s decisions was greatly
improved with the designation of a rapporteur responsible
for drafting the reasoning behind the decision.
In an area like research, where there is often a concentra-
tion of experts at the forefront of science, the potential
risk of a conflict of interests cannot be excluded from the
outset. Having said that, the two-stage evaluation struc-
ture and in particular the peer review of each proposal,
individually to begin with and then by the panel as a
whole, guarantees a balance between the potential risk of
a conflict of interests and the quality of evaluations. In
the fifth FP the evaluation manual sets out detailed pro-
visions requiring terms of reference, a code of conduct and
a declaration of impartiality duly signed by the party in
question to be attached to the contract of each evaluator.
(10) AnnualReport concerning the financial year1994 together
with the institutions’ replies, Chapter 9, OJ C 303,
14.11.1995.
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(b) eligibility criteria and user fees established for the
different activitieswere found tobe eithernot applied
by the contractors or not adequately evidenced as
checked by the Commission;
(c) significant improvements have been noted in the
training-through-research activity since the previ-
ous Court audit, despite wide divergences being
noted between the success rates for Marie Curie Fel-
lowship applications in the TMR programme and
the specific thematic programmes;
(d) from the results of the survey carried out, it was
noted that the contractors/beneficiaries were, on
average, satisfied with the service they received from
the Commission.
4.67. On the basis of these findings, the Court recom-
mends that the procedures in place for the evaluation of
proposals and the selection of evaluators should be
improved and rigorously followed. The Commission
should ensure that if target criteria are included in con-
tracts these criteria are checked and evidenced as such
when the cost statements are received. Finally, the man-
agement of all Marie Curie Fellowships should be cen-
tralised in the department managing this activity under
the TMR programme.
(b) The Commission services responsible for the negotiation
of user fees take all necessary steps to ensure that such
calculations are correctly established. As the system of
user fees was new in TMR, the negotiation procedures
and the corresponding documentation have been much
more carefully described in the fifth FP in order to improve
the general understanding of this accountancy basis.
(c) The Commission notes the considerable improvements in
the training through research activity underlined by the
Court. Any divergences between the success rates for the
various programmes stem from differences in the budget-
ary allocationsmade available to the specific programmes.
(d) The Commission is interested to learn of the results of the
TMR programme survey of contractors/beneficiaries car-
ried out by the Court. It notes the large response and is
pleased that they were, on average, satisfied in all sectors
of the TMR programme.
4.67. In the fifth FP the whole evaluation procedure was
improved. A single evaluation manual was adopted by the
Commission and made available to all potential participants.
The status of the independent evaluator, whose presence ensures
that procedures are properly followed, has been codified. As
regards the appointment of expert evaluators, an open call for
experts and a common expert database for all programmes
have been set up and have already considerably improved the
process.
Before making any payments the Commission systematically
checks the eligibility of costs (age, nationality). Since the fifth
FP, other criteria of note (geographic balance, male/female
parity, participation of less developed countries, representa-
tion of industry) are also systematically checked on the basis
of replies to the questionnaires distributed to the participants.
As far as the Marie Curie Fellowships are concerned, in the
project for the next framework programme, the Commission
has proposed concentrating themwithin one activity line under
the responsibility of one directorate.
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AUDITS CARRIED OUT BY THE COMMISSION
4.68. Table 4.3a summarises the information received
from the 13 Directorates General involved in internal
policies on the number of audits completed in 2000 in
this field. The majority of these audits have been car-
ried out on behalf of the Commission by external audit
firms. It should also be noted that these audits are
mainly financial or compliance audits at the level of
beneficiaries, and not the type of audits conducted by
the newly created internal audit units in the DGs, which
are mainly oriented towards auditing the internal pro-
cedures. Table 4.3b shows the actual recovery status as
at 31 December 2000on the amounts reported as recov-
erable by the Commission services on the basis of their
1999 audits.
4.69. A comparison with the data for 1999 (see
Table 4.3a) shows that, overall, the Commission has
considerably increased the number of audits by 63 %,
while the number of contracts audited went up by 14 %.
Excluding the veterinary and phytosanitary actions, the
recoverable amounts also rose from 8,64 million euro
to 11,58 million euro, mainly due to the more intensive
audit activities of the DGs Information Society (INFSO)
and Research (RTD).
4.70. DG RTD in particular increased its audit activi-
ties by almost 200 %, with 220 completed audits in the
year 2000 compared to 74 in 1999. In addition, this DG
had the highest growth (152 %) in the number of con-
tracts audited, from 126 in 1999 to 317 in 2000. As
2000 was the first year in which large fusion projects
have been audited, the value of the audited contracts
went up by a greater proportion. There was also a sub-
stantial increase in the recoverable amounts, from 1,9
to 5,3 million euro.
4.71. Aswell as the increased audit activities of DG IN-
FSO, the number of audits completed and the number
of contracts audited rose substantially in the fields of
environment (DG ENV), industry (DG ENTR) and jus-
tice and home affairs (DG JAI), while a decrease in the
audit activities was noted in the fields of education and
culture (DG EAC) and energy and transport (DG TREN).
4.69-4.70. The Research DGs jointly formulated in 1998
a coherent audit strategy for the whole Framework Pro-
gramme, based on the objective of giving assurance to man-
agement and interested parties on appropriate use of research
funds. The overall target is to audit 10 % of the contractors
during the RTD Framework Programme. For the execution of
this strategy the Commission has made use of a framework
contract with an external audit firm.
4.71. With the merger of the Energy and Transport DGs on
1 January 2000, the new DG TREN inherited a large num-
ber of uncompleted contracts, particularly from the old Energy
DG. To remedy the situation priority was given to paying
these contracts. This was done by financial audit staff, which
is why there was a fall in the number of finalised audits in
2000.
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Table 4.3a — Audits by the Commission completed in 2000 (1)
Directorate-General
Number of audits
completed
Number of contracts
audited Number of open contracts
Value of audited contracts
(Mio EUR)
Value of open contracts
(Mio EUR)
Amounts recoverable or
reduced payments as a result
of the audits (Mio EUR)
1999 (2) 2000 1999 (2) 2000 1999 (2) 2000 1999 (2) 2000 1999 (2) 2000 1999 (2) 2000
AGRI—Agriculture (4) 3 4 19 (7) 504 550 2,00 12,29 78,93 73,66 0,11 (7)
EAC — Education and Culture 119 106 211 172 5 424 25 306 (13) 114,35 56,29 469,70 654,04 (13) 3,28 0,92 (8)
EMPL — Employment and Social
Affairs 5 10 18 21 2 210 2 037 4,91 (3) 10,05 (3) 124,90 204,84 0,14 0,09
TREN — Energy and Transport 49 35 194 93 3 223 4 774 (12) 269,24 209,17 2 892,07 1 656,20 1,13 1,28
ENTR — Enterprise 6 8 9 37 (7) 746 5,82 53,60 (7) 181,10 0,17 0,15
ENV — Environment 16 30 30 40 2 848 2 505 5,11 12,56 360,98 295,12 0,08 0,10
FISH — Fisheries
(10)
3 5 12 13 171 188 2,54 7,04 181,46 194,53 0,03 0,03
3 3 8 9 7 (15) 13 10,00 27,60 91,46 (15) 95,84 (7) (7)
JAI — Justice and Home Affairs 17 (6) 64 44 (6) 65 (7) 713 10,28 (6) 4,26 (7) 31,95 (7) 0,45
SANCO — Health and Consumer
Protection
(5)
11 (9) 8 25 (9) 18 1 174 (9) 978 3,90 (9) 3,03 89,77 (3) (9) 85,48 0,19 (9) 0,05
5 10 5 12 n. a. n. a. 225,55 96,65 n. a. n. a. 98,60 15,03 (8)
INFSO — Information Society 13 25 54 66 2 490 2 330 19,29 40,09 6 434,00 6 135,00 1,57 2,80 (14)
MARKT —- Internal Market 0 1 0 1 80 175 0,00 (7) 6,92 8,79 0,00 0,00
RTD — Research 74 220 126 317 8 734 11 358 46,60 820,20 (11) 5 020,00 3 387,00 1,90 5,30 (11)
TAXUD — Taxation and Customs
Union 3 5 3 5 147 164 0,24 0,58 44,35 44,10 0,04 0,02
Total 327 534 758 869 26 865 50 378 719,83 1 353,41 15 794,54 12 866,55 107,24 26,22
(1) Definitions used in generating this table:
— Number of audits completed: number of financial audits where a final audit report was issued during the year.
— Number of open contracts: number of contracts signed in the year that have not yet been completed, plus the total number of contracts that were open at the beginning of the year that were not completed during the year. The
word ’contract’ denoted both contracts (either a shared-cost action or a contract awarded through the public procurement procedures) and subsidies (where a financial agreement has been reached). A ‘completed contract’ is a
contract where the terms of the contract have been fulfilled, all financial and technical reviews have been completed and the final payment has been made.
— Value of audited contracts: the value of only the contractor’s share of the contract audited on the spot.
— Amount recoverable: amounts calculated in the on-the-spot audits as recoverable and evidenced in the audit reports.
(2) See 1999 Annual Report, Table 4.4 (except (10)).
(3) Commission’s share only.
(4) Chapter B2-5 1 except (5).
(5) Veterinary and phytosanitary actions. Value of audited contracts means here claims of the Member States.
(6) In 1999, managed by the Secretariat General; includes a budget line under B7-6 0 (‘Community measures to support NGOs’).
(7) Not specified.
(8) For some of the audits, the recoverable amounts have not been established as at end-2000.
(9) Including ex DG Employment and Social Affairs.
(10) Fishery control measures. Contract means here programme of a Member State; value of audited contracts means here value of audited items within a programme; value of open contracts means here the total value of the
pluriannual measures 1996-2000 for all Member States.
(11) In 2000, large fusion projects have been audited for the first time.
(12) Total number of commitments; the actual number of contracts will be lower.
(13) Includes the individual contracts concluded between the Technical Assistance Offices (on behalf of the Commission) and the final beneficiaries.
(14) With reference to the Commission’s answer to point 4.73, the amounts recoverable are indicative only.
(15) Modified by the Commission’s service.
NB: n. a. = not available.
Source: Commission services.
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Table 4.3b — Recovery status
(Mio EUR)
Directorate-General
Amounts recoverable or reduced pay-
ments as a result of the audits (1) Actual recovery as at 31.12.2000
1999 Deducted from furtherpayments
Actually recovered due
to a recovery order
Not yet recovered;
recovery order issued,
but repayment
outstanding
Not yet recovered;
recovery order not yet
issued or adjustment
still outstanding
Not recoverable Total
AGRI — Agriculture 0,11 0,11 — — — — 0,11
EAC — Education and Culture 3,28 — 1,38 1,86 0,04 — 3,28
EMPL — Employment and Social Affairs 0,14 n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a.
TREN — Energy and Transport 1,13 5,49 0,17 0,09 — — 5,75
ENTR — Enterprise 0,17 0,17 — — — — 0,17
ENV — Environment 0,08 — 0,08 — — — 0,08
FISH — Fisheries 0,03 0,03 — — — — 0,03
SANCO — Health and Consumer Protection
(3)
0,19 (2) 0,19 — — — — 0,19
98,60 91,30 — — (4) — 91,30 (4)
INFSO — Information Society (6) 1,57 0,34 0,02 0,98 0,57 — 1,91
RTD — Research 1,75 (7) 0,73 0,21 0,26 0,57 (5) — 1,77
TAXUD — Taxation and Customs Union 0,04 — — 0,06 — — 0,06
Total 107,09 98,36 1,86 3,25 1,18 — 104,65 (4)
(1) As reported by the Commission’s services; see 1999 Annual Report, Table 4.4.
(2) Including ex DG Employment and Social Affairs.
(3) Veterinary and phytosanitary actions.
(4) An additional adjustment in the order of approximately 6 Mio EUR is still awaiting final agreement with the Member State concerned.
(5) Mainly cases where an adjustment will be done with the final payment.
(6) With reference to the Commission’s answer to point 4.73, the amounts recoverable are indicative only.
(7) Modified by the Commission’s service.
NB: n. a. = not available.
Source: Commission services.
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4.72. Table 4.4 of the 1999 Annual Report showed
that more than 100 million euro had been identified by
the Commission’s own audits as recoverable or deduct-
ible from future payments. Table 4.3b summarises the
follow-up concerning these amounts. 94 % of the
reported recoveries were effected by means of deduc-
tions from further payments to the beneficiaries con-
cerned. Less than 2 % was reimbursed after final pay-
ments. As regards the reported recoveries by DG INFSO,
only 19 % of the recoverable amounts identified from
the 1999 audits had been either reimbursed or adjusted
by 31 December 2000. For more than 570 000 euro,
recovery orders had not yet been issued at the above
date.
4.73. The actual recovery figures as at 31 Decem-
ber 2000 show that the recoverable amounts reported
for 1999 by DGs TREN, SANCO and INFSOwere appar-
ently not final figures. For example, in the area of vet-
erinary and phytosanitary actions, the payment reduc-
tions accepted by the Member States after the audit of
their claims is more than one million euro less than the
figure reported in 1999. On the other hand, the actual
amount established as recoverable by DG TREN was
more than 4,6 million euro higher than reported for
1999, of which about 4,3 million euro recovered by
It is important to note that the number of financial audits fell
by 30 % between 1999 and 2000, while the value of the
contracts fell by only 22 %.
At 30 June 2001, DG TREN has already arranged 35 audits,
the same number as for 2000, and plans to organise others.
The value of the contracts audited for 2001 will therefore be
higher than in 2000.
The objective is for financial audits to exceed the 1999 figure
in 2002.
As regards DG EAC, the reduction is due to the changeover
from auditing projects to auditing systems. This does not
mean that there were fewer checks; they were of a different type
and are not comparable with those carried out in 1999. DG
EAC is currently finalising a contract with a firm of auditors
which should result in a significant increase in the number of
financial audits.
4.72. As regard DG INFSO, the amount of EUR 570 000
represents recovery orders not yet issued but in preparation. Of
these, EUR 234 371 have been issued during 2001;
EUR 336 443 remains to be dealt with. Among these are
cases where the contractor has contested the audit results and
one case (EUR 32 910) in which the intervention of OLAF
was necessary.
4.73. Concerning recoveries by DG INFSO, a distinction
needs to be made between amounts found to be overclaimed
in specific cost statements audited and amounts found to be
recoverable when audit results are applied. Recoveries can be
higher or lower than the specific amounts found to be over-
claimed.
This is due to the fact that the amount reported by the audi-
tors as ‘recoverable’ does not take into account the payments
already
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ex-DG VII / TEN-Transport had originally not been
reported as recoverable. RegardingDG INFSO, the actual
amount established as a result of the 1999 audits is
22 % higher than reported.
4.74. Regrettably, the information requested was not
available from DG EMPL.
made to the contractor. It merely establishes the correctness or
otherwise of costs reported. Therefore, the amount to be recov-
ered can be higher if an advance was paid in addition to the
payments of the costs statements audited or lower if payments
were suspended during the audit. Furthermore, the implemen-
tation of the audit results to period, which were not covered
by the audit, may increase the amounts recovered.
As regards DG TREN, the fact that the amount established
as recoverable was EUR 4,6 million higher than the figure
initially reported is basically due to the fact that
EUR 4,3 million less was paid in connection with the Trans-
European transport projects.
As regards DG SANCO’s recoveries/refusal of expenditure,
the Commission has already drawn the Court’s attention to
the special nature of veterinary expenditure (eradication pro-
grammes or emergency measures in cases of animal epidem-
ics), which means that financial audits sometimes require
more than one year in certain complex cases. There may also
be discrepancies between amounts initially considered by the
auditors to be recoverable or to be refused and the amounts
finally refused by the Commission when the file is closed. In
the case in question, the EUR 1 million figure quoted by the
Court represents 1 % of the EUR 98,6 million considered
ineligible by SANCO following audits carried out in 1999.
4.74. DG EMPL stresses the difficulty of using the data for
1999 — bearing in mind the departmental restructuring
that went on that year (the reorganisation of DG XX’s control
activities and the creation of DG SANCO). It undertakes to
carry out a full assessment and present the Court with details
of the sums to be recovered following the 1999 audits as
quickly as possible.
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INTRODUCTION
5.1. This chapter deals with the traditional forms of aid
financed from the general budget and the operations
adopted by the Council under the Common Foreign
and Security policy (CFSP). The aid that is provided
through the European Development Funds (1) appears
only as a token entry in the general budget, as it is
financed separately. Apart from the analysis of budget-
ary management and the specific appraisal in the con-
text of the Statement of Assurance (which concentrates
on the Tacis programme), the chapter includes observa-
tions on sound financial management issues deriving
from the audit of Tacis. The chapter also contains sec-
tions on the follow-up of previous observations and on
the principal observations in recently adopted Special
Reports.
BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT
Introduction
5.2. Heading 4 ‘External action’ of the financial per-
spective applicable to the period 2000 to 2006 com-
prises subsection B7 of the budget, with the exception
of Title B7-0 ‘Pre-accession strategy’, and subsection B8
(see Table 5.1). The Commission’s apparent overrun of
the financial perspective for this heading is the result of
its recourse to the flexibility instrument, which autho-
rises the ceiling for a heading to be exceeded by 200
million euro, and of the utilisation, under Heading 4, of
the emergency reserve covered by Heading 6. Table 5.2
shows the changes in expenditure for subsections B7
and B8 over the last five financial years.
5.3. As from the financial year 2000, the new Head-
ing 4 no longer includes the appropriations for the
Phare programme, which up to that point were viewed
as forming part of external aid, but are now treated as a
pre-accession instrument.
(1) See separate observations in this report.
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Table 5.1 — Financial perspective heading: External action
(Mio EUR and %)
Financial
perspective
ceilings
Budget changes Implementation of the budget
Initial
appropria-
tions (1)
Final
appropriations
available (2)
Appropriations
utilised
% of final
available
appropriations
Appropriations
carried over to
2001
% of final
available
appropriations
Appropriations
cancelled
% of final avail-
able appropria-
tions
Pre-accession strategy for Malta and Cyprus
(B7-0 4) (4)
CA 0,0 15,0 7,7 51,3 7,3 48,7 0,0 0,0
PA 0,0 2,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,0 100,0
Humanitarian and food aid (B7-2) CA 936,0 946,0 943,2 99,7 0,0 0,0 2,8 0,3
PA 829,5 860,7 856,4 99,5 0,0 0,0 4,4 0,5
Cooperation with developing countries in Asia,
Latin America and Southern Africa, including
South Africa (B7-3)
CA 905,7 905,6 802,4 88,6 0,0 0,0 103,2 11,4
PA 632,0 667,4 621,9 93,2 14,1 2,1 31,5 4,7
Cooperation with Mediterranean third countries
and the Middle East (B7-4)
CA 1 142,9 1 044,1 1 005,7 96,3 8,8 0,8 29,6 2,8
PA 435,4 510,9 472,7 92,5 17,8 3,5 20,4 4,0
Cooperation with the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, the New Independent States and
Mongolia (B7-5)
CA 941,8 1 361,8 1 355,8 99,6 0,0 0,0 6,0 0,4
PA 742,3 1 223,4 1 145,4 93,6 72,1 5,9 5,9 0,5
Other cooperation measures — Community
measures to support NGOs (B7-6)
CA 356,9 355,4 337,4 95,0 13,8 3,9 4,1 1,2
PA 360,8 329,6 272,9 82,8 37,2 11,3 19,6 5,9
European initiative for democracy and human
rights (B7-7)
CA 95,4 96,9 93,8 96,9 0,0 0,0 3,0 3,1
PA 81,9 74,9 51,0 68,1 20,9 27,9 3,0 4,0
External aspects of certain Community policies
(B7-8)
CA 379,4 233,4 201,8 86,5 6,7 2,9 24,8 10,6
PA 225,5 191,1 168,9 88,3 2,0 1,0 20,3 10,6
Common Foreign and Security Policy (B8) CA 47,0 47,0 30,8 65,5 2,6 5,5 13,6 29,0
PA 30,0 30,0 19,6 65,2 9,0 30,0 1,4 4,8
Total for Heading 4 CA 4 627,0 4 805,1 5 005,1 4 778,6 95,5 39,2 0,8 187,2 3,7
PA 3 337,5 3 890,3 3 608,7 92,8 173,1 4,4 108,5 2,8
Emergency aid reserve (B7-9 1) (3) CA 203,0 23,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 23,0 100,0
PA 203,0 23,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 23,0 100,0
Total CA 5 008,1 5 013,1 4 770,9 95,2 39,2 0,6 210,2 4,2
PA 3 540,5 3 911,3 3 608,7 92,3 173,1 4,4 129,5 3,3
(1) Budget finally adopted by the European Parliament on 16 December 1999 (OJ L 40, 14.2.2000).
(2) Budget appropriations amended after taking into account supplementary and amending budgets and transfers, but not including appropriations carried over from 1999, appropriations resulting from the re-use of revenue, revenue
resulting from contributions by third parties and other revenue corresponding to a defined purpose and appropriations made available again.
(3) The emergency aid reserve comes under Heading 6.
(4) The other amounts of Chapter B7-0 come under Heading 7.
Source: 2000 revenue and expenditure account.
238
EN
O
fficialJournalofthe
European
Com
m
unities
15.12.2001
Table 5.2 — External action: comparison between the execution of commitments and payments under the budget for each financial year from 1996 to 2000
(Mio EUR)
Heading Title Description
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Committed Paid Committed Paid Committed Paid Committed Paid Committed Paid
4 B7-2 Humanitarian and food aid 1 218 852 1 013 892 1 058 820 1 231 955 943 856
B7-3 Cooperation with developing countries in Asia,
Latin America and Southern Africa, including
South Africa 818 474 797 472 771 463 686 570 802 622
B7-4 Cooperation with Mediterranean third countries
and the Middle East 654 357 1 076 404 1 069 422 1 027 334 1 006 473
B7-5 Cooperation with the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, the New Independent States and
Mongolia (1) 1 855 1 221 1 774 1 265 1 910 1 619 2 347 1 908 1 356 1 145
B7-6 Other cooperation measures — Community
measures to support NGOs 401 280 370 317 337 282 344 302 337 273
B7-7 European initiative for democracy and human
rights 91 65 90 59 86 66 94 46 94 51
B7-8 External aspects of certain Community policies 420 348 306 360 330 332 354 310 202 169
B8-0 Common Foreign and Security Policy 56 51 16 16 30 22 29 27 31 20
Total for Heading 4 5 513 3 648 5 443 3 785 5 589 4 025 6 112 4 451 4 771 3 609
6 B7-9 Emergency aid reserve 0 0 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Total 5 513 3 648 5 448 3 785 5 589 4 025 6 112 4 451 4 771 3 609
B7-5 + B7-0 3 Cooperation with the countries of Central and
Eastern Europe, the New Independent States and
Mongolia + phare 1 855 1 221 1 774 1 265 1 910 1 619 2 347 1 908 2 923 2 346
(1) To enable a comparison, the headings B7-5 and B7-0 3 have been combined for the financial year 2000.
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5.4. As regards Heading 4, the management frame-
work remained the same throughout the financial year
2000 since the Joint External Relations Service (SCR)
was only replaced by the new cooperation office known
as ‘EuropeAid’ on 1 January 2001. Similarly, the first
real effects of the deconcentration process that began
during the year will not become apparent until after the
end of the financial year 2001.
Commitment appropriations
5.5. In the case of some sizeable amounts (1 104,7
million euro, or 22,1 % of all the appropriations pro-
vided for under Heading 4), the commitment appro-
priations were placed in reserve and were therefore
unavailable at the beginning of the financial year (Euro-
pean Reconstruction and Development Programme in
SouthAfrica, Tacis Programme, former Yugoslavia, envi-
ronment and fisheries). Around half of them were
released by the Budgetary Authority in March (B7-52
and B7-54) and the remainder in the final quarter of
2000.
5.6. Again in 2000 (2), proposals were submitted to
the committees responsible for delivering an opinion
on the ‘MED’ and ‘ALA’ projects in the second half of
the year, and in one in every two cases these commit-
tees did not deliver their opinions until November and
December.
5.7. For these two reasons, already stated by the Court,
it was not possible to speed up the commitment rate or
improve the spread of the commitments over the finan-
cial year. Consequently, it was again noted that there
was a high concentration of commitments in December
2000 (see Table 5.3).
5.5. The amounts were placed in reserve pending adoption
of the legal basis. As soon as the legal basis for each particu-
lar budget line (or chapter) was adopted the Commission sub-
mitted proposals for transfers from the reserve (which were
approved by the Budgetary Authority).
5.6. The Commission trusts the enhanced committee pro-
cedure introduced by the new MEDA II Regulation and the
assignment or redeployment of staff to the area under the
Relex reform approved on 16 May 2001 can prevent a recur-
rence of this scenario. It also hopes that better multiannual
programming (under way) plus the devolution of manage-
ment to the delegations in 2001 and 2002 will make it
easier to consult the committees for MEDA and ALA projects
throughout the year.
5.7. The Commission has taken steps to spread commit-
ments more evenly throughout the year; these measures were
beginning to bear fruit in 2001 but will only be fully effec-
tive from 2002.
Nevertheless, the fact that some budget lines lacked a legal
basis for a good part of the year will again affect their execu-
tion in the same way as in 2000.
Forward planning efforts were made in 2001 to try and
minimise the procedural hurdles to be overcome before projects
go to the committees.
(2) See the Annual Report concerning the financial year
1999, paragraph 5.4 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000) and the
Annual Report concerning the financial year 1998, para-
graph 5.4 (OJ C 349, 3.12.1999).
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Table 5.3 — 2000 External action — Commitment by quarter
(Mio EUR and %)
Budget Area
Commitments 1st
quarter 2000
Commitments 2nd
quarter 2000
Commitments 3rd
quarter 2000
Commitments 4th
quarter 2000
Total
Commitments
2000
(Commitments December
2000)
Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount % Amount %
B7-2 Humanitarian & Food aid 82,6 8,8 201,7 21,4 360,5 298,3 31,6 943,2 200,1 21,2
B7-3 0 Cooperation with Asian developing countries 0,0 0,0 19,3 4,2 0,0 0,0 439,3 95,8 458,6 413,5 90,2
B7-3 1 Cooperation with Latin American developing countries 27,9 12,6 2,1 0,9 9,1 4,1 181,3 82,3 220,3 180,7 82,0
B7-3 2 Cooperation with South Africa 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,0 0,0 123,4 99,9 123,5 121,6 98,4
B7-4 Cooperation with Mediterranean third countries and the
Middle East 72,0 7,2 2,8 0,3 31,2 3,1 899,8 89,5 1 005,7 887,3 88,2
B7-5 2 Cooperation with the New Independent States and
Mongolia 0,3 0,1 – 0,2 – 0,1 30,8 6,9 417,5 93,1 448,3 417,3 93,1
B7-5 3 Other Community measures in Central and Eastern
Europe, the New Independent States, Mongolia and the
countries of the Western Balkans 20,0 23,0 0,0 0,0 22,0 25,4 44,8 51,6 86,9 44,8 51,6
B7-5 4 Cooperation with the Balkan countries 34,0 4,1 222,0 27,1 44,5 5,4 520,1 63,4 820,6 240,8 29,3
B7-6 Other cooperation measures 1,6 0,5 40,8 12,1 12,2 3,6 282,9 83,8 337,4 222,6 66,0
B7-7 European initiative for democracy and human rights 0,0 0,0 2,0 2,2 12,1 12,8 79,7 85,0 93,8 71,6 76,3
B7-8 External aspects of certain Community policies 61,4 30,4 67,8 33,6 5,3 2,6 67,3 33,3 201,8 54,7 27,1
B8-0 1 Common Foreign & Security Policy 13,5 43,8 6,3 20,6 2,8 9,1 8,2 26,6 30,8 6,1 19,8
Total 313,2 6,6 564,7 11,8 530,5 11,1 3 362,5 70,5 4 770,9 2 861,3 60,0
Source: Sincom Data Ware House.
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5.8. Over a quarter of the commitment appropria-
tions that had been set aside for cooperation with Latin
America were cancelled or transferred to another chap-
ter (114,6 million euro out of the 392,7 million euro
authorised (3)) as significant unused balances from the
financial year 1999 had yet to be committed. Besides
the unfavourable political situation, the Court noted
that in specific cases the weakness of local administra-
tions rendered difficult the adoption of projects at cen-
tral level in the beneficiary State. A way must therefore
be found of increasing the aid absorption capacity by
enhancing their administrative capacities and enabling
them to submit projects that comply with the criteria
stipulated.
5.9. Greater efforts were possible in Asia (480,9 mil-
lion euro were committed as against the 428,1 million
euro initially authorised (4)). This constitutes an improve-
ment on the financial year 1999 when it was only pos-
sible to commit 349,8 million euro.
5.10. The regional programme for the reconstruction
of Central America (RPRCA), the overall amount for
whichwas 250 million euro (5), wasmanaged in a decen-
tralised fashion (deconcentration) with a view to accel-
erating its implementation. The decision was taken to
commit this amount in four annual instalments, spread
between 1999 and 2002. The amount entered in the
accounts as commitments on this basis was neither the
overall amount decided on by the Commission nor the
amount normally entered in the accounts in similar cir-
cumstances, namely the amount arising from financing
5.8. The Commission has taken steps in connection with
the multiannual programming of projects to improve forward
planning of the coverage of financing requirements and improve
budget execution, so the situation described for Latin America
in 2000 should not recur.
The Commission is aware that in some cases weak local
administrations are an obstacle to project implementation.
Steps have been taken to remedy this situation by involving
recipient countries more closely in the identification and set-
ting up of projects, and at an earlier stage. In any case,
administrative capacity building in itself is an area of insti-
tutional cooperation expected to have an impact in the longer
term.
Management is due to be devolved to the delegations in Latin
America in 2001 and 2002, and this too should help
improve the execution of appropriations for this region.
5.10. The Commission’s plan was to commit the EUR 250
million allocated to the RPRCA in four annual instalments
starting in 1999. The sums were, or will be, committed on
the basis of decisions adopted by the College in accordance
with Article 36(2) of the Financial Regulation. Global com-
mitments were adopted in 1999 and 2000 but from 2001,
in the interests of transparency the idea is to switch to a sys-
tem of pre-commitments covering financing agreements signed
with the separate recipient countries. Individual contracts will
then be concluded under the financing agreements for opera-
tions or projects identified within that framework.
From 2001 individual commitments will be monitored by
Sincom II using the system of pre-commitments and second-
ary commitments; for commitments before that date the origi-
nal MIS system will continue to be used.
(3) 29,2 % on the basis of cancellations (89,6 million euro)
and a transfer of 25 million euro for Kosovo, as against
335,1 million euro under the initial budget and 57,6 mil-
lion euro by way of non-automatic carry-overs.
(4) 404,9 million euro under the initial budget and 23,2 mil-
lion euro by way of non-automatic carry-overs.
(5) Excluding 6,6 million euro set aside for technical assis-
tance (heading B7-3 1 3 A) and 8,2 million euro allocated
to preparation of the programme, financed from heading
B7-3 1 0).
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agreements corresponding to clearly defined pro-
grammes or projects. The RPRCA started with the iden-
tification of the actions to bemanaged, and it is expected
that the first major contracts will be awarded in 2001.
This will therefore mean that substantial payments can
be made, since none of the 25 million euro allocated for
2000 were disbursed. The level of payments is the prin-
cipal means of assessing the true state of this pro-
gramme when the volume of commitments and pay-
ments is lower than that originally envisaged (6). The
budget accounts, which are the only potential source of
information, do not enable comparison of the state of
progress of the RPRCA, based on the legal obligations
entered into, with that of a programme managed in the
traditional manner, and thereby to form an initial judge-
ment on the value of this deconcentration.
5.11. In 2000, the Commission began applying the
concept of a pre-commitment in some isolated cases,
despite the fact that the changes in the implementing
rules for the Financial Regulation (7) that had been nec-
essary since late 1998 had still not been adopted by the
end of the financial year 2000. As had also been pro-
posed by the Commission in the context of the reform
of the Financial Regulation (8), the idea was to make a
distinction between budgetary commitments and legal
obligations and to assess the actual extent of the latter.
The new information, which is intended to make bud-
getary implementation more transparent, is therefore
not yet available. This information would be such as to
enablemore effectivemonitoring of the state of progress
of actions such as RPRCA.
Because of delays with the detailed identification of opera-
tional data the first of the financing agreements relating to
1999 commitments were not signed until late in 2000, and
this in turn meant that the first payments (EUR 435 000)
were only made towards the end of the year.
The agreements relating to 2000 commitments will be signed
in 2001 and the payments will then follow. EUR 5.6 mil-
lion has already been paid in 2001 under the 1999 decisions;
the forecast execution figure for this financial year is approxi-
mately EUR 20 million. As from 2002 the rate of disburse-
ments is expected to rise sharply.
It was the Commission’s intention from the outset that the
RPRCA should be managed on a devolved basis, so it trans-
ferred the necessary resources to the Nicaragua delegation on
September 2000. Further arrangements were put in place in
line with requirements, on the lines already successfully pio-
neered in Sarajevo.
5.11. The Commission did indeed use overall budgetary
commitments, an approach provided for in an amendment to
Article 36(2) of the Financial Regulation adopted on
23 November 1998. For external operations the overall com-
mitment (the ‘decision in principle’) is then followed by indi-
vidual legal commitments. In practice, the overall commit-
ment allows spending of a specific sum for a specific purpose.
(6) See Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament of 28 April 1999 on a Com-
munity action plan for the reconstruction of Central
America (COM(1999) 201 final).
(7) See Regulation (EC, ECSC, Euratom) No 2548/98
(OJ L 320, 28.11.1998, p. 1) amending Article 36(2) of
the Financial Regulation. Proposals for the adoption of
the implementing rules were presented on 15 November
2000 in Communication SEC(2000) 1890 final. The only
known ‘legal basis’ for this practice is the Accounting
Officer’s instructions of 30 January 2001.
(8) See Articles 70 and 71 of the Financial Regulation as
envisaged by the Commission in its proposal for reform
(COM(2000) 461 final, 17.10.2000).
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5.12. Including the commitments entered into in 2000
in respect of budget headings that already belonged to
Heading 4 in 1999 (4 979,1 million euro) and for which
payments amounted to just 1 022million euro, the total
for outstanding commitments amounted to 12 663,6
million euro at the end of 2000, an increase of 5 %.
Efforts must continue to cancel commitments which
can now no longer be utilised.
5.13. Altogether, it is very difficult to determine the
amount of aid promised by the Community, the amount
of aid that has actually been granted, and the amount
which is still to be paid, owing to the lack of consistent
accounting methods and to uncertainties concerning
the commitments still to be settled.
Payment appropriations
5.14. The payment appropriations for the distribution
of food aid, the MEDA programme and other actions in
the CEEC-NIS-M and Western Balkans were consider-
ably increased, whilst there were sizeable carry-overs to
the following financial year for cooperation with the
Balkans due to transfers of appropriations made at the
very end of the financial year. It was not possible to
utilise 64,8 million euro, or around 17 % of the new
appropriations (9).
5.15. Payments were far more evenly spread over the
year than commitments, irrespective of the area con-
cerned, although a degree of concentrationwas recorded
for themonth of December. Some 2 200 paymentswere
made in that month (845,7 million euro), which is two
and a half times the usual monthly amount. Around fif-
teen of these payments, each for over 10 million euro,
which were made at the very end of the year and more
often than not in the form of an advance to an inter-
mediary, alone resulted in the disbursement of
336,9 million euro, or 10 % of the overall amount paid
in the financial year.
5.12. In the recent past the Commission has experienced
serious difficulties with the absorption of outstanding com-
mitments (RAL), leading it to undertake a thorough review
of ‘old’ and ‘sleeping’ commitments. In late 1999 it drew up
an action plan with the aim of reducing the overhang of RAL
and the plan was renewed in 2001 under the auspices of
EuropeAid Cooperation Office. By the end of 2000, a year
after the plan for budget lines managed by AIDCO came into
effect, the level of old (pre-1995) commitments had fallen
quite markedly from EUR 1 100 million to EUR 746,5 mil-
lion. The situation should improve still further in 2001 as a
result of the closure of budget commitments (decommitments)
and payments for projects under way. At 1 September 2001
the RAL was down to EUR 519,4 million.
5.13. In order to determine the amount of aid actually
granted, the Commission set up the system of ‘pre-
commitments’ and follow-up of legal obligations incurred
under those commitments. Although this measure has not
been in place for very long, it will provide the more reliable
information sought by the Court for financial years 2001 and
after as the data feeds into the accounting management of the
RAL.
5.14. Following a series of sizeable shortfalls in payment
appropriations for the Balkans the chapter received a EUR
180 million boost in the form of commitment and payment
appropriations for Serbia; though all the money was commit-
ted the payment appropriations were not, despite a high
repayment rate. A significant proportion (EUR 97.6 million)
of the increase for MEDA is accounted for by the release of
payment appropriations which were originally entered in the
B0-4 0 reserve.
(9) 64,8 million euro were carried over out of the 392 mil-
lion euro released in the financial year (10 million euro
under the SAB and 382 million euro by way of transfers).
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5.16. A sum of 40,4 million euro was paid to the fund
for the construction of a protective casing at Chernobyl
in December 2000, yet it was not until the middle of
the financial year 2001 that around two thirds of the
50 million euro paid by the Commission in 1999 were
actually used. Out of the 283,6 million euro paid to the
European Agency for Reconstruction (10), which were
viewed as expenditure for the financial year 2000,
25,7 million euro were still in the process of being
transferred from the Commission to the Agency as at
31 December 2000 and, in total, 105,7 million euro
had not been paid to the final beneficiaries on that date,
i.e. 40 % of the amounts transferred to the Agency in
2000. An amount of this size seems to be far beyond
the Agency’s immediate needs right at the beginning of
2001.
5.17. In all the cases in which budgetary expenditure
does not tally with the amounts actually received by the
final beneficiaries, the accounts are not intended and
are not able to give an idea of the scale of the activities
being carried on in the field.
5.18. Appropriations for administrative management
(type-A) expenditure were entered in the budget for the
first time. The level of implementation of these pay-
ment appropriations (totalling 27,2 million euro) was
particularly low (nearly 80 % of the payment appropria-
tions were cancelled), even though commitments had
been entered into for 86 % of the appropriations, albeit
only at the very end of the financial year. This under-
utilisation is also explained by the fact that the option
5.16. As agreed between the Commission and the EBRD,
the Commission’s contribution to the Chernobyl Fund was
paid following the signing of the contribution agreement. All
other donors make their contributions in the same way. Any
funding not needed immediately is set aside, and this in turn
generates interest which is credited to the Chernobyl Fund.
Given the diversity of activities that take place under the fund
it is extremely difficult to predict them beforehand.
The situation to which the Court draws attention is attribut-
able to the need to see that the Agency is in funds sufficiently
in advance, and for a reasonable (2 to 3 months) period, in
order to be able to cover its cash outgoings; this is in accor-
dance with the regulation setting up the Agency. In this con-
nection the Court itself, in point 5.98, praises the Agency’s
efficiency, and specifically its performance as regards pay-
ments.
The sum quoted by the Court includes a sizeable transfer
made in late December 2000; it relates to the implementa-
tion of the winter emergency aid programme for Serbia
approved by the Budgetary Authority at the end of November
2000. The financing requirements were verified in advance by
a Commission audit carried out in November 2000, and
supported ex post by a statement of the Agency’s financial
position transmitted in February 2001. Naturally, it was not
possible for the Agency to utilise the money in full before year
end (31 December 2000).
Note that the scale and urgency of the projects managed by
the Agency mean contracts must be signed and money dis-
bursed extremely fast.
5.18. The Budgetary Authority used ‘BA’ lines in the 2000
Budget for the first time with the aim of introducing transpar-
ency for the type of administrative expenditure hitherto buried
in operating appropriations.
The Court notes that earlier RAL were not reallocated to the
new lines, logically enough given that they were allocated pre-
viously. The RAL for 2000 are differentiated appropriations
and will be cleared over the new few budget years. All ‘BA’
expenditure, therefore, will shortly be handled in this way pro-
vided the system remains the same in future.
(10) Based in Thessaloniki with operational centres in Kosovo,
Serbia and Montenegro.
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was available to pay any unused balances for technical
and administrative expenditure (ATA) under the head-
ings that preceded the creation of this new budgetary
support. In 2000, the objective of making expenditure
which had been the subject of previous observations by
the Court (11) more transparent was therefore not com-
pletely achieved.
Presentation of the accounts to the discharge author-
ity (12)
5.19. The Court has noted for several years (13) that the
presentation of Volume I, Part 2 of the revenue and
expenditure account does not meet the requirement of
providing the discharge authority with a summary of
budgetary implementation for the financial year for the
External aid field. Despite the efforts made to rationalise
and improve the presentation of the financial informa-
tion concerning the main budgetary headings, improve-
ments still need to be made to the financial analysis.
5.20. For 2000, once again, there is no overall pre-
sentation introducing the field as a whole. Nor does an
introduction by budget heading precede the pages cov-
ering the various types of actions (budget chapters). Yet
the Commission does draw up a document containing
various summary analyses for its own internal needs as
well as analyses similar to those that the Court presents
in paragraphs 5.8 and 5.9 concerning Latin America
and Asia.
5.21. The Commission should also explain the rea-
sons why budgetary implementation is at variance with
the estimates. According to the standard presentation
method chosen by the Commission, in Volume 1, Part
2 of the revenue and expenditure account it should have
5.19. The Commission has taken some action in respect of
the Court’s previous remarks about improving the financial
statements and considerably more information is now shown,
giving the reader all the essential data. The next stage in
improving the financial statements will be the inclusion of a
commentary. This has already been done for other chapters
but has still to be completed for external operations.
5.20. For the 2001 financial year, the Commission will
examine the incorporation of an introductory summary to the
external aid chapter; this overview will assess the major events
affecting implementation in 2001 and will identify any sig-
nificant trends (e.g. lack of appropriations).
5.21. For 2001, together with the financial and output
implementation tables which are henceforth a standard part
of the report, the Commission will provide a commentary on
major variances.
(11) See Annual Report concerning the financial year 1998,
paragraphs 5.15 to 5.31 (OJ C 349, 3.12.1999)
(12) The Court has reviewed the information presented by the
Commission in Volume I of the revenue and expenditure
account. The purpose of this volume is to provide a com-
mentary on budgetary management for the year and, in
particular, explanations of variations between the initial
approved budget and the appropriations finally available
as well as between the appropriations finally available and
those utilised. This review did not seek to provide assur-
ance as to the reliability of its contents. Rather, it sought
to identify any significant variations for which explana-
tions are not provided and to identify any explanations
that might be considered misleading.
(13) See Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999,
paragraph 5.3 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000) and the Annual
Report concerning the financial year 1998, para-
graph 5.14 (OJ C 349, 3.12.1999).
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provided, on a systematic basis, and in addition to a
presentation of the budgetary data already to a large
extent shown in Volume 1, Part 1, comments on the
implementation of the various headings and on the
tables that would provide an understanding of the actual
utilisation of the appropriations.
5.22. Much remains to be done in these areas in order
for Volume 1, Part 2 of the revenue and expenditure
account to be rendered useful. The figures presented
contain errors and inconsistencies. Despite theAccount-
ing Officer’s instructions, the document does not pro-
vide the desired explanation of the implementation of
the budget. Initially, the documents received from the
Authorising Officers were of such an unsatisfactory
quality that they could not be used. An express request
for explanations of the main differences affecting some
30 budget headings received no reply. The use of the
emergency reserve (B7-9 1) to obtain 180 million euro
for the Balkans is neither mentioned nor explained
under the heading for the reserve. It becomes very dif-
ficult to provide explanations when the accounting sys-
tem is not supplied with pertinent data.
5.23. The adoption of new financial perspectives has
resulted in a substantial change in nomenclature. Fol-
lowing transfer of the Phare programme to Chapter
B7-0 3, residual expenditure under Chapter B7-5 4
relates to the Western Balkans. There is no explanation
or comparative table enabling an evaluation of the
increase in expenditure from one financial year to the
next in the two newly defined spheres of action.
SPECIFIC APPRAISAL IN THE CONTEXT OF
THE STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE
Intensive audit in the field of Tacis
Description of the subject area
5.24. Heading 4 of the financial perspective covers
external measures and includes a variety of instruments:
(a) the grantingof foodandhumanitarian aid (Title B7-2
of the EU budget);
5.22. The year 2000 was the first annual reporting occa-
sion on which this new form of presentation, combining
financial and output data, has been attempted. The inconsis-
tencies identified by the Court should, in the light of the expe-
rience gained in 2000, not recur.
Whilst the transfer of aid in favour of the Balkans is men-
tioned in the ‘Compte’ at budget line B7-5 4 1 ‘Aid for the
Republics formerly part of Yugoslavia’ it is acknowledged that
the explanation accompanying the transfer (from the reserve)
could be more detailed: as stated in point 5.20, such aspects
will receive particular attention in the 2001 financial year.
5.23. It is accepted that such movements could be better
presented to the reader. The intention is to give explanations
allowing the reader of the financial statements to understand
any significant changes in nomenclature or budgetary alloca-
tions, and this will be done for 2001.
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(b) the carrying-out of cooperation programmes via
budget headings devoted to specific geographical
areas (Latin America, Asia, and southern Africa,
Title B7-3; the Mediterranean third countries and
the Middle East, Title B7-4; Central and Eastern
Europe, the Balkans, the New Independent States
and Mongolia, Title B7-5);
(c) co-financing measures taken by non-governmental
organisations (NGOs) (the greater part of Title
B7-6), as well as
(d) other measures, the bulk of which concern interna-
tional fishing agreements and the Common Foreign
and Security Policy (the rest of Title B7-6, Title
B7-7, Title B7-8 and subsection B-8).
Scope and nature of the audit
5.25. In the area of External Actions only a small
number of transactions are tested for the global DAS. In
order to provide the discharge authority with more
focused information, the Statement of Assurance spe-
cific appraisal for external actions is based on a cycle of
in-depth audits of different elements of the budgetary
area each year. In 1999 the Court started this cycle with
decentralised Phare expenditure (at the time, part of
Heading 4), co-financed activities managed by NGOs
and expenditure for aid to Bosnia. Thus, in 1999 around
13 % of the total external actions expenditure was cov-
ered by an in-depth audit. For the year 2000 the Court
undertook an audit of the Tacis programme, mainly at
the level of the Commission (Title B7-5 of the budget),
representing almost 10 %of the total expenditurewithin
the external actions area. The objective of the audit was
to provide conclusions on the legality and regularity of
contracts concluded and payments made during the
year and to make observations concerning the func-
tioning of the control systems.
5.26. The audit included an examination of the system
of procedures and controls covering this area in order
to evaluate their theoretical and practical effectiveness
in ensuring that transactions are legal and regular. The
audit also included examination of representative ran-
dom samples of (i) contracts concluded by the Commis-
sion in the year 2000 drawn from the contracts data-
base and (ii) payments made in the year 2000 drawn
from the Commission central accounting system. The
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audit was based on documentary evidence available at
Brussels, including contracts, invoices and certificates
provided by the delegations and monitoring and evalu-
ation reports. Due to the nature of these transactions,
verifying the reality of the payment claims for services
is only possible by systematically examining in detail
the records of individual contractors at a time close to
the provision of the services. This was not feasible. This
work was supplemented by on-the-spot audits of trans-
actions for which most of the documentary evidence
was only available in the beneficiary countries, which
was the case essentially for thedecentralisedprogrammes
described in paragraph 5.33.
5.27. The majority of the projects in the Tacis area
involve the financing of technical assistance contracts
based on time spent by consultants at agreed rates,
together with other expenses such as travel and subsis-
tence. The work of these consultants can either involve
the preparation of an agreed output such as a report, or
can simply be a contribution to the ongoing work of a
beneficiary state administration or other organisation.
The inherent risk in this type of contract is the possibil-
ity that the quality and quantity (reality) of the services
performed do not match with the claims made and sup-
ported by time records and performance reports. In
principle, internal control systems and procedures
should take this risk into account.
The Tacis programme
5.28. The objectives of the programme are to promote
the transition of the 13 Eastern European and Asian
beneficiary countries towards well functioning market
economies and to reinforce democracy and the rule of
law. The assistance is, in general, delivered in the form
of grants financing technical assistance contracts. When
a project is launched a contractor is selected to deliver
services to the beneficiary organisation. The selected
contractor is almost exclusively an organisation from
the Member States, mainly from the private sector but
also from the public sector or a non-profit organisa-
tion. In the majority of cases, the contractor receives the
EU funds, while the beneficiary of the assistance, is a
government institution in the Tacis country.
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5.29. The services delivered by the contractor are in
the form of transferring know-how in eligible areas of
cooperation, which are:
— support for institutional, legal and administrative
reform,
— support to the private sector and assistance for eco-
nomic development,
— support in addressing the social consequences of
transition,
— development of infrastructure networks,
— promotion of environmental protection and man-
agement of natural resources,
— development of the rural economy,
— support for nuclear safety.
The new Tacis Regulation for the years 2000-2006 was
adopted in December 1999 (14). Most of the payments
made in 2000, and therefore selected for audit, are
related to contracts awarded under the old regulation.
5.30. The amounts committed, contracted and paid in
the years 1991 to 2000 are shown in Table 5.4.
(14) Council Regulation No 99/2000.
Table 5.4 — Tacis commitments, contracts and
payments
(Mio EUR)
Year Commitments Contracts Payments
1991 397 5 1
1992 419 203 32
1993 472 349 180
1994 465 515 300
1995 511 527 374
1996 536 455 376
1997 482 691 405
1998 508 507 462
1999 428 396 514
2000 444 384 465
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5.31. The Tacis programme is mainly managed cen-
trally from Commission departments in Brussels. The
Directorate-General EuropeAid-Cooperation Office
(AIDCO) (incorporating the functions previously car-
ried out by the Common Service for External Relations)
manages all implementation aspects and is also respon-
sible for all control functions and evaluations since
1 January 2001. Within AIDCO each technical assis-
tance contract is assigned to a Project Manager (for-
merly known as the Task Manager) who manages the
project, including monitoring the progress of the con-
tract.
5.32. A consortium of specialist companies (Monitor-
ing Units) has been contracted to monitor the contrac-
tors’ performance. This monitoring covers in a system-
atic way the qualitative aspects of their performance.
The resulting monitoring reports are sent to the Project
Managers.
5.33. There are some Tacis programmes where the
management is decentralised (see list in Table 5.5). The
payments to these intermediaries represented around
25 % of total Tacis payments in 2000. These decentra-
lised management bodies keep all financial records at
their premises and have thus been audited at this level.
Table 5.5 — Major decentralised Tacis programmes
(Mio EUR)
Programme Managed by Payments in2000
Bangkok facility EBRD 23
Science and Technology
Centres in NIS
ISTC in Moscow and
STCU in Kiev 24
Exceptional Assistance
Programme to Azerbaijan
Government of
Azerbaijan 10
Tempus European Training
Foundation 13
Bistro EC Delegations 3
Chernobyl Shelter Fund EBRD 40
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5.34. As part of the current reform of EU external
assistance programmes the Tacis programme has also
been subject to changes in monitoring and supervision.
The reform will imply a new allocation of responsibili-
ties between DG Relex, AIDCO and the EC delegations.
Audit findings
Contracts and payments
5.35. The audit work undertaken at the Commission
level on contracts concluded by the Commission, and
the underlying commitments, did not reveal material
errors of legality and regularity. However, the audit of
payment transactions revealed a small number of errors,
including wrongly charged expenses, costs claimed for
an ineligible period and costs not supported by time
sheets. These errors did not have a material impact on
total expenditure.
Observations on internal control
5.36. Given the inherent risk that Technical Assistance
contracts may not always be satisfactorily fulfilled, the
internal control system must cover the risk that the
quality and quantity of services performed may not
match the invoices and the supporting documents. The
risk of major failure by the contractors to deliver is
countered by the fact that the beneficiaries in the coun-
tries concerned have an interest in seeing that the con-
tractors perform their work and are likely to complain
if they do not. The monitoring reports provided to the
Project Managers (as described in paragraph 5.32) can
provide a further measure of assurance that the con-
tractors are actually doing their work.
5.34. The EuropeAid Cooperation Office was created as a
direct result of the Commission’s decision to reform external
aid management announced in May 2000. The External
Relations Directorate General is responsible for defining the
strategies, objectives, priorities and areas of cooperation in the
Tacis programme; the EuropeAid CooperationOffice is respon-
sible for management of the project cycle from identification
to final project evaluation.
The Commission also decided in May 2000 to devolve tasks
and responsibilities at all stages of the operation cycle to EC
delegations. This constitutes a key component of the reform
of external assistance. 22 EC delegations are included in the
devolution process in 2001, among them the delegation in
Russia. The Commission intends to complete devolution for
the Tacis area before the end of 2002.
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5.37. The Project Managers have a very important role
in themanagement and control of the Tacis programme.
The Project Managers need to be highly qualified and
experienced in the management of technical assistance.
The workload of these Project Managers is high and the
resulting strain on the individuals involved leads to high
staff turnover which puts at risk the appropriate func-
tioning of control systems. As a result, the Project Man-
agers do not pay close attention to the content of the
monitoring report which would allow them to take up
with the contractors any identified deficiencies in their
work before authorising payments. The Commission
does not make sample inspections of ongoing contracts
to check the accuracy of time records and expenses
claimed.
5.38. During the audit the Court has taken note of
some indications of improvements in the control envi-
ronment. The Commission has been successful in its
efforts to speed up the tendering and contracting as
well as the processing of invoices for payment. Invoices
are now paid within the normal 60-day period (exclud-
ing really exceptional cases) and the level of outstand-
ing commitments fell for the second year running.
5.39. In November 1999 the Commission adopted a
new manual for all external aid contracting in order to
simplify the award of contracts. The manual reduced
the number of different tendering procedures from 40
to eight (simplified) procedures. A ‘Practical Guide’ to
EC external aid contract procedures was published in
January 2001. These efforts should further contribute
towards overcoming some of the weaknesses which
were highlighted in the Court’s Special Report
No 16/2000 (15).
5.37. The Commission recognises the importance of moni-
toring reports and agrees that Project Managers should use
them to the greatest extent possible.
Under the new standard arrangements introduced in 2001, a
Project Manager representing the interests of the contracting
authority and responsible for monitoring contract progress is
identified for every contract. The new service contract also
incorporates a monthly, estimated cashflow forecast. The
Project Manager can use this to ensure that deviations from
the forecast correspond to changes in the actual time inputs
of experts and incidental expenditure of which he/she is aware
either from personal knowledge of the project or through the
monitoring unit reports.
The payment structure of the new service contract has removed
the need for the supporting documentation for contractors’
invoices to be verified before interim payments are made. The
actual days worked and actual incidental costs included in the
invoices are verified in every service contract by requiring an
audit certificate before the final payment is made. Conse-
quently, this will reduce the workload of both Project Manag-
ers and those involved in making payments.
5.39. The new practical guide to EC external aid contract
procedures, based on the November 1999 manual of instruc-
tions for external aid contracts, harmonises and simplifies the
management of EC external aid programmes. The Commis-
sion is now working on a complementary guide to financial
procedures for external aid, which should simplify and clarify
the applicable financial rules.
(15) Special Report No 16/2000 on tendering procedures for
service contracts under the Phare and Tacis programmes
(OJ C 350, 6.12.2000).
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5.40. In the new ‘Practical Guide’ a new set of general
conditions for service contracts is included. These new
conditions require a similar level of detailed time and
financial records to be maintained as in the old ones;
however, these will no longer need to be submitted with
invoices. The existence and accuracy of these records
will be certified at the end of the contract by an inde-
pendent auditor.
5.41. In the audited sample, 36 % of the invoices were
corrected by the Commission before the payments were
made. The corrections generally involved small amounts.
The Court established that the control system works
effectively. A significant amount of human resources is
used to carry out this control task. The high percentage
of correctionsmight indicate that guidelines for invoices
and supporting documents are insufficiently clear or
insufficiently adhered to.
Conclusions
5.42. Subject to the limitation in the scope of the audit
described in paragraph 5.26, the Court concludes that,
taken as a whole, the Tacis contracts concluded by the
Commission and payments made were legal and regu-
lar.
5.43. The Court welcomes the introduction of the
new ‘Practical Guide’ to EC external aid contract proce-
dures. However, these procedures do not incorporate a
direct link between the control of quality and quantity
of the contractors’ performance and the approval of
payments (see paragraph 5.37).
Recommendations
5.44. The Court recommends that:
(a) The Commission should pay closer attention to the
role and position of Project Managers to ensure that
experienced staff are retained. Sufficient training
must be provided in order to strengthen their man-
agement capacity.
5.41. The budget breakdown of the new service contract has
been considerably simplified to minimise the risk of calcula-
tion errors or the application of incorrect fee rates. In addi-
tion, the contractor must provide an audit certificate before the
final payment is made to confirm that all the transactions
invoiced by the contractor are based on the actual days worked
and the actual incidental costs incurred.
5.43. As described in the Commission response to 5.37,
from 2001 the Project Manager responsible for a contract
must approve interim and final payments on the basis of per-
sonal knowledge of the project or through Monitoring Unit
reports. Consequently, there is a link between the control of
quality and quantity of the contractors’ performance and the
approval of payments
5.44.
(a) The Commission recognises the importance of retaining
experienced Project Managers. In the past a high propor-
tion of Project Managers were on short-term contracts
and the Commission is replacing these with established
officials. In addition, devolution to delegations will
demand a longer-term commitment from the individuals
involved than has been necessary for Brussels-based jobs.
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(b) The Commission should, in line with the new Gen-
eral Conditions, further strengthen its system for
internal control of this type of contract, for instance
by:
(i) more systematic use of monitoring reports when
approving invoices for payment;
(ii) carrying out, or having carried out on its behalf,
timely inspections of Tacis technical assistance
contracts, to verify the reality of the services per-
formed and the accuracy of the time records and
expenses claimed.
FOLLOW-UP OF PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS
Nuclear safety
Introduction
5.45. Both the Council (16) and the European Parlia-
ment (17) urged the Commission to remedy the inad-
equacies in its management of the Phare and Tacis pro-
grammes in the field of nuclear safety pointed out in
the Court’s Special Report No 25/98 (18). The Court’s
main observations concerned the following:
(a) the Commission’s confused intervention strategy;
(b) the disparate and frequently changing human
resources allocated to the management of the pro-
grammes;
(c) the slowness of the project implementation mecha-
nism;
(b)
(i) From 2001 Project Managers have to confirm that
invoices reflect the activities actually carried out by the
contractors (on the basis of personal knowledge of the
project or monitoring unit reports) before approving
them for payment. The removal from the new service
contract of the need for supporting documentation to
be verified before payment of invoices should allow
Project Managers to monitor the progress of contracts
more closely in future.
(ii) Project Managers and delegation staff visit projects to
carry out inspections as frequently as possible, but the
availability of staff resources is a limiting factor. In
addition, there are only four delegations in the Tacis
region, assisted by a few branch offices. The Moscow
and Almaty delegations in particular have to cover
vast areas. A further constraint on inspection visits is
the lack of mission funds both for Brussels and the
delegations.
5.45. The Commission intervention was clarified in 1998
in Communication COM(1998) 134 to the Council and to
the European Parliament. Communication COM(2000) 493
of 6th September 2000 further explains this intervention and
clearly spells out the priorities of the programme. There is as
yet no follow-up to this Communication from Parliament or
the Council. The Communication clarified the rules and pro-
cedures to be applied to the complex and specialised nuclear
sector. In line with the reform of the management of external
assistance programmes, the responsibility for nuclear safety
has also been clarified. In order to ensure greater visibility and
transparency the Commission has proposed that from 2001
onwards there should be a single budget line for financial
assistance for nuclear safety in the NIS.
(16) Council Recommendation on the discharge for 1997.
(17) The Parliament’s report of 21 April 1999 on the post-
ponement of the discharge for 1997.
(18) OJ C 35, 9.2.1999.
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(d) the lack of transparency in management; and
(e) the limited involvement of the beneficiaries.
In addition to the observations of the Court, this
follow-up has also taken into account all the major rec-
ommendations made to the Commission by the Coun-
cil and the Parliament.
5.46. At the end of 2000, 1 064 million euro were
committed for Phare and Tacis nuclear safety pro-
grammes. About 83 % of those funds were contracted
and 61 % paid (see Diagram 5.1).
5.46. Payments for service contracts are usuallymade against
delivery of the results specified in the contract, which means
that payments are always behind commitments. In a complex
sector such as nuclear safety, it is normal for payments to be
several years behind commitments.
Diagram 5.1 — Phare and Tacis decisions on nuclear safety taken by the Commission since 1990
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New intervention strategy in the absence of qualitative
standards
5.47. Given the limited human resources available to it,
the Commission has decided to reduce the number of
projects and increase their size so as to be able to man-
age them better (19). In future it will only finance equip-
ment projects amounting to around 5 to 10 million
euro, the priority objective being the vocational train-
ing of power station staff, rather than the supply of
equipment as such. The Commission has switched from
an annual equipment supply programme for many sites
to a multi-annual programme for a few sites.
5.48. The objective of these measures is still to help to
bring nuclear plants in the CEECs and the NISs up to
‘European safety standards’ (20). At the end of 2000,
these European standards had still not been defined, nor
had the Commission yet established, as the Council and
the Parliament had requested, its own indicators for the
purpose of evaluating the effectiveness of the pro-
grammes and the real extent of improvements in power
plant safety.
5.47. Against the background of limited resources, the Com-
mission has decided to reduce the number of projects and to
focus support through larger plant improvement projects.
These projects consist of physical supplies and associated tech-
nical and management support. Assistance will also be pro-
vided on a more general basis in the area of operational safety.
This operational, technical and management support will be
provided by EU operators under the on-site assistance pro-
gramme in the framework of multiannual contracts. This form
of contracting will also help streamline implementation by
Commission services.
For accession countries the number and size of the projects is
also determined by the accession-driven approach to financial
assistance on the basis of the priorities laid down in the
Accession Partnerships.
5.48. A methodology for defining the EU position on a
‘high level of nuclear safety’ in the candidate countries, for
nuclear installations covered by the Convention on Nuclear
Safety, has been devised by a Working Party of the Council
Atomic Questions Group (AQG) and endorsed by the Com-
mittee of Permanent Representatives (Council doc 9181/01 of
27 May 2001). This methodology is not based on a formal
set of ‘EU standards’. However, we note that a high level of
convergence has been achieved.
In this context, the Commission considers that if the acces-
sion negotiations can be conducted without reference to a for-
mal set of EU standards, then a fortiori these should not be
necessary in order to assess the effectiveness of the Commis-
sion’s Phare and Tacis programmes, as the Court continues to
insist.
The objective of Tacis support, as agreed by the European Par-
liament and the Council and laid down in the Tacis Regula-
tion, is to help improve safety culture at the level of both
operators and regulators, but not necessarily to raise safety
standards to Western levels, which will not always be possible.
It is difficult to measure its impact on safety culture, or to
assess the impact of technical assistance on the improvement
of safety culture, particularly when Commission assistance has
been supplemented by national efforts and bilateral pro-
grammes.
(19) Communication from the Commission to the Council
and the European Parliament ‘Commission support to
nuclear safety in the New Independent States and Central
and Eastern Europe’ (COM(2000) 493 final).
(20) Council Resolution of 18 June 1992 on the technological
problems of nuclear safety (OJ C 172, 8.7.1992, p. 2).
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Human resources allocated to the management of the
programme and their organisation
5.49. In line with the European Parliament’s resolu-
tions (21) calling for better utilisation of resources, the
Commission restructured its departments so as to
improve the planning, implementation and monitoring
of programmes in the field of nuclear safety in the
CEECs and NIS. DG Relex retained only the planning
side and the Joint Relex Service (SCR) was given respon-
sibility for implementation and the financial manage-
ment of the projects, with the support of the Joint
Research Centre (JRC) for safety projects.
5.50. In September 2000, the Commission decided to
redistribute responsibilities again. DG ELARG was to be
responsible for the whole project cycle in the accession
candidate countries and, in the NIS, DG Relex was to
take charge of planning and the SCR the rest of the
project. At the end of the year 2000, this restructuring
had still not been implemented and the Commission
was still unable to satisfactorily clear up the backlog
and implement the new projects.
A number of reports and assessments, such as the IAEA
2000 Report and the Council’s Group on Atomic Questions,
suggest that the level of nuclear safety has improved in the
NIS in general and in a number of specific installations in
particular. The assessments also confirm that the Phare and
Tacis programmes have substantially contributed to this devel-
opment.
Bearing in mind the inherent limitations, now that sufficient
programmes have been implemented the Commission is con-
sidering a project under the 2001 programme to define ways
of evaluating improvements in power plant safety in the NIS.
5.50. The second restructuring only affected the Phare pro-
gramme, accounting for no more than 20 % or so of the total
nuclear safety budget. The formal transfer to the Enlargement
Directorate-General of programmes relating to accession coun-
tries was completed before the establishment of the EuropeAid
Cooperation Office on 1st January 2001. By May 2001, the
Enlargement Directorate-General had the necessary staff to
exercise responsibility for the Phare project cycle. The Com-
mission believes, therefore, that the added value provided by a
direct interface (facilitating accession negotiations, delivering
pre-accession support, continuing the political dialogue) far
outweighs the delays caused by the restructuring. Restructur-
ing also put an end to the anomaly whereby the Phare nuclear
safety sector was outside the normal structure.
In accordance with the White Paper on Commission reform,
the EuropeAid Cooperation Office has been designed to
increase the pace of programme implementation (line man-
agement, increased power of decision at lower levels, clear
lines of responsibility).
(21) European Parliament Resolution on the Commission’s
communication to the Council and the European Parlia-
ment concerning measures in the nuclear safety sector in
favour of the central and eastern European countries and
Newly Independent States (COM(98) 134) (OJ C 175,
21.6.1999, p. 288).
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5.51. The high level of staff turnover led to a loss of
corporate memory, a lack of continuity in the manage-
ment of the projects and some delays in project imple-
mentation. Of the 13 managers employed when the
SCR was set up in July 1998, 11 had left the unit in
December 2000. Other employees only stayed six
months in the unit. There was also a degree of internal
mobility within the unit, as some staff changed fields of
responsibility.
5.52. Moreover, the involvement of the delegations in
the programme implementation was usually fairly lim-
ited. In Bulgaria, even though the management of the
Phare programme is decentralised, the delegation is nei-
ther involved in project management nor in monitor-
ing. The Delegation in Russia was more informed of the
programme implementation, but did not provide any
follow-up. In 2000, the Commission had not allocated
a single member of staff to the Tacis section of its Rus-
sian Delegation to monitor these projects. Moreover,
delegations usually experience difficulties in recruiting
or retaining high level local staff because their contracts
are not sufficiently attractive.
5.53. However, the Kiev Delegation was actively in
contact with the Ukrainian authorities responsible. It
recruited a local expert at the start of the programmes,
who closely monitored the projects. This fact mitigated
the negative effects caused by the partial absence of a
manager at the Commission headquarters for on-site
assistance projects in the Ukraine in 1999.
5.51. The high staff turnover which affected the smooth
implementation of the nuclear safety programme was partly
caused by high numbers of temporary staff. New posts have
been allocated and auxiliary posts replaced by permanent
ones. Nevertheless recruitment of temporary staff with special-
ist skills (such as seconded national experts) will continue to
be necessary.
The implementation of existing and future nuclear safety
projects will require an increased number of Project Manag-
ers. The Commission has addressed this issue in the general
context of the reform of its external aid programmes. Addi-
tional statutory A and B grade staff posts have been added to
the nuclear safety unit in the EuropeAid Cooperation Office
and the Enlargement Directorate-General.
The nuclear safety unit in the Joint Relex Service (SCR) was
organised on horizontal lines. In the EuropeAid Cooperation
Office the unit is structured by sector, each with a separate
activity, such as on-site assistance, regulatory authorities,
design safety, etc. This structure increases corporate memory
and encourages the exchange of experience.
5.52 to 5.53. For the Phare nuclear safety programme, the
Commission has taken measures to increase the role of its del-
egations as part of the shift from centrally implemented
multi-country programmes to decentralised national pro-
grammes. Communication lines between headquarters and
the delegations have been tightened and contact persons for
nuclear safety have been designated in the delegations. The
Delegation in Sofia was involved in project implementation in
the past.
A Joint Management Unit has been set up in Moscow by
Minatom and the Commission. A staff member was added to
the Delegation in Moscow in summer 2001 with responsibil-
ity for nuclear safety matters.
One of the reasons which led the Commission to decide that
nuclear safety should not be included in the first wave of devo-
lution was the difficulty of recruiting high-level local or EU
staff.
The Commission’s policy in recruiting local staff has not
changed: staff recruited locally are paid at market rates, tak-
ing local circumstances into account. A distortion of the local
market is not in the interest of the beneficiary country.
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Slow implementation of projects persists
Clearing up the backlog, to the detriment of new projects
5.54. When the SCR was created, it took over a diffi-
cult situation (delays in most of the old projects that
had been started earlier, errors that had not been cor-
rected, numerous problems and invoices left in abey-
ance). Its first activity was to clear up the backlog, to the
detriment of newer projects. Projects had to be can-
celled or restarted because they had become obsolete or
because the bidders had not been able to keep their ten-
ders unchanged over such a long period.
5.55. Thus, at the end of 2000, only one contract and
two calls for tenders for the ‘design safety’ projects under
the 1997 programmes had been prepared. When the
SCR wanted to sign the contracts for two projects in the
context of the 1996 programmes, the relevant funds
were not available, because they had been used up in
1997 by DGIA to finance another contract. It took five
months to obtain a reallocation of funds and six and
eight months respectively to sign the two contracts.
5.56. Nevertheless, despite low staff numbers (which
was partly offset by the high level of involvement of the
managers), the Commission did improve the situation
for the Tacis programmes. Thus, the backlog of amounts
committed but not yet contracted fell from 142 million
euro to 117 million euro for equipment and from82 mil-
lion euro to 72 million euro for Tacis service contracts
between 1998 and mid-2000. However, on this same
date, the amount remaining to be contracted for Phare
service projects (42 million euro) was still more or less
as high as in 1998 (41 million euro).
5.54. In order to tackle the backlog the Commission decided
on a rigid prioritisation in launching new projects, which
meant that projects in the design safety sector were delayed.
Projects dating back to 1996 or before have now been com-
pleted, while 1997 and later projects are either being prepared
or are being implemented.
A major difficulty has been the mismatch between the dura-
tion of equipment projects and that of the financing memo-
randa. Measures were taken to extend budget lines and nego-
tiations undertaken with the bidders, in order to prevent loss
of funding for the beneficiaries. This was eventually achieved
in 1998/1999.
5.55. The decision to prioritise necessarily resulted in con-
siderable progress in sensitive fields but, as explained above,
caused delays in others, including the design safety sector.
However, EUR 3m was contracted by July 2001 for this sec-
tor out of an allocation for 1997 of EUR 11m.
Of the two projects which the Court notes were signed late,
one was delayed at the contractor’s request because of staffing
problems; the other was related to the completion of the tests
carried out on a certain type of reactor installed both in the
CEECs and in the NIS.
5.56. Since Phare programmes have a shorter life than Tacis
(three years) all funding needs to be contracted at shorter
notice. In keeping with normal procedure, the 1997 pro-
gramme was committed prior to its closure in October 2000.
Thus by October 2000, the figure for Phare was nearly EUR
3m lower.
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Time needed for the preparation of contracts
5.57. The majority of the contracts under the Phare
and Tacis programmes were delayed by more than a
year and the justification of some of them was even
called into question because they had become out of
date. In Russia, at the end of 2000, projects falling under
the 1993, 1994 and 1995 programmes had still not
been finalised. The contracts for many of the 1997
projects had not yet been signed and the terms of refer-
ence for the 1998 projects had not yet been established.
165 Russian projects had built up significant delays. At
the current rate, it will take more than six years to make
up for the delays that have accumulated.
5.58. The first phases of the projects financed in Rus-
sia under the 1992 to 1998 programmes took a very
long time to implement, as is shown by the duration of
the phases set out in Table 5.6. A study of the most
problematic cases shows that the delays observed were
largely due to the large number of participants in the
implementation and the cumbersome nature of the
procedures. The declared intention of the Commission
to discontinue the use of the procurement agencies,
which the Court had recommended, should improve
the situation by reducing the number of parties involved
and should thereby speed up the implementation pro-
cess.
5.57. The remainder of design safety projects from before
1997 are all related to the supply of equipment. These projects
were interrupted because of an apparent conflict of interest
and were later restarted. The Commission is still confident
that results can be delivered before the programme’s cut-off
date.
The 1997 projects are secured: all terms of reference have been
completed and contract extensions with procurement agents
have been made. For 1998 all terms of reference except two
have been endorsed.
It is misleading to extrapolate the current rate of implementa-
tion, for the following reasons:
— staff increases will enable the Commission to launch more
projects in parallel,
— new guidelines for supply contracts provide that all con-
tracting should be terminated 150 days after the cut-off
date for the submission of bids,
— programming of technically mature projects will lessen
project fragmentation and thus lead to higher expenditure
per contract.
Most of the 1993 to 1997 equipment can be contracted
within two years.
5.58. As of 1998 the Commission decided to reduce the
number of actors by entrusting more responsibility to EU
operators in charge of on-site assistance, for the implementa-
tion of plant improvement projects (see 1998 Communica-
tion). In 1998 the Commission decided to discontinue the use
of procurement agencies for future programmes.
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5.59. For all the equipment supply projects the local
regulatory authorities endorse the technical specifica-
tions, which must comply with the legislation of the
country concerned. This endorsement, which is required
before the publication of the call for tenders, is often
the cause of serious delays, sometimes for no apparent
reason.
5.60. Because of the unclear definition of responsibili-
ties between the Commission departments and the pro-
curement agencies, there are numerous exchanges of
correspondence between them. These always give rise
to more or less significant delays, in particular where
the Finance or Contract units within the Commission
are slow to reply. The acceptance of the tender evalua-
tion can take several months.
5.59. For new large projects the Commission intends to
request a Memorandum of Understanding which will bind the
beneficiaries to shorter response times.
5.60. The Commission has taken measures to clarify its
relationship with procurement agencies in order to avoid
unnecessary correspondence and delays. In the EuropeAid
Cooperation Office set up in 2001 the contracting and finan-
cial units have been combined as single units in each geo-
graphical Directorate. The rule that not more than 150 days
may elapse between tender closure and contract signing has
also led to a streamlining of operations between units.
Table 5.6 — 1992 to 1998 Tacis Programmes in Russia — Duration of the first 3 phases
Phases concluded as of 11 October 2000 Duration of the phases (in months)
Type of project TSs/TORs Tenders Negotiations Total for the 3 phases
Operational safety Average 3 2 5
Maximum 3 3 6
Design safety Average 5 10 7 21
Maximum 13 11 19 34
Safeguards Average 7 16 7 18
Maximum 13 16 10 30
Equipment Average 11 16 10 34
Maximum 28 32 32 64
All types Average 9 14 9 28
Maximum 28 32 32 64
Phases not concluded as of 11 October 2000 Time passed since the start of each phase (in months)
Type of project TSs/TORs Tenders Negotiations
Design safety Average 31 22
Maximum 31 26
Safeguards Average 19 26
Maximum 24 27
Equipment Average 32 24 23
Maximum 52 38 50
All types Average 30 23 23
Maximum 52 38 50
NB: The three successive phases are: the preparation of the Technical Specifications (TSs) and the Terms of Reference (TORs), the call for tenders up to the selection of the suc-
cessful tenderer and the negotiations with the latter up to the signing of the contract.
Source: Tacis Nuclear Safety Programme Joint Management Unit — Moscow.
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5.61. Other delays are due to inadequacies in the ser-
vices provided by certain on-site technical assistants —
unreliable estimates of project costs, poor initial qual-
ity of technical documents, slowness in including
requested amendments (on the part of the Commission
or the procurement agency).
Subcontracting
5.62. Western technical assistance firms subcontract
design safety studies to local institutes. Remuneration
for the services provided by these institutes is depen-
dent on the Commission’s payment to the main con-
tractor. Because of the slowness of these payments by
the Commission, the subcontractors are often not fully
paid off until a year after having carried out all the
plannedwork, which, given their often precarious finan-
cial positions, frequently causes them serious damage.
Despite the Court’s criticisms on this subject in its Spe-
cial Report, the Commission had not yet resolved this
problem in a satisfactory manner by the end of the year
2000.
Management improved, but transparency still inadequate
JRC technical support
5.63. Following the Court’s observation concerning
the excessive delegation of its responsibilities, the Com-
mission no longer uses the European electricity produc-
ers group for technical assistance. It has made the Joint
Research Centre responsible for providing technical
assistance for planning, drawing up terms of reference
and appraisal in respect of design safety and on-site
assistance projects.
5.64. Using the JRC for technical support was well
received by all the parties, who recognised its scientific
quality and independence. They are relatively satisfied
with the speed with which it handles its tasks. The aver-
age time for handling assignments regarding equipment
(technical specifications, terms of reference, evaluation
reports) went down from more than 70 working days
in the first quarter of 2000 to less than 20 days at the
end of the year.
5.61. The new arrangements provide that funding will be
committed only when it is clear that technical specifications
have reached a sufficient level of preparation. The Commis-
sion expects that this will improve matters. On-site technical
assistance is now taking greater care with the preparation of
new plant improvement projects, so it should be possible to
improve compliance with deadlines.
5.62. The Commission’s responsibility is to its main con-
tractor. It is taking steps to speed up payments to contractors,
which should mean there will be no reason why subcontrac-
tors should not be paid on time.
5.63. The Commission has indeed followed up on the com-
ment by the Court in 1998 on what it called an ‘excessive
role’ of the European electricity producers group, by discon-
tinuing contractual relations with this group and by calling
upon the JRC to take over the technical advisory function.
5.64. This improvement was largely due to the increase in
the number of JRC staff working full time on nuclear safety
support.
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Supply projects entrusted to other intermediaries
5.65. The Court also criticised the use of procurement
agencies for equipment supplies. In 2000, the Commis-
sion was still being assisted by such agencies for projects
for which funds were allocated prior to 1998. Currently,
it has decided not to manage these projects itself, but to
entrust them in the future to Western on-site technical
assistance firms. This solution, however, does not offer
a sufficient guarantee of transparency. Already, the
on-site consultants assist the beneficiaries in drawing
up technical specifications and terms of reference for
equipment projects and participate in tender evalua-
tions. However, on several occasions, the Court found
that these consultants did not always comply with the
tendering rules and procedures, which could result in a
risk of conflict of interests.
Limited involvement of beneficiaries
5.66. The economic situation in the beneficiary coun-
tries obviously has a direct impact on the level of nuclear
safety. Thus, in the year 2000, it was hard for the Ukrai-
nian plants to find the necessary resources to purchase
fuel, pay their staff (salaries were 1 to 2 months in
arrears), carry out the necessary maintenance and pro-
vide their part of the funding for certain projects. More-
over, the implementationof theprojectswas also affected
by institutional changes, in particular in Bulgaria, Rus-
sia and the Ukraine, where the regulatory authorities’
lack of powers and the frequent changes of staff posed
problems.
5.67. In the countries that have applied for accession,
the Commission has greater powers of persuasion than
in the NIS. Thus, just before the Helsinki Summit that
opened the way to accession negotiations, Bulgaria,
Lithuania and Slovakia accepted the Commission’s
requirement that they should shut down the oldest units
in their plants.
5.68. In the NIS, on the other hand, the Commission
is less able to bring pressure to bear. In the Ukraine, for
example, it asked the various government bodies to
strengthen the regulatory authority (it currently oper
ates under the Ministry of the Environment and has
5.65. The Commission has realised the risks of conflicts of
interest and has called on the JRC and other services to become
fully involved in the evaluation of supply/works projects. The
first time such an approach was followed, during the complex
evaluation of the Chernobyl facilities project, it proved its
worth. The team of JRC-specialists working full time ensures
that the cumulative experience will bear fruit.
5.66. The Court’s comments on the effects of the economic
situation and institutional changes in the Tacis area are cor-
rect. Institutional changes may be less relevant to Phare pro-
grammes, since the national aid coordinators in accession
countries have responsibility for counterpart actions.
5.68. The context of enlargement presents a unique oppor-
tunity for the Commission to have an impact on the recipient
countries, which is not the case for the NIS. EBRD projects
in these countries are also affected by difficulties in the national
decision-making processes.
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limited powers), without obtaining a firm commitment
on their part. The EBRD is able to lay down stricter con-
ditions because it has the G7 group’s backing. For
example, it can cancel a project if, after several months,
it has become clear that, through some fault of the ben-
eficiary, it will not be possible to carry the project out
in accordance with the planned timetable.
5.69. The low motivation of certain NIS beneficiaries
makes it difficult to implement the projects in the best
possible way. This is particularly true for the regulatory
authorities. The beneficiary countries have still notman-
aged to establish strong and independent regulatory
authorities, largely because they lack any real will to do
so. This situation has been denounced by various insti-
tutions, such as the G7, the IAEA and the EBRD.
5.70. The question of the impact of the EU-financed
projects in aid of the regulatory authorities must be
looked at against this background. The ‘2 + 2’ approach
(simultaneous aid to the power stations and regulatory
authorities) has turned out to be particularly difficult to
implement. This concept requires commitment from all
parties concerned and the synchronisation of both
industrial and regulatory work. In Russia, the only
framework contract that had been signed met with
numerous problems and no projects of this type had
got off the ground in the Ukraine by the end of 2000.
The beneficiaries seem not to understand the aim of
this approach and only see it as a source of funding for
their regulatory authorities.
Conclusions
5.71. On the basis of the follow-up work to the obser-
vations contained in its Special Report No 25/98, the
Court recognises that the Commission has clarified its
strategy for the future, but the benefits of this new
approach have yet to materialise. Particularly because of
the JRC’s support, it also monitors the projects better.
Furthermore, the Commission has slightly reduced the
time needed for payments and applies the rules more
strictly.
5.70. This concept, though suitable in theory, is difficult to
implement. The implementation of large projects (Plant
Improvement Projects) can only start once the Western Tech-
nical Safety Organisation has reviewed all aspects of the
licensing plans.
5.71. The Commission welcomes the Court’s comments on
the clarification of future strategy and the improvements in
monitoring and control. Although the system of prioritising
projects has been put into force, there has been no follow-up
from the Parliament or Council to the new strategy.
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5.72. However, the Court notes that several of the
shortcomings pointed out in its Special Report were
still there at the end of the year 2000:
(a) the Commission had still not specified indicators to
allow the measurement of progress achieved in the
field of safety standards (see paragraph 5.48);
(b) the high level of staff turnover and the low involve-
ment of the delegations hindered the implementa-
tion and the monitoring of the projects (see para-
graphs 5.51 to 5.53);
(c) the implementation of projects and the overcoming
of accumulated delays were still very slow (see para-
graphs 5.54 to 5.61);
(d) regulations in the field of calls for tenders had not
always been strictly complied with and problems
linked to the management and supply of equipment
had still not been solved (see paragraph 5.65);
(e) coordination between the projects realised on site
and those planned for the safety regulation and con-
trol authorities was still inadequate and the effec-
tiveness of the ‘2 + 2’ approach was not ensured (see
paragraph 5.70);
(f) the local institutes subcontracted to carry out stud-
ies continued to be paid very late, a fact that put
them in a delicate financial position (see para-
graph 5.62).
5.72.
(a) A methodology to define the EU position on ‘high level
of nuclear safety’ has been developed. The methodology is
not based on ‘EU standards’. This methodology will serve
in accession negotiations and it will be taken into account
in the project contemplated under the Tacis programme to
define ways of evaluating improvements in power-plant
safety in the NIS.
(b) The number of posts has been increased, temporary staff
are being replaced by permanent staff, and some devolu-
tion has taken place.
(c) The following measures have been taken: an increase in
human resources, a stronger involvement by the JRC, strict
prioritisation of projects, increased project size, an improve-
ment in programming, and discontinuation of the use of
procurement agencies. These measures have been supple-
mented by the general reforms undertaken when the
EuropeAid Cooperation Office was set up, such as the
150-days rule laid down in the new guidelines for sup-
ply contracts and the very structure of the new office, bet-
ter geared towards project implementation.
(d) The Commission has simplified its rules and procedures,
thus creating a more efficient framework and diminish-
ing the risk of non-compliance. The Commission is con-
fident that the measures summarised above will allow
equipment under the 1993 to 1997 programming years
to be contracted within two years.
(e) The Commission will undertake such industrial projects
only if clear conditionalities (e.g. approval of licensing
plans by the Western Technical Safety Organisation) are
met.
(f) The Commission cannot interfere in the relations between
its own main contractor and a sub-contractor. But mea-
sures taken by the EuropeAid Cooperation Office to speed
up payments to the main contractor should lead to a
faster payments to sub-contractors.
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5.73. These shortcomings are partly due to the fact
that the Commission has still not allocated adequate
human resources for satisfactory implementation and
monitoring of its programmes (see paragraphs 5.51 to
5.53). At the end of the year 2000, the restructuring of
its departments was still under way. Nor has it suffi-
ciently rationalised its implementation procedures (see
paragraphs 5.58 to 5.60) or sufficiently linked its aid to
the fulfilment of certain conditions so as to improve the
motivation of beneficiaries (see paragraphs 5.68 to
5.69).
Recommendations
5.74. The Commission should allocate the adequate
human resources to the management unit, if necessary,
by recruiting experts for an appropriate period. It should
also involve its delegations more and allow them to
offer local staff sufficiently attractive contracts to attract
and keep high quality experts.
5.75. The new instruction manual for service, supply
and works contracts (22) now imposes time limits for
the awarding and signature of contracts. In the future,
the Commission should also impose time limits for all
parties for drawing up and endorsing the documents
constituting the tender files.
5.76. The Commission could increase the effective-
ness of its measures by laying down stricter conditions
for its intervention. These conditions could be discussed
in the context of the Partnership andCooperationAgree-
ments (PCAs). If the guidelines laid down by the Envi-
ronment, Energy and Nuclear Safety Subcommittees
were examined at the level of the General PCA Com-
mittee, a consistent strategy covering social, fiscal and
institutional aspects that was binding for the benefi-
ciary State could be adopted for the energy sector.
5.73. The Commission has strengthened the relevant Units
in the EuropeAid Cooperation Office and the Enlargement
Directorate General with permanent staff. A continuous assess-
ment of the projects is undertaken by contracted monitors,
who report to the Commission at regular intervals. With the
use of new guidelines, project implementation has become
more efficient and transparent.
Only in the context of the Phare programmes can conditional-
ity be strictly applied. Memoranda of Understanding will
increasingly be used when dealing with the NIS.
5.74. Action has been taken to tackle the problem of human
resources by strengthening the nuclear safety operational unit
in the EuropeAid Cooperation Office, and within the Enlarge-
ment Directorate General, and by recruiting staff with a strong
specialisation in very specific areas for the JRC for a period of
three years. Issues relating to the optimal role of the delega-
tions are being studied, and should be solved as part of the
planned devolution of the Tacis programme and the decen-
tralisation of Phare.
5.75. The Commission expects the new guidelines to be
instrumental in shortening the time taken for the various
stages of the contract procedure. For future programmes it
intends to establish a set of guidelines laying down explicit
time limits for the various stages in the preparation of a tender
file.
5.76. The Commission fully recognises that any type of
assistance should be set within a broader policy framework.
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreements are certainly
the best tool available, both in the relevant subcommittees and
in the meetings at political level. Many of the difficulties
encountered are not only due to the lack of political endorse-
ment, but also to problems in the day-to-day follow-up of
project progress.
(22) The instruction manual for service, supply and work con-
tracts concluded in the context of Community coopera-
tion in favour of non-member countries (SEC(1999)
1801/2), adopted by the Commission on 10 November
1999.
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OTHER OBSERVATIONS
Tacis operations
Bangkok facility
5.77. Under the so-called ‘Bangkok facility’, the Tacis
programme has, from 1992, provided the European
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) with
grant funding to support Technical Assistance (TA) com-
ponents of its operation. The TA support is mainly
intended to be used for preparation and implementa-
tion of EBRD investments. The annual payments have
been around 20 million euro (23 million euro since
1998).
5.78. EBRD is every year reporting a ‘leverage ratio’
for the Tacis-funded TA leading to EBRD investments.
Depending on the definition of this ratio different fig-
ures may be reported. For instance, in the Tacis’ Annual
Report 1999 the ratio is reported as 1:50 while in a
1999 evaluation report two figures are given, 1:15 and
1:38. In our audit we had some difficulties in verifying
the link between TA support and actual EBRD invest-
ment. Some double counting of investment was found,
indicating that the real ratio is lower than reported.
Given the unclear definition of this leverage ratio it is of
limited use and should not be used as a justification cri-
teria for the Bangkok facility.
5.79. Part of the Bangkok facility can be used to finance
the operating costs of the Early Stage Equity (ESE) Funds
and provide TA for pre-investment studies and post-
investment consulting support. In the years 1999 and
2000 about 25 % of the Bangkok facility was used for
this purpose (5-6 million euro). As of 31 December
2000 a total of 31,2 million euro of the Bangkok facil-
ity had been used for the TA and management of ESE
Funds. The corresponding investments made and loans
disbursed by the EBRD amount to only 69,2 million
euro. This gives a very low investment ratio of only 1:2.
5.80. The ESE Funds were initially set up to provide
small and medium sized private companies with equity
capital within a specific region of operation. These con-
ditions have not always been fulfilled. The EBRD invest-
ment is in many cases a mixture of loans and equity.
5.78. The Commission believes such a performance indica-
tor is valuable in monitoring the impact of the Bangkok facil-
ity. It agrees that care must be taken to calculate the ‘leverage
ratio’ as precisely as possible and has already taken steps to
ensure that the calculation of this ratio is reported more accu-
rately in future. What constitutes a good result as measured
by the ratio will vary with the specific activity undertaken.
The ‘leverage ratio’ is not the main criterion of effectiveness for
Bangkok facility operations. The Commission and the Bank
instead seek to make a broader assessment of ‘transition
impact’ before financing operations. Measures used include
business growth, creation of jobs, use of new technologies,
improved business practice, and improved corporate gover-
nance.
5.79. Venture capital operations are notoriously expensive
and risky, and it was understood from the outset that the ratio
of technical assistance to capital invested would be high. In
fact, the ratio has been significantly better than anticipated
because less technical assistance was used than had been fore-
seen, and the Bank expects to increase the capital of some of
the funds as a step towards raising private sector capital. The
success of the funds in establishing themselves as credible
investment vehicles has meant that the Commission will be
able to withdraw its support somewhat earlier than expected.
5.80. The investment policy of the funds is decided by the
Supervisory Boards, of which the Commission is a member.
As is normal in private venture capital operations, the invest-
ment policy of the ESE funds provides for investments to take
the form of a mixture of loans and equity.
268 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.12.2001
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS COMMISSION’S REPLIES
5.81. The investment funds are managed by contrac-
tors known as Fund Managers. Many of the Fund Man-
agers are active in other investment and fund activities
in Russia, which creates a risk of conflict of interests: if
a FundManager can extensively use consultants to evalu-
ate and control investments in one portfolio there is a
risk that he couldmake the same investments in another
portfolio, thereby providing a service to the owners of
the latter portfolio. Accordingly, no assurance can be
obtained that the Fund Managers’ use of EU-supported
TA is appropriate.
5.82. The Bangkok facility is also used to finance the
Turn Around Management (TAM) programme. The pri-
mary objective of the TAM programme is to provide
practical advice to the senior management of selected
enterprises. This support does not have a direct link to
EBRD investments at all and it is not an integral part of
EBRD’s banking function. Accordingly, the eligibility
criteria for financing this programmeunder the Bangkok
facility are not met.
5.83. According to the annual Financing Memoranda
the EBRD is obliged to provide the Commission with a
report on each annual programme. The report should
include an assessment of the extent to which the objec-
tives of the programme have beenmet. The latest report
that could be provided was dated 12 April 1999 and
pertained to the year 1998. This report, however, does
not include any assessment of the extent to which the
objectives of the programme have been met.
5.81. Three safeguards prevent a real conflict of interests
from arising. These are:
— the EBRD is required to support operations that are
‘additional’, in other words, in areas where private sector
operators would not invest. This is reflected in the invest-
ment policy of the ESE funds;
— the fund manager agreements preclude cross-investments;
— EU technical assistance is managed by the EBRD, not by
the fund managers. The EBRD has advised the Commis-
sion that only one of the fund managers has other venture
capital interests in Russia. On no occasion has a fund
manager co-invested in a company also receiving ESE
investment.
5.82. The scope of the Bangkok facility is defined by the
annual financing agreement with the EBRD. In the years in
question, the TAM programme was explicitly mentioned on
the list of eligible projects which is annexed to the financing
proposal and submitted to the Member States for approval.
TAM is a valuable programme in its own right. However, the
Commission agrees that the Bangkok facility is not the most
appropriate funding mechanism, and has already decided that
from 2001, TAM should be financed from the Tacis national
programme.
5.83. The reports include an assessment of each of the
operations supported. In the past the Commission did not
insist that the Bank aggregate these to make an assessment
at programme level, as it was not convinced of the added value
of such an exercise. Nevertheless, from 2001 the EBRD is
attempting to make such an assessment in an annual report
to donors. The Commission has supplemented the annual
assessments of the Bank at operation level with an indepen-
dent evaluation of the programme, which reported in 1999.
Efforts are being made in 2001 to improve the layout and
content of the reports, with an added focus on transition
impact. The Early Stage Equity funds (25 % of the pro-
gramme) are subject to detailed quarterly reporting, as well as
six monthly reviews at the supervisory boards and an annual
report, which must be approved by the Commission before
funds are released for subsequent years. Agreement has been
reached in principle for closer monitoring by the Commission
of other recurrent projects, in particular the micro-finance
operations.
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5.84. DG AUDIT audited the facility at the EBRD in
February 2000. This was the only audit undertaken in
four years. The audit identified a number of material
findings and such ex-post audits should be carried out
on a regular basis. The Bangkok facility projects are not
monitored by the Tacis Monitoring Units nor by the
EBRD itself, although the monitoring contract provides
that monitoring should also be carried out on the
Bangkok facility projects if requested by the EBRD. No
request has been issued so far.
5.85. If it is decided to continue the facility, despite its
limited impact, the Commission should take steps to
improve its management: (i) the investment fund man-
agement contracts should be made more transparent;
(ii) the projects should be monitored within the normal
Tacis monitoring framework; (iii) the Commission
should systematically require operational and financial
reports and make these a condition for making pay-
ments; (iv) the reliability of the reports should be audited.
ISTC and STCU
5.86. The International Science & Technology Centre
in Russia (ISTC) and the Science and Technology Centre
in Ukraine (STCU) provide former weapons’ scientists
in the NIS the opportunity to redirect their talents to
peaceful activities (non-proliferation). Also the aim is to
contribute to the transition to market-based economies
and foster the integration of scientists and engineers
from NIS states into the global scientific community.
The centres are supported by a donor community of
which the largest contributors are the USA, Japan and
the EU. The centres employ local and international staff
and produce annual reports including financial state-
ments. The financial statements are audited by an exter-
nal private audit firm.
5.84. The Commission agrees with the Court’s findings
relating to audits, but does not believe that it is necessary or
desirable for Bangkok facility projects to be routinely moni-
tored by Tacis Monitoring Units. The EBRD is responsible for
the whole project cycle, including monitoring the quality of the
services provided, and is best placed to exercise the role of
monitor as it has the necessary technical expertise and pres-
ence in the field.
There is a role for greater Commission supervision of the out-
come of some of the longer-term programmes financed by
Tacis. A system of scrutiny is in place for the ESE, and will
be extended to cover micro-finance operations. The Commis-
sion is considering with EBRD whether there might also be a
role for some monitoring by the Tacis Monitoring Units of a
sample of Bangkok facility projects.
5.85. The Commission agrees with the need for more fre-
quent auditing of the Bangkok facility funds, and will con-
tinue to work to improve the quality of reporting and moni-
toring by its departments. It believes sufficient safeguards are
in place to ensure that there is no conflict of interests in the
fund management agreements. Routine Tacis monitoring
would not be appropriate, nor would it improve the manage-
ment of the funds. However, the Commission will ensure closer
monitoring by Commission officials, assisted where necessary
by external experts, along the lines adopted for the Early
Stage Equity Funds.
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5.87. Before the transfer in February 2001 of all pro-
gramme implementation to the Research Directorate-
General, the division of responsibilities within the Com-
mission for the financial management of the support to
the ISTC and the STCUbetween theDirectorates-General
Europe Aid (formerly the Common Service for External
Relations), External Relations and Research was unclear
concerning controls over payment and financial follow
up. Payments from the Commission to the ISTC and the
STCU are based solely on estimated cash-flow needs,
with no follow up of the expenditure actually incurred.
The Commission has paid 88 million euro to the ISTC
between 1994 and 2000, and 5 million euro to the
STCU between 1998 and 2000, without ever carrying
out an ex-post audit of these funds.
5.88. The Commission should improve the follow-up
of actual expenditure with regular ex-post audits. An
evaluation of the impact and effectiveness of the pro-
gramme should be carried out, as, for example, is done
regularly by governmental branches of another large
donor, the USA (23).
PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS IN SPECIAL
REPORTS
Emergency humanitarian aid for the victims of the
Kosovo crisis (ECHO)
5.89. The Kosovo crisis was characterised by large
population movements in the region between March
and July 1999 as well as large scale destruction. Through
the European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO)
the European Union (EU) provided 400 million euro of
humanitarian aid in response to the needs of the popu-
lation.
5.87. In order to improve financial control, the Commis-
sion has asked the Science Centres to provide updated expen-
diture estimates for each project, in addition to their requests
for cash-flow needs. This is particularly important as the Cen-
tres pay in United States dollars.
5.88. The Science Centres have a primary responsibility for
auditing and monitoring every project funded by the EU, and
the agreements signed between the Centres and the beneficia-
ries also provide for auditing and monitoring (1).
Day-to-day project monitoring is mostly performed by staff
at the Centres, not by Commission staff. The Centres examine
the technical reports, sometimes with the assistance of western
monitors, to ensure that projects are achieving the intended
results and to determine whether they are on schedule. Each
EU-funded project also has at least one EU collaborator, either
a national laboratory or a private company. The Tacis Mos-
cow office has provided assistance to such monitoring on at
least two occasions, in 1996 and in 1998.
5.89. The EUR 400 million, budget used in the Kosovo
crisis represented almost a doubling of ECHO’s original bud-
get, with virtually no additional staff. In practice this meant
that ECHO had to manage 12 additional decisions and 500
extra contracts.
(1) This approach to auditing and monitoring has been discussed
and approved by the Council Regulations (EEC) No 3955/92
(OJ L 409, 31.12.1992, p. 1), (Euratom, EEC) No 2053/93
(OJ L 187, 29.7.1993, p. 1), (EC) No 1766/98 (OJ L 225,
12.8.1998, p. 2) and (Euratom) No 2387/98 (OJ L 297,
6.11.1998, p. 4).
(23) Latest report: US General Accounting Office 01-582,
Weapons of Mass Destruction, p. 17, published inMay 2001.
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5.90. The main objective of the Court’s audit, which
was undertaken between July 1999 and February 2000,
was to assess ECHO’s management of the EU aid for the
victims of the Kosovo crisis, as well as the administra-
tive framework for this assistance.
5.91. ECHO operates as an active donor, funding the
programmes of UN and international agencies and
NGOs and taking responsibility for monitoring and
evaluation. A large number of actors were involved in
the Kosovo crisis, which, in some areas, has caused
duplication of efforts and inefficiency. The complexity
of the relations between the large number of actors has
caused the need for elaborate, ad hoc coordination
mechanisms.
5.92. Relations between ECHO and its UN partners
were tense. Differences of opinion remained on impor-
tant issues such as accounting for and reporting on
projects. Consequently, 15 million euro available from
ECHO for food aid remained blocked during the height
of the crisis situation in Kosovo. A more realistic and
more active approach to the financing and to the par-
ticipation in the decision-making of United Nations
agencies is required
5.93. ECHO field offices were short of staff. The
experts in the field offices faced many implementation
problemswithout having officials with decision-making
powers supporting them locally. This has caused delays
and created a gap between ECHO in Brussels, which
had the decision-making powers, and its field offices.
5.94. Decision-making and payment procedures at
Community level did not allow a rapid reaction. The
contractual procedures for implementing ECHO activi-
ties took only limited account of the urgency of the
situation. ECHO’s administrative procedures should be
tailored according to the degree of urgency.
5.90. The Commission accepts that the sample of contracts
examined by the Court reflects ECHO’s main partners (in
terms of those partners having contracts with larger individual
budgets), and the main geographical areas and sectors of
intervention. However, this may have led to insufficient focus
on ECHO’s NGO partners, which together ultimately received
more than half of the funds.
5.91. ECHO made many efforts to coordinate activities,
including providing daily updates on operations to Member
States. The Commission does not believe that any lack of
coordination between, or with, Member States can be held to
be primarily the Commission’s or ECHO’s responsibility.
5.92. The Commission agrees that not all the problems in
EC/United Nations relations have yet been solved, indeed the
EC/United Nations agreement of 9 August 1999 explicitly
identified certain areas which required further review An
inter-service consultation on this issue took place in the Com-
mission in summer 2001, but guidance notes for future con-
trol missions to be shared between the Commission and the
United Nations have still to be finalised. It is hoped that a
mutually satisfactory solution can be found by the end of the
year.
The failure to conclude contracts for EUR 15 million at an
earlier stage was largely due to a United Nations partner’s
initial outright refusal to allow access to original documents
during an ECHO verification visit in July 1999. This led to
the temporary suspension of payments in 2000. The funds
were subsequently entered into contracts.
5.93. A number of ECHO headquarters staff did under-
take missions to the field in order to assist with operational
and administrative matters, which meant that in most cases
communication between Brussels and the field was not a
problem. The only gap the Commission recognises is that in
some cases delays arose due to the need to get contract approv-
als from Brussels. Recognising the need to improve on this,
ECHO has now identified specific staff within its organisation
who are on standby to carry out these tasks when necessary
in the future.
5.94. The Commission, at ECHO’s request, has already
approved the principle of a new framework decision procedure
for primary emergencies to allow a faster and more flexible
response to such situations. This has now been implemented.
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5.95. Due to slow procedures, ECHO contracts con-
tinued for longer than initially planned because they
were launched late. This situation, in combination with
the quick and unforeseeable return of the refugees in
June 1999, has reduced the relevance and usefulness of
some of the measures concerned. Thus, the regulatory
and procedural framework had an adverse impact on
the capacity of ECHO to respond quickly and effectively
to the changing circumstances.
European Agency for Reconstruction
5.96. The Court assessed the efficiency of the Euro-
pean Agency for Reconstruction, for the year 2000 at
the level of its organisational structure, its operational
budget management as well as its programme imple-
mentation in Kosovo. It also examined whether matters
affecting economy or the effectiveness of the interven-
tions were not neglected.
5.97. The Court concludes that in 2000 the efficiency
of the Agency’s administration as well as its budget
management was high. It managed to achieve most of
the ambitious objectives set for its first year of activity
in the fields of energy, housing, transport and agricul-
ture. At the end of 2000 more than 90 % of the funds
committed before December 2000 were contracted and
more than half of the committed funds for operations
were paid. It tried to pay attention to the principles of
both efficiency and economy. By applying the rules in
force in a very flexible way the Agency managed to
obtain lowerprices and stimulated the regional economy.
5.98. The Court recommends to the Agency not to
disperse its efforts but to continue to focus its human
and financial resources on the latest reconstruction pri-
orities. It also urges the Commission, which is funding
the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo
(UNMIK) EU pillar in charge of Kosovo reconstruction,
to take much more action to set up a policy framework
and a strategy to ensure the sustainability of EU-financed
investments in Kosovo, which was not ensured in the
prevailing circumstances.
5.95. The Commission does not believe that delays in using
funds in 1999 materially reduced the relevance or usefulness
of Commission financed activities; indeed EUR 53.6 million
of humanitarian aid was already contracted by April 1999.
Given the complexity of the situation the Commission does
not consider that the delays were unreasonable or that any
other alternative was available.
5.97. The Commission welcomes the Court’s praise for the
Agency’s efficient administration and budget management.
Clear goals and a focus on the expected outputs enabled the
Agency to achieve its objectives.
5.98. The Commission shares the Court’s opinion that the
Agency should continue to focus its efforts on key sectors in
accordance with needs on the ground and the ‘CARDS’ Regu-
lation.
The Commission also shares the Court’s view on the need for
a policy framework and long-term strategy. The Commission
will pursue the issue of developing a sustainable policy and
regulatory framework with UNMIK and the provisional self-
government institutions which are to be elected in Kosovo.
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Tacis cross-border cooperation programme
5.99. The Tacis cross-border cooperation programme
was launched in 1996 on the initiative of the European
Parliament and covers regions inRussia, Belarus, Ukraine
and Moldova which border on the European Union
(Finland) or the ‘Phare’ countries. The programme also
reflects the demand of the 1994 Essen European Coun-
cil for intensified cross-border cooperation in Central
and Eastern Europe to promote regional cooperation
and good neighbourliness.
5.100. A total of 132,5 million euro was committed to
the programme over the period 1996 to 2000, which
represents approximately 5 % of the total Tacis budget.
According to the Commission’s main policy document
on the subject, the objectives of the programme are:
(a) to promote economic and social development in
theborder regionsby supporting sustainableprojects
to reduce the risk of stability in the region being
undermined by the very significant difference in liv-
ing standards on either side of the border. In par-
ticular, the programme should assist the border
regions to overcome their specific development
problems, which stem from being on the periphery
of their national economies.
(b) to finance projectswhich have a cross-border impact
and which are supported by communities on both
sides of the border, such cooperation being consid-
ered essential to ensure sustainable development.
(c) to finance as a priority projects with a demonstrable
local or regional commitment.
5.101. Although these objectives are similar to the
objectives of the Phare cross-border cooperation pro-
gramme, the Commission has not set up for the Tacis
CBC programme the coordinating mechanisms it used
for the Phare CBC programme to promote cross-border
cooperation. In particular, the Joint Programme and
Monitoring Committees established by the Commission
to provide a forum at regional level for Member States
and Phare countries to identify projects of common
interest have not been set up for the Tacis CBC pro-
gramme to encourage dialogue between Phare and Tacis
countries.
5.101. The cross-border cooperation started later than the
main Tacis programme and the Phare CBC programme and
it has relatively limited resources. At the beginning new pro-
cedures and practices had to be set up, and the impact of the
programme will not be evident until some years after its start-
up.
The Tacis CBC programme should be distinguished from the
corresponding Phare CBC programme. Even if the basic objec-
tives of the Tacis and Phare CBC are similar the political con-
text is completely different, the latter being part of
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5.102. The overall conclusion was that the Tacis cross-
border cooperation programme is an instrument which
can play a useful role in addressing issues relating to the
establishment of a new eastern border for the European
Union following the next accession and giving a more
concrete expression to the Northern Dimension policy.
However, its impact over the first five years of the pro-
gramme has been limited, not only because of imple-
mentation delays but also because of the very limited
funding available, the fact that no framework for cross-
border dialogue at the project programming stage was
set up, the failure to provide matching funding for the
Phare eastern border regions, and the insufficient prior-
ity given to projects that address the fundamental objec-
tive of the programme: namely, raising the living stan-
dards of the populations in the beneficiary regions.
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) manage-
ment
5.103. The Court of Auditors has assessed the evolu-
tion of the conditions governing the implementation of
expenditure under the Common Foreign and Security
Policy for the period from 1997 to 1999. The average
amount was 35 million euro per year during the period
1997 to 2000.
5.104. Title V of the Treaty of the European Union lays
down the provisions establishing and governing the
Common Foreign and Security Policy.
5.105. The Special Report focuses on joint actions,
which ‘shall address specific situations where opera-
tional action by the Union is deemed to be required’
(Article 14) as well as the implementing decisions of
common positions which ‘shall define the approach of
the Union to a particular matter of geographical or the-
matic nature’ (Article 15).
pre-accession assistance geared towards smoothing the transi-
tion from Phare to future Interreg programmes. The benefi-
ciaries of the Tacis CBC programme are NIS countries whose
relationship to the EU is still developing. These different start-
ing points are reflected in the decision-making procedures and
management structures and the resources allocated to the two
programmes.
Although no regional cross-border committees have so far
been set up between Phare and Tacis, a seminar is to be held
in St Petersburg in November which will be attended by rep-
resentatives of all parties involved in Tacis CBC and Phare
participants. At the seminar the advantages of the cross-
border committees operating between Finnish and Russian
partners will be presented with the aim of generating similar
arrangements on the Tacis/Phare borders.
5.102. The Commission takes the view that in December
2000 it was too early to make an assessment of the full
impact of the CBC programme. Tacis CBC beneficiary coun-
tries receive cross-border aid through the Tacis regional coop-
eration and national programmes. The CBC budget, includ-
ing the budget line for special action for the Baltic region, has
remained unchanged despite an overall decline in the Tacis
budget, so the CBC share of the total has actually increased.
The programme’s budget, which the Court finds limited, is
ultimately decided by the Budgetary Authority.
The Phare framework for cross-border dialogue and the whole
Phare CBC regulation are related to the pre-accession process.
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5.106. Despite a number of changes in the Treaty on
European Union, the Commission’s role in determining
the financial, legal and operational arrangements is still
not clear. Depending on the action, either the Commis-
sion or the Council defines the arrangements for its
implementation. In practice, this complicates day-to-
day management both in the field and at headquarters
level.
5.107. Criteria were laid down by the end of 1999 on
the sourcing of Community funding for CFSP actions
but exceptions were left open for so-called ‘borderline
cases’. Furthermore, the arrangements for contributions
in kind and for the sharing of costs between other
donors and the Union have not been adequately laid
down.
5.106. As far as the CFSP’s legal framework is concerned,
Article 14 of the EU Treaty provides that joint actions ‘shall
lay down their scope, ... means... and the condition for their
implementation’. However, the Commission retains certain
discretionary powers over the arrangements for implementa-
tion under Article 274 of the EC Treaty. In any case, despite
the somewhat vague wording of Article 18 of the EU Treaty,
in practice a fairly logical division of labour is emerging: the
Presidency has overall responsibility for achieving the objec-
tives of the Joint Action, assisted by the Secretary General/High
Representative (SG/HR), while the Commission is responsible
for the proper execution of the actions, preparing and nego-
tiating contracts with the implementing agencies and moni-
toring implementation as reported to the Commission.
5.107. The criteria adopted by the Committee of Permanent
Representatives in November 1999 on the financing of an
action under sub-section B8 have been followed except in two
cases. Both of these were financed under budget title B8
because the implementing body was the Western European
Union, a military organisation, which could not have received
financing under the First Pillar budget lines. The cases in
question are: the anti-personnel landmine operation in Croatia
(Weudam), due to terminate in November 2001, and the
operation to re-establish a viable police force in Albania
(MAPE), which has since been terminated. Certain measures
to support the Albanian police which are not linked to the
WEU as such will be continued under the CARDS Regula-
tion (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Develop-
ment and Stabilisation). The Commission refers to the inter-
pretation given in point 32 regarding the need to use
Article 17 for actions implemented by the WEU.
During the observation period covered by the Court’s audit
(1997 to 1999), there were cases where information on the
contributions of other donors was lacking. Political and man-
agement considerations mean it is not always possible or
desirable to flag exactly the amounts of each contributor.
Pledges are often solicited in order to create the political
momentum required for a specific project, but in the light of
political developments on the ground they may not subse-
quently be honoured if the other parties are geographically or
politically less concerned than the EU. It might nevertheless
be in the Union’s interests, for imperative reasons of conflict
prevention or political stabilisation, to continue the project
regardless of a shortfall in contributions.
There is, however, a clear improvement on this issue in 2000
and 2001 since contributions in kind are indicated in the
Financial Statements.
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5.108. The time lapse between the Council Decision
and the first payment was considerable in the period
1997 to 1999, i.e. 173 days on average. This indicated
that the speed of implementation for this type of action
was rather low.
5.109. Contracting was very complex in a number of
actions as a result of an accumulation of extensions and
other adjustments, to the extent that a proper follow-up
of the financial situation was made very difficult.
5.110. For remuneration and salary-related costs and
allowances for Special Representatives and office staff,
arrangements are not laid down or not applied unam-
biguously.
5.108. Tailor-made solutions often need to be drawn up for
the implementation of Joint Actions. Standard contracts can
rarely be applied, which means that negotiation and prepara-
tion of contracts to implement Joint Actions normally takes
more time than in the case of grants to NGOs or interna-
tional organisations.
Furthermore, at the end of 1997 the Commission underwent
internal reorganisation, separating management of the pre-
paratory phase and the implementation phase of the project
cycle between two different Directorates-General. This situa-
tion lasted until the end of 2000 and meant the time between
the Council Decisions and the first payments was longer. The
reunification of the project cycle in one unit at the beginning
of 2001 is expected to shorten these delays.
5.109. To ensure a timely reaction to political events the
Council usually adopts joint actions with a short time frame.
CFSP actions are easily affected by political and security devel-
opments necessitating adjustments or extensions to the exist-
ing action. Minor adjustments can be made by means of con-
tractual amendments but significant changes to the mandate
or renewals of the mandates should generally lead to new con-
tracts. This is the most practical and effective approach, even
if it makes follow-up more difficult.
5.110. A significant effort to establish clear criteria was
made with the adoption of two Communications in 1997 and
1998, defining the position of the Special Representatives.
The 1998 Communication stipulates uniform treatment for
people seconded to the offices of EU Special Representatives
whose mandates originate from after 1998. These rules have
been applied to those Special Representatives whose mandates
originate from after the two Communications. In any case,
from 2001 onwards the remuneration and salary-related costs
and allowances for Special Representatives are financed from
the administrative budget of the Council.
The Commission acknowledges that for office staff the situa-
tion is indeed somewhat ambiguous and might need to be
addressed in a more coherent way. However, the indirect appli-
cation of ‘market rules’ has so far generally produced the most
cost-effective results.
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5.111. Reporting is often late and irregular, and reports
in some cases present insufficient information. This
forms a weak basis for any evaluation. The limited fre-
quency of financial reports in particular forms a seri-
ous constraint to theCommission in supervisingprojects
on a systematic basis.
5.111. Financial and technical reporting by beneficiaries
has indeed sometimes been inadequate and should in future
be improved by closer and more interactive follow-up. The
average project lasts for one year, and normally requires two
financial reports. These must be submitted prior to payment,
thereby allowing adequate and regular control.
Responsibility for evaluation depends on the nature of the
action. While financial and technical evaluation fall to the
Commission, sometimes a specific assessment needs to be
made of the political desirability of continuing a particular
operation. Such an evaluation is implicitly carried out by the
Presidency and the Council working groups whenever an
action is extended. This is also the main reason why the dura-
tion of most actions is so short.
Two audits were completed in 1999, one for the OSCE in
Bosnia Herzegovina and one for the EC monitoring mission
(known as EUMM since 1 January 2001). Another audit
was conducted in 2001 on the three EU Special Representa-
tives and a fourth is planned for the Joint Action in Cambo-
dia, which has already been the subject of an evaluation by an
outside expert.
Each Joint Action is different and not all of them require an
audit. Some can well be evaluated on the basis of a final
report, especially when a Commission delegation is involved
in the implementation. However, the Commission has recently
made efforts to improve management in these respects.
In general, greater attention has been paid to the monitoring
and evaluation headings in the financial statements, and there
are plans to organise more inspections in the field.
In its remarks on budget line B8-0 1 5 (preparatory actions)
the Commission also proposed under the 2002 preliminary
draft budget that the Commission should be able to organise
evaluations and audits on its own initiative where necessary.
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5.112. The question of the definition of administrative
versus operational expenditure is still not solved:
although a budget heading was introduced from 1998
under subsection B8 to cover preparatory costs (which
were previously regarded as administrative costs), the
Council decided on 30 March 2000 that the costs of EU
Special Representatives should be considered to be
administrative expenditure, to be covered by the budget
of the Council’s General Secretariat.
5.113. On the basis of its audit conclusions, the Court
makes the following recommendations:
(a) the European Parliament, the Council and the Com-
mission should adopt, at an interinstitutional level,
clear operational principles and arrangements with
regard to the Commission’s role in the implementa-
tion of the CFSP;
(b) the financing of the CFSP actions should be man-
aged in a more transparent manner;
(c) the Commission should launch an enquiry into the
causes of long delays and reassess the action as well
as the partner for the management of the action;
(d) the Commission should amend contracts retroac-
tively or extend them only in cases of force majeure.
Certain practical measures facilitating the smooth
implementation of actions should be sought;
(e) the Council and the Commission should establish
clear rules on remuneration and salary-related costs;
(f) arrangements should be laid down for adequate
reporting, audit and evaluation.
5.112. As the Court notes, one of the major points of con-
cern it raised in its earlier report has been solved with the clas-
sification of preparatory costs as administrative.
The Court’s comment is valid regarding the contributions in
kind by the Council and the Commission to the offices of EU
Special Representatives.
In December 2000 the Commission drew the attention of the
Permanent Representatives’ Committee in writing to certain
problems linked to the practical implementation of the Coun-
cil Decision of 30 March 2000 on EU Special Representa-
tives. While stating its support for the aim of the new guide-
lines, i.e. to place the EU Special Representatives clearly under
the authority of the SG/HR, it called for a better definition of
administrative and operational expenditure.
In 2001, the Commission launched an audit of EU Special
Representatives which it hoped would help arrive at such a
definition.
5.113. The Commission welcomes the proposal by the Court
for clear operational principles and arrangements with regard
to the Commission’s role in the implementation of the CFSP,
and fully supports the request for more transparency. Improve-
ments can be made, notably by the rationalisation of the
number of budget articles in the preliminary draft budget
(PDB) 2002 as proposed by the Commission.
The Commission has already reacted, adopting the new man-
agement structure and considering further simplifications,
including a decision by the College empowering the Commis-
sioner in charge of external relations to take the required
financing decisions. But sometimes delays are unavoidable. In
any case they are not always a sign of bad management; they
may reflect thorough contract preparation designed to avoid
problems during subsequent implementation, and demands
for better reports from the implementing agency.
The Commission refers to its reply under point 5.109 where
it concluded that minor adjustments should be addressed by
contractual amendments whereas significant changes to the
mandate or renewals of mandates should generally lead to
new contracts.
Clear rules on remuneration and salary related costs were
adopted for the EU Special Representatives in 1998. As
regards other staff, the Commission acknowledges that for
office staff the situation is indeed somewhat ambiguous and
might need to be addressed in a more coherent way.
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International fisheries agreements
5.114. The Court examined the management by the
Commission of the international fisheries agreements,
and notably the extent to which their objectives were
being clearly defined and ultimately achieved. The
Court’s audit related to the five most significant agree-
ments in terms of the amounts charged to the Commu-
nity budget (92 % in 1999). The Court’s main observa-
tions are set out below.
5.115. The Commission is still to set in place a system
that enables continuousmonitoring and in-depth exami-
nation of the cost-effectiveness of the international fish-
eries agreements. These measures should enable it to
assess the extent to which the objectives of these agree-
ments are being achieved (market supply, catch oppor-
tunities, restructuring, jobs).
— It is up to the Commission to define performance
indicators and criteria for these agreements, so that
their effectiveness can be gauged.
The Commission refers to its reply under point 5.111 where
it concluded in particular that financial and technical report-
ing by beneficiaries should be improved by closer follow up.
Reports are obligatory prior to payment, but it would also be
possible for the Commission to initiate evaluations and audits
as necessary, as proposed in the Commission’s preliminary
draft budget 2002 in the budgetary remarks for budget line
B8-0 1 5.
Audits are not always needed for each Joint Action, especially
when a Commission delegation is involved in the implementa-
tion. The Commission has recently made efforts to improve
management in these respects.
5.115. The Commission agrees that there are weaknesses in
the system for monitoring and evaluating the international
fisheries agreements that need to be addressed. An important
step was taken in 1999 when the results of an outside evalu-
ation study were forwarded to the Council for discussion. It
would seem that this study was also very useful to the Court
when drawing up its Special Report. Furthermore, the Com-
mission has improved the preparatory arrangements for the
negotiation of new protocols by drawing up specific assess-
ment reports containing, among other things, data on the
state of stocks, on catch levels, on the use of fishing possibili-
ties and on the amounts allocated to targeted measures,
research, control and technical aspects. These reports are avail-
able to the Council and the European Parliament. Despite the
progress that has been achieved, further improvement is needed.
On the question of ongoing monitoring, the Commission
would like to point out that the data from the Member States
needed for determining whether objectives have been attained
is very often lacking. The Commission hopes that the adop-
tion on 14 March 2001 of the implementing rules for the
’Control Regulation’ will help ensure more regular and fuller
information from Member States, and in particular allow
better monitoring of actual catches under the various agree-
ments. In addition, in accordance with the Financial Regula-
tion rules, the Commission intends to launch a new external
evaluation study within 2 to 3 years. In the light of the con-
clusions of the debate on the Green Paper on the future of the
Common Fisheries Policy, and as part of the administrative
reform now under way, the Commission will endeavour to
establish criteria and performance indicators for the agree-
ments.
280 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 15.12.2001
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS COMMISSION’S REPLIES
5.116. The catch opportunities that the international
agreements afford to Community fishermen in third
country waters are not always exploited to the full. The
Community has therefore paid financial compensation
for fish that have only existed on paper.
— The Commission is called upon to ensure, first and
foremost, that fishing opportunities are actually
exploited.
5.117. The Court noted a lack of consistency and lack
of coordination between these international agreements
and the structural facet of the common fisheries policy.
— The Commission could, in particular, ensure that
there is consistency between the restructuring objec-
tives of these agreements and those of the Structural
Fund, for example in the financing of new vessels.
5.118. Several fisheries agreements have both a com-
mercial aim and development-aid aims. The fact that
these aims are intertwined makes it difficult to assess
the agreements and contributes to the lack of clarity in
the sharing of responsibilities between the Community
and the third countries.
— By clearly defining the various objectives of the fish-
eries agreements, the Commission would be able to
assess the advantages and costs of these agreements
and compare them on an equivalent basis.
5.116. The Court refers to the agreements with Greenland
and Senegal.
Article 1(2) of the new Protocol to the agreement with Green-
land sets out the catch possibilities available to Community
vessels for the period 2001 to 2006. These have been fixed
on the basis of scientific assessments and historical catches. In
the case of Senegal, the Commission has negotiated a new
category of fishing in the protocol for 1997 to 2001, in the
light of the negotiating directives it received from the Council.
The Commission, finding that Member States occasionally
overestimate their needs in terms of fishing opportunities,
emphasises to them each time negotiations take place that
they should keep their requests at a level which they can use
up in full.
5.117. The Commission is aware of the potential for con-
flict between the structural and international aspects of the
common fisheries policy. Together with the Member States, it
will address this question in the course of the debate on the
future of the common fisheries policy after 2002, in order to
achieve greater consistency between the different objectives.
5.118. The fisheries agreements, which to start with were
purely commercial, have gradually introduced aims for the
development of the fishing industry in the countries concerned.
This approach reflects, among other things, concern to ensure
consistency between the Community’s fisheries policy and
agreements and development policy. Funding for measures to
develop fisheries in the developing countries comes from the
financial instruments for development cooperation (EDF and
budget headings). Fisheries cooperation measures such as
those contained in certain bilateral fisheries agreements (tar-
geted measures) receive funding under the only budget head-
ing to which fisheries agreements may be charged (heading
B7-8 0 0 0) and full details are given in the terms of the
agreements. Since the adoption of the conclusions of the
October 1997 meeting of Fisheries Ministers the targeted
measures have been extended to encourage the introduction of
measures to ensure more responsible exploitation of fishery
resources, in particular in the area of evaluation and the sur-
veillance and control of fishing activities. The principal objec-
tive of the fisheries agreements concluded with non-member
countries is to safeguard fishing opportunities, which them-
selves create jobs in the areas dependent on fishing. The con-
clusions of the October 1997 meeting of Fisheries Ministers
provide that aspects which cannot be quantified, such as the
Union’s political relations and the strategic importance of the
presence of the Community fleet in non-member countries,
must also be taken into account.
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5.119. The management of the fisheries agreements is
impaired by the weak or inappropriate application of
certain provisions, and by the fact that they do not pro-
vide for the mandatory exchange of information.
— It would be appropriate for the Commission to rein-
force the legally-binding nature of the agreements
and improve the monitoring of them, for example
by inserting provisions concerning control or by
effecting payments according to the progress made.
It should also review certain unjustified practices
concerning the systematic unloading and reloading
of frozen fish.
5.120. The Court’s audit identified weaknesses in the
implementation and in the monitoring of the checks
carried out by the Commission and by the Member
States.
— The Commission should plan its control activities
and follow up previous findings more closely. It
should also, in tandem with the Member States, lay
down guidelines for the detailed rules applicable to
the checks which they conduct.
5.119. In order to strengthen the legally binding nature of
fisheries agreements and improve their monitoring, the Com-
mission, when negotiating new protocols, seeks to include a
requirement on the compulsory exchange of scientific infor-
mation. In addition, the majority of fisheries agreements pro-
vide that where conservation or other measures affecting the
fishing activities of the Community fleet are adopted by the
authorities of the other country, the terms of the protocols and
technical annexes, including the financial provisions, may be
adjusted in consequence. In addition, in the case of targeted
measures for example, reporting requirements have been
included in new protocols since the October 1997 Council
meeting of FisheriesMinisters. As regards landings and reload-
ing under the agreement with Morocco, it should be noted
that, although the terms of the agreement on this matter were
complied with, the Commission had made known its inten-
tion of revising the clauses concerning landings during the
negotiations for the new protocol, which proved unsuccessful.
With a view to sound financial management and the protec-
tion of the Community’s financial interests, the Budget
Directorate-General, the European Anti-fraud Office (OLAF)
and any other departments concerned will be involved from
the start of the preparations for negotiations and will be
asked to attend meetings before and during the negotiation of
new protocols.
5.120. Council Regulation (EEC) No 2847/93 sets out the
general obligations of both the Member States and the Com-
mission regarding monitoring, inspection and surveillance of
fishing activities in Community waters and Community fish-
ing vessels operating beyond those waters. Specific obligations
on these matters are contained in fisheries agreements and
regulations laying down arrangements concesing regional
fisheries organisations. The Commission draws up inspection
priorities before the start of the fishing year, and programmes
are drawn up for its inspectors as and when fishing proceeds.
Each inspection assignment is carefully prepared. However,
once on board, Commission inspectors may only observe the
control operations carried out by the Member States and verify
that they are being carried out in accordance with the agreed
rules. The Commission has taken a number of steps in recent
years to improve control of fisheries and considerable progress
has been achieved. The Commission is well aware of the con-
tinuing weaknesses and will take further action to address
them. As regards following up previous findings, the Com-
mission examines all alleged breaches noted in the inspection
reports. A decision is then taken whether to exchange infor-
mation with the Member States or initiate legal proceedings.
As part of the 2002 review of the common fisheries policy,
the Commission and the Member States will together look at
ways of improving inspection by the Commission and control
by the Member States.
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INTRODUCTION
6.1. This new chapter deals with the instruments for
countries preparing for accession to theEuropeanUnion,
for which a separate financial perspective heading exists
from 2000 onwards. It includes observations on bud-
getary management (1) and on the setting up of the two
new accession instruments (ISPA and Sapard), because
of their importance in terms of the future expenditure
foreseen by the financial perspective for 2000-2006
(see Table 6.1). The Court reported the results of its ear-
lier audits in respect of the existing instrument, Phare,
in the 1999 Annual Report and in its Special Reports
5/99 and 16/2000.
6.2. In December 1997, the Luxembourg European
Council endorsed the reinforced pre-accession strategy,
(1) The Court has reviewed the information presented by the
Commission in Volume I of the Revenue and expenditure
account. The purpose of this Volume is to provide a com-
mentary on budgetary management for the year and, in
particular, explanations of variations between the initial
approved budget and the appropriations finally available,
as well as between the appropriations finally available and
those utilised. This review did not seek to provide assur-
ance as to the reliability of its contents. Rather, it sought
to identify any significant variations for which explana-
tions are not provided and to identify any explanations
that might be considered misleading.
Table 6.1 — Financial perspective for the period
2000-2006 for pre-accession aid (2000 prices)
(Mio EUR)
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total2000-2006
Agriculture 529 540 540 540 540 540 540 3 769
Structural pre-
accession instru-
ments 1 058 1 080 1 080 1 080 1 080 1 080 1 080 7 538
Phare (Candidate
Countries) 1 587 1 620 1 620 1 620 1 620 1 620 1 620 11 307
Pre-accession
strategy for the
Mediterranean
Countries 20 20 20 19 19 98
Total 3 174 3 240 3 260 3 260 3 260 3 259 3 259 22 712
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which was part of the Agenda 2000 communication of
the Commission (2). In addition to an increase in the
funds for the existing Phare (3) programme, two new
instruments were foreseen: ISPA (Instrument for Struc-
tural Policies for pre-accession) and Sapard (Special
Accession Programme for Agriculture and Rural Devel-
opment).
6.3. The purpose of these programmes is to contribute
to the preparation for accession to the European Union
of the ten Central and East European Candidate Coun-
tries (4) in the areas of environment and transport (ISPA)
as well as in the area of agricultural and rural develop-
ment (Sapard). The two new instruments should help
the candidate countries to align their law as quickly as
possible on the Community acquis and to become famil-
iar with its different agricultural and structural instru-
ments, preferably before accession. New management
and control structures and new rules were created for
each of these programmes. The addition of these new
instruments meant that pre-accession aid effectively
more than doubled from 1999 to 2000. Their budget
amounts to 11 000 million euro for the period 2000-
2006 (5).
6.4. ISPA and Sapard have some features in common
with the instruments in support of the Candidate Coun-
tries (like Phare) and some others that are to be found
in support of the existing Member States. ISPA has simi-
larities with the Cohesion Fund, while for Sapard, char-
acteristics of Structural Funds and EAGGF Guarantee
are combined.
6.5. TheCourt adopted an opinion (6) inOctober 1998
on certain proposals for regulations within the
Agenda 2000 framework put forward by the
Commission in July 1997, including those for ISPA and
Sapard (7). These were approved in June 1999, one and
6.5. Any preparations made towards mobilising financial
resources before the relevant Council Regulations are adopted
could lead to confusion and constitute a waste of effort on the
part of, inter alios, the applicant countries. The second half
of 1999 was devoted to preparing the legal instruments for
the mobilisation of financial resources (Regulation (EC)
No2759/1999) and theCommission communication adopted
on 26 January 2000, which resulted in Regulation (EC)
No 2222/2000.
The Council did not take up the Court’s proposal aimed at
integrating the three pre-accession instruments in a single
Regulation. Instead, the Berlin Summit of 24 and 25 March
1999 decided on separate Regulations and financial alloca-
tions for each instrument, as well as a coordinating Regula-
tion.
This option reflects the scenario that applicant countries can
expect upon accession, with specific policies and instruments
(2) COM(97) 2000 final of 15 July 1997.
(3) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3906/89 (OJ L 375,
23.12.1989), as last amended by Council Regulation (EC)
No 1266/1999 (OJ L 161, 26.6.1999).
(4) Bulgaria, CzechRepublic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithua-
nia, Poland, Romania, Slovenia and Slovak Republic.
(5) Heading 7 — pre-accession aid of the financial perspec-
tive following the agreement of the European Council in
Berlin in March 1999.
(6) Opinion No 10/98, OJ C 401, 22.12.1998.
(7) Regulations (EC) No 1267/1999 and (EC) No 1268/99,
OJ L 161, 26.6.1999.
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a half years after the Luxembourg Council had endorsed
these two new pre-accession instruments in Decem-
ber 1997. The Court:
(a) had proposed to use the year 1999 to prepare for
the mobilisation of financial resources;
(b) had pointed out that the broad outlines of the pre-
accession aid were virtually indiscernible in the pro-
posed legislative framework, owing to the complex-
ity and diffuseness of the latter;
(c) had stated that the Phare programme, although
radically reworked, had not been the subject of any
proposal for amended legislation that would have
made it possible to integrate it with the new instru-
ments. The Court considered that a single regula-
tion would have been the most effective way of fos-
tering the desired unitary approach.
6.6. In view of the importance of these new instru-
ments and the newly established rules and structures,
the Court decided to perform an audit with the objec-
tive of assessing whether the Commission managed the
setting-up of the new instruments successfully and of
identifying at an early stage of implementation those
areas where improvements are needed.
6.7. During its audit, the Court identified certain prob-
lems concerning the rules governing expenditure on
the ISPA and Sapard programmes. In addition, the regu-
lations applicable to these two programmes contain
derogations from the Financial Regulation (see also para-
graph 0.9), which were not adopted on the basis of
Article 279 EC. The Court will make observations on
this subject after consulting the Community institutions
concerned.
6.8. Notwithstanding the problems mentioned in the
previous paragraph, the Court has audited the Commis-
sion’s management as it was carried out under the legal
framework actually applied by the Commission. This is
the subject of the following paragraphs.
such as the Structural Funds, the Cohesion Fund, the CAP
and the rural development assistance scheme, including the
two sections of the EAGGF. The Court proposal for a single
Regulation would probably undermine the institution-building
objective of the pre-accession strategy, particularly in the case
of Phare.
The Phare programme was amended by Regulation (EC)
No 1266/1999 in order to ensure that it was consistent with
Sapard and ISPA.
6.7. In the Commission’s view, the ISPA and Sapard Regu-
lations do not derogate from the Financial Regulation. They
were adopted on the basis of Article 308 of the Treaty. The
Commission will readily consult with the Court in this con-
nection.
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6.9. Article 8, (1)(a) of the ISPA Regulation provides
that ‘commitments [...] shall [...] be effected in annual
instalments’. This provision effectively extends the prac-
tice, already provided for in the Structural Funds Regu-
lation, whereby the Commission takes spending deci-
sions and concludes financing memoranda but only
charges to the commitments budget a part of the obli-
gation effectively entered into. The Court has frequently
criticised this, most recently in its opinion on the recast-
ing of the Financial Regulation (8), where the Court
stated that it considers that such provisions negate the
essential purpose of differentiated appropriations and
of a commitments budget. Accordingly, the proposal
for the Financial Regulation should be amended either
to prevent such practices or to provide for a payments
budget only, without commitment appropriations.
BUDGETARY MANAGEMENT
6.10. The new heading 7 of the financial perspective
includes, under Title 7-0 of the General Budget, the
appropriations set aside for the newpreaccession instru-
ments (Sapard and ISPA programmes), as well as those
authorising expenditure viewed to date as external aid
(the PHARE programme). The pre-accession strategy for
the Mediterranean countries (chapter B7-0 4) remains
under heading 4.
6.11. Responsibility for the Phare Programme was
transferred during the financial year 2000 from the
Joint External Relations Service (SCR) to the Enlarge-
ment DG. The Commission divided responsibilities for
the ISPA and Sapard programmes between the Director-
ates General for Enlargement (DG ELARG), Regional
Policy (DG REGIO) and Agriculture (DG AGRI).
6.12. Table 6.2 gives an overview of the budgetary
implementation for the pre-accession instruments in
the year 2000. After having been reduced by one quar-
ter, and in the absence of any payments for projects, the
payment appropriations for the Sapard instrument could
6.9. The provisions on annual instalments of appropria-
tions are governed by a Council Regulation which takes over
the terms used for many years in the Structural and Cohesion
Funds. The Court’s position on this matter is well known to
the Commission, which has already put forward its arguments
on numerous occasions. The specific provisions proposed by
way of an amendment to the Financial Regulation should
also consolidate rules applied under all the structural instru-
ments. Annual instalments allow the Commission to carry
out a broader investment programme by implementing a large
number of projects in tandem rather than committing in one
year large amounts which will mostly remain unused in the
early years because commitments cannot be turned into pay-
ments until there is real progress on the ground.
6.11. Responsibility for the full Phare project cycle was con-
centrated in DG ELARG in the year 2000. Previously, DG
ELARG had been responsible for programming and the SCR
for the rest of the project cycle.
6.12. Payment of sapard appropriations may go ahead only
after the commission has delegated the management of pro-
grammes to accredited paying agencies. None of the applicant
countries was able to obtain such delegation in 2000, which
prevented payments from being made.
The use of payment appropriations under ISPA is governed by
strict implementing conditions which are either general in
scope (setting up of the national structures defined in the
memoranda of understanding) or specific to individual projects.
The main challenge in 2000 was to use commitment
(8) Paragraphs 29 to 31 of the opinion.
15.12.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 287
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Table 6.2 — Pre-accession aid — Financial perspective heading: Pre-accession aid
(Mio EUR et %)
Financial
perspective ceil-
ings
Budget changes Implementation of the budget
Initial appropria-
tions (1)
Final appropria-
tions avail-
able (2)
Appropriations
utilised
% of final avail-
able appropria-
tions
Appropriations
carried over to
2001
% of final avail-
able appropria-
tions
Appropriations
cancelled
% of final available
appropriations
Agriculture (B7-0 1 0) CA 519,1 528,9 528,9 100,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
PA 190,1 140,1 0,0 0,0 140,1 100,0 0,0 0,0
Agriculture (B7-0 1 0 A) CA 9,9 0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 100,0
PA 9,9 9,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 9,9 100,0
Total B7-0 1 CA 529,0 529,0 528,9 100,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,0
PA 200,0 150,0 0,0 0,0 140,1 93,4 9,9 6,6
Instrument for structural policies for pre-accession (B7-0 2 0) CA 1 039,0 1 046,4 1 005,0 96,0 41,2 3,9 0,1 0,0
PA 226,0 171,0 2,5 1,5 0,0 0,0 168,5 98,5
Instrument for structural policies for pre-accession (B7-0 2 0 A) CA 19,0 11,6 11,3 96,8 0,0 0,0 0,4 3,2
PA 19,0 4,0 0,0 1,0 0,0 0,0 4,0 99,0
Total B7-0 2 CA 1 058,0 1 058,0 1 016,3 96,1 41,2 3,9 0,5 0,0
PA 245,0 175,0 2,5 1,5 0,0 0,0 172,5 98,5
Economic aid to the associated countries of central and eastern
Europe (B7-0 3 0)
CA 1 344,3 1 358,4 1 357,1 99,9 0,0 0,0 1,3 0,1
PA 1 035,2 1 015,2 1 010,7 99,6 0,0 0,0 4,4 0,4
Economic aid to the associated countries of central and eastern
European (B7-0 3 0 A)
CA 73,8 59,7 48,8 81,7 0,0 0,0 10,9 18,3
PA 73,8 33,8 1,5 4,4 0,0 0,0 32,3 95,6
Cross-border cooperation (B7-0 3 1) CA 159,0 159,0 159,0 100,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
PA 140,0 200,0 187,8 93,9 0,0 0,0 12,2 6,1
Cooperation with the associated countries of central and eastern
Europe under the Euratom Treaty (B7-0 3 2)
CA 2,7 2,7 2,1 80,9 0,0 0,0 0,5 19,1
PA 2,1 2,1 0,8 41,0 0,0 0,0 1,2 59,0
Total B7-0 3 CA 1 579,7 1 579,7 1 567,0 99,2 0,0 0,0 12,7 0,8
PA 1 251,0 1 251,0 1 200,9 96,0 0,0 0,0 50,1 4,0
Total heading 7 CA 3 166,7 3 166,7 3 112,2 98,3 41,2 1,3 13,3 0,4
PA 1 696,0 1 576,0 1 203,4 76,4 140,1 8,9 232,5 14,8
Pre-accession strategy for Malta (B7-0 4 0) CA 0,0 6,0 6,0 100,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
PA 0,0 0,8 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,8 100,0
Pre-accession strategy for Cyprus (B7-0 4 1) CA 0,0 9,0 1,7 18,9 7,3 81,1 0,0 0,0
PA 0,0 1,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,2 100,0
Total B7-0 4 CA 0,0 15,0 7,7 51,3 7,3 48,7 0,0 0,0
PA 0,0 2,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 2,0 100,0
Total heading B7-0 CA 3 174,0 3 166,7 3 181,7 3 119,9 98,1 48,5 1,5 13,3 0,4
PA 1 696,0 1 578,0 1 203,4 76,3 140,1 8,9 234,5 14,9
(1) Budget finally adopted by the European Parliament on 16 December 1999 (OJ L 40, 14.02.2000).
(2) Budget appropriations amended after taking into account supplementary and amending budgets and transfers, but not including appropriations carried over from 1999, appropriations resulting from the re-use of revenue, revenue resulting from third party contribu-
tions and other revenue corresponding to a defined purpose and appropriations made available again.
Source: 2000 revenue and expenditure account.
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be carried over. Those for the ISPA instrument had
nearly all to be cancelled since the only payments made
amounted to 2,5 million euro (9). These were for pur-
poses other than those explicitly covered by the ISPA
Regulation. On the basis of Council Decision
No 2000/474/EC (10), the Commission decided in
July 2000 (11) to change the Community contribution
to the Danube clearing project to budget headings B7-
0 2 0 (ISPA), B7-0 3 0 (Phare) and B7-5 4 1 (Obnova).
6.13. The characteristics of the budgetary manage-
ment of Heading 7 are very similar to those for Head-
ing 4 (see paragraphs 5.2 to 5.18 for further details):
(a) a heavy concentration of commitments at the end
of the financial year, because 59 % of the 3 130 mil-
lion euro committed in 2000 against title B7-0 was
not committed until the month of December. To a
large extent this was due to the late commitment of
the ISPA and Sapard programmes, 33 % of the Phare
programme having been committed in December;
(b) the absence of any payment in respect of the Sapard
and ISPA programmes had the effect of automati-
cally increasing by 61 % the commitments outstand-
ing against title B7-0. For the Phare programme, the
increase in commitments outstanding was 18 %;
(c) the month of December is characterised by a con-
centration of payments, representing 25,1 % of the
year’s expenditure, and
(d) the absence of any utilisation of payment appro-
priations for administrative management expendi-
ture initiated by the Commission, since only 3,2 %
of the amounts set aside were actually used.
appropriations in order to avoid losing them, given the enor-
mous financial requirements of the applicant countries in the
pre-accession phase. Some discrepancy between commitments
and payments is quite normal in view of the scale of the
investment projects assisted by ISPA. The next challenge will
be to ensure that projects are carried out within the deadlines
laid down in the financing agreements, and thus gradually
use the payment appropriations available.
6.13. The general observations concerning the management
of Heading 7 do not differentiate between Phare, ISPA and
Sapard.
(a) Phare commitments inDecember 2000 represented 33 %
(not 34 %) of the annual total.
(b) The increase in the RAL for Phare — given the growth
of the programme — represents an actual reduction in
the number of years needed to absorb the RAL (in terms
of either commitments or payments).
(c) The national authorities send payment requests to the
Commission when the conditions for triggering a pay-
ment are fulfilled. The Commission has no control over
the time when the national authorities submit their pay-
ment requests. After checking them, the relevant depart-
ments carry out the payment as soon as possible
(d) The Commission used the appropriations earmarked for
the administrative management of measures in accor-
dance with requirements. It should be noted that the
statutory figure of 2 % of total appropriations constitutes
an upper limit for technical assistance provided on the
initiative of the Commission, and not an expenditure tar-
get. Although payments fell well short of the budgeted
amounts, the bulk of unused commitment appropriations
were made available through transfers to support other
aspects of the instruments.
(9) Another 42 000 euro was spent for consultants support-
ing DG REGIO in the appraisal process.
(10) OJ L 187, 26.7.2000, p. 45.
(11) Commission decision circulated under No C(2000)2297.
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ISPA
Allocation of funds
6.14. An indicative allocation between candidate coun-
tries was made, based on the criteria of population,
gross domestic product (GDP) per inhabitant (12) and
surface area (13) (see Diagram 6.1).
6.15. The allocation between candidate countries is
expressed as a range (minimum and maximum receiv-
able ISPA funds) in order to encourage them to propose
high quality projects, and to provide some flexibility for
the management of ISPA funding. Although the alloca-
tion can be adjusted to take account of performance in
previous years, no performance indicators were estab-
lished (14).
6.15. The ‘performance indicator’ used by ISPA is the abil-
ity of a country to produce and implement sound projects. If
countries cannot do this, the Commission will commit less
than the country’s annual allocation. This practice was already
followed in 2000.
(12) In purchasing power parities.
(13) Refer to Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1267/1999; Com-
mission Decision of 7 March 2000, (OJ L 72, 21.3.2000,
p. 21).
(14) The Court already identified this problem in its opinion
No 10/98.
Diagram 6.1 — Allocation of ISPA funds for 2000 to candidate countries
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Commitments
6.16. The 2000 commitments budget was used as
shown in Table 6.3.
6.17. Table 6.4 shows the division per country and per
sector of the decisions and commitmentsmade in 2000.
Table 6.3 — Use of ISPA commitment appropriations
in 2000
(Mio EUR)
Purpose Commitments
Commitments relating to 75 projects out of
which 13 relate to technical assistance (TA)
representing 8 million euro 997,5
Danube Clearing project 7,5
Use of framework contractors (selected for the
Cohesion Fund) to assist the Commission (DG
REGIO) in its project appraisal 4,2
Allocation to Heads of Delegations (DG RELEX)
to finance extra staff to implement the
deconcentration model established for the
PHARE programme from 2001 onwards 7
Total commitments 1 016,2
Source: DG REGIO.
Table 6.4 — ISPA Allocation
(Mio EUR)
Candidate Country
Environment projects Transport projects
Combined totals
Total amount approved Budget 2000 Total amount approved Budget 2000
Bulgaria 77,98 52,05 80,00 52,00
Czech Republic 34,77 27,82 66,22 42,17
Estonia 19,76 15,81 15,51 12,41
Hungary 71,72 43,83 190,11 44,16
Latvia 37,69 26,57 43,44 20,18
Lithuania 22,75 18,20 42,55 34,04
Poland 201,84 132,99 329,85 173,97
Romania 181,38 120,60 346,88 118,63
Slovakia 27,22 11,61 38,57 30,85
Slovenia 14,19 11,36 10,35 8,28
Subtotal 689,30 460,82 1 163,48 536,70
Total amounts approved 1 852,79
Total budget 2000 997,52
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6.18. The Commission decisions taken in 2000 (75
approved projects) fix the maximum ISPA contribution
at 1 863 million euro in total. In total 143 projects were
presented to the Commission, which did not accept 19
and postponed 39 to be presented to the ISPA Manage-
ment Committee within the coming years. The ISPA
Management Committee itself gave a positive opinion
for 85 projects. Out of these 85, the Commission took
a decision in 2000 for 77 projects and committed 75 of
them. According to the ISPA Regulation, the amount
not committed in 2000 (865,5 million euro) is to be
committed in the following years.
6.19. The Commission implements expenditure under
ISPA on the basis of financing memoranda, to be drawn
up between the Commission and the beneficiary coun-
tries for each project. Most of them, relating to the
projects committed during the year, were signed at the
very end of 2000.
Delays in preparing the legal and administrative frame-
work
6.20. As ISPA is of a hybrid nature, situated between
the existing support to candidate countries (like Phare)
and the financial support to Member States (like the
Cohesion Fund), it was quite a challenge for the Com-
mission to prepare the legal and administrative frame-
work in time. Following the 18 months taken after
December 1997 to approve the ISPA Regulation it took
a further nine months until March 2000 to decide on
the allocation of assistance between the candidate coun-
tries. Despite these constraints, all national ISPA strate-
gies and 75 projects were approved up until the end of
2000 thanks to the considerable effort of DG REGIO.
6.21. The preparation of ISPA legislation was a time-
consuming and complicated exercise, since it involved
various Directorates-General which had to find the right
balance between Structural Fund and external aid rules.
6.20. The Commission was already preparing the applicant
countries in 1999: negotiation of strategies, project pipelines
and procedures took place in tandem with the preparation of
the legal/administrative framework from the very beginning in
early 1999.
The allocation of assistance was given a favourable opinion by
the ISPA Management Committee at its meeting held on
21 December 1999.
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6.22. In addition to the time taken to adopt the Regu-
lation, the following weaknesses were noted as regards
the adoption of implementing rules:
(a) the ‘common rules for the eligibility of expenditure’
(Article 7(7) of the ISPA Regulation) were adopted
at the ISPA Management Committee meeting (15) of
December 1999;
(b) DG REGIO had to start with a very small team to
prepare ISPA while in parallel the legal framework
for implementation was developed. The ISPA direc-
torate itself was not fully operational until April
2000;
(c) an ‘ISPA manual’, which lays down implementing
rules for ISPA (16), was presented to the applicant
countries in May 2000;
(d) internal rules defining responsibilities and inter-
service consultation procedures were formally
agreed only in July 2000;
(e) in contrast to the Cohesion Fund, the applicant
countries are not allowed to use their own procure-
ment rules, but must use those set out in the ‘Practi
6.22. Implementing rules (annexes to the financing memo-
randa) received a favourable opinion from the ISPA Manage-
ment Committee on 21 December 1999 and were introduced
in the first financing memoranda agreed.
(a) The eligibility rules were adopted six months before ISPA
measures were presented to the Management Committee.
(c) The ISPA manual concentrates on the implementation of
the projects; the beneficiary countries had been informed
of all aspects of project preparation in the assistance
application forms at the beginning of 1999.
(d) Interdepartmental consultations are governed by general
rules in force at the Commission; the empowerment pro-
cedure in favour of the Commissioner responsible for
Regional Policy, while very useful, is not strictly neces-
sary to enable the Commission to take decisions (by either
the written or the oral procedure).
(e) The ‘Practical Guide’ to public procurement procedures
revises and replaces — in the case of all external aid —
a previous guide which applied in full to ISPA
(15) This Committee is required to deliver an opinion on the
draft of the measure to be financed by ISPA. It is com-
posed of representatives of the Member States chaired by
a representative of the Commission, and the EIB appoints
a non-voting representative.
(16) Matters such as the use of interest earned on the envis-
aged advances of 20 % of the whole project amount are
only treated in the ISPA manual and not in the financing
memoranda. This underlines the importance of these
rules.
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calguide’ (17). The ISPA Regulation has already had
to be amended (18), because an exemption from the
application of Title IX, Article 114 of the Financial
Regulation (19), such as that provided for in the
Phare Regulation, was not included in the initial
ISPA Regulation. This caused problems with
co-financing provided by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD);
(f) internal administrative procedures were not clear:
the confusing formulation in the ISPA Regulation
caused long discussions on when commitments
could be made and financing memoranda signed. As
a result of administrative misunderstandings two
Polish environment projects (20) of about 41 million
euro, which received a favourable opinion from the
ISPAManagement Committee inOctober 2000,were
not committed in 2000. Three financing memo-
randa (21) had already been signed by the Commis-
sion and the candidate country before the corre-
sponding commitments were made. Consequently,
part of the internal procedure for formal approval
had to be restarted;
(g) eight out of 10 Memoranda of Understanding
(between the Commission and the Candidate Coun-
tries) on the utilisation of the National Fund (22), a
pre-condition for disbursing ISPA funds from the
Commission to candidate countries, were signed
only at the end of 2000.
until the entry into force for ISPA of this new ‘Practical
Guide’ (1 March 2001).
The Commission recognises that the ISPA Regulation
fails to provide for the possibility of allowing for excep-
tions to Article 114 of the Financial Regulation. In order
to remedy this shortcoming, the Commission submitted
to the Council a proposal to amend the ISPA Regulation
on 8 March 2001 (COM(2001)110).
(g) The late signing of the Memoranda of Understanding did
not delay implementation in the two countries concerned.
(17) According to the financing memoranda, detailed proce-
dures for tendering and contracts are laid down in the DIS
(Decentralised Implementation System) manual estab-
lished for Phare programmes. However, the part concern-
ing works contracts has only been partially developed.
The new ‘Practical guide’ was available at the beginning of
2001.
(18) COM(2001) 110 final.
(19) Bidders from countries other than Member States and
recipient countries may exceptionally participate in ten-
ders.
(20) 2000/PL/16/P/PE002 and 019.
(21) 2000/PL/16/P/PE001, PT002 and PT003.
(22) Single entity in each Candidate Country through which
all Community funds granted under ISPA must be chan-
nelled.
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6.23. Although the ISPA Regulation does not require
the approval of ISPA country strategies, the ISPA
manual (23) considers it necessary. 60 % of the national
transport and environment strategy papers were pre-
sented to the same ISPA Management Committee meet-
ing as the corresponding projects, the others only some
months before. In order to avoid further delays, strate-
gies and projects had to be prepared in parallel. Although
this required important efforts from the Commission, it
is, however, not the most logical approach, since it
entails the risk of not establishing the most pertinent
strategies or not identifying the most suitable projects.
6.24. Thedelays in thedecision-makingprocess caused
problems in some candidate countries where the part of
the national budget relating to a particular project was
approved and had to be used by starting the project
(often prepared with Phare support) prior to the Com-
mission approval. As a result, all expenditure incurred
before the signature of the financing memorandum was
ineligible.
Lack of use of repayable assistance
6.25. According to the ISPA Regulation, Community
assistance may take the form of non-repayable direct
assistance, repayable assistance or any other form of
assistance. ISPA funding has so far consisted only of
grants and 95 % of the projects committed in 2000
were subsidised at a rate higher than 50 %. The maxi-
mum rate of 75 % was approved for 41 projects, of
which 11 concerned the environmental sector.
6.23. With a view to ensuring that investments financed
under ISPA comply with strategic objectives for membership,
the Commission requested the applicant countries to prepare
strategies before projects are presented to the Management
Committees. In general, the preparation of these strategies
started well before the presentation of projects to the Commit-
tee and before the submission of applications to the Commis-
sion. The approach followed made it possible to present to the
Committee a sufficient number of sound projects which com-
plied with the requirements of the ISPA Regulation and stra-
tegic objectives for accession.
6.24. The Commission recognises that the procedures for
signing the financing agreements are cumbersome. The appli-
cant countries are fully aware that any expenditure incurred
before the signature of the financing memorandum by the
Commission is ineligible for ISPA funding.
6.25. The Commission would emphasise that the excep-
tional grant rate of 85 % which is allowed under the ISPA
Regulation was not used for any of the projects adopted in
2000. The average rate applied in 2000 (in the order of
64 %) may be considered moderate since many projects do not
generate income.
(23) ‘It is evident that effective project identification requires a
strategy [...]. Each beneficiary country needs, therefore, to
define a national ISPA transport strategy and a national
ISPA environment strategy. [...]. The national ISPA strate-
gies should be based on and make reference to the Acces-
sion Partnerships and on the National Programme for the
Adoption of the Acquis, and they should also draw on rel-
evant national planning documents.’
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6.26. In order to strengthen the leverage effect of the
resources available, the ISPA Regulation provides that
either the rate of assistance shall be reduced to take
account of the availability of co-financing, the mea-
sure’s capacity to generate revenues and an appropriate
application of the ‘polluter pays’ principle or that assis-
tance given could be repayable.
6.27. DG Budget advocated that a more thorough
analysis of revenue-generating capacity be carried out at
the project appraisal stage. For example, the level at
which tariffs or charges were fixed should take into
account the expected increase in household income. So
far, the Commission has not used repayable assistance.
The ISPA Regulation specifies that assistance reim-
bursed to the managing authority or to another public
authority shall be reallocated for the same purpose. The
financing memoranda should lay down the modalities
for such allocations, and the applicable control mecha-
nisms in particular.
Technical assistance deficiencies
6.28. The financial support to help candidate coun-
tries in their project preparation (including institution-
building) came from different instruments (24) financed
by Phare as follows:
(a) ‘Special Preparatory Programmes for Structural
Funds (SPPs)’ were launched in 1998 with the aim
helping to improve the candidate countries’ capac-
ity to develop the policy-making skills, administra-
tive structures and budgetary procedures necessary
for their future participation in EU structural pro-
grammes. Thus, Phare supported preparation for
6.26. The Commission bears in mind the fact that projects
need to be affordable for the users of the infrastructure and
take account of income levels in the applicant countries, which
are only a fraction of those in the Member States. In apprais-
ing environmental projects, the Commission assesses future
revenue, including the application of the ‘polluter-pays’ prin-
ciple, and decides on a grant rate which makes the project
financially viable over its lifetime. For environmental projects
grant rates varied between 49 % and 75 %. Transport projects,
particularly road projects, do not normally have any substan-
tial revenue which could be taken into account for the purpose
of reducing the grant rate. The application of a lower grant
rate is, moreover, artificial in the case of the financing of cor-
ridor projects, since ISPA usually provides funds for only a
limited section of the corridor.
6.27. The Commission believes that repayable assistance
requires sophisticated implementing, monitoring and control
structures which are not yet in place in the applicant countries.
Moving on to repayable assistance schemes too early would be
incompatible with the principles of sound management of
Community assistance. The objectives of leverage assistance
can also be achieved by reducing the grant rate, as has been
done for a variety of projects.
Applicants are required to undertake a financial analysis of
the project, which includes the aspects noted by the Court. The
robustness and quality of the financial analysis are scrutinised
in the course of the appraisal.
6.28. It should be noted that the objectives of these pro-
grammes were met, as is demonstrated by the fact that there
is a sufficient number of well-developed projects to allow full
commitment of the ISPA allocation for 2000.
(24) Implemented under the responsibility of DG ELARG and
the Delegations.
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implementing ISPA and Sapard and establishing the
relevant national strategies. SPPs could be imple-
mented by so-called ‘twinning projects’ (25) as the
principal tool for assistance in institution-building;
(b) the Large Scale Infrastructure Facility, Part 4 (LSI-
F IV) (26);
(c) other national programmes financed by Phare sup-
ported the candidate countries in ISPA project iden-
tification and preparation.
The implementation of these programmes was delayed
by problems with consultants as well as a lack of com-
mitment on the part of the candidate countries them-
selves. In the case of some of the ISPA twinning projects
within SPP, there was insufficient guidance from the
Commission.
6.29. From 2000 onward, ISPA funds have also been
available for technical assistance. A few projects were
prepared with bilateral support from Member States or
by candidate countries on their own.
6.30. The Commission has neither properly assessed
the needs for technical assistance nor defined priorities.
The Court was unable to obtain a complete overview of
the EU-funding spent in 2000 for all these different
kinds of technical assistance related to the preparation
of ISPA projects.
6.30. The Commission emphasises that the real measure of
the quality of technical assistance is the quality of the applica-
tion that follows.
For Phare, the Commission can only readily extract contract
data sorted by existing codes. Preparation for ISPA is not one
of the existing codes. Compiling the information sought by
the Court would, therefore, require a manual, ad hoc search
through both the Désirée and Perseus contract databases for
all the programmes indicated by the Court in 6.36. This is
technically possible but very time-consuming and the Com-
mission considers that the benefits of such a search would be
disproportionate to the cost. The development of a more
sophisticated management information system is foreseen
under the 2000 Phare review.
(25) Provides the framework for administrations and semi-
public organisations in the Candidate Countries to work
with their counterparts in the Member States.
(26) Precursor to ISPA funding.
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6.31. Therefore, country strategies and applications
for ISPA projects finally presented to the Commission
did not meet the Commission’s criteria and the differ-
ent Commission services involved needed to put in a lot
of work to bring them to an acceptable standard. In par-
ticular, there were shortcomings in the preparation of
economic and financial analyses.
Coordination needed to complete the decentralisation
process
6.32. The creation of two new pre-accession instru-
ments (ISPA and Sapard), with different regulations and
implementing rules, alongside the existing Phare pro-
gramme, resulted in a big challenge to the candidate
countries, who had to handle these funds while at the
same time trying to reform their internal administra-
tion (27).
6.33. Identification of transport projects was based on
the Transport Infrastructure Needs Assessment (TINA),
which identified network components for a futureTrans-
European Network (TEN) in the candidate countries. No
equivalent needs assessment was carried out in the
environment sector. Therefore, the Commission decided
to concentrate — as for the Cohesion Fund — on spe-
cific sub-sectors. ThePriority Environmental Programme
for Accession (PEPA), which has a wider scope than
ISPA, is developing a database of potential environmen-
tal projects to help candidate countries to identify prior-
ity projects for the medium and long term. PEPA was
launched in late 1999 and the first country reviews were
presented in late 2000.
6.34. A key factor determining the success of ISPA is
the establishment of appropriate programming and
management structures in each beneficiary country (28).
The coordination Regulation provides that the require-
ment for ex ante approval by the Commission of project
selection, tendering and contracting may be waived as
soon as project management capacity, financial control
procedures and public finance structures in the candi-
date countries are considered appropriate.
6.34. From the outset, ISPA has been implemented on the
basis of the Decentralised Implementation System (DIS) simi-
lar to that applicable under Phare. That means that, in addi-
tion to the ex ante approval of the tendering and contracting
process by the Commission, the applicant country is respon-
sible for the implementation of the project following the sig-
nature of the financing memorandum, and in particular for
financial management and control. Article 12(2) of the coor-
dinating Regulation provides for the waiver, by a Commis-
sion decision, of the prior approval requirement for tendering
and contracting procedures where certain criteria and condi-
tions are fulfilled, resulting in extended decentralised imple-
mentation (EDIS). In 2000, the Commission was concerned
to ensure that the bodies responsible were setting up the struc-
tures necessary to manage ISPA in accordance with DIS, so
that they would be fully in place by the time implementation
of ISPA projects began. For that reason, the request of July
2000 was transmitted to the applicant countries.
(27) See the Court’s conclusions in paragraph 5.73 of the
Annual report concerning the financial year 1999,
OJ C 342, 1.12.2000.
(28) Article 9 of the ISPA Regulation requires the beneficiary
countries to establish proper management and control
systems as from 1 January 2000 and in any event not
later than 1 January 2002.
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6.35. This matter is closely related to the accession
negotiations regarding ‘Chapter 28 (Financial control)’.
For those countries where a provisional closure of this
chapter has been agreed on, it is important to complete
the process of decentralisation, in order for them to be
ready when accession takes place. In the ‘Phare 2000
Review’ paper (29) it is planned to fully decentralise
responsibility for ISPA implementation to the candidate
countries from 2002 and to reinforce support to imple-
menting authorities that have been approved by the
Candidate Countries and the Commission. Only in
July 2000 did DG REGIO request the Candidate Coun-
tries to produce an assessment of their capacity for
decentralised management.
Coordination needs to be improved
6.36. The coordination Regulation specifies that the
Commission is responsible for the coordination of the
three instruments (Phare, ISPA and Sapard), and in par-
ticular for the establishment of pre-accession guidelines
for each country. In practice, this resulted in the ‘Gen-
eral assistance documents’ of March 2000 and
April 2001, which, however, did no more than describe
the state of preparation in the candidate countries at
that date.
6.37. For the transport infrastructure projects, at the
start no link was established between the different
TINA/TEN Steering Committees and the ISPA Manage-
ment Committee to guarantee a harmonised implemen-
tation of projects.
6.38. The interservice coordination of the appraisal of
national ISPA strategies and project applications is func-
tioning well, especially since the formalisation of these
procedures in mid-2000.
The Phare review set out the main principles for EDIS. The
Commission prepared a single working document for Phare
and ISPA containing a checklist for each of the preconditions
defined in Council Regulation (EC) No 1266/1999 and this
document was sent to applicant countries in January 2001 to
help them prepare for EDIS. This has been followed up in
2001 with meetings with applicant countries in order to
explain in detail the requirements for EDIS and the measures
to be carried out.
6.35. The General Assistance Document for 2001 was dis-
cussed with and welcomed by the Phare Management Com-
mittee on 26 April 2001. This document provides informa-
tion about priorities and indicative allocations for each country
and each instrument, about coordination with the EIB and
IFIs, and about progress and prospects for decentralised man-
agement.
6.36. A large number of the Member State representatives
sitting on the ISPA Management Committee also fulfil the
role of Chairman or Vice-Chairman of the TINA/TEN Steer-
ing Committees. For the purpose of coordinating the projects,
the Commission has appointed from among its staff one per-
son to be responsible for each of the ten corridors. Within this
context, it has been cooperating with the Steering Commit-
tees for the different corridors since September 2000.
(29) Communication from Mr Verheugen, C(2000)3103/2 of
27 October 2000.
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6.39. The approach to the appraisal process varied
between the Directorates-General:
(a) DG ENV contracted a consultant to develop check-
lists for the approval procedure. The same consult-
ant is available to give advice on complex projects;
(b) DG TREN does not have the resources to concen-
trate on anything other than the question of coher-
ence between projects and EU and national trans-
port strategies;
(c) DG REGIO’s ISPA directorate sometimes uses exter-
nal consultants for project appraisal. In addition, a
framework contract was concluded with the EIB,
which provides technical support in the case of a
limited number of project applications.
6.40. No clear guidelines providing approval criteria,
apart from the generally formulated requirements in
Annex I and II of the ISPA Regulation, could be identi-
fied. A harmonised approach to the appraisal procedure
within DG REGIO or between the different Commis-
sion services was not apparent, nor was there a clear
follow-up of comments made by the different DGs.
SAPARD
Consequences of the complex legal framework
6.41. The Sapard Regulation is complex, because it
combines elements of three different policy areas: Struc-
tural Fund multiannual programming, EAGGF Guaran-
tee financial control procedures and external aid inter-
national agreements. In addition, as such management
and control procedures did not exist in the beneficiary
countries, the legal basis had to be developed by the
Commission.
6.39.
(b) DG TREN’s contribution to the ISPA transport guide-
lines has been extremely valuable, particularly that con-
tained in a technical paper dated 28 August 2000,
which was presented for information purposes to the ISPA
Management Committee in February 2001. Moreover,
in the course of interdepartmental consultations, DG
TREN normally checks that transport projects comply
with a number of European agreements (AGR, AGTC,
TEM) and with the provisions of Council Directive
96/53/EC as regards axle weight and dimensions.
6.40. The assessment criteria for projects are clearly described
in the Regulation and in the assistance application forms.
Projects are assessed by all Commission departments on the
basis of their respective responsibilities and in accordance with
a well-established, interdepartmental dual consultation pro-
cedure. The follow-up to the comments made by the different
DGs is governed by these same rules of procedure and is speci-
fied in the empowerment procedure drawn up in favour of the
Commissioner responsible for Regional Policy.
6.41. The Commission set up a financial framework to
implement rural development programmes in third countries
with adequate guarantees governing the use of Community
funds and accountability for them. It pursued the dual aims
of managing the system in a manner which had already proved
to be effective within the Community and of familiarising the
applicant countries with the application of internal Commu-
nity rules prior to accession.
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6.42. The Sapard Regulation did not clearly define the
legal and management framework and it took the Com-
mission seven months to reconcile the heterogeneous
requirements and to apply the principles for the imple-
mentation of Sapard. The Commission had considered
making a new proposal to the Council in order to pro-
vide a legal basis, but did not do so on the grounds that
this was not necessary.
6.43. The Regulation required the Commission to
adopt detailed financial rules; this was done in June
2000. Because the Regulation could not be directly
applied in candidate countries, the Commission had to
transform the rules into an international agreement (the
‘Multiannual Financing Agreement’). The process of
drafting and negotiating the agreement with the 10
candidate countries took six months, and the document
setting out the rules was approved by the Commission
on 29 November 2000.
6.44. The financial management and control proce-
dures stipulated in the international agreement are those
of EAGGF Guarantee (including paying agencies and the
clearance of accounts procedure). Financial manage-
ment and control procedures governing similar pro-
grammes in the Member States are those of the Struc-
tural Funds. Although the systems being set up will
provide the candidate countries with relevant experi-
ence, it appears that certain procedures being intro-
duced are temporary and will not be needed upon
accession.
The Commission’s management
6.45. It is clear that the Commission was working
within a very tight timetable, in order to set up the legal
framework and put in place the Sapard rural develop-
ment programmes. It was an achievement, for both the
Commission and the candidate countries, that all rural
development programmes were approved in a timely
manner. Furthermore, the procedure of drafting and
signing the international agreements was concluded
successfully.
6.42. Council Regulation (EC) No 1268/1999 lays down
that Sapard must be implemented in accordance with the
principles of Community legislation on the EAGGF and
external aid. Moreover, the Financial Regulation provides
under Title IX (External Aid) for ex-ante approval by the
Commission of management tasks (such as project selection,
tendering and contracting). Implementing Regulation (EC)
No 1268/1999 will entail many applications for often small
projects, so that the delegation of management tasks to the
applicant countries, as provided for in Council Regulation
(EC) 1266/1999, was necessary. The framework for such a
novel system inevitably took time to establish.
6.44. At the time of accession, the system created for Sapard
would require onlyminor amendments in order to fulfil respon-
sibilities relating to both the existing Structural Funds and
EAGGF Guarantee requirements.
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Problems faced by candidate countries in setting up the
systems
6.46. Candidate countries had no experience of setting
up the management and control systems required for
EU funds. Furthermore, since there are differences
between these systems and those of the Member States,
the Commission should have prepared specific working
methods to help candidate countries in setting up the
required systems, as had been done for EAGGF Guar-
antee paying agencies in Member States. The Commis-
sion should have laid down clear and simple rules with
the associated guidance before the candidate countries
started setting up their systems. Instead, the Commis-
sion provided the candidate countries with the guide-
lines that it issued to Member States advising them on
obtaining accreditation of their paying agencies.
6.47. A further complication was that the Commis-
sion drafted the implementing regulations and the agree-
ments with the candidate countries (which contain the
legal basis for management and payment of funds) at
the same time that the candidate countries were draft-
ing their rural development programmes and setting up
their systems. This has meant that management has in
fact been on an ad hoc basis with problems being
addressed and advice given only when the candidate
countries actually faced them.
6.48. All 10 candidate countries received considerable
financial support from the Phare programme to help
with the implementation of Sapard. For example,
3,6 million euro had been committed by the end of
2000 for Bulgaria, and an additional 1 million euro is
planned for 2001. This reflects the lack of experienced
people in the administrations in the candidate coun-
tries, and has required a large input from EU experts,
particularly in the setting up of the management sys-
tems. Phare also financed, for more than 1 million euro,
support costs of the Sapard (Paying) Agencies in ben-
eficiary countries, for items such as computer equip-
ment. This is not in accordance with the explanatory
remark for the budget line concerned (B7-0 3 0), which
specifies that ‘irrespective of the beneficiary’, no admin-
istrative expenditure against this article is authorised.
The Commission interprets this as authorising admin-
istrative expenditure. The Court does not agree with
this interpretation.
6.46. The relevant working method devised for Member
States, namely the guidelines for setting up paying agencies,
was made available to the applicant countries. The Commis-
sion did not deem it appropriate to provide the applicant
countries with further working methods. However, where an
applicant country sought guidance, each individual problem
received an appropriate response.
The framework for the financial implementation of Sapard
was already defined by the Commission communication of
26 January 2001. That framework was further developed in
Commission Regulation (EC) 2222/2000 of 7 June 2000.
In the Commission’s view, this approach constitutes ‘clear and
simple rules’, as requested by the Court.
6.47. Forging ahead with the setting up of Sapard in tan-
dem with the drafting and approval of the financial rules and
Multiannual Financing Agreement was in the interests of the
applicant countries. Waiting until the financial rules and
MAFA were finally adopted could have laid the Commission
open to criticism for delaying and for being too formal and
inflexible in cooperating with applicant countries.
6.48. The Commission regards institution-building support
aimed at helping countries prepare and implement Sapard as
a key condition for its success. Since such support cannot
legally come from Sapard, it comes from Phare, in accordance
with Council Regulation (EC) No 1266/1999 on coordinat-
ing pre-accession assistance. Assistance from Phare is granted
in the context of support for institution building in order to
develop an effective capacity for implementing the acquis. The
supply of computer equipment for Sapard Agencies in the ini-
tial phase is an integral part of this process. The example of
Bulgaria as cited by the Court is correct, except that the EUR
1 million project is part of the 2000 Phare programme for
Bulgaria, and the 2001 Phare programme for this country
does not include additional funding for this purpose.
The comment on budget line B7-0 3 0, that ‘irrespective of
the beneficiary, no administrative expenditure against this
article is authorised’, should be read in conjunction with the
comments on Phare budget line B7-0 3 0 A (expenditure on
administrative management). This means that any adminis-
trative expenditure relating to themanagement of Phare should
be financed under administrative line B7-0 3 0 A. In the case
in point, the initial installation of computer equipment is not
administrative expenditure connected with the implementa-
tion of the project, but the Phare project itself.
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Shortcomings in the Commission’s analysis of manage-
ment and control systems
6.49. The legal basis for Sapard requires that the Com-
mission’s decision on decentralised management should
be based on an analysis of the management and control
systems of that candidate country. In view of the impor-
tance of the accreditation decision and in order to
ensure that a favourable accreditation decision is soundly
based, this review should be carried out by persons who
are functionally independent of the staff who have
advised the candidate countries in setting up those sys-
tems. In the Commission, however, the advice and con-
trol activities have not always been clearly separated in
the context of the Sapard programme.
6.50. It is general audit practice for the analysis of a
system to be based on the identification of risks. How-
ever, the checklist used by the Commission to verify
whether the conditions specified in the Multiannual
FinancingAgreement (which includes the financial rules)
are fulfilled, is not based on risk analysis. As a result
several risk areas are not addressed, in particular: the
overlap between Phare and Sapard and the quality of
staff of the competent authority in each of the Candi-
date Countries, which are responsible for granting
accreditation to their national Sapard (Paying) Agencies.
Moreover, no specific checks are included for the require-
ment in the Multiannual Financing Agreement that
expenditure shall be eligible only if the use of the assis-
tance is in accordance with the principles of sound
financial management, in particular those of economy
and cost-effectiveness.
6.49. An auditor may not carry out or participate in the
management of the auditee’s activities or, in this specific case,
be responsible for setting up the procedures and structures for
the management of the Sapard programme over and above his
operational responsibilities. In practice, therefore, an auditor
may:
(a) perform auditing and accounting tasks and give advice in
this connection,
(b) give advice in areas which are closely connected with the
audit function and in which the auditor has the necessary
competence.
Auditing has, by its very nature, resulted in exchanges of
views between the authorities and the auditors on procedures
and structures during fact-finding missions and in the course
of the auditor’s examination that is carried out on the basis
of a decision by the Competent Authority.
6.50. The Commission decided to base its checks on a
100 % verification of the elements specified in the MAFA
rather than on a risk analysis.
The possibility of an overlap between Phare and Sapard is
covered by the audit programme, ‘The receipt of Project Pro-
posal, Accounting of Contracts and Notification of Approval’.
In the Commission’s view, the verification of these proposals
on the basis of a sample provides reasonable assurance that
any overlaps will be detected.
The curricula vitae of the staff performing the work at the
National Fund have been checked for ‘quality’, although this
aspect is not explicitly mentioned in the checklist.
According to Article 4 of the MAFA, sound financial man-
agement and, in particular, economy and cost-effectiveness
constitute an eligibility criterion. Verification includes the
means used by the Agency to assess the processes and related
controls which cover this concept on an operational level.
Although the checklist does not specifically mention checks in
this area, this aspect is nonetheless verified as far as eligibility
criteria are concerned.
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CONCLUSIONS
6.51. In 2000, the Commission faced the difficult task
of implementing two new programmes in candidate
countries, while at the same time preparing these coun-
tries for accession. Nevertheless, it succeeded in approv-
ing 75 projects for ISPA, 10 Rural Development Pro-
grammes for Sapard, and committed almost all of the
available appropriations. However, hardly any payment
appropriations were used (see paragraphs 6.12, 6.18
and 6.43).
6.52. No project could start in 2000, due to the late
adoption of the legal framework and delays in setting
up applicable administrative structures and procedures
within the Commission, all of which delayed the pre-
paratorywork. Additional delayswere caused for Sapard,
because the Commission first needed to clarify the legal
andmanagement frameworkwhich had not been clearly
defined in the Regulation (see paragraphs 6.20-6.24 and
6.39-6.41).
— The Commission should analyse and develop the
manner in which it will implement new expenditure
programmes while the legal basis is being devel-
oped, in order to ensure that these programmes can
be implemented in a timely and effective manner.
6.51. The level of payments is not abnormal and reflects
the early phases of project implementation. Payments will
increase as the projects advance and expenditure is incurred.
6.52. ISPA and Sapard followed normal Community prac-
tice, whereby a new policy is defined by a Council legal frame-
work, which requires subsequent implementation on the basis
of Commission manuals, provisions or regulations. In accor-
dance with the relevant institutional procedures, Commission
regulations could be drawn up only after the Council had
adopted the basic legal framework.
After adoption of the Council legal framework, both the Com-
mission and the applicant countries needed some time to set
up appropriate administrative structures, submit and approve
programmes and select projects. This period compares favour-
ably with that required for similar tasks in Member States.
ISPA is providing Community assistance for infrastructure
investment on an unprecedented scale. Large infrastructure
projects generally require a lengthy, well-prepared start-up
phase. Implementation of several projects already got under
way in 2000 with the preparation of tendering and contracts.
The adoption of financial rules for Sapard and the assessment
and Commission approval of Sapard programmes were car-
ried out simultaneously, the process having been completed
long before any country was ready to begin implementing
projects. The time taken by most countries to set up the Sapard
Agencies can be attributed to various causes, the majority of
which derive from the scale of the task. However, Sapard
Agencies are now in operation in two countries, while in
others even the national accreditation process is not yet in its
final stages.
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6.53. The national administrations in the candidate
countries had great difficulty in trying to manage more
than double the previous amount of pre-accession aid,
to familiarise themselves with new and different regula-
tions and to reform their own administrations all at the
same time. This required a strong commitment from
each candidate country, which was not always evident,
and a significant input from the Commission, which
was not always provided in time (see paragraphs 6.27-
6.31 and 6.44-6.45).
— The Commission should provide the maximum
guidance and technical advice in time, in the form
of manuals, specific working methods and rules, in
order to assist the candidate countries in making the
necessary commitment.
6.53. The Commission has provided applicant countries
with the legal framework for implementing aid, and with con-
siderable guidance and technical assistance from its own
departments and under several specific measures financed by
Phare and other sources.
The Commission acknowledges the efforts made by applicant
countries confronted with the task of setting up structures and
procedures adapted to their own internal structures, while
complying with the acquis communautaire. Manuals, specific
working methods and rules provided by the Commission could
cover only common factors, while specific national aspects had
to be dealt with in the context of technical assistance pro-
grammes financed under Phare.
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ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENDITURE OF THE
INSTITUTIONS AND COMMUNITY BODIES
Introduction
7.1. Heading 5 of the financial perspective, ‘Adminis-
trative expenditure’, contains the institutions’ and bod-
ies’ administrative appropriations (Part A of the budget
in the case of the Commission), the implementation of
which is detailed in Table 7.1. These appropriations are
managed directly by these authorities and are used pri-
marily to pay the salaries, allowances and pensions of
persons working for the Community institutions, as
well as rent, property purchases and miscellaneous
administrative expenditure. The breakdown of staff
receiving these payments is shown in Tables 7.2 and
7.3. In the Commission’s case, these appropriations also
enable subsidies to be given to associations and organ-
isations that assist in the implementation of various
aspects of the European Union’s activities.
Budgetary management
7.2. The Court has reviewed the information presented
in Volumes I to IV of the revenue and expenditure
account. Volumes I and III provide a commentary on
budgetary management for the year and, in particular,
explanations of variations between the initial approved
budget and the appropriations finally available, as well
as between the appropriations finally available and those
utilised. This review did not seek to provide assurance
as to the reliability of these explanations. Rather, it
sought to identify any significant variations for which
explanations are not provided and to identify any explan-
ation that might be considered misleading. The review
did not reveal any case where the explanations appeared
to be implausible, except at the Council, where mission
costs totalling some 0,5 million euro relate to missions
carried out in 1999 in the absence of any appropri-
ations and pre-commitment.
7.2. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
Parliament is always willing to continue, together with the
other institutions, the efforts which have been made to improve
the transparency of the information presented in the revenue
and expenditure account. However, it draws the Court’s atten-
tion to the information in the revenue and expenditure account
which concisely justifies each variation between initial and
final appropriations. These variations, incidentally, arise from
transfers approved by the budgetary authority on the basis of
the more detailed information forwarded to it.
7.2. THE COUNCIL’S REPLIES
In the section on budgetary management the Court highlights
the 1999 mission expenses of EUR 0,5 million that had to
be financed from the 2000 budget. In fact, the Council had
found that the relevant departments had taken internal meas-
ures to avoid a recurrence of this in future, and those assur-
ances had enabled it to approve the transfer in question.
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Table 7.1 — Administrative expenditure 2000 (1) (summarised by section)
(Mio EUR)
Section I Section II
Section III - Part A
(including the Publica-
tions Office)
Section IV Section V Section VI Section VII Section VIII
Total Parliament Council Commission Court ofJustice
Court of
Auditors ESC COR
European
Ombudsman
Financial perspective ceiling 4 798 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
2000 budget development
Initial appropriations 4 704 965 348 3 069 131 70 81 35 4
Final available appropriations (2) (3) 4 725 980 354 3 069 131 70 81 35 4
Implementation of the 2000 budget (3)
Appropriations used (4) 4 656 973 350 3 025 129 66 76 32 3
% of final available appropriations 99 99 99 99 99 94 94 91 82
Appropriations carried over to 2001 (5) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
% of final available appropriations 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Cancelled appropriations 71 7 5 44 2 4 5 3 1
% of final available appropriations 1 1 1 1 1 6 6 9 18
(1) Under the financial perspective.
(2) Budget appropriations amended after taking into account supplementary and amending budgets and transfers.
(3) Not including appropriations carried over from 1999, appropriations from the reuse of revenue, revenue resulting from third-party shareholdings and other revenue corresponding to a specific use and appropriations made avail-
able again.
(4) Sums committed which gave rise either to payment during the financial year, or to an automatic carry-over to the financial year 2001.
(5) Non-automatic carry-overs.
For further information concerning the implementation of the budget, please refer to Diagrams III and IV in Annex I to this report.
Source: 2000 revenue and expenditure account.
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7.3. The general approach adopted by the institutions
to the analysis of budgetary management fails to inform
readers of the most significant features of expenditure
for the year. All of the institutions focus on explaining
variances between outturn and the budget, sometimes
in great detail. The way they do this is, however, incon-
sistent both within and between institutions. The analy-
sis often obscures key issues in budgetary management:
for example, Parliament does not explain the operation
of the procedure to apply unused appropriations on
other budget lines to capital repayments on buildings;
the Commission has not explained the significant varia-
tions affecting Chapter A-7 0 (decentralised expenditure
on support staff and administration); and none of the
institutions explains the differences between sums com-
mitted and payments made. It is desirable for the insti-
tutions to provide a more global analysis in the future,
focusing on the main trends in expenditure, and the
major capital items, as well as offering key measures
ofeconomy and efficiency.
7.3. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
On this subject, too, Parliament is willing to continue its
efforts. As regards, in particular, the early payments for build-
ings, it is out of a concern to make optimum use of the appro-
priations made available to it and to ensure sound financial
management that Parliament uses unused appropriations to
increase the appropriations for financing of buildings. This
results in significant savings which enable Parliament to meet
new needs without increasing its share of the financial per-
spective. At all events, the increases made are first approved
by the budgetary authority on the basis of the information
supplied to it.
7.3. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission will explore with the other institutions a
coordinated approach on administrative expenditure and,
Table 7.2 — Staff numbers by institution and by category as at 31 December 2000
Institution Officials Temporarystaff
Auxiliary
staff
Local
employees DYEs (
7) SNEs (8) Advisors Total
European Parliament and Ombudsman (1) 3 283 587 219 32 — — — 4 121
Council 2 505 38 — — — — — 2 543
Commission (2)
— Administration (Brussels, Luxembourg (3) ,
Strasbourg) 15 414 512 976 — — 529 26 17 457
— Joint Research Centre (4) 759 922 219 — — — — 1 900
— Shared-cost research 416 972 369 — — — — 1 757
— Representation in the EU and staff seconded
to satellite bodies 445 13 23 187 — — — 668
— External Delegations, representations and
offices 690 3 — 2 142 — 10 — 2 845
Court of Justice 758 223 20 — — — 1 1 002
Court of Auditors 405 119 22 — — — 1 547
Economic and Social Committee (5) 470 66 23 — — — 1 560
Committee of the Regions (6) 165 59 12 — — — — 236
Total 25 310 3 514 1 883 2 361 — 539 29 33 636
(1) Ombudsman : 11 temporary and 6 auxiliary staff.
(2) Commission total: 24 627 (i.e.17 724 officials, 2 422 temporary staff, 1 587 auxiliary staff, 2 329 local employees, 0 delegated young experts, 539 seconded
national officials and 26 special advisors).
(3) Including EUR-OP.
(4) JRC staff and Commission staff at the JRC.
(5) Economic and Social Committee.
(6) Committee of the Regions.
(7) Delegated young experts (DYEs).
(8) Seconded national experts (SNEs).
Source: The relevant institutions.
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Table 7.3 — Staff numbers by institution and by place of employment as at 31 December 2000
Place of employment
European
Parliament and
Ombudsman
Council European Commission Court of Justice Court ofAuditors ESC/ COR (
7) Total
1999 2000 (2) 1999 2000
Administration (4)
Representations
in the EU and
staff seconded
to the satellite
bodies
Delegations (5) Shared-costresearch (6)
Joint Research
Centre (6) 1999
total
2000
total 1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000
1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000 1999 2000
Member States (headquarters)
— Brussels 1 641 1716 2 495 2 515 14 623 14 548 — — — — 1 570 1 554 63 59 16 256 16 161 — — 1 1 762 796 21 155 21 189
— Luxembourg 2 252 2202 — — 2 884 2 909 — — — — 64 79 1 1 2 949 2 989 966 1 002 552 546 — — 6 719 6 739
— Strasbourg 53 63 3 3 1 — — — — — — — — — 1 — — — — — — — 57 66
Member States (outside
headquart.) 132 140 — — — — 721 668 — — 104 107 1 911 1 840 2 736 2 615 — — — — — — 2 868 2 755
Total for Member States (1) 4 078 4 121 2 498 2 518 17 508 17 457 721 668 — — 1 738 1 740 1 975 1 900 21 774 21 765 966 1 002 553 547 762 796 30 799 30 749 (1)
Outside the Member States — — 24 25 (3) — — — — 2 523 2 845 24 17 — — 2 547 2 862 — — — — — — 2 571 2 887
Grand total 4 078 4 121 2 522 2 543 17 508 17 457 721 668 2 523 2 845 1 762 1 757 1 975 1 900 24 321 24 627 966 1 002 553 547 762 796 33 370 33 636
(1) Member States: Belgium: 21 377, Denmark: 34, Germany: 340, Greece: 33, Spain: 111, France: 168, Ireland: 170, Italy: 1 422, Luxembourg: 6 730, Netherlands: 185, Austria: 33, Portugal: 29, Finland: 24, Sweden: 25, United Kingdom: 63.
(2) Ombudsman: Brussels 3, Strasbourg 14.
(3) Outside the EU: Geneva 15 and New York 10.
(4) Including EUR-OP.
(5) External Delegations, representations and offices.
(6) Brussels: 1 613, Luxembourg: 80, Ispra: 1 227, Karlsruhe: 216, Geel: 184, Petten: 157, Seville: 55, Naka: 17, Garching: 48, Culham: 3, Frascati: 8, Cadarache: 28, Jülich: 6, Padua: 2, Vienna: 2, Madrid: 4, Utrecht: 2, Bologna: 1, London: 2, Rome 1, Stockholm: 1 (includ-
ing shared-cost staff).
(7) Economic and Social Committee and Committee of the Regions.
Source: The relevant institutions.
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Specific appraisal within the framework of the State-
ment of Assurance
Scope of the audit
7.4. The Court’s audit focused on all the accounts and
operations involving administrative expenditure (head-
ing No 5 of the financial perspective).
provided an agreement can be reached with these other bod-
ies, will develop a consistent approach on programme expen-
diture to be applied by all.
Management of the appropriations entered in Chapter A-7 0
is decentralised. At the beginning of the year each DG/service
receives a ‘total allocation’ of administrative appropriations,
including appropriations for employing external staff, broken
down between the various headings of Chapter A-7 0. Each
DG/service can then reallocate their appropriations to vari-
ous items as needs be. These adjustments are made by way of
transfers during the financial year. Overall, the lines ‘external
staff’ were increased by EUR 3,3 million from other admin-
istrative lines in Title A-7. In practice, the increase went mainly
to line A-7 0 0 0 (auxiliaries), with transfers coming from
line A-7 0 0 2 (Service providers). The reasons for increase
for line A-7 0 0 0 were certain one-off measures not known
about when the preliminary draft budget 2000 was drawn
up, the efforts made to speed up the clearance of the outstand-
ing commitments in the field of external relations, the return
of certain tasks previously carried out by the technical assis-
tance offices and increases in order to meet one-off require-
ments arising from large-scale redeployment of staff in vari-
ous Commission departments.
In 2000, the budgetary authority also made two transfers:
first, EUR 2 283 000 was transferred from item A-7 0 0 0
(Auxiliaries) to Title A6 (Delegations) in support of the pro-
cess of decentralising the implementation of aid programmes
for third countries; second, the EUR 2 000 000 which the
European Parliament had entered in reserve was transferred
from Chapter A-10 0 to line A-7 0 0 2 (Seconded). The net
result was a reduction of EUR 283 000 in the appropria-
tions available in Chapter A-7 0.
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Reliability of the accounts and legality and regularity of
the underlying transactions
7.5. The samples and analytical tests carried out have
revealed a situation which, save for some specific obser-
vations, remains satisfactory overall.
7.6. The budgetary accounts and financial state-
ments supporting the consolidated balance sheet
faithfully reflect the administrative expenditure of Com-
munity institutions and bodies. The off-balance-sheet
commitments present future pension costs in a more
informative manner. The annual cost of pension rights
acquired during the financial year is now shown. How-
ever, in the view of the Court it would be better for the
liability to be presented in the balance sheet and the
annual charge included in the calculation of the eco-
nomic result, in accordance with international account-
ing standards. The presentation of fixed assets has
improved, but is still affected by the incorrect account-
ing treatment noted in paragraphs 7.8-7.10, 7.12, 7.13-
7.14 and 7.17.
7.7. Except for the matters discussed in paragraph 7.6,
the Court accordingly considers that the accounts of
the European Union institutions are reliable in their
presentation of administrative expenditure and related
assets and liabilities. It further considers that the under-
lying transactions are, taken as a whole, legal and regu-
lar. The Court notes that its own accounts are the sub-
ject of a comparable report provided by independent
auditors (1).
7.6. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
Parliament is willing to comply with the Court’s recommenda-
tions concerning the presentation of the balance sheet if all the
institutions decide to adopt the proposed approach. As regards
fixed assets, see replies to paragraphs 7.8 to 7.10.
7.6. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission feels that, at this stage, what is most im-
portant is to provide full information about pension commit-
ments in the financial statements. As the Court acknowledges,
the Commission included exhaustive information in theAnnex
to the financial statements.
At the moment, there is no consensus at international level
with regard to the procedure to deal with the public entities’
pension debt. A very thorough accounting analysis is required.
The procedure recommended by the Court is by no means
applied by the Member States or other non-member countries
with sophisticated public accounting systems.
The Commission would also add that the IFAC (International
Federation of Accountants) has not yet adopted standards to
be applied to public sector pensions.
(1) OJ C 312, 7.11.2001.
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Parliament
7.8. Parliament has for the first time entered the Louise
Weiss building in Strasbourg under the heading ‘Leas-
ing’ in its balance sheet, for a net accounting value of
367,4 million euro, in accordance with the provisions
adopted by the Commission on the accounting man-
agement of non-financial fixed asset accounts (2) and
the Court’s previous observations. The notes to the bal-
ance sheet do not mention that this is an estimated
value or that costs of around 21,5 million euro are con-
tested by Parliament. Moreover, the value of this asset is
to some extent underestimated, since this amount
includes the value of the land, amounting to 8,8 million
euro, for which, contrary to the applicable rules, a
cumulative depreciation sum of 1,2 million euro has
been calculated. Furthermore, 20 million euro of this
amount comprises the value of special equipmentwhich
Parliament has depreciated at a maximum annual rate
of 25 %, producing a cumulative value at the end of the
financial year 2000 of 60 million euro, without disclos-
ing the nature of the equipment concerned and the
depreciation rates that should actually be applied.
7.9. Themanagement of the other tangible fixed assets
has improved significantly as a result of using a new
inventorymanagement system (ELS) andapplyingdepre-
ciation, measures which will enable a more reliable
valuation of these assets to be presented than in the
past, especiallywhen the physical inventory programme,
which had progressed considerably by the end of the
financial year 2000, has been completed and taken into
account in the accounts inventory databases. At the end
of the financial year 2000, assets not yet identified dur-
ing a physical inventory accounted for a total of 1,4 mil-
lion euro, or around 4,1 % of the value of assets subject
to inventory that are shown in the balance sheet.
7.10. However, the inventory does not show assets
purchased by Parliament’s political groups using appro-
priations made available to them.
7.8. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
If the definitive value of the building were not known at the
end of 2001, the Court of Auditors’ remarks would be taken
into account in the preparation of the notes to the balance
sheet on the item ‘leasing of the Louise Weiss building’. As
soon as the breakdown of assets is available, the calculation
of depreciation will be brought into line with the Court’s rec-
ommendations.
7.9. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
The improvement brought about by the new inventory man-
agement system (ELS) is indeed significant. The percentage
represented by the value of assets whose inclusion in the inven-
tory is required and which were entered in the balance sheet
without being identified referred only tomovable items (exclud-
ing, therefore, the value of immovable property likewise included
in the balance sheet).
7.10. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
Parliament is aware of the problem raised by the Court and
will try to find a solution with the assistance of the political
groups.
(2) Commission Regulation (EC) No 2909/2000 of
29 December 2000 on the accounting management of
the European Community’s non-financial fixed assets
(OJ L 336, 30.12.2000, p. 75).
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7.11. Overtime costing a total of 0,54 million euro for
the financial year 2000 was paid, even though it was
not authorised beforehand, there was no evidence that
it had not been possible to take compensatory leave for
overtime worked and, in around a quarter of the cases,
there was no documentary evidence of the justification
for such overtime work.
Council
7.12. Although the Justus Lipsius building was com-
missioned in 1995, it is entered, for an amount of
339,1 million euro, under the heading ‘Fixed assets
under construction’ on the grounds that the official
deed has still not been signed, and as a result it has not
been depreciated at all. The fact is, however, that this
building has been paid for in full and the property’s
inherent risks and benefits have actually, in substance,
been transferred to the Council. This asset should there-
fore have been entered under the heading ‘Land and
buildings’ for a net accounting value of 257,7 million
euro, allowing for cumulative depreciation amounting
to 81,4 million euro. In addition, the absence of a physi-
cal inventory means that it is not possible to check that
the accounting inventory (8,52 million euro) for the
other tangible fixed assets corresponds to reality.
Court of Justice
7.13. Leased buildings are shown in the balance sheet
for the first time. Their net accounting value, i.e. 96 mil-
lion euro, is underestimated by some 2,1 million euro
because, in the case of Annex B, depreciation was cal-
culated on the basis of the financial year following that
in which it was commissioned. In addition, the notes to
the balance sheet make no reference to the provisional
nature of this value, since negotiations are still under-
way to determine the financial consequences of certain
construction faults.
7.11. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
Overtime is inherent in the nature of Parliament’s work, with
its peaks, and is therefore unavoidable, has to be worked regu-
larly and is kept within the limits of budget allocations, which
partly explains the absence of written authorisations. How-
ever, detailed records are kept of the hours worked, signed by
the hierarchical superior, and payment for them is limited by
the provisions in force. However, the directorates-general have
had their attention drawn to the absence of justification which
the Court noted, and since then they have abided by their obli-
gations in this respect.
7.12. THE COUNCIL’S REPLIES
Regarding the issue of how the Justus Lipsius building was
included in the budget, the Council agrees with the Court’s
analysis, but would explain that the heading ‘Fixed assets
under construction’ was chosen because of the legal complex-
ity of the situation coupled with the fairly long time it had
taken to finalise the relevant accounting rule. Also, the Coun-
cil is currently making a physical inventory (in the context of
2001), which will resolve the problem of the reliability of the
accounts inventory.
7.13. THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S REPLIES
When the balance sheet is drawn on 31 December 2001, the
net accounting value will be amended in order to take account
of the overvaluation of the buildings pointed out by the Court
of Auditors. Furthermore, the financial repercussions which
might result from the present negotiations concerning certain
defects are to be taken into account in that balance sheet. If
the negotiations are not completed on time, a note to that
effect will be added to the balance sheet.
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7.14. The reliability of the value of the other tangible
fixed assets, i.e. 9,8 million euro in total, cannot be
guaranteed. Contrary to what the Court of Justice stated
in its replies to the observations made by the Court in
its Annual Report concerning the financial year1999 (3),
it has still not implemented the new inventory manage-
ment system or conducted a full physical inventory. In
drawing up its balance sheet it has also failed to apply
depreciation which, according to the documents for-
warded to the Commission for it to draw up the con-
solidated balance sheet, amounts to 6,1 million euro.
Commission
7.15. The administrative expenditure of the Commis-
sion and the related assets and liabilities form a small
part of the overall consolidated financial statements, the
audit of which is reported in Chapter 9 of this docu-
ment. The following observations relate solely to the
administrative expenditure elements.
7.16. The Court notes that for the first time the finan-
cial statements mention the liabilities taken on by the
Commission in connection with the renovation work
on the Berlaymont building, which is estimated at 374
million euro. This real-estate operation also calls for
examination with regard to sound financial manage-
ment, given, inter alia, the Commission’s lack of control
over these renovation costs.
7.14. THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S REPLIES
During the financial year 2000, the Court implemented its
new computerised fixed-assets system together with a physi-
cal inventory. That work, which was not completed until the
beginning of the financial year 2001, has revealed inconsis-
tencies between the physical inventory and the data recorded
in the new computerised system. Given that those data are not
sufficiently reliable, it was decided in February 2001 not to
calculate the amount of depreciation of the tangible fixed
assets to be entered in the balance sheet which was then for-
warded to the Commission of the European Communities.
However, having regard to the progress made in the attempt
to reconcile the data in the inventory system with those in the
physical inventory, it was possible in April 2001 to estimate
the amount of depreciation and forward it to the Commission
for inclusion in the consolidated balance sheet. It should also
be noted that the necessary alterations to the computerised
database will be completed by the end of the year 2001. In
those circumstances, for the balance sheet as at 31 December
2001 depreciation will be calculated using the new comput-
erised fixed-assets system.
7.16. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission will use the interinstitutional and interde-
partmental working party set up to prepare the implementing
rules of Regulation (EC) No 2909/2000 of 29 December
2000 on the accounting management of the European Com-
munities’ non-financial fixed assets, to ensure that the account-
ing standards included in the above Regulation are interpreted
in the same way by the various departments in the institu-
tions.
With regard to training, the Commission accepts the Court’s
comment and will study the possibilities of organising the
appropriate courses.
(3) OJ C 342, 1.12.2000, p. 172.
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7.17. The reliability of the value of the tangible fixed
assets cannot be guaranteed. The Directorate-General
for External Relations entered all the computing soft-
ware installed in the Delegations in the accounts itself,
at a net accounting value of 0,13 million euro, whereas
at the Commission itself, only software covered by a site
licence or large-account contract was included in the
accounts. Conversely, the cost of licences for the Trans-
lation Service, forming part of a contract valued at
1,25 million euro, was not entered in the balance sheet.
Decentralisation of administrative management brings
with it an increased risk of disparate practices in the
various Commission departments, some of which are
probably not yet familiar with preparing financial state-
ments. TheAdministration and BudgetDGsmust ensure
that the requisite consistency is achieved and that the
necessary training and supervision are provided.
7.18. The long-term liabilities include an amount of
8,8 million euro for the unemployment fund for tem-
porary officials, the reliability of which cannot be guar-
anteed, since there has been no reconciliation with the
contributions made and allowances paid since 1998.
Procurement procedures
Scope of the examination
7.19. The Court examined the design and operation of
the controls over procurement procedures used by the
institutions to purchase services, supplies and works.
This included:
(a) a review of the controls in place at the institutions
for ensuring compliance with the relevant articles of
the Financial Regulation, the implementing mea-
sures and the public procurement directives in the
purchasing of all services, supplies and works;
(b) an examination of the procurement procedures asso-
ciated with the payments in an intensified sample of
transactions at the institutions.
7.18. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission acknowledges the importance of taking the
appropriate steps to monitor the unemployment fund in order
to guarantee long-term budgetary equilibrium. It undertakes
to get back on schedule in analysing the receipts and expen-
diture of the unemployment fund in the coming months.
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Legal basis of procedures and controls over procurement
7.20. The Financial Regulation sets out the responsi-
bilities of the different actors in the procurement pro-
cess and the framework for ensuring that appropriate
tendering procedures are followed:
(a) the authorising officer alone has the responsibility
for entering into financial commitments on behalf
of an institution and hence responsibility for ensur-
ing that appropriate procedures are followed. These
must comply with the Council directives on the
coordination of procedures for the award of public
works, supplies and services contracts;
(b) the system of control envisaged by the Financial
Regulation is provided jointly by an Advisory Com-
mittee on Procurements and Contracts (ACPC) and
Financial Control. The ACPC delivers an opinion
prior to the signing of a contract on whether the
procedure followed for selection of the successful
tenderer and the proposed terms of contract are
correct;
(c) Financial Control attends ACPC meetings as an
observer and checks that the commitment, the
authorisation of the expenditure and the payment
are in order and comply with the regulations.
Audit findings
Operat ion of cont ro l sys t ems
Implementat ion of the system envisaged by the F inan-
c ia l Regulat ion
7.21. The system of control envisaged by the Financial
Regulation has been implemented. Each institution oper-
ates an ACPC, composed in compliance with the Finan-
cial Regulation, which meets regularly during the year.
At each institution Financial Control is represented at
ACPC meetings and reviews tendering procedures.
7.22. No interinstitutional ACPC has been set up even
though many procurement needs are common to sev-
eral institutions. Occasionally ad hoc interinstitutional
tenders are launched by the larger institutions, with
which the smaller institutions are invited to associate
themselves.
7.22. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
The lack of an interinstitutional ACPC is offset by the recog-
nition of a lead ACPC, namely the ACPC of the institution
which is assuming primary responsibility for the invitation to
tender. The opinion of this ACPC is in principle accepted by
the other ACPCs.
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Operat ion of these controls at the inst i tut ions
7.23. In general, the Court found systems operated as
intended at each of the institutions, but the following
weakness was found to apply to all institutions. The
ACPC and Financial Control, although they operate ex
ante (i.e. prior to the commitment being entered into),
are detective controls designed to highlight errors in
procedures already carried out. When problems with
procedures are identified, the options for remedial action
available are often very costly and impractical for the
institution. Therefore, in practice, ACPCs’ opinions
reflect the overall interests of the institutions and are
not limited to giving an opinion on whether the tender-
ing procedure was in order. This is one element con-
tributing to the low rate of negative opinions given at
the larger institutions and the adoption of policies of
never giving negative opinions by some of the other
institutions. As a result, in a number of cases ACPCs
gave favourable opinions combined with explicit criti-
cism of certain aspects of the tendering procedure and
recommendations aimed at improving future practice.
7.22. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE’S REPLIES
The Economic and Social Committee occasionally uses the
results of tenders organised by other institutions. However, the
ESC is often unable to use the results of the tendering proce-
dure organised by other institutions either for official reasons
or because they do not take account of the ESC’s specific
needs. The ESC therefore proposes that tendering procedures,
in particular those organised by the larger institutions, are
more systematically organised between institutions.
7.22. THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS’ REPLIES
Wherever possible, the Committee of the Regions uses the
results of tenders organised by other institutions. However, the
COR is often unable to use the results of the tendering pro-
cedure organised by other institutions either for official rea-
sons or because they do not take account of the COR’s specific
needs. The COR therefore proposes that tendering procedures,
in particular those organised by the larger institutions, are
more systematically organised between institutions.
7.23. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
The Court of Auditors observes that, out of a concern for the
overall interests of the institutions, ACPCs deliver very few
unfavourable opinions in order to avoid a procedure’s having
to be started afresh after reaching the final stage. This seems
to underestimate the pre-referral system introduced by the
Secretary-General in 1997. Authorising officers are required
to submit to the ACPC the texts of invitations to tender gov-
erned by the public procurement directives before initiating a
procedure so that problems can be detected in advance and in
order to ensure, wherever possible, that the procedure selected
is the most appropriate with a view to concluding a contract
at the best price. If a problem emerges subsequently, the case
is referred back for a reconsideration of the tenders, which
enables the irregularity identified to be remedied.
7.23. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
It is true that in the great majority of cases, the ACPC and
Financial Control give their opinion on procedures already
carried out. However, authorising officers have the possibility
of submitting procurement files to the ACPC at any stage of
the procedure, e.g. before publishing a tender or sending out
the terms of reference.
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7.24. The operation of the ACPC and Financial Con-
trol at two institutions shows the following specific fea-
tures:
(a) at the Commission, the absence of identification of
procurement expenditure in the accounting system
combined with the sampling approach to select
commitment and payment proposals for testing
make it difficult for Financial Control to ensure that
all contracts that should have been submitted to the
ACPC before signing have actually been submitted
and that points raised by the ACPC have been fol-
lowed up;
7.23. THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S REPLIES
In so far as it is concerned by the Court of Auditors’ observa-
tions, the Court of Justice must point out that it is in no way
the policy of the institution’s Advisory Committee on Procure-
ment and Contracts (ACPC) never to give a negative opin-
ion. It is true that, in keeping with its advisory role, the ACPC
may in certain instances append to its opinion remarks crit-
ical of various features of the procedure followed in such and
such a proposed procurement contract; however, the facts
which give rise to those remarks are not such as could have
justified a negative opinion on the proposed procurement con-
tract in question.
7.23. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE’S REPLIES
The wording used by the Court of Auditors could give the
impression that, as a small institution, the ESC’s ACPC never
gives negative opinions. In actual fact, the ACPC gave a nega-
tive opinion for 5 % of the dossiers presented in 2000 and
also gave a number of negative opinions in 2001.
7.23. THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS’ REPLIES
The wording used by the Court of Auditors could give the
impression that, as a small institution, the COR’s ACPC
never gives negative opinions. In actual fact, the ACPC gave a
negative opinion for 4 % of the dossiers presented in 2000
and also gave a number of negative opinions in 2001.
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(b) the Court of Justice interprets the Financial Regula-
tion and the public procurements Directive differ-
ently from the other institutions by applying a
threshold of 200 000 special drawing rights (SDR),
rather than 130 000 SDR, when assessing whether
a proposed procurement falls within the scope of
the services and supplies directives.
7.24. THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S REPLIES
(b) The interpretation relied upon by the Court of Justice in
determining the applicable threshold is based on the fol-
lowing considerations.
Article 56 of the Financial Regulation of 21 December
1977 applicable to the general budget of the European
Communities (1) provides that ‘When concluding con-
tracts for which the amount involved is equal to or greater
than the threshold provided for by the Council directives
on the coordination of procedures for the award of public
works, supplies and services contracts, each institution
shall comply with the same obligations as are imposed
upon bodies in the Member States by those directives’.
Article 7 of Council Directive 92/50/EEC of 18 June
1992 relating to the coordination of procedures for the
award of public service contracts (2), as amended by
Directive 97/52/EC of the European Parliament and of
the Council of 13 October 1997 (3), and Article 5 of
Council Directive 93/36/EC of 14 June 1993 coordinat-
ing procedures for the award of public supply con-
tracts (4), as amended by Directive 97/52/EC, set the
Directive’s application thresholds at 130 000 special
drawing rights (‘SDR’) and 200 000 SDR respectively,
depending on whether or not the contracting authorities
are listed in Annex I to Directive 93/36/EEC.
Since the directives relating to the coordination of proce-
dures for the award of public service contracts are addressed
to the Member States and not to the Community institu-
tions, Annex I to Directive 93/36/EEC lists only the
contracting authorities of the Member States and not the
Community institutions, which are contracting authori-
ties within the meaning of Article 128 of Commission
Regulation (Euratom, ECSC, EC) No 3418/93 of
9 December 1993 laying down detailed rules for the
implementation of certain provisions of the Financial
Regulation of 21 December 1977 (5).
Since Directives 92/50/EEC and 93/36/EEC, amended
by Directive 97/52/EC, provide for two thresholds, it is
necessary to determine which threshold is applicable to
the Community institutions (which, by virtue of
Article 56 of the Financial Regulation, are obliged to
comply with the same obligations as are imposed upon
bodies in the Member States) on the basis of that differ-
ence in threshold. The 130 000 SDR threshold was
introduced as a result of the Agreement on Government
Procurement concluded at Marrakesh on 15 April 1994.
Article 1(1) of that agreement defines its scope. It pro-
vides: ‘This Agreement applies to any law, regulation,
(1) OJ L 356, 31.12.1977, p. 1.
(2) OJ L 209, 24.7.1992, p. 1.
(3) OJ L 328, 28.11.1997, p. 1.
(4) OJ L 199, 9.8.1993, p. 1.
(5) OJ L 315, 16.12.1993, p. 1.
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Resu l t s o f compl iance and subs tant i ve t e s t ing
7.25. TheCourt examined a sample of payments related
to the provision of services, supplies or works with a
view to determining whether, where appropriate, the
right tendering procedures had been correctly carried
out prior to the signing of the contract and whether the
system of controls in place had operated effectively.
7.26. The Court found only one case in the conduct
of a tendering procedure which presented serious prob-
lems: that concerning the provision of a security service
at the European Parliament buildings in Strasbourg,
which Parliament asked the Court to examine. The
ACPC gave a favourable opinion. However, Financial
Control withheld its visa because the successful candi-
date, who was already under contract, was favoured by
the fact that the relevant department of Parliament had
not given all tenderers full information about the pay of
those employed, whom another contractor would have
been obliged by national law (under the Transfer of
Undertakings Directive) to employ if he had tendered
successfully. Parliament had no means within the terms
of the previous contract of compelling the contractor to
provide informationwhich he regarded as commercially
confidential. Financial Control was overruled by the
institution. The Court shares the concerns expressed by
Financial Control and considers that in future
procedure or practice regarding any procurement by enti-
ties covered by this Agreement, as specified in Appendix
I.’ Annex I to that Appendix lists the bodies to which the
130 000 SDR threshold applies. In the section reserved
for the European Communities, the entities listed are
divided between the bodies of the European Communi-
ties and the contracting authorities of the Member States.
The first paragraph, headed ‘European Community enti-
ties’, refers exclusively to the Council of the European
Union and the European Commission as being the bod-
ies of the European Communities subject to the threshold
of 130 000 SDR provided for in that agreement.
Lastly, the interpretation above cannot be contradicted by
any indications which may appear in the vade-mecum of
the Commission’s ACPC. Since that document is internal
to that institution it cannot be binding on the other insti-
tutions. Moreover, that vade-mecum specifically states
that the Commission is one of the contracting authori-
ties subject to the Marrakesh Agreement on Government
Procurement without taking any view on the status of the
other Community institutions in this respect.
7.26. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
In the case in question the authorising officer, aware of the
need to ensure that tenderers were on an equal footing as far
as possible, managed to obtain the total wage bill for the staff
employed at the time, and the wage scales on which it was
based, from the then contractor despite having no means in
law of compelling the contractor to supply that information
to his competitors. The ACPC took the view that that infor-
mation would make it possible to ensure equal treatment and
that the firms which had withdrawn would be able to submit
realistic tenders. On that basis, and in the light of an opinion
from the Legal service which confirmed that the authorising
officer had no means of demanding additional details and
that he had acted in accordance with the legislation appli-
cable, Parliament’s Bureau decided to overrule the Financial
Controller’s withholding of approval in this case. The opinion
from the Legal service which was in favour of the application
of the ‘transfer of undertakings’ Directive after the contract
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Parliament should take into consideration national law
and ensure that all tenderers are put on an equal foot-
ing.
7.27. In addition, the Court found a number of cases
of apparent weaknesses in the system for ensuring com-
pliance with the regulations and directives:
had been awarded is also confirmed by the interpretation
given by the Court of Justice in its judgement of 25 January
2001 (Oy Liikenne Ab v Pekka Liskojärvi and Pentti
Juntunen).
With regard to the future, the ACPC first recommended that,
in connection with subsequent invitations to tender when
existing contracts expire, authorising officers require new con-
tractors to communicate the relevant information to tenderers,
but subsequently had to rescind this recommendation upon
the advice of the Legal service, which showed that authorising
officers had no legal basis for compelling a successful tenderer
to supply such information and that such an obligation would
inflict unequal treatment on the service provider concerned.
Parliament therefore introduced the practice of making explicit
reference, in the terms applicable to all similar contracts, that
the conditions governing any take over of staff by a new con-
tractor will be governed by the applicable national legislation.
Lastly, it should be pointed out that, as the Court indicates,
Parliament considered that the questions raised by this case
merited detailed examination by the Court, to which, accord-
ingly, it was referred by letter of 8 May 2000 from the Presi-
dent. The issue has also been raised with the relevant national
authorities.
7.27. THE COUNCIL’S REPLIES
In connection with public contracts, where the Court points to
some cases in which the rules were not correctly applied, the
Council would point out that that the Deputy Secretary-
General has made a fundamental overhaul of internal practice
on public contracts, particularly in order to ensure from 2002
onwards that for any substantial purchase a fully independent
unit composed of deputy authorising officers will be respon-
sible for determining the procedure to be followed and for
implementation of that procedure. This, then, is an additional
precaution to ensure that the rules are respected.
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(a) five cases where the grounds for claiming exemp-
tion from tender procedures were questionable or
not supported by evidence submitted to the ACPC
(Court of Justice: four, Council: one). Four of these
cases were service contracts in technical domains
where exemption was claimed under Article 59(d)
of the Financial Regulation;
(b) one case where a procurement need appeared to
have been split into several contracts with the effect
that the provisions of the directives were not applied
to part of the procurement (Court of Justice);
(c) a rental contract on a building also covered refur-
bishment work which was not put out to tender
(ESC and COR);
(d) four cases of contracts with a value exceeding the
ACPC threshold had not been submitted to the
ACPC (Commission: two, Council: one, ESC and
COR: one);
(e) one case of an annual indicative notice being pub-
lished in the middle of 1997, rather than at the
beginning of the year as implied by the public pro-
curement directives, in order to speed up the pro-
curement process (Commission).
Conclusion and recommendations
7.28. In general, the procurement procedures applied
by the institutions are legal and regular. Infringements,
where they occur, result, in the main, from the lack of
experience/expertise in the domain of tendering for
particular services, and pressures on departments to
adopt administratively convenient solutions, e.g. exemp-
tions from tendering on ‘technical grounds’ to facilitate
the commitment of funds before the year end.
7.27. THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S REPLIES
(a) Of the four contracts which are the subject of observa-
tions, two are for a total amount over the 130 000 SDR
threshold but below the 200 000 SDR threshold. Accord-
ingly, no contract notice was published for those two, as
is made clear in the explanation given in reply to para-
graph 7.24(b).
So far as the other two contracts are concerned, the Court
of Justice is not of the same opinion as the Court of Audi-
tors which considers that it was incorrect to apply
Article 59(d) of the Financial Regulation. It is the view
of the Court of Justice that in either case only a particular
supplier could perform the contract, which justified mak-
ing a contract with that person by private treaty.
(c) The Court of Justice considers that the special circum-
stances of the contract referred to in this observation dem-
onstrate that there was no splitting of a contract and that
the provisions applicable to public procurement were not
disregarded.
7.27. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
(e) Not all procurement plans are known at the beginning of
the year. In these cases, indicative notices can also be pub-
lished during the year.
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7.29. Institutions need to introduce a system of pre-
ventive measures, such as training authorising officers
in procurement procedures and developing checklists,
to complement the roles the ACPC and Financial Con-
trol currently play if compliance with the directives is to
be improved further. Internal control systems reviews
and compliance testing by the internal auditors will also
be important in the future, due to the planned abolition
of the ACPC and Financial Control.
7.29. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
Parliament currently offers a course concerning public con-
tracting procedures. However, its content will need to be
expanded in future. In addition, the pre-referral system intro-
duced in 1997 (see point 7.23) makes it possible to avoid
problems in advance of the procedure.
7.29. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Intensive training in public procurement and contracting pro-
cedures is already taking place for Commission departments.
7.29. THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S REPLIES
Back in May 2001 the administration of the Court of Justice
organised training in public procurement procedures, espe-
cially for managers in the departments authorised to pass
accounts. That training dealt both with the Financial Regula-
tion and its implementing rules and with the various direc-
tives concerning public procurement contracts.
7.29-7.30. THE COURT OF AUDITORS’ REPLIES
It has already been several years since the Court of Auditors
set up a system of internal control to ensure the regularity of
its procedures for awarding contracts.
In the first place, it trained a specialist in this field whose role
is to advise and support the various authorising officers con-
cerned. Although this official has been appointed to a special
department of the Secretariat-General, he is still available to
other departments if needed; a recent example that may be
quoted is that of the invitation to tender concerning the audit
automation project.
Furthermore, before an invitation to tender is issued formally,
the authorising officials consult the Legal service on their draft
invitation to tender with regard to both the actual specifica-
tions and compliance with the regulatory provisions in force,
particularly the directives concerning open invitations to ten-
der in relation to the planned procedure (pre-information
notice in the Official Journal, publication in the Official Jour-
nal, etc.).
7.29. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE’S REPLIES
The ESC accepts the Court’s suggestion to introduce measures
to improve expertise in tendering (i.e. training authorising
officers and developing checklists).
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7.30. All institutions should apply the same thresh-
olds when deciding whether a proposed procurement
of services or supplies falls within the scope of Public
Procurement Directives 92/50/EEC and 93/36/EEC.
Given that expertise in the domain of tendering is concen-
trated at the European Commission and given the need for
interinstitutional harmonisation, the Committee proposes
implementing these measures in close cooperation with the
Commission.
7.29. THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS’ REPLIES
The COR accepts the Court’s suggestion to introduce measures
to improve expertise in tendering (i.e. training authorising
officers and developing checklists).
Given that expertise in the domain of tendering is concen-
trated at the European Commission and given the need for
interinstitutional harmonisation, the Committee proposes
implementing these measures in close cooperation with the
Commission.
7.30. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
Parliament supports all initiatives designed to harmonise the
institutions’ practices. However, it believes that the maximum
amount which determines whether the contract-awarding pro-
cedure comes under the directives on services and supplies is
EUR 200 000. This opinion is based on the fact that the
Agreement on Government Procurement (Annex 4 to the
Agreement establishing the World Trade Organisation) only
expressly lists the Council and the Commission as Community
contracting authorities subject to the Agreement. This distinc-
tion is carried over into Commission Regulation (EC)
No 1687/2001 amending the detailed application rules.
7.30. THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S REPLIES
See the reply to paragraph 7.24(b).
15.12.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 327
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS
7.31. With the proposed changes to the implement-
ing measures likely to raise the threshold for the ACPC
to between 300 000 euro and 500 000 euro, the insti-
tutions should consider introducing an interinstitu-
tional ACPC. This would have the benefit of concentrat-
ing expertise, simplifying the process, increasing the
independence of the ACPC vis-à-vis particular institu-
tional objectives, and improving the consistency of the
interpretation of the Financial Regulation and direc-
tives.
7.32. Institutions should focus, in particular, on con-
trolling the following risk areas in order to improve
compliance with the Financial Regulation and directives
on procurement:
(a) the late identification and incorrect valuation of
purchasing needs;
(b) the use of negotiated procedures without fully dem-
onstrating that goods and services could only be
provided by one particular contractor or supplier.
7.31. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The concept of an interinstitutional ACPC has been the
repeated subject of interinstitutional discussion. The overall
conclusion has been that an interinstitutional ACPC, while
offering obvious potential advantages in economic terms,
tends to be cumbersome in practice. It also raises issues of
institutional responsibility and autonomy. However, the Com-
mission agrees that the potential benefits of interinstitutional
cooperation could be explored further, e.g. the use of tender
clauses which allow other institutions to draw on existing
contracts.
7.31. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE’S REPLIES
Given the expertise required and the need to handle dossiers
in cooperation with the other institutions, in principle the ESC
supports the Court’s proposal to introduce an interinstitu-
tional ACPC.
7.31. THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS’ REPLIES
Given the expertise required and the need to handle dossiers
in cooperation with the other institutions, in principle the CoR
supports the Court’s proposal to introduce an interinstitu-
tional ACPC.
7.32. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
The ACPC is devoting all necessary attention to subpara-
graphs (a) and (b). Negotiated procedures are monitored very
stringently, whatever the grounds for them.
7.32. THE COURT OF AUDITORS’ REPLIES
The Court of Auditors is in complete agreement with this rec-
ommendation, which it is already applying.
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Other observations
7.33. The respective balance sheets of the ESC and the
Committee of the Regions (COR) neither disclose the
value of the buildings worth 225million euro for which
they signed long-lease contracts with an option to pur-
chase in December 2000, nor even the advance of
26 million euro that was paid (which the Commission
nevertheless included in the consolidated balance sheet).
A formula for apportioning these joint assets between
the ESC and the COR has still not been determined.
7.34. The Commission has removed computer equip-
ment that has disappeared over the past five years, with
a net accounting value of 80 000 euro, from its assets.
This does not call for observations concerning the reli-
ability of the balance sheet, but does raise concerns
about the fact that such thefts even take place, some of
which involved new equipment stolen immediately upon
delivery, as the value of such equipment purchased over
the five-year period was over one million euro. Even
though the equipment stolen only represented annually
0,15 % of the quantity and 0,126 % of the value of all
the IT hardware, the loss of new equipment not yet
installed shows that the Commission must take action
to ensure that such assets are protected.
7.33. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE’S REPLIES
The value of the Montoyer building will be included in the
2001 review, as will the value of the Belliard building once
the environmental and building permits necessary for carry-
ing out the work have been granted. The Committee has
already mentioned these two building leases in its comments
on the review.
The correction concerning the advance of EUR 26 million,
made by the Commission while the ESC’s accounts were being
consolidated (i.e. after they had been closed), will be entered
in the ESC’s accounts.
The distribution key for these joint ESC and COR assets will
be fixed before the end of the financial year 2001.
7.33. THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS’ REPLIES
The value of the Montoyer building will be included in the
2001 review, as will the value of the Belliard building once
the environmental and building permits necessary for carry-
ing out the work have been granted.
The correction concerning the advance of EUR 26 million,
made by the Commission while the COR’s accounts were being
consolidated (i.e. after they had been closed), will be entered
in the COR’s accounts.
The distribution key for these joint COR and ESC assets will
be fixed before the end of the financial year 2001.
7.34. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
In order to comply with the Court of Auditors’ recommenda-
tions relating to the 1999 Statement of Assurance, the Com-
mission changed the way in which it deals with stolen com-
puter equipment for the 2000 Statement of Assurance.
In future, the Commission will comply with the Court of
Auditors’ recommendations and the requirements of the Inven-
tory Regulation and at least once a year it will present a file
listing equipment stolen during that period which is to be
removed from the inventory.
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7.35. The problems with the budgetary nomenclature
and the classification of expenditure, which the Court
noted in its Annual Report concerning the financial
year 1998 (4), result in a lack of transparency as regards
the nature of the institutions’ expenditure on buildings.
The budgetary nomenclature should be amended to fol-
low the example of the Court of Justice’s accounts (5),
which distinguish between rent, costs of acquisition and
other types of expenditure, such as lease payments
where there is an option to purchase.
The Commission Protocol and security service (DG ADMIN)
is responsible for protection against and prevention of theft.
Apart from direct measures, such as, for example, increased
surveillance during removals, this Service regularly conducts
campaigns to alert Commission officials and other servants to
the problem of theft, in particular, by means of posters and
warnings sent through the internal mail.
7.35. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
In order meet the Court’s wish, Parliament created a sub-item
for each type of expenditure in the budget for 1998. The bud-
getary authority subsequently decided to delete all the sub-
items from the budget, so that it only preserved the distinc-
tion between ‘Rent and annual lease payments’ and ‘Acquisition
of immovable property’. However, the sub-items were retained
in Parliament’s accounts, so that information is available per
type of expenditure. Nonetheless, Parliament will consult the
other institutions over a change in nomenclature so as to
clarify expenditure on immovable property and will submit a
proposal to the budgetary authorities for the budget for 2003.
7.35. THE COUNCIL’S REPLIES
The Council will consider the question of budgetary nomen-
clature when preparing the 2003 PDB.
7.35. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission will look into the possibility of complying
with the Court’s recommendation and will, where necessary,
change the budgetary nomenclature from the financial year
2003 onwards in order to create a distinction between expen-
diture linked with:
— rent
— acquisitions
— long-term lease/purchase payments.
(4) OJ C 349, 3.12.1999, paragraph 6.5.
(5) The Court of Justice’s budget distinguishes between rent
(heading 2000) and lease/purchase payments (heading
2001).
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7.36. There are differences in the way the institutions
calculate the basic minimum pension. These arise from
differences of interpretation of the fourth paragraph of
Article 77 of the Staff Regulations, which provides that
‘the amount of the retirement pension must not be less
than 4 % of the minimum subsistence figure per year of
service’. The Court of Justice and, to a lesser degree, the
Council apply a broader interpretation than the other
institutions, since, in addition to the number of years of
service, they take account of any annual contributions
acquired following transfers of pension rights acquired
outside the department. Harmonisation is needed to
put an end to this unequal treatment of officials work-
ing in the various institutions.
7.35. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE’S REPLIES
Following the Court’s suggestion, during 2003 budget prepa-
rations the Committee will propose creating a budget line
entitled ‘Building rent’.
7.35. THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS’ REPLIES
Following the Court’s suggestion, during the 2003 budget
preparations the Committee will propose creating a budget
line entitled ‘Building rent’.
7.36. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
Parliament will approach the other institutions with a view to
harmonisation.
7.36. THE COUNCIL’S REPLIES
Finally, regarding the differences of interpretation in calculat-
ing the minimum basic pension, the Council cannot but agree
with the need for harmonisation in this area; its departments
are ready to participate in any interinstitutional discussion
that may be organised for that purpose.
7.36. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Differences in applying some provisions can occur. In order to
limit the negative effects of this, interinstitutional meetings of
the departments involved are organised regularly. The Com-
mission undertakes to relaunch the interinstitutional debate
on the matter of the particular interpretation of the fourth
paragraph of Article 77 by the Council and the Court of Jus-
tice.
7.36. THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S REPLIES
The observations of the Court of Auditors relating to the
interpretation given by the administration of the Court of Jus-
tice to the fourth paragraph of Article 77 of the Staff Regula-
tions are correct. It is the opinion of that institution that to
take less favourable account of the years credited under a
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Follow-up to previous observations
Follow-up to Special Report No 8/98 concerning the
Commission departments specifically involved in the
fight against fraud
Introduction
7.37. The Court examined the operation of the Com-
mission departments specifically involved in the fight
against fraud in 1997 and published its findings, together
with the response of the Commission, in its Special
Report No 8/98 (6). This Report contributed to the
debate on the future of the anti-fraud unit (UCLAF),
which led to CommissionDecision 1999/352/EC, ECSC,
Euratom (7) of 28 April 1999, replacing UCLAF with
the European Anti-fraud Office (the Office). In
early 2001 the Court visited the Office to assess the
progress made on the issues identified in the 1998
Report.
transfer would be tantamount to depriving an official of part
of the benefit of the contributions which he paid into the
national pension scheme before entering the service of the
Communities and which have been transferred to the Com-
munity scheme in order to be taken into account in the cal-
culation of his Community pension. With the exception of the
10 years’ service required for entitlement to a pension, the
Staff Regulations do not, moreover, draw any distinction
between the years of service which are accomplished in the ser-
vice of the Community and those credited following a transfer.
In 1995 this matter was the subject of interinstitutional dis-
cussions in which it became apparent that the Court of
Justice’s interpretation was followed by the Council also, but
not by the other institutions. Given the limited number of
cases (at the Court, for example, there have been three), the
institutions merely noted the differences of interpretation. The
administration of the Court of Justice is of course willing to
take part in further consultation with the other institutions for
the purpose of making a fresh attempt to reach a common
position.
(6) OJ C 230, 22.7.1998.
(7) OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20.
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Principal conclusions of Special Report No 8/98
7.38. The principal conclusions of Special Report
No 8/98 were that
(a) the administrative framework inwhichUCLAF oper-
ated and its own organisational structure were not
always appropriate;
(b) UCLAF was not appropriately staffed;
(c) databases were not always operational or effective,
management informationwas insufficient, and some
published information on the fight against fraud
was unreliable;
(d) procedures for dealing with cases of corruption and
of internal fraud were ill-defined and incomplete.
Progress since 1998
Es tab l i shment o f the Of f i c e
7.39. In early 1999 the Commission brought forward
proposals for the replacement of UCLAF by an inde-
pendent Anti-fraud Office. Following extensive consul-
tations with the Council and Parliament, which took
account of Special Report No 8/1998 and the Court’s
Opinion No 2/99 (8), the Commission approved Deci-
sion 1999/352/EC, ECSC, Euratom (9). This established
the new Anti-fraud Office (the Office) as a part of the
Commission. The Commission transferred all existing
staff of UCLAF to the Office on its approval in April
1999. A Director for the Office (with the status of
Director-General) took up his post on 1 March 2000, at
the conclusion of a procedure involving the Council
and Parliament.
The new ar rangements fo r the European Ant i - f raud Of f i c e
prov ide a more appropr ia t e admini s t ra t i ve f ramework
7.40. The Office forms part of the Commission and
can use Treaty powers granted to the Commission. It
relies on Commission services for a significant element
of logistical support (for example, the provision of office
space). However, the arrangements concerning the
appointment of the Director, the existence of a
(8) OJ C 154, 1.6.1999.
(9) OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 20.
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Supervisory Committee, and the grant of appointing
officer power to the Director all serve to strengthen the
investigative independence of the Office.
Sta f f ing has inc reased , but more s lowly than expec t ed
7.41. The Director of the Office has the power to
appoint staff and to move staff within the Office. He
has little scope to remove staff. The difficulties in staff-
ing the Office take three main forms:
(a) the Commission transferred staff en bloc from the
former UCLAF to the Office before the Director was
appointed;
(b) additional recruitment has been slow;
(c) the Office and the Secretary-General of the Com-
mission failed for a considerable time to agree on a
procedure for appointments at Director level.
7.41. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Director of the Office is bound by the Staff Regulations
and therefore in principle also by the rules providing for the
removal of staff. OLAF has more temporary staff than other
DGs; this makes the management of staff more flexible.
(a) It should be noted that the reason for transferring UCLAF
staff ‘en bloc’ to the newly created Office was in order to
ensure continuity. There was no realistic alternative at the
time of the creation of OLAF, since any other solution
would have meant a complete disruption of the Office’s
activities for a considerable period of time.
(b) Shortly after its establishment in mid-1999, the Office
had a total of 149 posts in its establishment plan.
According to the Court’s report, 126 were occupied on
15 September 1999. In 2000, the establishment plan
was brought up to 224 posts and on 30 March 2001
the posts in place totalled 189. The high occupation rate
in 1999 would not have been possible without the trans-
fer to OLAF of the UCLAF staff in place.
At the beginning of 2000, when the Director of OLAF
took up his post, DG ADMIN launched together with
OLAF a number of selection procedures for temporary
agents in order to allow OLAF to recruit the specialist
staff needed. These selections, involving some 1 100 can-
didates, led to the establishment of reserve lists with 150
candidates in A and B grades together in Decem-
ber 2000.
(c) It should be noted that the Commission as a whole, not
solely the Secretary-General, insisted that candidates for
Director-level posts in OLAF, performing classic Com-
mission tasks, representing the Commission vis-à-vis the
other institutions as well as the outside world and pos-
sibly working at a later stage in other parts of the Com-
mission than OLAF, should also have been assessed in
the framework of the Commission procedures in force,
notably the ‘CCN’, the final decision on the candidates
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7.42. The appointment of all former UCLAF staff to
the Office can be usefully contrasted with the action
taken in setting up the new Internal audit service. In the
case of the Internal audit service the Commission did
not transfer staff en bloc from existing services. Instead
it created a small team (including expert assistance from
other organisations) to recruit the nucleus of the organi-
sation on the basis of the response to a vacancy notice.
In the case of the Office, however, a considerable ele-
ment of continuity was essential: it was not a feasible
option to halt ongoing investigations pending the
completion of reorganisation. But this transfer made it
difficult for the new Director to choose his own team
and replace staff members with inappropriate skills and
aptitudes.
7.43. Recruitment of new staff has not progressed as
quickly as expected, as is shown in Table 7.4. Mean-
while the budgetary authority changed the balance
between permanent and temporary posts in awaywhich
was not consistent with the Office’s actual recruitment.
remaining entirely with the director of the Office. Further,
most senior posts have in the end been attributed on a
temporary basis, which means that the Commission did
not participate at all in these appointments.
Table 7.4 — Staff resources
Staff at
15.9.1998
(UCLAF)
Authorised
posts for 1999
(UCLAF)
Staff at
31.12.1999
(UCLAF)
Authorised
posts for 2000
(OLAF)
Staff at
31.12.2000
(OLAF)
Authorised
posts for 2001
after SAB
No 3/2001
Staff at
30.6.2001
(OLAF)
Permanent A 26 64 50 83 71 59 69 (2)
Temporary A 38 7 1 15 1 61 37
Permanent B 18 43 33 60 41 50 40
Temporary B 17 5 1 15 1 66 21
Others 27 30 21 51 39 64 40
Total 126 149 106 224 153 300 (1) 207 (2)
(1) 38 posts in total remain blocked out of the 300.
(2) Includes 10 staff reassigned to posts elsewhere in the Commission who will have left OLAF before 1 October 2001.
Source: European Anti-fraud Office.
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7.44. As theOffice now has the status of a Directorate-
General, more staff are allocated to support services
such as Administration, Human resources and Budget
(19 posts at March 2001). Although it has a budgetary
allocation of 300 posts for 2001, Parliament has blocked
76 of these posts, until the Office has reviewed the suit-
ability of all current staff, and the Commission accepted
the resulting transfer decision (10). This conditional grant
of staff curtails the independence both of the Director
and of the Office as a whole.
7.45. The problems involved in appointing directors
arose because a Director appointed within the Office
becomes a Director of the Commission at large: the
Secretary-General of the Commission therefore consid-
ered that he should be represented in the appointment
procedure to ensure that a candidate appointed would
be capable of fulfilling a directorate role elsewhere in
the Commission.
Databases and management in format ion have not improved
s ign i f i cant l y s ince the publ i ca t ion of Spec ia l Repor t No 8/98
7.46. In Special Report No 8/98 the Court noted that
UCLAFmade limited use of its databases (IRENE), which
led to their contents being unreliable. UCLAF foresaw
that full implementation of a new system and integra-
tion of this with the previous system would resolve the
problems found.
7.47. In its examination of own resources (11) and
Structural Funds (12) the Court found that UCLAF and
the Office did not update relevant databases with cases
notified by the Member States in the period 1997 to
2000. In 2001 usage of databases has begun to improve,
and new procedures in the investigations directorate
mean that the staff input new cases on a more system-
atic basis. However, databases were still not reliable or
complete and did not provide the full range of informa-
tion required for effective management of investiga-
tions.
7.44. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
With the adoption, on 12 July 2001, of supplementary and
amending budget No 3/2001, 38 posts were unblocked.
7.45. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
OLAF’s operational independence, combined with the need
for adapting recruitment to the specificity of the functions
exercised by OLAF, argue for an ‘ad hoc’ composition of the
comité consultatif des nominations (CCN) in the frame-
work of procedures for filling management posts, as was con-
firmed by the Commission on 24 January 2001.
7.47. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Since the introduction of the case management system (CMS)
in May 2001, the reliability and completeness of data con-
cerning cases newly under investigation by OLAF have sig-
nificantly improved.
The support unit is at present in the process of cleaning up
data imported from IRENE into CMS and completing an
update of all the data recorded.
With the introduction of the ECR (the former ‘external part’
of the old IRENE system) in March 2001, the situation
regarding cases communicated by the Member States has
equally progressed.
The Court’s findings with regard to the ECR only relate to the
updating of data concerning own resources and Structural
Funds. Following the migration to the ECR system, these data
are being updated and completed.
(10) OJ L 56, 26.2.2001, p. 159.
(11) Annual Report, Chapter 1, paragraphs 1.88 to 1.90.
(12) Special Report No 10/2001 on the financial control of
the Structural Funds (OJ C 314, 8.11.2001).
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7.48. The Office now expects the required improve-
ments to be achieved through two developments: the
case management system, introduced in May 2001, and
the service platform, which has provided Commission
DGs and national administrations with access to formal
communications under the sectoral regulations since
March 2001. The case management system seeks to
providemanagement with ameans of tracking progress.
Basic statistics for cases under investigation in March
2001 are given in Table 7.5.
7.48. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The CMS database not only seeks to provide management
with a means of tracking progress, but is also intended to sys-
tematically record and account for all investigative activities of
the Office.
In accordance with the procedure laid down in the OLAF
manual, all incoming mail relating to investigations is now
forwarded to the support unit, which maintains the CMS. The
registration of cases is now centralised in the support unit
(individual investigators no longer have the possibility of
opening or closing files) and is performed independently of the
investigator pools. In the event that a new case needs to be cre-
ated, this is systematically performed on the same day cor-
respondence is received by the support unit. Regular reconcili-
ations are performed between the internal mail registration
system and new entries in the CMS database, to ensure that
all relevant data is captured in the CMS database.
Given that the database only came into operation in May
2001, it should be stressed that the figures given in Table 7.5
(basic statistics for cases under investigation in March 2001)
are not based on the CMS.
The ‘service platform’ is a concept aimed at furthering coop-
eration with other services and the Member States. As part of
the service platform, a database has been set up (ECR) which
provides access to formal communications under sectoral regu-
lations. Member States do not yet have direct access to the
data recorded in the ECR. At present, this is only the case for
other Commission services.
Table 7.5 — Staff resources and cases under investigation as at 21 March 2001
Sector Awaitingvalidation
Under
investigation
(of which internal
cases)
Cases presented to
judicial/other
authorities
(of which internal
cases)
Number of
investigators
Anti-corruption and expenditure 42 136 (33) 213 (14)
31External aid 159 39 (5) 32 (1)
Trade 24 108 (1) 51 (0)
52
Agriculture 19 20 (0) 7 (0)
Customs 101 78 (0) 102 (0)
Total 345 381 (39) 405 (15) 83
Source: European Anti-fraud Office.
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7.49. The newDirector has sought to ensure that there
is now clear management control of the assignment of
investigators to cases and the priorities for investiga-
tions and that investigating teams are no longer left to
make these decisions themselves. However, the Office
has no time-recording system to measure directly
resources applied to each investigation. In addition, it
currently lacks a comprehensive system for recording
the outcome of the different investigations, and amounts
recovered. At the time of the audit visit, the Office had
no plan to record such information in the case manage-
ment system.
7.50. In 1998 the Court criticised the quality of infor-
mation presented in UCLAF’s annual report. In 2000
the Annual Report on the Fight against Fraud presented
more prudent figures. The Office no longer puts for-
ward unsustainable estimations of the extent of fraud,
and the impact of investigations, for example, in the
area of excise duty and VAT fraud. The reliability of
published information should improve further if the
Office successfully introduces the planned case manage-
ment system, and systematically records the outcome of
all cases.
There i s now a lega l bas i s fo r inves t iga t ions and procedure s
are be ing improved
7.51. Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 gives a legal basis
for investigations performed by the Office, and estab-
lishes its rights and responsibilities. On the basis of this
Regulation, the Director of the Office is required to
reach a decision as to whether a prima facie case exists
which merits an investigation. Although the Director
has instructed the staff to present a proposal on open-
ing an investigation within one week of the receipt of
an indication or allegation of fraud, in early 2001 deci-
sions were taking 16 weeks on average: this was partly
explained by the presence of a number of old cases, pre-
dating the introduction of new procedures.
7.49. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
As regards the definition of priorities for investigation and the
assignment of investigators to individual cases, a meeting is
held once a week by the Board of the Operational Director-
ate, which is also attended by at least one representative from
the Magistrates’ unit. The duties of this Board include ensur-
ing a quality control function by reviewing all proposals to
open and close investigations and assessing whether the pro-
posed staffing of an individual investigation is appropriate.
With a view to recording the outcome of investigations and
amounts recovered, two further sections of the CMS — a
follow-up section and a recovery section— are currently being
defined.
7.51. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The one week period referred to is a best guide. In some cases,
it is not possible to meet this deadline, due for example to the
fact that the information received may require more than five
days to analyse. The manual specifically states: ‘As the time
needed for an initial assessment depends largely on the volume
of the material received, and its linguistic accessibility, no for-
mal deadline is applied’. There is a clear trend towards a
reduction in the time needed for the initial assessment of a
case. Since the introduction of the OLAF manual, the aver-
age time needed for an initial assessment has been halved.
This downward trend is expected to continue as new staff are
recruited and the backlog of old cases is gradually reduced.
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7.52. The Office has begun to create a unit made up
of prosecution experts from all Member States. This
unit should ensure that investigations always result in
admissible evidence in national courts, and that infor-
mation is passed to prosecution services in the Member
States in a usable way. At the time of the audit, this
project had not, however, advanced significantly com-
pared to the situation in 1997.
The inves t iga t ion of case s wi th in the ins t i tu t ions does not
enta i l a heavy dra in on resource s , but i s h indered by s ta f f
r u l e s and procedure s
7.53. The investigation of cases within the institutions
has not hitherto required the commitment of substan-
tial staff resources. Only seven of the staff of the Office
had ever been involved in the investigation of cases of
corruption and internal fraud at the time of the Court’s
visit in March 2001. None of these worked full time on
internal cases. Such cases represent less than 5 % of the
workload.
7.54. The new arrangements for the investigation of
internal cases (13) provide for the Office to inform the
institution concerned when an investigation involves a
member of its staff (although notification can be waived
where absolute secrecy is required). Notification of an
enquiry poses a dilemma for the institution involved: it
is difficult to suspend a staff member simply because an
investigation is under way. On the other hand, the fail-
ure to do so, and to exclude the individual from access
to his office, may lead to the destruction of relevant evi-
dence. The Staff Regulations can discourage a rapid
administrative response to an investigation. Although
they allow for an official to be suspended with immedi-
ate effect on half pay in the case of allegations of seri-
ous misconduct, such a suspension triggers a four-
month deadline for the resolution of the issue (14), which
is often difficult to meet. If the issue is not resolved
within this timescale, the official returns to full pay, and
receives the balance of pay withheld. In this situation
7.52. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The staffing of the unit of prosecution experts has progressed
considerably. In addition to the head of unit, five prosecution
experts have started working in this unit. Three additional
prosecution experts will take up their posts in October, and
two will do so before the end of the year. As regards the pros-
ecution experts from the four remaining Member States, the
recruitment procedure has been relaunched.
7.53. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
At least 16 people are currently working or have worked on
internal investigations. A policy of zero tolerance is now in
operation concerning suspected cases of fraud within the insti-
tutions, meaning that all suspected cases will be investigated
without exception.
7.54. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Regulations (EC) No 1073/1999 and (Euratom)
No 1074/1999 provide that the Office’s investigations extend
to serious matters relating to the discharge of professional
duties liable to result in disciplinary or criminal proceedings.
In practice, internal OLAF enquiries often result in disciplin-
ary proceedings. However, these proceedings, including the
possibility of suspending officials, are the competence of the
appointing authority (AIPN) (6). The suspension issue was
addressed in the consultative document on discipline
(SEC(2000) 2079/5), where it was proposed that the time
limit be raised from four to six months. Article 88 of the Staff
Regulations provides that an official can only be suspended if
an allegation of serious misconduct is made against this offi-
cial by the appointing authority. In view of the serious con-
sequences that a suspension may have for the person con-
cerned, the Staff Regulations strike a balance between
(6) TheDirector-General of Personnel andAdministration in respect
of officials of grade A 3 and below and the Commissioner in
charge of Personnel in respect of those of grades A 1 and A 2.
For officials of grade A 3 and below paid from the research bud-
get, the competent appointing authority is the Director-General
of RTO or of the JRC.
(13) Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the Euro-
pean Parliament and of the Council.
(14) Article 88 of the Staff Regulations.
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institutions have apparently been inclined to wait until
further information was available before suspending an
official.
7.55. In addition, the Staff Regulations (14) rule out all
disciplinary action until the conclusion of any criminal
case. This creates very lengthy delays. As the burden of
evidence is not the same for a disciplinary case as for a
criminal prosecution, and as gross negligence may be
apparent in a case in which criminal intent is difficult
to prove, such a rule limits unnecessarily the institu-
tion’s freedom of action.
Conclusions
The Of f i c e needs more f re edom of ac t ion on s ta f f i s sues
7.56. The Office needs more freedom of action on
staffing matters. This might encompass an agreement
with the wider Commission to accept transfers of staff
from the Office, more flexibility in the appointment of
Directors, the possibility of making greater use of tem-
porary staff and the right to determine an appropriate
mix of permanent and temporary posts. The Court
notes that supplementary and amending budget
No 3/2001 converted three of the five Director posts
from permanent to temporary, thereby ruling out any
question of the appointees to these posts having any
right to work elsewhere in the Commission at the end
of their fixed-term contracts.
the presumption of innocence that officials must enjoy, and
the need to ensure that investigations can be conducted effi-
ciently.
It should be noted that the Office is obliged to inform the
institution concerned when an investigation involves a mem-
ber of its staff but not the member of staff concerned.
7.56. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
As regards staffing policy, the Commission decision of
28 April 1999 (Article 6) has conferred the power of AIPN
to OLAF’s Director, with regard to his personnel. As a result,
the Director enjoys the necessary independence in the appoint-
ment and management of staff. The Director of the Office
uses his power in full respect of the Staff Regulations and, in
principle, in accordance with the rules and practice established
by the Commission. Exceptions to these rules are possible
whenever these are essential for the fulfilment of OLAF’s spe-
cific mandate.
In line with these principles, a number of steps have been
taken in order to accommodate the Court’s views with regard
to the Office’s staffing policy:
— a number of officials have been reassigned to other Com-
mission services,
— the procedure for appointing OLAF’s directors has been
adjusted,
— the Office currently has more than one half of its total A
grade resources in the form of temporary posts.
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The Of f i c e shou ld de t e rmine pr io r i t i e s and s t ra t eg i e s on the
bas i s o f Commiss ion compe tenc i e s and the d i re c t r i sk to the
budge t
7.57. The value added by the Office varies significantly
between different areas of activity. In the area of expen-
diture, in particular direct expenditure, the Office has
direct responsibility and a key role. In areas such as
excise duty and VAT, the Office has no direct compe-
tence but can provide support to the Member States,
even though the Community budget is, at most, only
indirectly affected by fraud in these areas. There should
be scope for the Office to become more proactive in
launching investigations in expenditure areas, for
example, on the basis of risks identified from other
cases.
The Sta f f R egu la t ions shou ld be amended to fac i l i ta t e the
suspens ion o f ind iv idua l s sub j e c t to inve s t iga t ion and to
speed up di s c ip l inar y ac t ion
7.58. It would be appropriate to change the Staff Regu-
lations to:
(a) lengthen the period overwhich officials under inves-
tigation can be suspended on half pay;
(b) provide for their immediate exclusion from Com-
munity premises, thereby reducing the risk that the
officials will destroy relevant evidence.
Management in fo rmat ion and publ i shed in fo rmat ion mus t
become more re l iab l e , pe r t inent and comprehens ive
7.59. The deficiencies identified in databases in 1998
are, in general, still present, although several develop-
ments are in the pipeline. Management information
needs to be sufficient to track all cases throughout the
investigation process, to record the resources devoted to
different classes of enquiry, and indeed, individual cases
(for example, through the introduction of a time-
recording system) and record fully the outcome of inves-
tigations.
7.57. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Office agrees with the need to adopt a proactive attitude
to launching investigations in expenditure areas, on the basis
of risks identified from other cases. The recent creation of a
specific Directorate for Intelligence, which will, on the basis of
risk analysis, establish guidelines for investigation priorities,
is expected to further this aim.
7.58. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
(a) The suspension issue was addressed in the consultative
document on discipline (SEC(2000) 2079/5), where it
was proposed that the time limit be raised from four to
six months.
7.59. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The deficiencies identified in 1998 have for the largest part
been corrected. The new CMS, in conjunction with the OLAF
manual, provide for significant improvements in the reliability
and completeness of management information (see replies to
7.48 to 7.50 above).
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A per iod o f s tab i l i t y i s now requ i red
7.60. The investigation units of the Commission have
been reorganised on two occasions in the last seven
years. Each time a change has been made at the top
level, with a relatively minor impact at the level of
investigators. Following the creation of the Office in
April 1999, nearly one year passed before a new Direc-
tor was able to take up post, and subsequent changes to
procedures and to staffing are only now being made.
Given the length ofmost investigations, it will take some
time for these to have a significant impact on the results
of the Office. In the view of the Court, the Office will
always require a substantial number of expert tempo-
rary staff on medium-term secondment from national
authorities responsible for investigating and prosecut-
ing fraud.
7.61. Regulation (EC) No 1073/1999 of the European
Parliament and of the Council (15) provided for a review
of its operation by 31 May 2002. Given the delays expe-
rienced in appointing the Director, and increasing the
staffing of the Office, it now appears that such a review
will be premature, as it will be difficult to determine
whether the new approach to fraud investigation is
proving successful until the second half of 2002 at the
earliest.
7.60. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
OLAF also needs a reasonable number of permanent staff,
taking into account the specific role of the Office, which is not
only an investigative body, and the need to manage staff turn-
over. As the Court itself stressed in its conclusions to Special
Report No 8/98, a balance needs to be found between the
number of permanent and temporary staff, in order to ensure
the necessary stability, continuity and independence of the
Office.
In addition to the permanent posts, the Office has a high
number of temporary posts and can also employ 13 national
experts on secondment.
The one year it took to appoint the Director of OLAF can
partly be explained by the wish of the European Parliament
for the new Commission, which took office in September
1999, to participate in the appointment decision and not the
old one. The decision on the person of the new Director was
made before the end of 1999; the new Director could, how-
ever, not take up his new position before March 2000.
7.61. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
While the Commission shares the view that most of all a
stable regulatory and institutional framework is needed for
OLAF to develop its full potential, the Commission neverthe-
less believes that the review foreseen in Regulation (EC)
No 1073/1999 offers a useful opportunity for assessing the
progress made so far and possible improvements.
(15) OJ L 136, 31.5.1999, p. 1.
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Follow-up to various previous observations made by the
Court concerning the institutions’management of expen-
diture on buildings
7.62. In its Special Report No 5/2000 (16) on the Court
of Justice of the European Communities’ expenditure
on buildings, the Court made the following recommen-
dations to all the institutions:
(a) Community institutions should obtain the budget-
ary authority’s prior authorisation before undertak-
ing an extensive building project;
(b) the Communities should set up amultiannual invest-
ment budget and look into the advantages of mak-
ing direct use of loans to finance construction pro-
grammes;
(c) the Communities should have full administrative,
technical and financial control over their construc-
tion projects;
(d) in the event that the Communities wish to delegate
their powers as project owner, the delegation pro-
cedures, ceiling price and the rights and obligations
of the authorised agents should be stipulated in a
contract beforehand.
7.62-7.65. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
Once the requisite amendments to the Financial Regulation
have been adopted, Parliament will support the Court in its
recommendations concerning the institutions’ buildings, par-
ticularly the possibility that they might take out direct loans
to finance the acquisition of buildings.
Parliament is already doing everything necessary to maintain
full control over its building projects, particularly in Brussels
and Luxembourg, and will continue its efforts in this respect.
7.62. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
(a) Every major or sensitive buildings file will first be the
subject of a communication to the budgetary authority
before any undertaking is given. Furthermore a commu-
nication from Mr Kinnock to the full Commission on
buildings policy and its implementation is being prepared
and will be presented in autumn 2001.
(b) See replies to 7.64.
(c) The Commission shares the Court’s opinion with regard
to the control of buildings projects and took it into account
in its action plan for the setting up of an office for logis-
tics and operational support on which it will take a deci-
sion shortly.
(d) Should the Commission delegate its function of project
owner, any adjustments made by the authorised agent are
in its own name within a fixed budgetary allocation for
a work programme covered by a contract.
(16) OJ C 109, 14.4.2000.
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7.63. In thewake of these recommendations, the Com-
mission included the option, where necessary, of con-
tracting a loan to finance such expenditure (17) in its
proposal to amend the Financial Regulation.
7.64. This idea, which is also put forward by the Court
in the opinion it delivered prior to the amendment of
the Community Treaties in Nice, was not taken up by
either the Intergovernmental Conference or the Coun-
cil. The result is that several institutions continue to
finance their property purchases by means of ‘special
purpose vehicles’, which bear the same principal fea-
tures as loans, but cost more than if had they been con-
tracted directly.
7.65. The process of reviewing the Financial Regula-
tion is not conducive to prompt introduction of the
widespread use of differentiated appropriations and, at
present, the appropriations authorised for property
transactions still have a limited two-year life (a year, plus
one for carry-overs) during which time the commit-
ments, signing of contracts, performance of the work
and subsequent payments have to be effected. None of
the institutions is in a position to have any sort of
7.62. THE COURT OF AUDITORS’ REPLIES
The Court of Auditors’ administration agrees entirely with the
recommendations set out in this paragraph and, what is more,
has used them in the context of its current building project, in
so far as is possible under the current rules. I.e.:
(a) the budgetary authority’s prior approval was obtained
before the project was undertaken;
(b) not applicable, given the current rules;
(c) and (d) as the Court did not have enough staff to enable
it to exercise complete administrative, technical
and financial control, it delegated these tasks on
a contractual basis.
7.63, 7.64 and 7.65. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
In spite of the difficulties referred to by the Court, the Com-
mission is continuing to press for the possibility of raising
loans to finance buildings expenditure. In its amended pro-
posal for the recasting of the Financial Regulation, the Com-
mission maintains and clarifies its proposal (Article 14(2):
the Communities may not raise loans to cover a budget deficit.
They are, however, authorised to raise loans for the sole pur-
pose of acquiring land and buildings and on the strict condi-
tion that such loans offer every guarantee of sound financial
management).
7.63-7.65. THE COURT OF AUDITORS’ REPLIES
The Court of Auditors was indeed obliged to spend the appro-
priations by paying advances against future work because the
current text of the Financial Regulation makes no provision
for either dissociated appropriations or recourse to borrowing.
(17) See also Opinion No 4/97.
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construction completed within such a short space of
time. The Committees (ESC and COR), as well as the
Court, thus found themselves in a position where they
were spending their committed appropriations in the
form of advances against future work.
7.66. The institutions in Luxembourg (Parliament,
Court of Justice, Commission and Court of Auditors)
have begun to explore the possibility of setting up a
joint structure to take charge of the various technical
and financial aspects of constructionmatters. The Court
hopes that a similar approach will be taken in Brussels.
7.66. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
There is indeed likewise a technical working party for Brus-
sels by means of which representatives of the institutions
present at the location exchange information, compare their
views and try to agree common positions on specific issues of
mutual interest.
7.66. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The meeting between Secretaries-General of institutions that
took place on 9 July 2001 endorsed the recommendations (see
below) contained in the report prepared by the interinstitu-
tional working group on buildings policy. The working group
is invited by the Secretaries-General to pursue its reflections
as regards the possible pooling of resources, and a specific
report on the buildings policy in Luxembourg has been drawn
up and will be circulated to Secretaries-General for their com-
ments.
The working group recommends the following courses of
action to the Secretaries-General.
— The institutions should further develop a common strat-
egy with respect to the appropriate public authorities of
the host Member States on the questions of common
interest. In particular, they should make common cause
in Brussels for the conclusion of an accord de siège in
order to provide a stable framework for their collective
relations with the Belgian authorities.
— A regular information and consultative structure should
be established through which the institutions exchange
information on their buildings policy and intentions vis-
à-vis the property market. To secure such a continuous
information flow, the existing formal and informal meet-
ings on information exchanges at the administrative level
should be more structured, and held regularly (i.e. twice a
year) with a fixed agenda and a rotating presidency. This
could evolve into a consultative committee, following the
example of the IT sector.
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— The institutions should draw up a charter for the provi-
sion of mutual assistance in the field of building policy.
Such assistance should take the form of service provisions
in connection with specific buildings-related dossiers,
allowing all to make use of expertise available in each
institution: framework contracts, contractors already in
place or individual specialists.
— The institutions should jointly negotiate future utility
contracts where their collective weight would enable much
better conditions to be obtained, in particular in view of
the planned market liberalisation in certain sectors.
— Renewed efforts should be made to arrive at mutual rec-
ognition procedures between the various institutions for
tendering and other pre-contractual and contractual
arrangements. The Presidents of the ACPC of each insti-
tution should be asked to draw up a common document
on the necessary conditions to be fulfilled in order to
achieve this mutual recognition in full compliance with
the Financial Regulation and the relevant directives for
public tendering.
— The institutions should further examine how their obliga-
tions under health and safety legislation can be imple-
mented on an interinstitutional basis in an effective and
legally secure manner, whilst respecting the legal obliga-
tion for each to retain responsibility for its own premises.
— Since environmental obligations and standards are com-
mon to all, each institution will benefit from the results
of the interinstitutional study currently being carried out
on the environmental impact assessment of buildings.
This study forms part of the overall ‘green housekeeping’
activities that already are subject to regular interinstitu-
tional consultations. The result of the study should lead
to specific proposals and initiatives with regard to the
equipment and management of buildings with an inter-
institutional environmental dimension.
— A common software system for inventory management
designed for interinstitutional use should be implemented
in all the institutions as soon as possible.
There is a need for the creation of a particular regulatory
framework for property acquisition by the institutions. The
financial and budgetary mechanisms currently in place are
not well suited to the financing of a building policy, especially
since there is a shift from a purely rental policy towards the
acquisition of buildings.
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7.67. The Court’s Report (paragraph 20(f)) also drew
attention to invoicing anomalies that called for addi-
tional investigation. The Court of Justice replied that it
intended to conduct the investigations concerned to
ensure that there had been no irregularity. The Court of
Auditors notes that these investigations had only just
started in June 2001.
7.68. The Court notes that the Committees (ESC and
COR), when renewing and renegotiating the contract
concerning the Belliard building formerly occupied by
the European Parliament, found themselves in a difficult
position as a result of an obligation placed on them by
Parliament, i.e. that of taking over this building, for
which Parliament had signed a lease running until 2007.
Nevertheless, they succeeded in reintroducing an
7.66. THE COURT OF AUDITORS’ REPLIES
The Court’s administration has, along with the other institu-
tions located in Luxembourg, committed itself fully to setting
up a logistical structure for building matters which would
pool all the resources available to each institution. It has also
expressed its preference at a meeting of Secretaries-General for
an interinstitutional structure that is common to all the main
places of employment (Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg)
as far as technical matters are concerned.
7.66. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE’ S REPLIES
The ESC welcomes the Court’s suggestion to create a joint
structure responsible for the various technical and financial
aspects of premises in Brussels.
7.66. THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS’ REPLIES
The COR welcomes the Court’s suggestion to create a joint
structure responsible for the various technical and financial
aspects of premises in Brussels.
7.67. THE COURT OF JUSTICE’S REPLIES
An expert has been appointed, by common agreement with
the Luxembourg authorities, to undertake further investiga-
tions concerning invoicing anomalies, in order to respond to
the observations in paragraph 20(f) of Special Report
No 5/2000 of the Court of Auditors on the expenditure of
the Court of Justice of the European Communities on immov-
able property. Those further investigations were still under
way in October 2001.
7.68. THE ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE’S REPLIES
Following the Court’s suggestion, the ESC and COR have
reopened negotiations with the owner with a view to possible
early repayment if the financial terms are reasonable.
15.12.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 347
THE COURT’S OBSERVATIONS
element of negotiation by deciding to refer to the mar-
ket in the summer of 2000. The prices finally agreed are
more in line with those offered on the Brussels market
for this type of building. This new contract contained
an early repurchase clause, but no provision was made
for reducing the balance to be paid in the case of early
repayment of the illiquid capital by the owner. It would
be advisable for this aspect of the contract to be rene-
gotiated forthwith to provide the option of an early
repurchase under economically reasonable conditions.
The pay system applicable to EU employees
Introduction
7.69. As shown in Tables 7.2 and 7.3, the European
Communities employ some33 600permanent and tem-
porary staff members. The gross annual cost of salaries
amounts to about 2,5 billion euro, or nearly 3 % of the
budget. Taxes andother charges leviedupon staff amount
to nearly 0,5 billion euro, and are treated as a budget-
ary receipt.
7.70. The Court audits salary payments each year and
has found very few cases ofmistakes. This year the Court
has also performed an analysis of certain aspects of the
efficiency and effectiveness of the pay system. It should
be recognised that there are strong interactions between
the pay system and other aspects of staff management,
including in particular promotion policy and arrange-
ments for reporting on the performance of staff. The
Court’s aim was to assess whether the pay system,
together with other personnel management arrange-
ments, facilitates the effective recruitment, motivation
and retention of staff (18). The Court has not sought to
form a judgement about the appropriateness of the
overall level of pay.
7.68. THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS’ REPLIES
Following the Court’s suggestion, the COR and ESC have
reopened negotiations with the owner with a view to a pos-
sible advance payment of the rent on financially more advan-
tageous terms.
(18) An effective retention policy should lead to staff resources
being appropriately balanced in terms of age, experience
and gender. It does not necessarily seek to ensure that all
staff remain in post until retirement age.
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7.71. In performing this audit, the Court has examined
the legislative instruments (19) which set out the person-
nel system. It has also tried to identify areas where the
application of these legislative instruments fails to
achieve their intended objectives. In order to evaluate
the Community system, the Court has visited five Mem-
ber States, reflecting the full range of administrative trad-
itions present within the Community. It has also visited
a number of international organisations which face
challenges close to those of the institutions. Informa-
tion has been gathered on the basis of interviews with
representatives of these administrations and organisa-
tions.
The current pay system
7.72. The current pay system is relatively simple. It is
essentially made up of:
(a) a basic salary (determined by individual category,
grade and step) (see below);
(b) plus family allowances:
— a household allowance (5 % of basic salary),
— a dependent child allowance (at 1 July 2000,
2 688 euro per year per child);
(c) plus other allowances:
— expatriation allowance (16 % of basic pay, paid
to staff whose country of origin is not that of
their place of work), or
— 4 % paid to staff recruited locally, but who are
not nationals of their place of work,
— secretarial allowance (for those with specific sec-
retarial skills);
(19) Council Regulation No 259/68 of 29 February 1968
(OJ L 56, 4.3.1968, p. 1), as subsequently amended on
numerous occasions, contains the main provisions con-
cerning the Staff Regulations of officials and the Condi-
tions of employment of other servants. It was last amended
by Regulation (EC, ECSC, Euratom) No 2805/2000
(OJ L 326, 22.12.2000, p. 7).
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(d) less social security contributions:
— pension,
— sickness insurance (1,7 % of basic salary),
— accident insurance (0,1 % of basic salary),
— unemployment insurance (for temporary staff)
(0,4 % of basic salary);
(e) outside Brussels and Luxembourg, a correction coef-
ficient (over, equal to or under 100 %) is applied, in
combination with an exchange rate fixed annually
for the countries which have not adopted the euro,
to compensate for the difference against Brussels’
cost of living;
(f) all officials, permanent and temporary, are subject to
progressive income tax (top marginal rate of 45 %)
on their remuneration and this revenue accrues to
the EU budget. In addition, they pay a temporary
contribution of 5,83 % on all remuneration in excess
of a basic minimum.
7.73. Grade and step depend largely upon recruitment
level and seniority. Staff are usually recruited at entry
levels (A 7/A 8, B 5, C 5, D 3/D 4) depending on their
education levels. In theory, they receive an automatic
increase (‘step’) every two years until they reach the top
of the scale for their grade. Thus, staff have the right, on
appointment or promotion, to incremental pay increases
of up to 25 % to 30 % within their new grades. Most
staff receive some credit for previous experience and, if
promoted, are ranked at a step above the one corre-
sponding to their previous salary and so are paid above
the scale minimum. Hence, it is rare for staff to pass
throughmore than four seniority steps in any one grade,
which implies a 20 % increase in salary. Relative pay
rates for the various grades and steps are set out in
Table 7.6.
7.74. Promotion is, in principle, based on the ability
and performance of staff. Under the Staff Regulations,
officials become eligible for promotion after two years’
service in a grade. The Commission calculates that the
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Table 7.6 — 100-based salary scale index
Standard posts Grade
Steps Total percent-
age increase
available1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Administration (A) and language service (LA)
University education
Director-General A 1 580,03 610,85 641,66 672,47 703,28 734,10 26,6
Director A 2 514,73 544,13 573,54 602,94 632,34 661,74 28,6
Head of Division A 3/LA 3 426,29 452,01 477,73 503,45 529,16 554,88 580,60 606,32 42,2
Principal administrator A 4/LA 4 358,13 378,20 398,28 418,35 438,43 458,50 478,57 498,65 39,2
Principal administrator A 5/LA 5 295,26 312,75 330,24 347,74 365,23 382,72 400,21 417,71 41,5
Administrator A 6/LA 6 255,16 269,08 283,00 296,93 310,85 324,77 338,69 352,61 38,2
Administrator A 7/LA 7 219,64 230,57 241,50 252,43 263,36 274,29 24,9
Assistant administrator A 8/LA 8 194,25 202,09 4,0
Administration and technical service (B)
Advanced secondary education
Principal administrative
assistant B 1 255,16 269,08 283,00 296,93 310,85 324,77 338,69 352,61 38,2
Senior Administrative
Assistant B 2 221,08 231,44 241,81 252,17 262,54 272,90 283,26 293,63 32,8
Senior Administrative
Assistant B 3 185,44 194,06 202,67 211,29 219,91 228,53 237,15 245,76 32,5
Administrative assistant B 4 160,39 167,86 175,33 182,81 190,28 197,76 205,23 212,70 32,6
Administrative assistant B 5 143,36 149,41 155,46 161,51 12,7
Secretariat and clerical service (C)
Standard secondary education
Executive secretary/principal
clerical officer C 1 163,59 170,18 176,78 183,38 189,97 196,57 203,17 209,76 28,2
Secretary/clerical officer C 2 142,29 148,33 154,38 160,42 166,47 172,51 178,56 184,60 29,7
Secretary/clerical officer C 3 132,73 137,91 143,09 148,27 153,44 158,62 163,80 168,98 27,3
Typist/clerical assistant C 4 119,93 124,79 129,64 134,50 139,36 144,22 149,08 153,93 28,3
Typist/clerical assistant C 5 110,58 115,11 119,64 124,18 12,3
Messenger and driver services
Primary education
Head of Unit D 1 124,97 130,44 135,90 141,37 146,84 152,30 157,77 163,23 30,6
Skilled employee/worker D 2 113,95 118,81 123,66 128,51 133,37 138,22 143,07 147,93 29,8
Skilled employee/worker D 3 106,06 110,60 115,14 119,68 124,22 128,76 133,30 137,84 29,3
Unskilled employee/worker D 4 100,00 104,10 108,20 112,30 12,3
Average increase (%) 28,3
NB: The Court carried out its 100-based indexation with reference to the lowest salary paid (D 4, step 1).
With effect from 1 July 2000, the monthly value of the index point is 19,8129 euro, i.e. 1 981,29 euro for a member of staff at Grade D 4/1 (index 100).
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average career period needed from A 7 to A 4 is just
over 15 years. Those staff who reach grade A 3 have on
average 18 years’ experience within the Commission,
with very few achieving this in less than 14 years.
Although the Staff Regulations make some provision
for appointment of staff at levels above the entry grades,
as a matter of policy institutions have made relatively
little use of the facility. However in recent years the
Commission has arranged a number of competitions at
A 4/A 5 level in order to recruit different categories of
specialists.
Recruitment
7.75. The institutions do not generally find it difficult
to recruit sufficient candidates to fill most posts: often
hundreds of candidates apply for every post available.
However, certain nationalities are underrepresented in
open recruitment competitions for general service per-
manent posts (20). In general, the structure of remu-
neration interacting with local economic and fiscal con-
ditions results in employment in the institutions being
very attractive to candidates who live close to a centre
of activity and less attractive to candidates who will
need to move to take up employment. Lower numbers
of candidates apply from regions with high levels of
pay. In the case of specialist competitions aiming to
recruit staff with professional skills which are well
rewarded across the EU, there are again relatively fewer
applicants, plus geographical imbalances.
7.75. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission acknowledged this problem (underrepresen-
tation of certain nationalities) in its consultation document on
recruitment policy of 28 February 2001, but is willing to
continue its efforts to reach a better geographical balance.
Visits in Member States are regularly organised to raise
awareness amongst possible candidates from all countries.
The Court refers to the lower number of candidates from
regions with high pay levels. This is true in respect of the
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Germany and Sweden
despite great publicity efforts by the Commission. The imbal-
ance in candidates from different regions leads inevitably to
imbalances in the recruits subsequently. Therefore, there is a
close link to pay level, not only to recruitment.
A further reason is linked to family situation: moving from
remote regions often means that spouses or partners need to
give up their job without any guarantee of equivalent career
possibilities at the site of the European institutions.
(20) The Commission told the Court that there are notably
lower numbers of candidates from regions with high pay
levels. For example, in the last B competition on financial
management there were 2 056 candidates, of whom only
26 were from the United Kingdom and 117 from Ger-
many, and in the last B competition on information tech-
nology there were 1 228 candidates, but only 14 from the
United Kingdom and 50 from Germany.
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Motivation
7.76. Other than through the scope for promotion, the
Community pay system does not seek to motivate staff
through targeted financial rewards. There is no provi-
sion for any responsibility allowance or performance
bonus. Nor is there any clear association between grades
and defined levels of responsibility. Within the Com-
mission, for example, heads of unit may be of grades
A 3, A 4 or A 5. They may have higher graded (and
higher paid) staff within their team.
7.76. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
In reply to the statement on motivation, financial rewards,
performance bonus, it is necessary to point out that superiors
having higher graded staff in their teams, is rather an excep-
tion and that the fact of having higher paid staff is mostly a
result of seniority steps.
In its orientation paper of 28 February 2001, the Commis-
sion endorsed the ideal of introducing position-related premi-
ums. The results of the concertation with staff representatives
on such premiums need to be awaited. Premiums could in
particular be relevant for rewarding heads of unit.
The introduction of a performance bonus has expressly been
rejected as inappropriate in the multicultural context in which
the institutions operate.
Article 7(2) of the Staff Regulations allows in principle higher
payment for an official temporarily in a posting above the
grade held. In addition, Article 99 of the Staff Regulations
provides for a bonus system for scientific staff.
In terms of staff, the Commission employs two thirds of all
staff falling under the Staff Regulations. The need for heads
of units (nearly 800 today) is greater than in any other insti-
tution. Another option would be to employ all these heads of
unit at A 3 level as in the other institutions, which would
increase the wage bill.
Careers should not only be seen from the point of view of
management functions. Firstly, a career-based system should
allow each average official in category A to reach A 4. Sec-
ondly, providing careers for top specialists up to A 3 is impor-
tant.
According to the consultation document on middle manage-
ment, the Commission intends to move, in the medium term
and after a reform of the career structure, towards a system
where A 3 appointments are only promotions of heads of unit
or advisers at A 4 grade thus excluding selection to vacant
A 3 posts.
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Stability
7.77. Among permanent officials, staff turnover is very
low. 532 staff left the Commission during 2000. This
represents around 3 % of the total permanent staff at
the Commission at the end of 2000. This experience is
consistent with a pay system which enables staff who
have achieved some limited promotion to continue to
receive automatic increases until the end of their career,
and pension entitlements are earned at a faster rate
between the age of sixty and sixty-five. There is no
ongoing scheme for early retirement: the terms onwhich
officials over 50 with a minimum of 10 years’ service
can choose to retire with actuarially reduced immedi-
ate pensions are not attractive, with the result that, at
the Commission, fewer than than 10 people a year fol-
low this course as against 350 normal retirements and
130 invalidity retirements.
7.78. A high proportion of officials have served in the
institutions for many years. For instance, within the
Commission, 54 % of A 4 grade staff and above have
been with the institutions for at least 20 years. The cor-
responding percentages for B 1 and B 2 grade staff and
C 1 and C 2 grade staff are 58 % and 70 % respectively.
The EU system compared with other systems
7.79. The Court sought to compare the Community
system with the systems of some of the Member States
and of certain international organisations. This exami-
nation focused upon whether:
(a) staff were generally expected to have a job for life;
(b) staff received automatic increases based on
age/seniority;
(c) performance bonuses are paid;
(d) responsibility allowances are paid;
(e) recruitment is open to all levels.
7.77. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission would like to add that since the first waves
of staff are about to retire now, the future figures should be
awaited (pension problems) before taking the figures of 2000
as representative.
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7.80. Pay structures differ widely among the organisa-
tions examined. All Member States have some element
of flexibility not present in the EU system in that they
use some combination of performance bonuses, respon-
sibility allowances and open recruitment at all levels.
The international financial institutions share many of
these features and tend to make particularly extensive
use of performance bonuses. The other international
organisations operate systems which are closer to the
EU system, although still taking the more flexible
approach on at least one of the points listed above.
7.81. All the Member States’ systems examined, except
for Sweden, offered civil servants the prospect of a job
for life; in the United Kingdom, however, civil servant
numbers have been considerably reduced through com-
pulsory redundancy, early retirement or privatisation of
functions. NoMember State has fully automatic bonuses
based solely on age or seniority. France and Germany
come closest to the EU system, but vary the date on
which increments are paid on the basis of performance.
All these Member States pay performance bonuses of
some kind, with these being least common in Swe-
den. In Sweden, however, pay is set individually each
year for each civil servant, taking performance into
account. In Germany performance bonuses are not paid
to staff working in ministries at Federal level, as a fixed
allowance is paid to all such staff. All these Member
States pay some form of responsibility allowance. Open
recruitment at all levels is possible in Italy, Sweden and
the United Kingdom. In Germany this is only the case
for public sector workers who are not classified as statu-
tory civil servants. The EU position is clearest on all
points: EU civil servants have a guaranteed job for life;
they receive fully automatic increments every two years,
regardless of performance; they are not paid perfor-
mance bonuses or responsibility allowances. In general,
recruitment in the EU is at entry level.
7.82. Among the international organisations only the
EIB offers a guaranteed job for life to staff. In the United
Nations, staff usually work for six years on temporary
contracts, but may then be granted continuing con-
tracts. Automatic increases based on seniority are paid
by Europol, the OECD and the United Nations, but not
by the Investment Banks. In contrast, only the Invest-
ment Banks pay performance bonuses. None of these
institutionspays responsibility allowances, andall recruit
at all levels. The United Nations does not usually offer
expatriate terms to general service staff, and recruits
locally to fill the bulk of such positions.
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7.83. Tables 7.7 and 7.8 seek to classify the compara-
tive systems on a simple yes/no binary schema. In prac-
tice, personnel arrangements form a broad continuum,
and to that extent the classification represents an over-
simplification. The footnotes to these tables give an
indication of the extent to which certain Member States
and international organisations occupy an intermediate
position.
Table 7.7 — Some Member State and EU pay systems
Job for life
Automatic increases
based solely on
age/seniority
Performance bonuses Responsibilityallowances
Open recruitment at all
levels
France Y N (1) Y Y N
Germany Y N (1) (2) Y (3) Y N (4)
Italy Y N Y Y Y (5)
Sweden N N Y (6) Y Y
United Kingdom Y (7) N Y Y Y
EU Y Y N N N (8)
(1) The date upon which the increment is paid is variable, dependent on performance.
(2) No incremental progression after age 53.
(3) Not paid to federal civil servants in the ministries.
(4) However, this is an option for the largest group of public sector employees who are are not classed as civil servants.
(5) Italy has radically reduced the number of grades, increased the rate of responsibility allowance and permitted the recruitment of outside managers on fixed-term
contracts.
(6) Provided for, but not common in practice.
(7) In practice most civil servants have continuing contracts and can expect life-time employment if they wish to remain in the civil service, however there is significant
movement in and out of the public sector.
(8) Recruitment is concentrated at the basic levels, except for the most senior posts, although the Commission has recently made some use of A 4/A 5 competitions.
Table 7.8 — International organisations’ and EU pay systems
Job for life Automatic increasesbased on age/seniority Performance bonuses
Responsibility
allowances
Open recruitment at all
levels
EBRD N N Y N Y
EIB Y N Y N Y
Europol N Y N N Y
OECD N Y N N Y
UN N (1) Y (2) N N Y
EU Y Y N N N (3)
(1) Staff are usually employed on temporary contracts for the first six years of employment. Thereafter, they are employed on continuing contracts.
(2) In theory, incremental progression is dependent on satisfactory performance, although, in practice, such progression is quasi-automatic.
(3) Recruitment is concentrated at the basic levels, except for the most senior posts, although the Commission has recently made some use of A 4/A 5 competitions.
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Assessment of the EU system
Strengths of the EU system
7.84. Pay at all levels is generally transparent. The rules
are relatively simple, and few errors occur in the deter-
mination of pay. Overall, pay levels attract a sufficient
number of suitable candidates for general service recruit-
ment competitions.
7.85. The emphasis on seniority may form a protec-
tion against discriminatory treatment of staff. This argu-
ably is a particular risk in the Community context, given
the difficulty of establishing objective measures of per-
formance, and the apparent low levels of confidence in
systems for staff evaluation.
7.86. The dissociation between grade and responsibil-
ity, which is particularly apparent in the Commission,
can be seen as a recognition of staff merits which over-
rides the grade and pay structures.
Weaknesses of the EU system
7.87. Apart from the uncertain prospect of eventual
promotion, the current system does not provide a finan-
cial incentive for staff to accept additional responsibili-
ties, and does not reward staff who perform well, but
who cannot, for whatever reason, be promoted. The
very extensive provision for automatic increases, com-
bined with large overlaps between grades, results in a
system which gives a great deal of weight to length of
service as compared to other factors.
7.87. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
As a matter of fact, the Commission having noticed weak-
nesses in the current personnel policy is engaged in a reform
process, one of whose main objectives is to provide a better
link between career development and the performance and
merit of officials while continuing to reward experience.
Although it is true that in the existing pay system there are
no salary increments based on performance, the proposals
contained in the consultative document on a new staff appraisal
and promotion system provide for a reward for performance
through a yearly assessment of merit.Merit would be appraised
on the basis of staff’s performance, competencies and conduct.
In turn, performance would be assessed against predefined
objectives. The impact of performance on career development
reports and the direct link between merit and promotion would
result in a significant reward of performance. It is not entirely
true that the same salary scale applies to all staff, both gen-
eralists and those with particular specialist qualifications is
concerned, as Articles 92 to 101 of the Staff Regulations
contain special provisions for officials in the scientific or tech-
nical services of the Communities. Besides, the reform propos-
als contain more flexibility for the initial grading.
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7.88. While the system helps institutions to retain staff
and thereby ensure continuity in their activities, the low
turnover of staff means fewer promotion opportunities
and less scope for the introduction of new ideas. The
ongoing arrangements do not facilitate early retirement
and thereby bring younger people more quickly into
management positions.
7.89. The same salary scales apply to all staff, both
generalists and those with particular specialist qualifica-
tions. This makes it relatively more difficult to recruit
people whose specialist qualifications are more highly
rewarded in the wider market.
Concluding remark
7.90. The Commission is currently consulting on pos-
sible changes to the pay and career structure. In reach-
ing decisions on eventual changes, a careful balance will
need to be struck which addresses some of the prob-
lems associated with the present system, without at the
same time calling into question its essential strengths.
AUDIT OF THE COMMUNITY SATELLITE
BODIES
Introduction
7.91. The annual audits of the Community satellite
bodies have been reported on in specific annual
reports (21).
7.88. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission does not entirely share the opinion of the
Court of Auditors and would like to make the following com-
ments.
— Fresh ideas are not intrinsically linked to new recruits.
The principle of life-long learning has been highlighted
in the orientation paper on career. This principle is also
expressly endorsed by Member States. In addition, sec-
onded national experts make important contributions in
this context.
— The Commission is always open to recruitment at inter-
mediary level, in particular A 5/A 4. It is organising
external competitions in 2001 to recruit specialists.
— A permanent ‘early retirement scheme’ is being considered
among Commission reform ideas.
7.90. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission basically agrees on the concluding remark
drawn by the Court of Auditors in point 7.90. In the consul-
tative documents of 28 February 2001 on the reform of the
personnel policy, the emphasis was on remedying problems of
the current pay and career structure whilst not detracting from
its strengths. Continued attention is given to this particular
concern during the current consultation process
(21) Currently being published in the Official Journal.
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7.92. The satellite bodies may be divided into three cat-
egories:
(a) the ‘first generation’ satellite bodies, whose manage-
ment boards are granted discharge by the Council
and the European Parliament;
(b) the ‘second generation’ satellite bodies which are
not self-financing and whose discharge authority is
their own board of directors or management board;
(c) the ‘second generation’ satellite bodies which are
wholly or partly self-financing and whose discharge
authority is their own management board.
7.93. The European Agency for Reconstruction, like
the first-generation satellite bodies, is granted discharge
by the Council and the European Parliament. Its pur-
pose is to implement Community aid programmes for
Kosovo and other regions in the former Yugoslavia (see
paragraphs 5.96-5.98).
Implementation of the budget
7.94. The budgetary implementation of most satellite
bodies (SBs) is characterised by carry-overs, which
remain significant in number, despite the efforts made
to the reduce them. This situation is most frequently
due to the mismatch between the rate at which deci-
sions are taken and work programmes for which the
SBs are responsible are implemented and the rate at
which the budget is implemented. Thought should be
given to the approaches to be adopted to achieve a bet-
ter correlation between the programming of work and
the principle of annuality of the budget.
Financial statements and the keeping of the accounts
7.95. The SBs’ budgets totalled 976,8 million euro in
2000, compared with 266,9 million euro in 1999 (see
Table 7.9). This increase is due to the creation of the
European Agency for Reconstruction (with a budget of
682,3 million euro). The SBs’ staff has increased simi-
larly, numbering 1 634 in 2000, as compared with
7.94. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
All decentralised bodies (except the Translation Centre in Lux-
embourg) have operating appropriations entered in Title 3 of
their budget. Most of these appropriations are used to con-
clude service contracts or make financial contributions to third
parties to carry out their work programme. These contracts
often overrun the end of the year in which they were con-
cluded. Thus the appropriations committed have to be carried
over in part. Since most cases involve multiannual projects,
the decentralised bodies should take the initiative to propose
an amendment to their Financial Regulation to the effect that
the appropriations in their Title 3 can be entered as differenti-
ated appropriations.
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1 304 in 1999, i.e. an increase of 330 staff, 258 of
whom work for self-financing bodies. The increase in
the number of posts for the remaining SBs is due essen-
tially to the creation of the European Agency for Recon-
struction.
7.96. The Court’s audits confirmed the reliability of
each of the SBs’ financial statements and did not give
rise to any significant remarks concerning the legality
and regularity of the underlying transactions.
Table 7.9 — Budgets and staff for 1999 and 2000 — The Community satellite bodies (SBs)
Name Headquarters Year ofcreation
Budget (Mio EUR) Permanent posts
1999 2000 1999 (1) 2000
I. First-generation SBs
european centre for the development of vocational training
(Cedefop) Thessaloniki 1975 15,3 13,3 81 81
European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and
Working Conditions Dublin 1975 14,8 15,0 84 85
II. Second-generation SBs which are not self-financing
European Environment Agency (EEA) Copenhagen 1990 18,5 18,9 68 76
European Training Foundation (ETF) Turin 1990 16,2 16,2 130 130
European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction
(EDMC) Lisbon 1993 8,2 8,2 45 48
European Agency for Safety and Health at Work (EASH) Bilbao 1995 6,6 7,0 24 26
European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia Vienna 1997 3,9 4,9 19 26
III. Second-generation SBs which are wholly or partially self-financing
European Agency for the Evaluation of Medicinal Products
(EMEA) London 1993 42,6 55,3 203 210
Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market (OHIM) Alicante 1994 115,4 133,0 490 713
Community Plant Variety Office (CPVO) Angers 1994 8,1 7,2 29 44
Translation Centre for the bodies of the European Union
(TCBEU) Luxembourg 1994 17,3 20,7 131 144
IV. SBs for implementing Community programmes
European Agency for Reconstruction Thessaloniki 2000 — 682,3 — 51
Total 266,9 981,9 1 304 1 634
(1) The 1999 figures had to be adjusted in relation to those published in the previous report to take account of information received after it had been published.
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7.97. The presentation of the SBs’ financial statements
should be harmonised. The SBs should consider jointly
developing their accounting systems and the principles,
methods and rules on which the accounts they keep are
based, so that the presentation of their financial state-
ments is uniform. As the Court recommended in its
Opinion No 2/2001 (Title VI) (22), the basic accounting
framework should be in line with the generally accepted
standards.
7.98. Inventory-keeping suffers from shortcomings in
most of the SBs. In order to apply a consistent approach,
the SBs should take the necessary steps to improve their
inventory systems and make the requisite adjustments
to their own Financial Regulation to incorporate the
provisions on the accounting management of non-
financial fixed-asset accounts adopted by the Commis-
sion in December 2000 (23).
Financial provisions
7.99. Taken as a whole, the SBs adhere to the provi-
sions of their Financial Regulations. The rules concern-
ing ex ante approval by the Financial Controller have
been simplified considerably at the European Agency
for Reconstruction, but steps were taken to ensure that
ex ante checking was carried out in the second half of
2001.
Follow-up to previous observations
7.100. Up until December 1998 the general Financial
Regulation provided for expenditure to be charged to
the budget inclusive of VAT, allowing the VAT to be
reused after its repayment. Since that time (24) the gen-
eral Financial Regulation has stipulated that expenditure
is to be charged net of VAT. Some SBs, such as the Ali-
cante and Angers Offices, have undertaken to adapt
their Financial Regulation. The Court once again (25)
calls on the SBs that have not yet done so to take the
necessary steps to change their respective Financial
Regulations.
7.97. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission will ask the decentralised bodies to take an
initiative in this respect.
(22) OJ C 62, 5.6.2001, p. 1.
(23) CommissionRegulation (EC)No2909/2000of29Decem-
ber 2000.
(24) See Article 27(2)(a) of the Financial Regulation applicable
to the general budget of the European Communities, as
amended by Council Regulation (EC, ECSC, Euratom)
No2548/98of 23November 1998 (OJ L 320, 28.11.1998,
p. 1).
(25) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999, para-
graph 6.38 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000, p. 166).
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7.101. During 2000, most of the SBs implemented the
SI2 budgetary accounting system and were able to inter-
face it with their general accounting systems (26). The
SBs must continue to improve their accounting systems
and, in particular, ensure that they develop analytical
accounting systems that better enable them to deter-
mine the cost of their activities, as well as ensure that
the manner in which these costs are monitored is
improved. In the case of self-financing agencies, these
systems should also enable them to improve the basis
on which charges for their services are decided.
7.102. All of the SBs’ Financial Regulations require that
their budgets be published in the Official Journal. Out
of 12 bodies, only eight published their budget for 2000,
seven on 23 October 2000 (27) and one on 22 Decem-
ber 1999 (28). Even though the publication date has
been brought forward, it is still overly tardy and the
situation is little better than it was in 1999 (29).
Employment in the satellite bodies and the growth of
their activities
7.103. The audits concerning the financial year 2000
examined the rise in employment in the SBs in greater
detail than in previous years. The findings of these audits
were compared with the data available on the SBs’
activities in an attempt to draw conclusions concerning
their global productivity.
The staff of the satellite bodies
7.104. Table 7.10 provides a description of the employ-
ment situation in the SBs as at 31 December 2000. It
shows that, in general, the SBs are able to fill most of
the posts provided for in their establishment plans and
to make up any shortages by using auxiliary staff (AS),
local employees (LEs) or even seconded national experts
(SNEs). Generally speaking, in 2000 the SBs had a staff
complement comparable with that provided for in their
establishment plans, making up shortfalls by using
supplementary staff, and especially auxiliary staff. The
high number of unfilled posts observed at the CPVO
(Angers) is due mainly to the fact that the recruitment
procedures launched in 2000 had not been completed
(26) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999, para-
graphs 6.37 and 6.38 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000, p. 166).
(27) OJ L 270, 23.10.2000, p. 1.
(28) OJ L 330, 22.12.1999, p. 13.
(29) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999, para-
graph 6.40 (OJ L 342, 1.12.2000, p. 167).
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by the end of the same year. In the case of the European
Agency for Reconstruction, the large number of staff
recruited outside the establishment plan is due to the
special procedures for managing administrative expen-
diture laid down in its Financial Regulation.
Staff recruitment and management
7.105. Generally, the SBs’ recruitment procedures
should be rendered clearer and more transparent, so
that the principle of equal access to the European civil
service is promoted.
7.106. Some SBs, the OHIM (Alicante) being the most
typical example, have developed a recruitment model
whereby staff are first recruited on insecure contracts
(as auxiliaries or even agency staff) and, by means of
internal procedures and calls for applications that are
not widely publicised, are then taken on as temporaries
and later as permanent officials, provided that this is
possible under the establishment plan.
7.107. Other SBs, such as the EEA (Copenhagen), do
not use this model, but carry out most of their recruit-
ment using a model similar to that of the institutions,
which is based on open competitions that are publi-
cised as widely as possible.
Table 7.10 — Employment in the satellite bodies — Situation as at 31 December 2000
Agencies
Posts provided
for (establish-
ment plan)
Posts occupied Occupancy rate(%) Other staff
Total
employment
Actual occupancy
rate (%)
a b c = b / a d e = b + d f = e / a
EMEA — London 210 189 90 9 198 94
OHIM — Alicante 713 540 76 87 627 88
CPVO — Angers 44 26 59 2 28 64
TCBEU — Luxembourg 144 125 87 5 130 90
Cedefop — Thessaloniki 81 82 101 26 108 133
Foundation — Dublin 85 72 85 3 75 88
EEA — Copenhagen 76 61 80 16 77 101
ETF — Turin 130 115 88 13 128 98
EDMC — Lisbon 48 47 98 18 65 135
EASH — Bilbao 26 24 92 9,5 33,5 129
Monitoring Centre — Vienna 26 24 92 2 26 100
European Agency for Reconstruction —
Thessaloniki 51 47 92 50 97 190
Total 1 634 1 352 83 240,5 1 592,5 97
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7.108. Improvement of the management of the agen-
cies’ staff is dependent on improving the staff informa-
tion systems. The upkeep of personnel files should be
more systematic to better ensure that the information
required for good management is complete.
Increase in staff and growth of the satellite bodies’ activi-
ties
7.109. For the purposes of the audit, staff were placed
in two categories:
(a) those responsible for support activities (support
staff), i.e. activities that ensure the SBs’ operational
continuity (e.g. administrative and accounting
departments, secretariat, etc.);
(b) so-called ‘operational’ staff, who are directly involved
in achieving the SBs’ objectives.
7.110. Table 7.11 shows the distribution of both grade
A and all other staff appointed to operational and sup-
port activities respectively. In general, the proportion of
operational staff tends to be higher in self-financing
SBs. The situation varies more in the other SBs. There
is a discernible trend regarding SB staff in that the
smaller the SB, the more it is able to concentrate its staff
on operational activities. Taking the staff as a whole, the
division between operational and other staff seems to
be determined by the nature and type of the individual
SBs’ activities.
7.111. Table 7.12 shows the amount of actual revenue
generated per head in self-financing SBs. Given the var-
ied nature of these bodies’ activities, the disparities
found cannot be considered very meaningful.
7.112. With regard to the other SBs, whose purpose is
to provide support in respect of specific EU policies, the
table shows the amount of actual operating expenditure
per head. The differences noted reflect various factors,
such as the efficiency in managing operating appropria-
tions or the extent to which the various SBs make use
ofoutside services to implement theirworkprogrammes.
In the case of the Turin Foundation, the particularly low
level of expenditure per head is explained by, inter alia,
the fact that the figures do not include Commission
programmes managed by the Foundation.
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Table 7.11 — Number of operational staff — Situation as at 31 December 2000
Agencies
Grade A operational
staff Grade A staff
Percentage of
operational staff (%)
Operational staff of
all categories (%)
a b c = a / b d
EMEA — London 89 102 87 72 (1)
OHIM — Alicante 90 132 68 57 (1)
CPVO — Angers 4 4 100 33 (1)
TCBEU — Luxembourg 71 73 97 60 (2)
Cedefop — Thessaloniki 28 44 64 30 (1)
Foundation — Dublin 19 27 70 23 (2)
EEA — Copenhagen 32 36 89 43 (2)
ETF — Turin 33 48 69 60 (1)
EDMC — Lisbon 23 27 85 35 (2)
EASH — Bilbao 11 12 92 40 (1)
Monitoring Centre — Vienna 8 10 80 55 (1)
European Agency for Reconstruction — Thessaloniki 28 34 82 29 (2)
(1) Percentage estimated on the basis of a sample.
(2) Percentage estimated on the basis of all staff.
Table 7.12 — Revenue and/or expenditure by Title — 2000
Agencies (1) Indicator
Amount (Mio EUR) Total staff Amount per head(1 000 EUR)
a b c = a / b
EMEA — London Real revenue 38,0 198 192
OHIM — Alicante Real revenue 108,9 627 174
CPVO — Angers Real revenue 6,8 28 245
TCBEU — Luxembourg Real revenue 20,6 130 158
Cedefop — Thessaloniki Operating expenditure (2) 4,8 108 44
Foundation — Dublin Operating expenditure (2) 6,0 75 80
EEA — Copenhagen Operating expenditure (2) 9,4 77 122
ETF — Turin Operating expenditure (2) 4,7 128 37
EDMC — Lisbon Operating expenditure (2) 3,4 65 52
EASH — Bilbao Operating expenditure (2) 3,1 33,5 92
Monitoring Centre — Vienna Operating expenditure (2) 1,5 26 56
(1) The European Agency for Reconstruction has not been taken into account, owing to the very special nature of its activites in relation to the other SBs.
(2) Real operating expenditure against appropriations for the financial year and appropriations carried over from the previous financial year (Title III).
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7.113. Table 7.13 compares the average increase over
the period 1998 to 2000 in the following areas: staff at
the SBs, these bodies’ expenditure on support activities,
i.e. the expenditure required for an SB’s activities to be
carried out (Titles I and II expenditure), and either their
revenue, in the case of self-financing SBs, or their oper-
ating expenditure (Title III expenditure), in the case of
the other SBs.
7.114. Generally speaking, for the majority of the SBs
the increase in support expenditure is greater than that
in the number of staff. The reasons for this difference in
increase are attributable in part to unavoidable factors,
such as cost-of-living adjustments, seniority increases
and the increasing proportion of permanent and tem-
porary staff (whose salary costs are higher) and, in some
cases, the size of the investments the SBs have been
forced to make in recent years.
7.115. In the case of two of the self-financing SBs, the
OHIM (Alicante) and the EMEA (London), their actual
revenue increased at approximately the same rate as, or
even faster than, their support expenditure. This trend
may be regarded as satisfactory and should enable these
SBs to deal more easily with changes in the economic
climate. With regard to the CPVO (Angers) and the
TCBEU (Luxembourg), it is difficult to draw conclusions
because of the high proportion of support expenditure
accounted for by investments made over the period
examined.
Table 7.13 — Average annual growth rate (1998 to 2000): total staff, support expenditure and operating
expenditure/revenue
Agencies (1) Total staff (%) Support expenditure(%) (2)
Revenue/operating
expenditure (%) (3)
Self-financing bodies
EMEA — London 11 23 53
OHIM — Alicante 30 27 27
CPVO — Angers 33 47 20
TCBEU — Luxembourg 29 46 33
Other bodies
Cedefop — Thessaloniki 6 9 9
Foundation — Dublin – 2 3 2
EEA — Copenhagen 6 7 5
ETF — Turin – 1 – 2 12
EDMC — Lisbon 17 8 7
EASH — Bilbao 58 20 67
(1) Given their recent creation, the data concerning the Vienna Monitoring Centre and the European Agency for Reconstruction cannot be regarded as significant.
(2) Actual staff and administrative expenditure against appropriations for the financial year and appropriations carried over from the previous financial year (Titles
I and II).
(3) Actual operating expenditure against appropriations for the financial year and appropriations carried over from the previous financial year (Title III).
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7.116. As far as the other SBs are concerned, in four
cases, i.e. Cedefop, the Dublin Foundation, the EEA
(Copenhagen) and the EMCDDA (Lisbon), the average
rates of increase in their support and operational expen-
diture are of the same order of magnitude over the
period examined. This situation gives reason to think
that the extent to which these SBs use outside services
has remained stable. The increase in staff at three of
these SBs (Cedefop, the Dublin Foundation and the EEA
(Copenhagen)) is lower or of the same order of magni-
tude, which tends to suggest that the situation is stable
or even improving in terms of productivity. In two other
cases (the ETF (Turin) and especially the EASH (Bilbao)),
the increase in operational expenditure was greater on
average than that in support expenditure, which sug-
gests an increase in the use of outside services. In both
cases a comparison between the increase in staff and
that in the various types of expenditure seems to indi-
cate that productivity has increased.
Conclusion
7.117. In most cases, the SBs have been able to find the
staff needed to carry out their activities, sometimes by
resorting to auxiliary staff. In general, the SBs should
ensure that their recruitment procedures are rendered
more straightforward and transparent so that the prin-
ciple of equal access to the European civil service is
applied more effectively. They should also improve the
system formanaging andmonitoring their staff. It would
be advisable, either as part of the reform of the Staff
Regulations or by means of specific regulations appli-
cable to all the SBs, for the institutions’ and the SBs’
recruitment policies to be harmonised further and pos-
sibly managed jointly.
7.118. In terms of productivity, the SBs should moni-
tor their staff structure with a view to optimising the
ratio of operational to support staff. The growth in
administrative expenditure and salary costs in particu-
lar should also be monitored closely so that productiv-
ity increases at least offset the rise in salary costs per
head.
7.117. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The decentralised bodies have a separate legal personality from
that of the Community and accordingly they have complete
autonomy with their own appointing authority. Naturally,
they must exercise this power in total compliance with the
Staff Regulations.
The Commission plays an advisory role with a view to ensur-
ing consistency in their policies on human resources, without,
however, the legal authority to impose them.
As the decentralised bodies differ enormously in their tasks
and situations, it is difficult at this point to see how harmon-
isation other than that provided for in the Staff Regulations
can be achieved. The Commission intends to continue to play
its advisory role in full compliance with the Staff Regulations
and to encourage the agencies to coordinate their staff policy.
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7.119. In order to achieve this, the SBs’ programming
of their activities must be more rigorous (see para-
graph 7.94) and their analytical accounting systems
must be developed so that cost trends are monitored
more effectively (see paragraph 7.101). It should be
noted that this aim calls for more particular attention in
the smallest of the SBs, which are unable to achieve
substantial economies of scale because of their limited
size.
AUDIT OF THE EUROPEAN SCHOOLS
7.120. The Court’s audit of the European Schools is the
subject of a specific annual report sent to the Board of
Governors of the European Schools. In line with the
cyclical audit plan foreseen for the European Schools,
the audits carried out in 2000 focused on the schools
in Karlsruhe, Luxembourg and Mol. The findings of
these audits and those of previous years allow the con-
clusion that the system for the financial management of
the schools is of adequate quality. Nevertheless, the
audits carried out in 2000 gave rise to the following
remarks.
Financial provisions
7.121. The audits revealed shortcomings in the run-
ning of the inventory system. The inventory procedures
should be more rigorous and applied properly. In this
regard, it would be advisable for the schools to review
their rules in this area, with a view to making the neces-
sary amendments, on the basis of the Commission
regulation adopted in December 2000 (30) detailing the
accounting provisions concerning tangible and intan-
gible fixed assets.
7.122. Computer equipment accounts for a substantial
proportion of the purchasesmade by the schools. Going
beyond the three schools audited, the Court recom-
mends that all the schools look into the scope for
grouping their purchases so that they are able to benefit
far more from invitation-to-tender procedures and to
improve their management of procurements.
(30) CommissionRegulation (EC)No2909/2000of29Decem-
ber 2000 (OJ L 336, 30.12.2000, p. 75).
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7.123. Teachers seconded by the Member States are
only paid their basic national salary by the latter, whereas
the salaries they earn in their own countries are made
up of the basic salary plus various supplementary
amounts based on their seniority, level of training, posi-
tion in their home school, etc. This situation results in
the schools having to finance a larger share of their sala-
ries. In order to harmonise the Member States’ practice
concerning the paying of national salaries to teachers
seconded abroad, the Board of Governors of the Euro-
pean Schools should re-examine this matter.
Contributions to school fees
7.124. The pupil population of some schools is made
up mostly of children (up to 90 %) whose parents have
no working relationship with the institutions and Com-
munity bodies. These children’s school fees are covered
by financing agreements concluded with the school or
the parents themselves. However, the latter category,
which is the most predominant, is granted exemptions
and school fee reductions which are determined on the
basis of the parents’ income.
7.125. With regard to the exemption thresholds, these
vary according to the school with no apparent justifica-
tion, as is shown in Table 7.14, which compares the
thresholds in force with those that would apply if the
Brussels schools’ exemption thresholdwere tobe applied,
while also taking account of the weighting applicable to
the places in which the schools are located. This matter
should be examined, so that the exemption thresholds
are fixed in a fair and rational manner.
7.126. In 2000 the schools’ operating costs amounted
to 187 million euro, or 11 357 euro per pupil. The aver-
age contribution per non-entitled pupil is quite differ-
ent. It amounts to 7 966 euro for category II pupils and
1 556 euro for those in category III. The proportion of
pupils in the last category is particularly high in some
schools (around 80 % in four of them). This for the
most part explains the fact that the Commission sub-
sidy paid per pupil to the various schools ranges from
6 126 euro (Luxembourg) to 10 698 euro (Bergen).
7.125. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The exemption thresholds were fixed by the various adminis-
trative boards of the European Schools. Only the Board of
Governors, on the Commission’s initiative, can revise them
along the lines desired by the Court.
7.126. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Under the rules approved by the Board of Governors, in the
exercise of the powers granted by the Convention of 15 April
1957, category I pupils are exempt from school fees, category
II pupils pay a fee set in the agreements signed by the bodies
and the Board of Governors and category III pupils pay a fee
(‘minerval’), the amount of which is determined by using a
formula approved by the Board of Governors. Accordingly the
amounts of these fees vary.
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7.127. Under these conditions and given these schools’
purpose, which is to facilitate the operation of the insti-
tutions andCommunity bodies, the Commission should
examine whether some of the schools should not now
be closed. It should also ensure that the costs which
should normally be borne by the host Member State are
not charged to the Community budget.
The fact that the Commission grant for each category III pupil
varies from one school to another is explained by the different
number of these pupils in the different schools. The Conven-
tion of 1957 provides that the admission of these pupils to
the European Schools depends on the number of places avail-
able, which in turn explains the differences, for example,
between the Luxembourg and Bergen Schools.
7.127. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
In accordance with the criteria for establishing and closing
European Schools, approved by the Board of Governors on 24
and 25 October 2000, the existence of a European School is
warranted as long as it is indispensable to the proper func-
tioning of an essential Community activity; its existence can
be called into question when it no longer helps to meet that
objective.
In the Commission’s opinion, the existing 10 Euro-
pean Schools continue to be indispensable.
The European Schools and, most particularly, the Commis-
sion ensure that the host States defray their share of the costs
of the European Schools located in their countries.
Table 7.14 — Comparison of exemption thresholds
(EUR)
Schools
Exemption threshold for first child
Weighting
Threshold calculated on the basis
of the Brussels threshold and the
relevant weighting
Difference
Value
(a) (c) (d) = 15 528 * (c) (e) = (a) - (d)
Brussels I, II, III 15 528 100,0 15 528 0
Mol 19 555 100,0 15 528 4 027
Luxembourg 17 325 100,0 15 528 1 797
Karlsruhe 20 486 97,4 15 124 5 362
Munich 20 486 108,0 16 770 3 716
Bergen 17 078 114,5 17 780 – 702
Culham 22 203 127,6 19 814 2 389
Varese 13 919 95,3 14 798 – 879
(a): Net revenue, except for Culham where gross revenue is used to calculate the exemption.
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GUARANTEE FUND FOR EXTERNAL ACTIONS
Introduction
8.1. The decision to set up the Guarantee Fund for
External Actions was taken at the Edinburgh European
Council of December 1992. The Fund was established
on 31 October 1994 by Council Regulation (EC, Eura-
tom) No 2728/94 (1) and was built up by contributions
from the budget in the following years. The Fund is
drawn on if the beneficiary of a loan granted or guar-
anteed by the Community to or in a third country
defaults. If the beneficiary is still in default three months
after the date on which payment was due, the Fund
reimburses the Community cash resources that were
previously used to service the borrowing.
8.2. The Court audited the Fund for the financial year
ended 31 December 2000, at the Commission as regards
the administrative management and at the European
Investment Bank (EIB) as regards the financial manage-
ment. Without prejudice to the observations made in
paragraph 8.9, the Court has no comments to make on
the results of the audits.
Situation and development of the Fund
8.3. Since theGuarantee Fundwas set up, it has received
funds from the budget totalling 1 824,7 million euro as
at 31 December 2000 (see Table 8.1). Calls on the
resources of the Fund in its role as guarantor amounted
to 458,9 million euro (including 16,5 million euro in
default interest), while late recoveries from defaulting
debtors totalled 327 million euro (including 41,3 mil-
lion euro in default interest).
8.4. At 31 December 2000, the balance of defaults
stood at 215,1 million euro, which represents the dif-
ferences between calls on the Fund and recoveries for
capital and interest plus the balance of default interest.
The details are given in Table 8.2.
(1) OJ L 293, 12.11.1994, p. 1.
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Table 8.1 — Guarantee Fund operations and situation
(Mio EUR)
Financial
year Payments (
1) Activation ofguarantees (2)
Late
repayments Result (
3) Remunerationpaid to EIB
Repayments to
budget
Total fund
ressources at
31 December (4)
Total guarantee
outstanding (5) Coverage (%)
1994 293,7 — — 0,5 — — 294,2 6 017 4,9
1995 250,8 (303,1) 35,6 23,4 0,2 — 300,9 5 882 5,1
1996 235,4 (52,5) 55,7 18,0 0,2 — 557,4 6 715 8,3
1997 286,1 (54,3) 45,0 27,5 0,3 — 861,8 7 960 10,8
1998 272,4 (15,4) 185,3 42,6 0,5 (66,0) 1 280,7 9 834 13,0
1999 300,1 (16,3) 5,3 41,1 0,6 (297,8) 1 313,1 12 052 10,9
2000 186,3 (17,4) — 57,4 0,7 (107,9) 1 431,6 14 069 10,2
Total 1 824,7 (458,9) 327,0 210,5 2,5 (471,7)
(1) Payments to Guarantee Fund pursuant to Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 2728/94 of 31 October 1994.
(2) The Guarantee Fund has been operating since January 1995 to reimburse defaults.
(3) The result is the difference between the interest on the Fund’s deposits and the management fees levied by the EIB.
(4) After deduction of EIB fees not paid at 31 December.
(5) Including default interest incurred but not paid at 31 December.
Source: Commission.
Table 8.2 — Cumulative total of operations since the creation of the Guarantee Fund and the default situation
at 31 December 2000
(Mio EUR)
Country
Calls on fund Recovered by fund Balance of defaults
Capital Interest
Default
interest
Capital Interest
Default
interest
Capital Interest
Default
interest (1)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) = (1) - (3) (6) = (2) - (4)
Armenia 57,6 0,9 57,6 9,3
Georgia 113,3 14,9 2,1 113,3 14,9 17,0 0,0
Kazakhstan 1,6 0,0 1,6 0,0
Kyrghyzstan 0,7 0,0 0,7 0,0
Tajikistan 54,5 8,7 1,3 3,5 54,5 8,7 14,9
Turkmenistan 44,9 1,0 0,8 44,9 1,0 2,7
Ukraine 31,9 1,0 31,9 1,6
Former Yugoslavia 46,3 67,0 10,3 6,2 13,6 7,2 40,1 53,5 43,5
Subtotal 348,6 93,9 16,5 253,9 31,8 41,3 94,6 62,1 58,4
Total 458,9 327,0 215,1
(1) This column includes interest accrued between the date of the call on the Fund and the end of the financial year; comparison of the three ’default interest’
columns is thus not possible.
Source: Commission.
15.12.2001 EN Official Journal of the European Communities 373
8.5. In 2000, 186,3 million euro were transferred to
the Fund from the reserve for guarantees, while a sum
of 107,9 million euro was repaid in March 2000. This
represented the difference between the actual level of
the Fund at 31 December 1999 (1 313,1 million euro,
or 10,9 % of the guarantee outstanding) prior to remu-
neration of the EIB (0,6 million euro) and the target
amount of 1 205,2 million euro, or 10 % of the guar-
antees outstanding on 31 December 1999 (2).
8.6. The ratio of the Fund’s liquid assets (1 431,6 mil-
lion euro) to its outstanding capital liabilities for loans
and loan guarantees for third countries plus unpaid
interest due (14 068,8 million euro) was 10,2 % at
31 December 2000 (see Table 8.1). On the basis of a
target amount of 1 266,2 million euro (9 % of the guar-
antees outstanding on 31 December 2000), 165,4 mil-
lion euro have to be refunded to the budget in 2001.
8.7. During the financial year there were three calls on
the resources of the Fund as guarantor, totalling 17,4 mil-
lion euro (including 1,6 million euro in default interest).
These three calls concerned loans mostly drawn up in
currencies other than the euro. The evolution of the for-
eign exchange rates during the three-month period
between the notice of default and the intervention of
the Fund resulted in an additional charge of 1,1 million
euro to be paid by the Fund according to the Regula-
tion.
8.8. Guarantee Fund activities generated 57,4 million
euro in net interest revenue in 2000, representing an
average overall yield of 4,2 %.
(2) Article 3 of the Regulation stipulates that: ‘The Fund shall
rise to an appropriate level, hereinafter referred to as “the
target amount”. The target amount shall be 10 % of the
Community’s total outstanding capital liabilities arising
from each operation, increased by unpaid interest due. If,
at the end of a year, the target amount is exceeded, the
surplus shall be paid back to a special heading in the
statement of revenue in the general budget of the Euro-
pean Communities.’ Since 1997, this ratio has consistently
exceeded the rate of 10 % set as the target amount. As of
1 January 2000, the target amount was lowered to 9 %.
Council Regulation (EC, Euratom) No 1149/1999 of
25.5.1999 amending Council Regulation (EC, Euratom)
No 2728/94 of 31.10.1994 establishing a Guarantee Fund
for external actions (OJ L 139, 2.6.1999).
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Follow-up of previous observations
8.9. The 0,05 % annual fee for 2000, an amount of
0,7 million euro, was paid to the EIB for its financial
management of the Fund. This rate of remuneration has
not changed since 1995 (3). In its Annual Report on the
financial year 1999, the Court recommended that ‘in
the light of the financial management experience
acquired and the Fund’s level of resources, this annual
fee should be reviewed’ (4). Despite the Commission’s
expectations an overview of the costs has not yet been
provided by the EIB. The rate remained unchanged in
2000.
EUROPEAN INVESTMENT FUND (‘EIF’)
Introduction
8.10. In accordance with the wishes of the Edinburgh
European Council of December 1992, the European
Investment Fund was established in 1994. Its sharehold-
ers were the European Investment Bank (EIB), the Com-
munity and several financial institutions (see para-
graph 8.11). It was set up to contribute to the pursuit
of Community objectives by providing additional financ-
ing capacities in support of the development of Trans-
European Networks (TENs) and small and medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs). During 2000, for the first time
since its establishment, the EIF underwent a thorough
reform.
Reform of the EIF
8.11. By acquiring non-allocated shares and shares from
financial institutions, the EIB became themajority share-
holder of the EIF. Thus the EIF is now more than 90 %
owned by European public bodies and institutions. 20 %
of these shares were paid in before the reform and this
percentage remained the same after the reform.
8.9. A new fees structure for the year 2001 is shortly to be
agreed between the EIB and the Commission services.
(3) Since the Fund had reached 300 million ECU at 31Decem-
ber 1995, the rate of remuneration paid to the EIB was
reduced from 0,125 % to 0,05 % of the Fund’s average
monthly assets, with retrospective effect to 31 December
1994. Since its inception, the Fund has paid the EIB
2,5 million euro in management fees.
(4) OJ C 342, 1.12.2000, p. 175.
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8.12. As a consequence of the reform, the EIF became
an EIB subsidiary specialising in risk-capital activities.
The management of the portfolio of venture-capital
operations signed by the EIB in its own name (922 mil-
lion euro) was transferred to the EIF. In addition, up to
1 000 million euro were made available from EIB
reserves to back the new venture-capital operations to
be concluded by the EIF. At the end of 2000 the EIF was
entrustedwithmanaging an amount of up to 2 493 mil-
lion euro of participations.
8.13. According to the Council Decision of 1994 (5),
the Commission is supposed to represent the Commu-
nity as a member of the EIF. The Community represen-
tatives should therefore take care to ensure that there is
a balance between the pursuit of Community objectives
and the commercial basis (6) of the Fund’s activities.
8.14. In June 2000, the EIF General Meeting approved
the new statutes and rules of procedure proposed by
the Supervisory Board.
8.15. As a consequence of the new statutes:
(a) the managing body of the EIF was the Financial
Committee, consisting of three members, one of
them representing the Commission. No decision
could have been taken without his presence. Now,
the Financial Committee has been replaced by a
single Chief Executive, nominated by the member of
the Fund with the highest number of shares (7) (i.e.
the EIB);
8.15. The new statutes have been brought into line with
standard rules of corporate governance. The Board of Gover-
nors now decides on all operations, with the possibility of del-
egating this power in whole or in part.
The Financial Committee has been replaced by a Chief Execu-
tive, who acts independently, serves the best interests of the
Fund and is accountable only to the Board of Directors.
The Community is represented on the Board by two members.
The stipulation that these two members act independently and
serve the best interests of the EIF is in line with normal gov-
ernance (cf. EIB and EBRD).
The EIF statutes stipulate that members of the Fund may dis-
pose of their shares by transferring them either to another
member or to a third party. The necessary consent of the EIB,
as the majority shareholder, reflects normal governance prac-
tice, as stated above.
(5) Decision 94/375/EC of 6 June 1994.
(6) Article 2.3 of the new statutes: ‘The activities of the Fund
shall be based on sound banking principles or other sound
commercial principles and practices as applicable.’
(7) Articles 10 and 24 of the original statutes and 17 of the
initial rules of procedures; Article 21 of the new statutes
and 16 of the new rules of procedures.
EIF shareholders (total capital 2 000 Mio EUR)
Before reform
(%)
After reform
(%)
EIB 40 60,75
European Community 30 30
Financial institutions 19,25 9,25
Non-allocated shares 10,75 0
Total 100 100
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(b) the Supervisory Board has been replaced by a Board
of Directors. The concept of Community represen-
tation on the Board, which was mentioned in the
former statutes, has been deleted in the new stat-
utes (8). The two out of seven members designated
by the Commission shall now ‘act independently
and serve the best interests of the EIF. They shall be
accountable only to the General Meeting’ (of the
EIF);
(c) while there was no provision on this matter in the
original statutes, now the Commission cannot dis-
pose of its share without the consent of the EIB (9).
Budgetary management of measures under mandate
8.16. During 2000, the EIF managed three measures
financed by the Community budget: the ‘Growth and
Environment Pilot Project’ (10), the ‘European Technol-
ogy Facility - Start-up’ (‘ETF Start-up’) and the ‘SME
Guarantee Facility’. The two latter measures, along with
the ‘European Joint Venture scheme’, which is directly
managed by the Commission, are the constituent parts
of a programme of financial assistance for innovative
and job-creating SMEs (11).
8.17. A budgetary appropriation amounting to
391,56 million euro (12) has been 100 % committed by
the Commission. Payments from the Community bud-
get to the EIF for these measures stood at 145 million
euro at the end of 2000, the same amount as in 1999,
namely 60 million euro for the European Technology
Facility - Start-up, 60 million euro for the SME Guaran-
tee Facility and 25 million euro for the Growth and
Environment Pilot Project. No new payment was made
in 2000.
(8) Article 16 of the original statutes, Article 18 of the new
statutes.
(9) Article 7 of the new statutes.
(10) Parliament Amendment No 0233 to the draft Commu-
nity budget for 1995 (OJ C 18, 23.1.1995, p. 317).
(11) Council Decision 98/347/EC of 19 May 1998 on mea-
sures of financial assistance for innovative and job-creating
small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) (OJ L 155,
29.5.1998, p. 43).
(12) ETF Start-Up: 168 million euro for the years 1998, 1999
and 2000; SMEs Guarantee: 198,56 million euro for the
years 1998, 1999 and 2000; Growth and Environment
Pilot Project: 25 million euro for the years 1995 to 1997.
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ETF Start-Up Facility
8.18. The objective of the measure is to develop risk-
capital participation in innovative and job-creating SMEs
by investing in specialised venture capital funds, par-
ticularly smaller or newly established funds, funds oper-
ating regionally or funds focused on specific industries
or technologies, or venture capital funds financing the
exploitation of R&D (research and development) results.
The EIF receives Community funds and invests in equity
participations in Venture Capital Funds (VCFs). Those
funds invest in SMEs.
8.19. For the years 1998, 1999 and 2000, the total of
the budgetary resources committed by the Commission
for the Facility amounts to 168 million euro, i.e. 100 %
of the appropriation. At 31 December 2000 the EIF had
paid 32,2 million euro into VCFs (see Table 8.3).
SME Guarantee Facility
8.20. The aim of the facility is to cover the cost of
guarantees and counter-guarantees issued by the EIF in
order to promote an increase in the loans granted to
innovative and job-creating SMEs, by increasing the
capacity of guarantee schemes operating in the Member
States, in the public or private sector, including mutual
guarantee schemes. The budgetary allocation is to cover
the full cost of the facility, including the EIF’s guarantee
losses and any other eligible costs or expenses of the
facility. The cost of the facility to the Community bud-
get is capped for each financial intermediary so that it
does not under any circumstances exceed the budget-
ary allocations made available to the EIF.
8.21. For the years 1998, 1999 and 2000, the total of
the budget allocation committed by the Commission
for the facility amounts to 198,56 million euro, i.e.
100 % of the appropriation. At the end of 2000, the EIF
agreed with their contractors a maximum of 130 mil-
lion euro (see Table 8.4). The amount spent so far was
0,45 million euro for defaulted loans and 2,6 million
euro in management costs.
8.19. At the end of 2000 the EIF had signed contracts with
VCFs for a total of 71.7 million euro, of which 12,8 million
euro are conditional on further fund-raising by the VCFs. Of
the 58,9 million euro ‘unconditional’ commitments, the EIF
had paid in 32,2 million euro.
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Table 8.3 — ‘ETF Start-up’ — Accumulated commitments and investments into venture capital funds (‘VCFs’)
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Table 8.4 — SME guarantee facility — Accumulated commitments
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Growth and Environment Pilot Project
8.22. The Growth and Environment Pilot Project was
launched in 1995 as an initiative of the European Parlia-
ment. It aims to facilitate access for SMEs to bank
financing for new environmental investments. The
scheme provides for guarantees of up to 50 % of financ-
ing granted by financial institutions in the Member
States. Under this scheme, the Commission provides
subsidies designated to cover premiums for guarantees
and costs to promote the scheme. The appropriations
of 25 million euro for this project during the years1995
to 1997 were 100 % committed by the Commission and
paid over to the EIF. At the end of 2000 the EIF had
signed guarantee contracts involving potential guaran-
tee fees of 24,4 million euro, corresponding to a maxi-
mum guaranteed amount of 674,6 million euro and a
maximum loan volume of 1 353,5 million euro. The
total of guarantee fees and promotion costs amounted
to some 9,4 million euro, of which 6,4 million euro had
been disbursed to the EIF by the end of 2000.
Management of own funds
8.23. The Commission, which acts as the Community
shareholder in the EIF and holds 30 % of the shares, has
signed an agreement with the Court, to which the EIF
itself is also a signatory, concerning the auditing of the
EIF’s operations that are financed from its own funds.
This agreement, which was signed in September 2001
for a period of two years, defines the Court’s right of
access to the documents and information it needs,
including those of other auditors. The Court believes
that this agreement constitutes a useful basis for the
purpose of giving concrete form to the auditing of the
Community participation, bearing in mind the special
context in which it is held.
Follow-up of previous observations
8.24. As already pointed out by the Court in 1998 and
1999, a budgetary implementation rate of 100 % calcu-
lated on the basis of the Community budget alonemight
conceal an under-utilisation of budgetary funds by the
agent, and, in practice, lower implementation of the
programme financed.
8.23. The Commission is satisfied that an agreement has
been signed.
8.24. The Commission is aware of the problem of the dis-
parity between budgetary implementation and actual imple-
mentation. In order to improve the information provided in
the financial statements as well as their readability, the Com-
mission has included data in the annex relating to the funds
granted to public or private financial intermediaries which
they had not used at 31 December 2000. The Commission
has for the first time set out the information by budget head-
ing so that actual budget consumption can be identified.
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8.25. The Commission committed itself (13) to insert
an explanatory note in the balance sheet identifying the
amounts corresponding to funds held by the EIF. How-
ever, this note had not yet been included in the 2000
balance sheet. In the Revenue and Expenditure Account
and Balance Sheet for 2000, the information is limited
and not transparent. This document does not show
those amounts on the treasury accounts of each of the
financial intermediaries which had not yet been trans-
ferred to the beneficiaries.
8.26. In its Annual Report for 1998 (14) the Court
drew the attention of the Commission to the need to
improve its control of the Growth and Environment
Pilot Project, in particular the implementation costs and
the eligibility criteria. In 2000 the Commission carried
out an internal audit on the basis of the Court’s recom-
mendations. After this audit, the Commission launched
a renegotiationof the fiduciary agreement for theGrowth
and Environment Pilot Project with the EIF, defined pro-
cedures for a systematic control and decided to launch
an evaluation of the scheme. However, these measures
were not yet effective at the end of 2000.
8.25. It is true that the Commission undertook in the reply
to the 1999 annual report to provide the figure for the amount
managed by the European Investment Fund. Nevertheless, in
view of the number of intermediaries managing Community
funds, and for the sake of transparency and harmonisation,
the Commission has preferred to provide, in the Annex to
Volume IV – consolidated revenue and expenditure account
and balance sheet (see pages 68 and 91), an overall explana-
tory note for all the intermediaries concerned rather than refer
just to certain intermediaries. The funds held by the EIF at
31 December 2000 are included under headings B5-3 and
B5-5 and total EUR 112 million, which accounts for only
17 % of total funds held by intermediaries.
8.26. The Commission wishes to point out that in 2001
the measures referred to by the Court have become effective:
following extensive negotiations, an amendment to the Fidu-
ciary and Management Agreement is in the process of being
signed, the evaluation of the scheme has started and sample-
based controls at the level of financial intermediaries are under
way.
(13) OJ C 342, 1.12.2000, p. 183.
(14) OJ C 349, 3.12.1999.
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STATEMENT OF ASSURANCE CONCERNING THE GENERAL BUDGET FOR THE
FINANCIAL YEAR ENDED 31 DECEMBER 2000
I. The European Court of Auditors (‘the Court’) has examined the consolidated accounts of the European Com-
munities for the financial year ended 31 December 2000. The accounts consist of the consolidated revenue and
expenditure account and balance sheet as well as explanatory notes (1) and are the responsibility of the Com-
mission. Pursuant to the Treaties (2), the Court is required to provide the Parliament and the Council with a state-
ment of assurance as to the reliability of the accounts and the legality and regularity of the transactions which
underlie these accounts.
II. The Court carried out the audit in accordance with its audit policies and standards. These adapt generally
accepted international standards to the Community context. The audit comprised an appropriate range of pro-
cedures designed to examine, on a test basis, evidence relating both to the amounts and disclosures in the con-
solidated accounts and the legality and regularity of the transactions underlying the accounts. It also included
an assessment of the accounting principles used and of significant estimates made by management, as well as
of the presentation of the accounts. Through the audit the Court obtained a reasonable basis for the opinion
expressed below. The scope of the Court’s opinion is limited in relation to own resources (see paragraphs 1.11
and 1.69) and external actions (see paragraphs 5.25 to 5.26).
*
* *
Reliability of the accounts
III. Except for the effects of the matters summarised below, the Court is of the opinion that the revised accounts
for the financial year ended 31 December 2000 as published in the Official Journal reflect reliably the Com-
munities’ revenue and expenditure for the year and the financial situation at the end of the year:
(a) a net understatement of fixed assets by about 140 million euro (see paragraph 9.5);
(b) an incomplete presentation of advances and payments on account at the year end (see paragraphs 9.9 and
9.10);
(c) an overstatement of commitments still to be settled by some 1 680 million euro (see paragraph 9.12);
(d) an omission of commitments of 213 million euro (see paragraph 9.15) and a net overstatement by 1 343 mil-
lion euro (see paragraph 9.16);
(e) an absence of certain information necessary for the calculation of the economic result (see paragraphs 9.34
to 9.37).
(1) Volume IV of the documents was submitted by the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council and to the
Court on the official date of 1 May 2001 (shortly available in the Official Journal; available on the site:
http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/fr/com/cpi_index_en.html).
(2) Article 248 of the EC Treaty, Article 160c of the Euratom Treaty and Article 45c of the ECSC Treaty with regard to the
ECSC’s former administrative budget, which was incorporated into the general budget by the Merger Treaty of 8 April
1965.
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Legality and regularity of underlying transactions
IV. The audit of the principal management and control systems (3) applicable to agriculture and structural mea-
sures (see paragraphs 9.52 to 9.65 and 9.73 to 9.76) revealed weaknesses in the functioning of control proce-
dures aiming to secure the legality and regularity of the transactions.
The audit of operational expenditure revealed an unacceptable incidence of error affecting the amount of the
payments, the reality or the eligibility of the underlying transactions (see paragraphs 9.56, 9.60 and 9.75).
In view of all the results of its audit, the Court is of the opinion that the transactions underlying the financial
statements, taken as a whole, are legal and regular in respect of revenue, commitments and administrative expen-
diture but declines to provide this assurance in respect of the other payments.
10 October 2001
Jan O. KARLSSON
President
European Court of Auditors
12, rue Alcide De Gasperi, L-1615 Luxembourg
(3) Integrated Administrative and Control System for Agriculture, Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 for Structural Funds and fifth
framework programme for research and development.
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INTRODUCTION
9.1. Pursuant to Article 248 of the Treaty, the Court of
Auditors provides the European Parliament and the
Council with a Statement of Assurance (DAS) concern-
ing the reliability of the accounts and the legality and
regularity of the underlying transactions. The approach
the Court has applied, whilst still abiding by generally
accepted auditing practices, has been broadened to
encompass a larger range of audit evidence to support
its conclusions. For the financial year 2000, the Court
has endeavoured to provide more diversified informa-
tion on the nature, location and causes of the problems
affecting the management of Community funds.
9.2. The aim of the work on the reliability of the
accounts is to obtain a reasonable assurance that all the
revenue, expenditure, assets and liabilities have been
entered in the accounts correctly and accurately. In par-
ticular, the auditing work involves an analytical review
and a detailed scrutiny of the Communities’ consoli-
dated revenue and expenditure account and balance
sheet.
9.3. The aim of the work on the legality and regularity
of the underlying transactions is to obtain enough evi-
dence of a direct or indirect nature to prove that the
underlying transactions have been dealt with in accor-
dance with the regulations or contractual provisions in
force and that the corresponding Community funds
have been correctly calculated. Various techniques are
used, such as in-depth audits of certain selected areas or
systems, the evaluation of horizontal audit procedures
and substantive tests on transactions. The detailed find-
ings of this audit work are set out in the specific apprais-
als for the various headings of the financial perspective,
contained in the preceding chapters.
RELIABILITY OF THE ACCOUNTS
Comments on the consolidated financial statements
9.4. The Court notes the efforts made by the Commis-
sion’s accounting departments as regards the presenta-
tion and amplification of the data contained in the con-
solidated financial statements. Nevertheless, the official
version of the financial statements presented by the
Commission on the statutory date of 1 May 2001 was
marred by omissions and inconsistencies such that a
correctedversionhad tobepresented inSeptember 2001
for publication in the Official Journal.
9.4. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission did indeed make some major improvements
to the 2000 consolidated financial statements presented on
1 May 2001. However, as that version still contained some
imperfections, it thought it preferable to produce a new ver-
sion for publication in the Official Journal.
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Fixed assets
9.5. The total value of the tangible fixed assets
(3 261 million euro) shown on the balance sheet is both
understated (by 225 million euro) because it does not
take sufficient account of buildings which the Economic
and Social Committee (ESC) and the Committee of the
Regions (COR) are renting, with an option to buy, and
overstated (by about 81 million euro) because it does
not take account of the depreciation on the Council’s
building. The lack of a physical check on movable prop-
erty, in particular on the Joint Research Centre’s (JRC)
various sites apart from Ispra, for goods with a pur-
chase value of some 96 million euro, impairs the qual-
ity of the accounting inventory.
Amounts receivable and potential assets
9.6. In response to one of the Court’s observations (4),
a lump-sum reduction in value based on age (139 mil-
lion euro) has been applied for the first time for the sun-
dry debtors (2 217 million euro) which have not under-
gone a specific value reduction. The Commission has
not been able to supply the details of how this
9.5. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission stresses that progress has been made by all
the institutions in improving the reliability and accuracy of the
amount shown on the balance sheet for non-financial fixed
assets. This represents a significant advance over previous
years.
The two buildings being rented by the Committees with an
option to buy were not included on the assets side of the bal-
ance sheet since, at 31 December 2000, they did not meet the
necessary conditions laid down by the Regulation on the
accounting management in the accounts of the European
Communities’ non-financial fixed assets. The value of one of
the buildings will be included in the 2001 balance sheet since
the contract takes effect on 1 January 2001. The other build-
ing will be included on the balance sheet as soon as the risks
and rewards are transferred to the Committees. In the mean-
time, information on these two buildings is included in the
off-balance-sheet commitments.
As far as the Council’s building is concerned, the Commis-
sion explained in the notes to the balance sheet the reason why
it had not been possible to allow for depreciation on this
building.
As regards the physical inventory on the JRC sites other than
Ispra, the Commission would point out that a full physical
check on property is under way. The objective is to finalise this
exercise before the end of 2001 and to enter the result in the
2001 balance sheet.
9.6. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission has taken steps to ensure that, in future,
clear and full information on the value adjustment for sundry
debtors will be provided.
(4) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999, para-
graph 8.5 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000, p. 187).
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reduction was calculated, but amounts receivable relat-
ing to fines imposed for infringements of open compe-
tition (973 million euro) have been excluded. The Com-
mission, once it has made an analysis, should lay down
specific rules for this category of amounts receivable.
9.7. The Court notes the efforts made by the Commis-
sion to identify the financial intermediaries managing
Community funds and to determine the amount
recorded in the balance sheet under sundry debtors
(792 millioneuro).Nevertheless, this inventory is incom-
plete and, since this is an amount entered on the bal-
ance sheet on the basis of a non-accounting record, the
central accounting departments are also not in a posi-
tion to carry out an adequate check on this amount.
The Court has taken note of the Commission’s under-
taking (5) to lay down minimum rules, for the accounts
for 2001, for the management and control of these
funds.However, it considers that theCommission should
also have updated balances available in the accounts on
an ongoing basis and should avoid non-accounting
inventories (see paragraphs 9.28 and 9.29).
9.8. The amount shown as off-balance sheet commit-
ments concerning the potential assets relating to cases
of fraud and irregularities in the area of the EAGGF-
Guarantee (1 099 million euro) has several flaws. Thus,
pending the entry into force of the regulations con-
cerned, the amounts which may duplicate those entered
in the EAGGF-Guarantee debtors general ledger have
only been deducted for the Member States that have
presented these data. Furthermore, the respective data
are not drawn up on the same date, and the deduction
has been made without any individual reconciliation.
Amounts receivable relating to fines imposed for infringement
of the competition rules were excluded from the value adjust-
ment calculation since past experience shows that these fines
have, as a rule, been collected without any loss. The fines
which are not the subject of an appeal against the businesses
concerned are recovered on the date shown in the decision
imposing the fine. Fines which are subject to an appeal to the
competent court are recovered after the final ruling. Further-
more, the risk of insolvency of the business on which fines
have been imposed is limited and does not warrant a lump-
sum reduction in value. The Commission will lay down rules
in the accounting and consolidation manual.
9.7. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission would like to emphasise the significant
progress made in the financial statements both in terms of
presentation and in terms of the content of the report com-
pared with previous years. In line with its undertakings, it has
compiled a list of financial intermediaries managing Com-
munity funds and has included additional relevant informa-
tion on this type of activity in the financial statements. It will
continue its efforts to specify the proper procedure for the col-
lection and checking of information and to make the amount
to be taken over onto the 2001 balance sheet more complete.
This problem will be dealt with in work on modernising the
Commission’s accounting in order to move towards a new
integrated accounting system.
9.8. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
For the year 2001 onwards, changes have been made regard-
ing the information to be communicated by theMember States
to the EAGGF Guarantee Section which will enable debtors,
who have also been notified to OLAF as cases of fraud or
irregularity, to be identified. This information will help to
eliminate any double counting.
(5) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999, the
Commission’s replies, paragraph8.8 (OJC 342,1.12.2000,
p. 196).
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Advances and payments on account
9.9. The only information as to whether the payments
borne by the budget are definitive or not relates, firstly,
to payments to intermediate financial bodies which have
not yet been transferred to the final beneficiaries (see
paragraph 9.7), and, secondly, to advances concerning
the new programming period (2000 to 2006) paid out
of the budget for the financial year 2000 for the Struc-
tural Funds.
9.10. In its replies to the Court’s observations on the
financial year 1999 (6), the Commission said that it
would consult the administering departments to lay
down detailed rules for each sector of activity and that
it would apply the classification of the different types of
payment provided for in the proposal for a revision of
the Financial Regulation (7) even before this revision is
approved. The Court has not noted any progress in these
areas.
Commitments and potential liabilities
9.11. At 31 December 2000, commitments against
differentiated appropriations totalling 65 596 million
euro remained to be settled, 2 166million euro of which
were covered by payment appropriations carried over
from 2000 to 2001.
9.12. At the year-end, the amounts relating to com-
mitments outstanding from before 1999 total around
18 574 million euro, of which some 7 400 million euro
were not subject to any payment during 1999 and 2000.
Of the latter amount, the Court considers that some
1 680 million euro (23 %) no longer represent an obli-
gation to make payments.
9.10. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission is aware of this problem. Thus, in the pro-
posed new accounting framework, the accounting departments
work together with the main DGs concerned to find the best
accounting procedure to follow in future.
9.12. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission has started analysing and managing the
outstanding commitments in order to eliminate the abnormal
component. It has also undertaken to keep the budgetary
authority regularly updated on progress in this area.
With a view to providing relevant information, the Commis-
sion specified in the financial statements that the amount of
outstanding commitments corresponded to amaximumpoten-
tial commitment and estimated the abnormal component at
EUR 4,9 billion (except for the Structural Funds).
(6) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999, the
Commission’s replies, paragraphs 8.11 to 8.13 (OJ C 342,
1.12.2000, p. 197).
(7) Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC, ECSC, Euratom),
presented by the Commission on 17 October 2000, on
the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget
of the European Communities COM(2000) 461 final of
17 October 2000, Article 75.
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9.13. In the area of Structural Operations, the Com-
mission’s budgetary commitments, in accordance with
the regulations, only show the annual tranches that are
outstanding and that have fallen due. The amounts of
the multiannual legal commitments that have been
entered into are, however, disclosed as potential liabili-
ties. For all other areas of expenditure, the regulations
do not make any distinction between legal commit-
ments and budgetary commitments. These differing
definitions result in inconsistencies in the financial state-
ments.
9.14. For Structural Operations too, certain practices
that are open to criticism still persist (8). Firstly, in cer-
tain areas, intermediate payments are systematically
charged to the oldest annual tranche, with the result
that the commitments still outstanding are thus closed
before the final payment of the balance has been made.
Secondly, the Commission does not systematically adjust
the commitments in the event of reprogramming.
9.15. For the budget headings relating to the interna-
tional fisheries’ agreements, the Commission has entered
into legal obligations which exceed available appropria-
tions by 39 million euro. The same is true in the area
of External Actions, where a sum of 174 million euro is
involved. As a result, the legal obligations entered into
by the Commission exceed available appropriations by
a total of 213 million euro. The amounts concerned,
however, are disclosed as potential liabilities.
9.13. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
In accordance with the legislation, structural operations are
undertaken by annual tranche, hence there is a difference
between the legal and budgetary commitments. This is why
the Commission presents the legal commitments which are
not yet committed in the accounts in the off-balance sheet
commitments.
9.14. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission maintains that it would have been difficult
to do it differently. For the period 2000 to 2006, Regula-
tion (EC) No 1260/1999 provides specifically for the post-
ing of payments to the earliest open commitment made. The
question of the adjustment of commitments in the event of
reprogramming does not arise since changes to a programme’s
financial plans can only affect subsequent years.
9.15. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The fisheries agreements and certain other agreements in
external relations constitute legal frameworks which, while
extending over several financial years, define the obligations
for each party (Community — third countries) for each year.
The Community’s financial obligation is thus clearly divided
into annual tranches in the basic text (the financial protocol).
This is why, during the year in question, the Commission
commits only the individual tranche for that year.
In the light of the Court’s repeated comments and for the sake
of transparency, every year since 1997 the Commission has
included in the off-balance sheet commitments all the amounts
not yet committed corresponding to the legal obligations under
the agreements in force.
Furthermore, in order to provide a definitive solution to this
problem, the Commission included in its proposal for the
recasting of the Financial Regulation, both under Title I, Gen-
eral Provisions, and Title II, Implementation of the Budget,
the possibility of annual instalments for commitments where
the action extends over several financial years, as long as the
basic instrument provides for this, as it does in the case of the
international fisheries’ agreements.
(8) See, for example, the Annual Report concerning the finan-
cial year 1998, paragraph 8.17 (OJ C 349, 3.12.1999), the
Annual Report concerning the financial year 1997, para-
graphs 8.23 and 8.56 (OJ C 349,17.11.1998) and the
Annual Report concerning the financial year 1993, para-
graph 14.10(b) (OJ C 327, 24.11.1994).
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Aspects relating to the implementation of the budget
9.16. In its Annual Report concerning the financial
year 1999, the Court pointed out that reprogramming
decisions (2 377 million euro) taken before 31 Decem-
ber had not given rise to the required budgetary com-
mitments (9). Similarly, 1 034 million euro correspond-
ing to the 2000 tranche of 16 programmes for the new
2000 to 2006 period for which Commission decisions
had been taken before 31 December 2000 had not been
the subject of budgetary commitments in 2000. The
amounts not committed are shown off-balance-sheet.
The lack of any budgetary commitment parallel to the
legally binding commitment is contrary to Article 36 of
the Financial Regulation. The appropriations carried
over from 2000 to 2001 to cover these decisions do not
satisfy the conditions stipulated in Article 7(2) of the
Financial Regulation. Non-automatic carry-overs of
commitment appropriations are to be used only in the
case of files which are virtually completed by 31 Decem-
ber, which does not apply to the decisions taken.
9.17. The payments on account made on the non-
committed part of the programmes decided in 2000
(see paragraph 3.32), which amount to 507,4 million
euro, have de facto been carried over to the financial
year 2001. Furthermore, for 15 of these operations and
10 programmes for which the 2000 tranche was com-
mitted for all the Funds concerned, the corresponding
payments on account were not carried out as soon as
the commitment was made, which is contrary to
Article 32(2) of Regulation (EC)No 1260/99.As a result,
1 027,1 million euro in payments due in 2000 were car-
ried forward to 2001.
9.16. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Court rightly points out that the legal commitments were
entered into without the corresponding budgetary commit-
ment for the first tranche being made. The Commission
acknowledges the existence of this problem, which is the result
of varying practices in the programmes’ adoption procedures.
In these circumstances, it is correct that such commitments
which have not yet been committed in the accounts should be
included in the off-balance sheet commitments.
The Commission then carried over the corresponding appro-
priations in order to make the accounting commitment in
2001. In any case, from an operational point of view, in this
particular case there are no other solutions within the frame-
work of the existing financial perspective.
Since certain legal commitments were not covered by budget-
ary commitments at the end of the financial year, the only
alternatives to carrying over appropriations would have been
to leave the legal commitments not covered by budgetary com-
mitments, which would not have been acceptable, or to revise
the financial perspective.
9.17. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The reason why payments on account were not made in 2000
for a number of programmes which had already been approved
during the course of the financial year is that the commit-
ments for these programmes were made at the end of 2000.
The short time available and the large number of end-of-year
decisions made it physically impossible to make all the cor-
responding payments on account; they were made at the
beginning of 2001.
(9) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999, para-
graphs 3.41 and 8.17 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000).
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9.18. A new budgetary nomenclature was adopted in
the 2000 budget. Title B2-1, ‘Structural Funds’, is sub-
divided into chapters, no longer by Fund, but by the pri-
ority objectives of the Structural Funds. This new
arrangement has the advantage of identifying the appro-
priations of the new programming period more clearly
and it is consistent with the cofinancing of multifund
programmes by objective. However, as regards the pre-
ceding periods, for which commitments representing
41 600 million euro were still outstanding at the end of
1999, the new nomenclature means, for example, that
one single article (completion Objective 1) encompasses
the total payment appropriations for the four Structural
Funds under Objective 1 (12 000 million euro). As
already pointed out by the Court (10), for the headings
to which such amounts are allocated, the principle of
the specificity of the budget loses some of its meaning.
9.19. Negative expenditure on agriculture totalled
3 798 million euro for 2000, according to the consoli-
dated financial statements. In order to eliminate this
practice, which undermines the transparency of the
budget and the accounts, the Commission has suggested
that in future these items of negative expenditure should
be treated as earmarked revenue and be charged, indis-
criminately, to the EAGGF in order to finance any item
of expenditure regardless of its nature, as of the time
when it can be assigned to the Guarantee Section (11). In
the Court’s opinion, the most orthodox solution in
terms of the budget would be to enter the items of agri-
cultural revenue, hitherto shown in the budget as nega-
tive expenditure, in the general statement of revenue (12)
(see paragraphs 2.12 to 2.16).
9.20. Because Italy failed to pay the additional levy
charged due to overruns on milk quotas, reductions in
advances were imposed on it for a total of 380,6 mil-
lion euro (134,7 million euro for the 1998 to 1999
9.18. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The point of the budget structure is to group together the
appropriations intended for any given category of operations.
The ‘completion’ lines mentioned by the Court group together
programmes decided on before the current period for a specific
objective, this objective being the logical link between them.
On the other hand, the amounts on these lines is not such a
fundamental criterion. Furthermore, the amounts to be entered
should decline rapidly over the next few years and frequent
changes in nomenclature should be avoided. Furthermore,
implementation can be monitored, if necessary, at a more
decentralised level since there are subdivisions in the accounts.
9.19. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission does not share the Court’s opinion that
negative expenditure should be entered in the general state-
ment of revenue. Instead it considers that these amounts,
which are repayments of amounts which have already been
financed by the EAGGF, should be treated as earmarked rev-
enue to be used by the EAGGF, as proposed in the recasting
of the Financial Regulation.
9.20. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Where the Member State does not respect the Community leg-
islation, the Commission, in application of the provisions
regarding budgetary discipline, recovers the amounts due by
reductions of the advances. In such cases, the Commission has
no other choice than to book the amounts recovered to the spe-
cial budget item which is provided for this purpose in the
Community budget (B1-3 7 0 1).
(10) Opinion No 2/2001 on a proposal for a Council Regula-
tion on the Financial Regulation applicable to the general
budget of the European Union (submitted pursuant to
Article 279/EC), paragraph 6 (publication pending). Opin-
ion No 4/97 on the proposal for a Council Regulation
(Euratom, ECSC, EC) amending the Financial Regulation
of 21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of
the European Communities, paragraph 15 and Annexes
1.20 and 1.21 (OJ C 57, 23.2.1998).
(11) Proposal for a Council Regulation amending Council
Regulation (EC) No 1258/1999 on the financing of the
common agricultural policy as well as various other regu-
lations relating to the common agricultural policy. Com-
mission document, reference 2000/0204 (CNS) —
COM(2000) 494 final.
(12) Opinion No 1/2001 of the Court of Auditors (OJ C 55,
21.2.2001).
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marketing year and 245,9 million euro for the 1999 to
2000 marketing year). Charging these amounts to the
item ‘reductions of advances’ instead of to the item
‘additional levies’ is an infringement of the principle of
the specificity of appropriations and leads to a lack of
transparency in the accounts. Furthermore, the reduc-
tion in an advance of 134,7 million euro, due to a delay
in notifying the figures for 1999, was entered in the
accounts for 2000, which is an infringement of the
principle of the annuality of the budget (see para-
graph 2.18).
9.21. Several observations need to bemade in the light
of the examination of transfer of appropriations
No 79/2000 concerning the EAGGF-Guarantee, which
had to be submitted to the budgetary authority for a
decision and involved a total of 544 million euro, of
which 310 million euro were to be transferred to the
monetary reserve (see paragraphs 2.9 to 2.11).
9.22. The Commission sent this proposal to the Coun-
cil on 10 January 2001 whereas, according to the regu-
lations, it ought to have sent it at the latest by the end
of October 2000 for the part transferred to the mon-
etary reserve (13). As a result of the fact that it was sent
late, the Commission had to record the transfer before
its formal approval by the Council so as to be able to
enter the budgetary operations in the accounts by the
deadline laid down in the regulations.
9.23. Moreover, when the transfer to the monetary
reserve was made, the Commission withdrew most of
the 310 million euro from Chapter B1-3 7, ‘Clearance of
previous years’ accounts and reduction/suspension of
advances’, and not from the items where savings had
been made, following favourable developments in the
euro/dollar parity. This practice, on which the Court
has already made an observation (14), means that it is
not possible to present to the budgetary authority all
The late transmission of data by the Member State made it
impossible to book the reduction of EUR 134,7 million in
1999. Steps were taken in 2000 to prevent a recurrence of
this problem (see point 2.18).
9.21 to 9.22. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The transfer to the monetary reserve was carried out follow-
ing receipt and examination of the final declarations of expen-
diture from the Member States, which permitted identifica-
tion of the budget lines from which it was appropriate to
transfer these appropriations (see point 2.10). This approach
avoided unnecessary recourse to other procedures such as a
supplementary and amending budget.
For the other transfers, the proposal was transmitted to the
Council by the deadline of 10 January 2001 as laid down in
Article 104 of the Financial Regulation. The transfers, which
were regularisation transfers aimed at permitting the booking
of expenditure which had already taken place, were registered
following approval by Coreper on 25 January 2001, some
four days before formal approval by the Council. This enabled
the Commission services to proceed with consequential trans-
fers necessary for the closure of the accounts by the deadline
of 31 January as laid down in the Financial Regulation.
9.23. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
A careful reading and comparison of the second and third
sentences of Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC)
No 2040/2000 shows that the Regulation on budgetary
discipline does not require that transfers to the monetary
reserve be effected solely and entirely from those lines where
expenditure is influenced by changes in the euro/dollar parity
(see point 2.11).
(13) Article 11 of Council Regulation (EC) No 2040/2000
concerning budgetary discipline (OJ L 244, 29.9.2000,
p. 27).
(14) See Annual Report concerning the financial year 1998,
paragraph 2.28 (OJ C 349, 1.12.1999).
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the transfers from chapter to chapter which ought to
have been submitted to it (see paragraph 2.11) and leads
to expenditure having to be financed by exchange-rate
differences arising from other headings.
9.24. Some items of expenditure have been declared
either before their actual payment or very belatedly and
have therefore been booked to a financial year other
than that which has actually borne the said expenditure.
For example, Spain declared some expenditure (Aid to
bee-keeping) as effected in one financial year whereas it
had in fact been paid in the following financial year.
Conversely, Italy and Spain were very late, in relation to
the stipulations of the regulations, in paying advances
(aid for the processing of citrus fruit and aid to fruit and
vegetables), which meant that the expenditure was not
booked until the following financial year. Lastly, in
France, transport costs relating to public storage were
not declared until more than six months after their
actual date of settlement, with the result that their
booking was deferred until a subsequent financial year.
In the latter three cases, however, the Commission could,
over and above the specific provisions in Commission
Regulation (EC) No 296/96, have made a correspond-
ing reduction in the advances in accordance with Coun-
cil Regulations (EC) No 2040/2000 and (EC)
No 1258/99.
In the case of a fall in the dollar against the euro, the Regula-
tion clearly specifies that ‘... transfers shall be made to the
EAGGF Guarantee section headings affected by the fall in the
dollar’ (third sentence of Article 11). However, where the dol-
lar strengthens against the euro, as was the case in 2000, the
Regulation merely states that ‘... savings in the Guarantee sec-
tion of up to EUR 500 million... shall be transferred to the
monetary reserve’ (second sentence of Article 11), without
specifying the origin of these savings. This is in contrast to the
more precise wording of the third sentence of Article 11. The
order of the two sentences is also significant.
The Commission has pointed out in previous reports and
transfer proposals concerning the impact of movements in the
dollar exchange rate (for example, in the Report and Transfer
Proposal for 1998— SEC (1998) 1893 final of 13 Novem-
ber 1998) that the savings for each sector need not necessar-
ily result in identical end-of-year availabilities. Indeed the
Commission drew attention to such factors in its reply to
point 2.28 of the Court’s Annual Report for 1998 (OJ C 349,
3.12.1999, p. 53).
9.24. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Article 14 of Regulation (EC) No 2040/2000 provides for
the reduction or suspension of advances where expenditure
does not comply with Community rules; it applies, in conjunc-
tion with Article 4 of Regulation (EC) No 296/96, to all
cases of failure to respect the payment deadlines laid down in
the legislation. For the year 2000, 233 budget lines were
checked and reductions of EUR 15,7 million were made from
the monthly advances.
However, the deadline for certain payments depends on the
date applications are received or checked in Member States
and can only be verified by checking individual files in the
Member States. It would only be possible to discover cases
such as those referred to by the Court under the clearance of
accounts procedure under Article 7(4) of Regulation (EC)
No 1258/1999, and even then only if the sector in question
has been selected for audit on the basis of risk analysis and if
the transaction in question is selected in the sample chosen for
audit.
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9.25. As in previous years, an analysis of the entry in
the budget of the monthly adjustment payment orders
for the EAGGF-Guarantee operations has revealed that
for eight out of twelve months (corresponding to a total
of 33 286 million euro, i.e. 82,4 % of payments) these
payment orders were approved and validated outside
the time-limits laid down in the regulations. The delays
were found to fluctuate between 16 and 70 days (see
paragraph 2.47).
9.26. According to Article 10 of the Financial Regula-
tion (15), the budget and the supplementary or amend-
ing budgets (SAB) have to be published in the Official
Journal, at the instance of the President of the European
Parliament, ‘normally within one month of the date of
the declaration of final adoption of the budget’. SAB
No 1/2000, adopted on 2 August 2000, was not pub-
lished until 17 April 2001, i.e. more than seven months
later than the deadline laid down in the regulations.
SAB No 2/2000, adopted on 6 July 2000, was not pub-
lished until 2 October 2000, i.e. almost two months
late.
Accounting framework and practices
Keeping of the accounts
9.27. Pursuant to the provisions of the Financial Regu-
lation and of the corresponding implementing rules (16),
the accounting officer is required to keep budgetary
cash-based accounts for drawing up the consolidated
revenue and expenditure account and general accounts
for drawing up the consolidated balance sheet. The
transactions are first charged to a budget heading and
then, in the case of transactions to be included in the
balance sheet, recorded in the general accounts and in
the consolidated balance sheet, on the basis of non-
accounting inventories.
9.25. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
For a variety of administrative and technical reasons, the
accounting registration of the monthly regularisation pay-
ments for eight months suffered delays of 39 days on aver-
age. However, these problems have now been addressed and,
since August 2000, only two delays have been encountered,
of 1 and 5 days respectively.
9.26. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission is endeavouring to provide all the necessary
technical assistance to the relevant services of the European
Parliament in order to speed up the publication of the SAB.
9.27. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission is aware that it does not have a proper
accounting framework conforming to the usual standards on
the basis of which the institutions’ accounts could be drawn
up in a harmonised, consistent fashion. This shortcoming will
be addressed by putting in place a new accounting framework,
which is now an essential task. It will be implemented in suc-
cessive phases corresponding to the financial statements of
several financial years.
(15) Financial Regulation of 21 December 1977 applicable to
the general budget of the European Communities
(OJ L 356, 31.12.1977), as amended by several regula-
tions.
(16) Articles 6, 69, 70, 70a and 72 of the Financial Regulation
of 21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of
the European Communities (OJ L 356, 31.12.1977), as
amended by several regulations. Articles 133 to 136 of
Commission Regulation (Euratom, ECSC, EC)
No 3418/93 of the detailed rules for the implementation
of certain provisions of the Financial Regulation
(OJ C 315, 16.12.1993).
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9.28. These non-accounting inventories, in particular
as regards capital expenditure, stocks or advances paid
to financial intermediaries but not yet transferred to the
final beneficiaries (see paragraph 9.7), are drawn up by
the managers without any reconciliation being made
with the corresponding amounts charged to the budget.
The debts, which are a factor needed for calculating the
economic result (see paragraphs 9.34 to 9.37), are not
systematically recorded.
9.29. The lack of continuous, detailed entries in the
general accounts makes it impossible to close accounts
at regular intervals and within reasonable time-limits as
a significant proportion of the necessary information is
lacking from the central accounting system.
Changes in the accounting framework
9.30. Since 1994, the part of the Statement of Assur-
ance (DAS)which concerns the reliability of the accounts
has included reservations and observations, many of
which have been repeated year after year. They often
stem from the fact that no suitable accounting frame-
work has been defined for budgetary transactions and
transactions relating to assets.
9.28. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The information on the non-accounting inventories was com-
piled by managers on the basis of precise, detailed standards,
in particular the Regulation on the accounting management
of the European Communities’ non-financial fixed assets and
Accounting and Consolidation Manual (manual designed to
establish a uniform set of rules for accounting and presenting
the accounts of the European institutions), even if they have
not actually been reconciled with the budget accounts.
The new integrated accounting framework will make it pos-
sible to gradually eliminate non-accounting inventories.
Given that the accounts are cash-based, debts are not recorded
regularly. The central register of invoices (in the process of
being set up) will enable debts to be systematically entered in
the accounts in future, which is not the case under the current
organisation of accounts (see point 9.36).
9.29. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
As explained in the following points, the new accounting
framework will solve the current shortcomings in the Euro-
pean Communities’ accounting.
9.30. THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT’S REPLIES
Final adoption of supplementary and amending budget (SAB)
No 2/2000 took place on 6 July 2000. The Parliament
department responsible forwarded the budget to the Office for
Official Publications of the European Communities (OPOCE)
the following week.
As Parliament had adopted an amendment to SAB
No 1/2000 which required the Council’s agreement, final
adoption of SAB No 1/2000 did not take place until
2 August 2000; that budget was forwarded to OPOCE at
the start of September.
However, reversing the ’natural’ order of the two supplemen-
tary and amending budgets gave rise to technical difficulties
concerning the basic amounts. The process of publishing SAB
No 1/2000 was suspended at the request of the Commission
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9.31. The Commission has for several years been
undertaking to define a new accounting framework
based on the principles of accrual accounting. A group
of high-level independent experts finalised and pre-
sented a study in July 2000. The timetable drawn up by
the Commission did not enable it to include the pro-
posals contained in this study in its proposal for an
amendment to the Financial Regulation of 17 Octo-
ber 2000 (17) (18).
to enable it to carry out the necessary checks in liaison with
Parliament’s Committee on Budgets. The definitive texts were
forwarded to OPOCE, for publication, on 26 February 2001.
Following a number of subsequent corrections, the Commis-
sion validated the budget file on 5 April 2001.
Parliament will ensure that delays such as these in the publi-
cation of the budget or of SABs are avoided, by closely moni-
toring the physical publication process and calling on the bod-
ies responsible for publication to work more quickly if a risk
of delay arises.
9.30. COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission has embarked upon a process of modernis-
ing the European Communities’ accounting system in order to
develop from an accounting system, based only on the descrip-
tion of the impact in terms of cash movements for budget
implementation, towards integrated accrual accounting the
objective of which is to present the Communities’ financial
situation in a more complete and reliable way. The new inte-
grated accounting framework will make it possible to gradu-
ally eliminate the use of non-accounting inventories.
9.31. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The new accounting framework must change on several fronts:
(1) evolution towards an integrated system of accounting
which contains all the information necessary for present-
ing the accounts;
(2) adoption of the generally accepted accounting principles;
(3) evolution towards a general accounting system based on
accrual accounting and maintenance of cash-based bud-
get accounting. This will involve comprehensive lines
between the budget accounts and the general accounts;
(4) adoption of accounting methods and rules of evaluation
which flesh out the accounting principles adopted;
(17) Proposal for a Council Regulation (EC, ECSC, Euratom),
presented by the Commission on 17 October 2000, on
the Financial Regulation applicable to the general budget
of the European Communities (COM(2000) 461 final).
(18) See also Opinion No 2/2001 of the Court of Auditors on
a proposal for a Council Regulation on the Financial
Regulation applicable to the general budget of the Euro-
pean Communities, paragraphs 41 to 43 (OJ C 162,
5.6.2001).
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9.32. Since then, progress on this matter has been
made at a snail’s pace. The detailed action plan has not
yet been approved, and provisions relating to the basic
accounting framework, the keeping of the accounts and
the presentation of the financial statements for inclu-
sion in the draft revision of the Financial Regulation
have not yet been finalised.
9.33. The Commission is invited to take urgent action
to remedy these shortcomings, whilst at the same time
bearing in mind the practical impact that a project of
this scale and this complexity is likely to have both in
terms of the human and technical resources needing to
be deployed and at organisational level, given that it will
concern the whole of the Commission.
(5) improvement of the financial statements so that they give
an accurate picture of assets, the financial situation, bud-
get execution, the entity’s outturn and the cash flow for
the year. The aim is to follow the International Federa-
tion of Accountants (IFAC) recommendations;
(6) extension of the scope of consolidation.
All these elements will be included in the amended proposal
for the recasting of the Financial Regulation and in the Regu-
lation laying down the implementing rules.
As the Court rightly points out, the draft accounting project
needs time. It is essential to prepare it properly, analyse it and
evaluate it before making it effective. An action plan has just
been drawn up by the Commission’s accounting officer. A
group of accounting specialists, made up of officials on the
one hand and external consultants on the other, will be formed
to carry through the accounting project.
Furthermore, contacts have been made with the national
administrations of the Member States that are most advanced
in the field of public sector accounting; these contacts will con-
tinue throughout the project. It makes sense to take advantage
of the experience acquired by these countries.
In conclusion, reforming the European Communities’ accounts
is an ambitious project which fits in with the direction which
is being taken by accounting developments in different coun-
tries and is recommended by the international accounting
institutions.
9.32. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
There has been a report on this project detailing the various
aspects of the project, including a detailed action plan which
will be approved by the Commission’s new accounting officer.
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Economic result
9.34. This year, for the first time, the institutions have
calculated a broader result, called the economic result in
the consolidated financial statements. In accordance
with the amendments made to the Financial Regulation
in November 1998 (19), it comprises the balance of the
budget and the outturn of the adjustments. It aims to
make the link between the budgetary cash-based
accounts and the general accounts, which are moving
towards accrual accounting. It reveals the impact on the
balance sheet of expenditure and revenue not originat-
ing in budgetary management.
9.35. The adjustments made to the budgetary balance
mainly concern the rebooking of purchases and sales of
fixed assets and stocks charged in the first instance to
the budgetary accounts, payments and repayments of
loans or holdings against budgetary appropriations, and
the allocations, withdrawals of depreciations and reduc-
tions in value relating thereto. They also concern the
entry in the accounts of budgetary amounts receivable,
allocations and withdrawals of reductions in value
against these receivables, and allocations and withdraw-
als concerning provisions.
9.36. Calculating an economic result represents a step
forward, which is in line with the general trend observed
in the public sector at international level. A number of
items of information are missing, however, owing, in
particular, to the present accounting system which does
not allow the comprehensive recording of all the data
needed for calculating the result. For example, the Com-
mission is not able to put a figure on the amount of the
debtors to be entered on the consolidated balance sheet.
Of the off balance sheet commitments, certain provi-
sions for risks and liabilities are not taken into account
for the calculation of the economic result, such as the
provision to be made for the costs of decommissioning
the JRC’s nuclear installations still in operation and dis-
posing of their waste (at 31 December 2000, 220 mil-
lion euro), or the commitments for pensions, to be esti-
mated on the basis of an actuarial calculation (see
paragraph 7.6).
9.36. COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission will analyse in detail the examples given by
the Court, in order to determine the best procedure to be fol-
lowed in the light of the following.
Debts: as indicated, the European Communities’ accounts are
cash-based. As a result, debts are not systematically recorded.
The Commission is in the process of developing the project of
a central register of invoices which will make it possible in
future to enter debts in the accounts. Furthermore, as already
explained, the draft new integrated accounting framework
provides, among other things, for debts to be entered in the
accounts.
Pensions: the Commission’s opinion is that, at this stage, the
most important thing is to provide complete information in
the financial statements on commitments entered into with
regard to pensions. As the Court acknowledges, the Commis-
sion included exhaustive information in the annex to the
financial statements. There is as yet no international consen-
sus on the procedure to be followed for the debt relating to
public sector pensions, and this requires in-depth accounting
analysis. The procedure recommended by the Court is far from
(19) See the amended Article 70 of the Financial Regulation of
21 December 1977 applicable to the general budget of the
European Communities (Council Regulation (EC, ECSC,
Euratom) No 2548/98 of 23 November 1998 (OJ L 320,
28.11.1998, p. 1)).
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9.37. The Court is well aware that the move towards
accrual accounting, which produces an economic result,
can only be made gradually. Pending its full implemen-
tation, the result that is shown only partly reflects the
true economic situation.
Follow-up of observations on the Sincom 2 accounting
system
9.38. Most of the observations made by the Court in
itsAnnualReport concerning the financial year1999 (20)
are still relevant.
being followed by the Member States or by other third coun-
tries which are very advanced in matters of public sector
accounting.
The Commission would also point out that the IFAC has not
yet adopted a standard for pensions applicable to the public
sector.
The costs of decommissioning the JRC’s nuclear installations:
the Commission has made a provision of EUR 230 million
for the cost of decommissioning installations that are already
closed down (including the cost of nuclear waste processing).
For the other installations which are still in use, the Commis-
sion undertakes to enter a provision in the accounts as soon
as it has sufficient information to do so. In the meantime, it
has estimated the cost in the off-balance sheet commitments.
9.37. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The calculation of the economic result represents an important
development in the European Communities’ accounting sys-
tem. It will continue to be gradually improved as the draft
new accounting framework progresses.
9.38. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission would point out that the quality of
Sincom 2 is an ongoing concern and that it is making regular
and major efforts to improve the performance of the horizon-
tal financial applications.
However, it acknowledges that certain planned actions have
been delayed because of the technical complexity of the solu-
tions that are to be implemented. However, measures are being
taken to strengthen the management of the financial informa-
tion systems.
(20) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999, para-
graphs 8.41 to 8.56 (OJ C 342, 1.12.2000, p. 193).
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9.39. Despite the complexity of the Sincom 2
accounting system, the Commission still does not make
comprehensive, periodic reconciliations between the
data in the three Sincom 2 subsystems. The Commis-
sion’s central departments have also not issued any
written instructions to the managing departments nor
made any systematic reconciliations between all the
local systems and the central system, despite the under-
taking given in the replies to the Court’s observa-
tions (21). There is therefore a lackof consistencybetween
the data in the subsystems, and the reliability of the
information made available to the administrators for
management purposes cannot be guaranteed.
9.40. The operational shortcomings pointed out by
the Court have only very partially been rectified. The
problems concerning the processing of dates and
accounting periods, the management of part payments
for own resources and amendments being made to
commitments in a way which obscures the audit trail
are all problems which still persist. No consideration
seems yet to have been given to integrating certain basic
accounting functions available in the software, such as
control accounts for debtors and receivables or for fixed
assets. The drawing-up of reports, in particular as regards
revenue and monitoring of receivables, continues to
pose problems.
9.39. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission has started analysing a new approach for
the regular reconciliation of the data of Sincom 2’s three sub-
systems. An initial test on the consumption of commitment
appropriations was conducted in the context of the 2000 clo-
sure.
The Commission acknowledges that it has got behind in send-
ing written instructions to the departments for which it is car-
rying out regular checks between the local system data and the
Sincom 2 data. Since the transactions input from local sys-
tems are only validated in the central system (Sincom 2), it is
up to the authorising officer to make sure that their local sys-
tem has in fact taken over the central data. Departments will
be sent written instructions in October 2001.
9.40. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission would point out that it has made significant
progress in 2001 on alleviating the operational deficiencies
indicated by the Court, although there have been problems
meeting the deadlines previously notified.
The Commission has planned measures to improve the man-
agement of transactions using accounting dates and periods.
The software supplier has made a new version available to the
Commission which, since August 2000, has made it possible
to get a history of transactions. A data search tool is now
operational. The takeover of historical data from Sincom 1
(1990-98) and Sincom 2 into Data Warehouse started in
2001: data on commitments and payments have been avail-
able since May 2001, while data on appropriations will be
available by the end of 2001. A report will then make it pos-
sible to monitor the various amendments made to a commit-
ment.
Various measures have been undertaken by the Commission
in order to incorporate certain accounting functions available
in the software. A first prototype of the central invoice register
application (Action 11 of the White Paper) was launched in
the autumn of 2001. This is the first stage towards putting
in place third-party accounting.
The management of partial collection in own resources and
other functions concerning revenue management became par-
tially operational in September 2001.
(21) Annual Report concerning the financial year 1999, the
Commission’s replies, paragraph 8.48 (OJ C 342,
1.12.2000, p. 200).
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9.41. The data-recovery testing which the Commis-
sion had undertaken to carry out by the end of 2000
has been postponed several times, most recently at the
end of July 2001.Without an operational disaster recov-
ery plan, the Commission would not therefore be able
to recover data and continue the functions in progress
if a major incident were to occur. On the basis of a risk
analysis made by the Commission departments, the
direct loss that might arise from such a breakdown of
the system has been estimated at some 100 million
euro, owing in particular to late-payment interest, pen-
alties and double payments.
9.42. Although the Commission has started to take
remedial action in the area of access security, a large
number of important shortcomings persist, as con-
firmed by the producer of the software for the
Sincom 2 reference system after a review made in Feb-
ruary 2001. There is still no strict procedure as regards
supervision and monitoring of defects recorded by the
system, accessmanagement is not correctly documented
and the number of users holding administrator or devel-
oper profiles continues to be too high.
9.43. The Court has noted the frequent occurrence of
technical interventions in the system, which may con-
sist of removing blockages caused by inconsistencies in
the design of the system, and also of changing the key
details of transactions, such as the amount or the bud-
get heading. Very often there is virtually no documenta-
tion at all to back up these interventions and they thus
involve a risk of losing the audit trail. Furthermore,
these matters are no longer referred back to the Finan-
cial Controller and the accounting officer for their
approval. The Court has also found a persisting prob-
lemwith the granting of user profiles that are too broad.
As a matter of urgency, the Commission must now give
higher priority to strengthening the internal control
mechanism relating to this system.
9.41. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
A complete test of the contingency plan had to be postponed
following the replacement of a number of computers at the
Computing Centre, since it can only be fully carried out on the
new configuration. The Commission informed the Court of
this in full transparency. Partial tests were none the less car-
ried out pending the definitive implementation of the overall
contingency plan.
9.42. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission has drawn up an action plan to strengthen
security. A great many individual measures were taken in the
first half of 2001 (e.g. blocking inactive users and stepping
up password management). The Commission will continue to
make the necessary efforts to complete this action plan.
The Commission will develop standard reports to identify
users’ rights of access to the application.
The Commission has started taking steps to reduce the num-
ber of users with the broadest access profiles to what is strictly
necessary.
9.43. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The complexity of the system makes technical interventions
necessary in order to both unblock transactions and align the
data from the authorising officer’s module (SI2) on the
accounting data (R/3).
The Court is mainly referring to two types of operation: syn-
chronisation of the outstanding commitments and realloca-
tion. As far as taking over outstanding commitments is con-
cerned, at the beginning of the financial year the commitments
expressed in national currencies which are subject to a monthly
revaluation in euros are taken over from the previous year to
the current year. Because there is a specific revaluation mecha-
nism for each national currency, there may be differences of
cents of euros; this means that the value of the commitments
outstanding must be synchronised in the authorising officer’s
module (SI2) with the values determined in the accounting
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LEGALITY AND REGULARITY OF THE
UNDERLYING TRANSACTIONS
Introduction
9.44. One of the features of the way in which the
EuropeanUnion budget is implemented is that themany
very different parties involved are superimposed at
module (R/3). This synchronisation in no way changes the
facts approved by the Financial Controller and validated by
the Accounting Officer.
Another category of interventions concerns rebooking opera-
tions, consisting of moving a commitment from one budget
line to another, either to take account of transfers of compe-
tence between Directorates-General decided by the Commis-
sion at the beginning of the financial year, or to take account
of changes in the budget nomenclature. The Commission will
ensure that approval by Financial Control is included in the
workflow.
With regard to the documentation of these interventions,
although there is a whole array of information on them in the
system, the Commission will make it an absolute priority to
improve the quality of the documentation on them and to
formalise the procedures to make the audit trail easier.
As regards referring the other types of amendment to the
Financial Controller and the Accounting Officer, consulta-
tions will begin in the near future in order to better define the
types of intervention on operations falling within their respec-
tive area of competence. If amendments to Sincom 2 do prove
to be necessary, they will be implemented as a matter of prior-
ity.
The Commission would point out that any software applica-
tion must allow technical intervention to unblock transactions
or correct programmes. A limited number of system admin-
istrators or officials in charge of security must therefore be
given extensive access.
The Commission has already limited its user access. In order
to guarantee the security of interventions, they are confined to
a given module; they never refer to both of the two modules
making up the Sincom 2 application. The Commission will
ensure that intervention is limited to the strict minimum.
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several levels. They range from the centralised manage-
ment of the Commission authorising officers to the
large number of local aid recipients who are very scat-
tered geographically and in terms of their function.
Between the two are several types of national or regional
decentralised management. In the areas of agricultural
policy and structural operations, which account for
more than 80 % of the budget, the Community mea-
sures are managed, at their level, by national/regional
authorities and bodies. In the areas of internal policies,
research and external actions, the funds and the associ-
ated operations are directly managed by the Commis-
sion departments through numerous intermediate or
recipient bodies in Europe or other parts of the world.
9.45. The way in which the budget implementation
process is split up in terms of place and time thus makes
the task of verifying the legality and regularity of all the
transactions a particularly complex one. The Commis-
sion, which, under Article 274 of the EC Treaty, is
responsible for implementing the budget, is dependent
on the good cooperation of the national authorities and
other bodies involved. This system is characterised by
great diversity in terms of the administrative and
accounting cultures, traditions and practices involved.
9.46. One of the means available to the Commission
to ensure the smooth functioning of the whole process
is to adopt regulations or standard provisions stipulat-
ing the minimum checks to be carried out by the
national authorities, accompanied, if need be, by pro-
cedures for accrediting competent bodies and by penal-
ties. Such regulations exist in the agricultural sector,
with the clearance of accounts, including the procedure
for certifying the accounts of the paying agencies, and
with the integrated administration and control system
(IACS) (22), and in the area of structural operations,
with Regulations (EC) No 2064/97 and (EC)
No 438/2001 (23) laying down detailed rules for the
implementation of the management and control sys-
tems for the assistance granted. The other areas of the
financial perspective are not governed by any such
framework control regulations.
(22) Council Regulation (EEC) No 3508/92 of 27 Novem-
ber 1992 (OJ L 355, 5.12.1992, p. 1). Commission Regu-
lation (EEC) No 3887/92 (OJ L 391, 31.12.1992, p. 36)
laid down detailed rules for its application.
(23) OJ L 290, 23.10.1997, p. 1 and OJ L 63, 3.3.2001, p. 21.
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9.47. The Court’s work for the financial year 2000,
namely an audit of underlying transactions and an analy-
sis of certain management and control systems (see
paragraphs 9.1 to 9.3), has revealed that there are high
risks of dysfunction, particularly at the final beneficiary
level. The audit findings are summarised below accord-
ing to the major areas of the budget.
Own resources
9.48. The majority of own resources (around 83 % of
the total) derive from VAT and GNP. Amounts are based
on complex financial models which use statistics pro-
vided to the Commission by Member States. Two prin-
cipal factors affect the calculation of these resources:
the reliability of the statistics themselves, and the qual-
ity of the Commission’s system for handling the data.
As the overall income from own resources has to match
overall expenditure, with the GNP resource funding the
balance, errors in the calculation can only affect each
Member State’s share of the total.
9.49. The Court examined the approach taken by the
Commission to ensure the quality of the systems of
procedures and controls established in Member States
for collection of VAT, including the prevention and
detection and correction of fraud or other irregularity.
It found that the Commission could improve the coord-
ination and execution of its work in this area, in par-
ticular in monitoring and evaluating the performance
of the national systems (see paragraphs 1.19 to 1.36).
9.50. Following the Court’s earlier work on the Com-
mission’s control of the reliability and comparability of
Member States’ GNP data, a follow-up audit was under-
taken on the remedial action taken by the Commission.
The Court concluded that, whilst a sound and adaptable
framework for the management of quality control of
GNP data is now in place, it is not being systematically
applied. Furthermore, the communication of the data
to users is often incomplete, leading to risk of misinter-
pretation (see paragraphs 1.50 to 1.65).
9.47. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
See conclusions. The Commission’s view is that it is making
considerable efforts to put in place coherent verification sys-
tems and ensure effective implementation of them, particularly
in the fields of agriculture, structural operations, research and
external action. The reform of the Commission and the recast-
ing of the Financial Regulation are important elements here.
9.49. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission is neither required, nor has it the resources,
to undertake more in this area. It explained its role with
regard to VAT own resources in its comments on Chapter 1
of this annual report. It will continue to play its part in this
area in cases where it considers that a Community dimension
will strengthen action by Member States’ national adminis-
trations. However, apart from the specific obligation under
Article 12 of Regulation (EEC) No 1553/89, the present
Community legal framework does not make the Commission
responsible for monitoring and evaluating Member States’
VAT control.
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9.51. Traditional own resources account for around
14 % of the total and essentially consist of customs
duties paid on the importation of goods into European
Union territory. The responsibility for collecting such
duties resides with Member States’ customs authorities.
One of the critical aspects of this process is to ensure
that duty is completely and accurately identified and
paid. It is the responsibility of customs authorities to
establish sufficientprocedures andcontrols toadequately
cover this risk. In undertaking its audit work on anti-
dumping, which comprises one of the types of customs
duties, the Court examined the systems established to
counteract the high risk of exporters to the European
Union attempting to evade such duties. The Court’s
work revealed a number of weaknesses in the concept
and application of the systems in place at both Com-
mission and Member State levels, including inadequate
technical tools used in the risk-based selection of cus-
toms declarations for detailed checking.
Agricultural policy
9.52. The Agriculture Guarantee Fund is the largest
area of the budget (representing some 47 % of the total).
Expenditure is indirectly managed in cooperation with
Member States through their paying agencies. Millions
of payments are made by the agencies to a multitude of
beneficiaries, in general individual farmers or agricul-
tural enterprises. The payments are based on claims
made, in which the claimants attest to the eligibility of
their actions, such as sowing areas of land to certain
crops or maintaining a number of animals for a given
period. In such an environment, management and con-
trol systems must be sufficiently robust to handle dif-
ferent categories of risk of legality/regularity errors. The
Court’s systems evaluations and audit findings confirm
for 2000 a situation of insufficientmanagement of these
risks. A brief analysis of a key system is presented below.
9.53. The integrated administration and control sys-
tem (IACS) was introduced after the common agricul-
tural policy reform of 1992 and requires that national
authorities apply systematic logic and reasonableness
checks on aid applications, systematic cross-checks
9.51. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Regarding the remarks concerning the ‘weakness in applica-
tion and inadequate technical tools’ the Commission would
point out that, as already mentioned at points 1.31 to 1.34
and 1.40 of Chapter 1, the Commission makes specific data
related to the published anti-dumping legislation available to
Member States via TARIC, in order to ensure the uniform
and simultaneous application of anti-dumping measures.
Furthermore, since 1997 there has been a published ‘Guide to
risk analysis and customs control’, in which specific risk indi-
cators for goods subject to anti-dumping and countervailing
duties are defined (Chapter 3, subsection 3). These indicators
should cover the risk indicated by the Court’s audit.
In addition, since risk analysis is an important tool for cus-
toms control, the Commission promotes a Community
approach to risk management under the Customs 2002 pro-
gramme including the development of risk indicators for the
customs clearance process on import, export and within the
transit regime.
9.52. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
On the basis of its own audit work, as well as its analysis of
the DAS 2000 exercise, the Commission does not agree that
there has been insufficient management of the risks of errors
of legality or regularity.
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between aid applications and a permanently updated
database of agricultural parcels or animals, standardised
processing of calculations, accounting and payments of
aid, timely on-the-spot sample checks on claimants, to
verify the physical reality of aid applications, and a sys-
tem of penalties for incorrect declarations.
9.54. The risk concerning incorrect beneficiaries’
applications is only partially covered as errors concern-
ing the physical reality of the declarations, i.e. the actual
crop type sown to the whole area or the actual number
of animals kept, can only be detected by physical inspec-
tions on the spot. The regulation requires only a limited
minimum coverage (5 % to 10 %) by such physical
inspections.
9.55. A number of weaknesses still occur in certain
Member States (see Special Report No 4/2001), includ-
ing someof themost important requirements not always
being respected. In overall terms, IACS can be seen as a
good basis for managing the risk of incorrect or inac-
curate claims but the Commission should better ensure
a full and consistent application. Furthermore, it only
applies to certain budget headings (representing some
60 % of total expenditure), and not to all agricultural
expenditure.
9.54. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Physical inspection remains a key method to ensure compli-
ance with the rules and provide assurance that databases have
been properly notified. The Court cites the minimum require-
ments for on-the-spot checks as only 5 % for arable crops and
10 % for animals. However, these levels constitute the abso-
lute legal minimum expressed as a percentage of aid applica-
tions, and the proportion of areas or animals actually inspected
is always greater and sometimes far greater. It must also be
stressed that on-the-spot checks are generally risk-based, and
the rate of on-farm checks must be increased if significant
irregularities are revealed.
The system for granting direct aids is based on producers’
applications but the Court seems to overlook the very complete
(100 % administrative) cross-checking, and other verifications
facilitated by databases to which they are subjected. These
exhaustive administrative controls do lead to selection for
on-the-spot inspection, do result in the application of sanc-
tions and can result in delayed payments for offending pro-
ducers. The dissuasive effect of the administrative checks can
therefore be considered one of the key elements of the IACS.
9.55. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Court’s positive appraisal of the IACS is welcomed. The
Commission has also established continuing weaknesses in
some Member States and deals with them fully in the context
of the clearance of accounts procedure, which the Court has
elsewhere (in the Court’s recent BSE draft report — point
1.69) considered to be a good way of encouraging Member-
States to take corrective action.
Having set out the regulatory framework for effecting expen-
diture under the IACS and providing guidelines and advice to
Member States on their IACS systems, the Commission closely
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9.56. In conclusion, the system provides a sound basis
for controlling most of the EAGGF-Guarantee Section
expenditure, but at present does not function in such a
way that sufficient assurance can be derived from it.
The weaknesses identified in the operation of IACS and
in the management of other agricultural markets are
also confirmed by the results of the Court’s checks on
the EAGGF transactions (see paragraphs 2.29 to 2.52).
Structural Operations
9.57. The objective of the Structural Funds (the ESF,
ERDF, EAGGF-Guidance, FIFG) and the Cohesion Fund,
representing about 35 % of the budget, is to contribute
to the strengthening of the economic and social cohe-
sion of the European Union. Structural Fund expendi-
ture passes through a complex structure, involving a
multitude of managing entities implementing thou-
sands of projects. Structural Fund rules are often com-
plicated, difficult to apply and open to misinterpreta-
tion. Under the regulations that govern the 1994-1999
programming period for which the closure process is
under way, the Commission has no clear legal basis for
sanctioning or imposing financial corrections for short-
comings in the management and control systems of
Member States. The latter weakness has been remedied
in the legal framework of the 2000 to 2006 program-
ming period.
monitors the work, allowing any shortcomings in the opera-
tion of the system to be identified, so that the Member States
take the necessary steps to remedy the situation. If the IACS
systems put in place by a Member State prove to be unsatis-
factory, the Commission refuses, under the clearance of accounts
procedure, to finance all or part of the expenditure concerned.
Moreover, the Commission has been reviewing the IACS leg-
islation since the end of 2000, which will result in a new
codified Regulation in 2002, and would also draw attention
to the regular experts’ group meetings, which provide an
excellent forum for harmonisation, improvement and exchange
of information.
9.56. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
As regards the weaknesses identified by the Court in respect
of agricultural expenditure generally, the Commission consid-
ers that these should be put into proper context, both quali-
tatively and quantitatively. In particular, it must be reiterated
that farmers sometimes face great difficulty in measuring their
plots precisely. It is not, therefore, surprising that the Court’s
on-the-spot controls, conducted 18 months after the aid dec-
laration, when plots may have been re-grouped or re-formed,
often reveal differences (usually relatively minor) — hence the
need for regulatory and technical tolerances.
9.57. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission shares the view of the Court that the imple-
mentation of the Structural Funds is a complex process which
necessarily involves many different bodies in the execution of
the many thousands of projects which are co-financed from
the Community budget. There have to be detailed rules to
ensure that the objectives of the Funds are attained, and there
is a risk that problems of interpretation will arise. The Com-
mission has made efforts to improve the clarity of the rules for
the period 2000-2006, for example through the adoption of
Regulation (EC) No 1685/2000, and provides Member-
States with advice on questions which are raised.
It is the Commission’s view that, under Article 24 of Regula-
tion (EEC) No 4253/88, it can not only impose corrections
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9.58. Previous audits of the Court have revealed that,
prior to the declaration of expenditure or the closure of
forms of interventions, Member States either did not
carry out the necessary verifications at all or did so only
to a limited extent. The introduction of Regulation (EC)
No2064/97, setting out requirements forMember States’
management and control procedures, represents an
important initiative by the Commission to improve
financial control of Structural Funds by Member States.
9.59. The regulation stipulates that the checks to be
carried out before the closure of each form of assistance
must cover at least 5 % of the total eligible expenditure.
No clear guidance has been provided on the objectives
of these checks or on the selection of the operations
covered. As a matter of fact, a balance has to be struck
between risk-based checks which offer the best prospect
of finding and correcting errors, and representative
checks which both indicate the incidence of errors and
deter incorrect claims. The Court’s audit on the imple-
mentation of this control framework revealed that
although progress has been achieved, there remain sig-
nificant weaknesses in the implementation of the checks
provided for in all the Member States visited. Insuffi-
cient clear and timely guidance has been given by the
Commission, despite the guidance given in two Appen-
dices of the audit manual distributed in October 1999,
which provides a useful basis for the implementation of
the regulation. The Commission had carried out little
assessment of the Member States’ efforts by the end of
2000 (see paragraphs 3.47 to 3.52).
9.60. The weaknesses identified are also confirmed by
the results of the examination of transactions underly-
ing the expenditure declarations and by the Court’s
detailed audits of selected closed programmes. The high
proportion of ineligible expenditure in the final declara-
tions presented by the Member States has resulted in a
loss to the Community budget (see paragraph 3.39).
for individual cases of irregularity, but can also apply larger-
scale corrections which take account of the wider risk to Com-
munity funds in duly justified cases. This is indicated in the
internal guidelines on financial corrections of 15 October
1997.
9.58 to 9.59. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Checks by Member States were established as a requirement
by virtue of Article 23 of Council Regulation (EEC)
No 4253/88, although it was Regulation (EC) No 2064/97
that established in detail the nature and minimum number of
checks required. Since Regulation (EC) No 2064/97 entered
into force, the Commission has made great efforts to give
detailed guidance to Member States on the implementation of
its provisions, notably through the Structural Funds audit
manual, first presented in June 1998, and through systemati-
cally dealing with questions on the regulation in the bilateral
coordination meetings with Member States, the annual meet-
ing of EU Financial Controllers in 1998, 1999 and 2000,
and on other occasions.
In particular, the Commission has given guidance on the
checks to be carried out and the selection of operations in the
Structural Funds audit manual. The Commission is currently
reviewing the manual and will take account of the findings of
its own audit work as well as the observations of the Court,
and will discuss the detailed methodology with Member
States.
As regards assessment of the application of the regulation, a
number of audit missions have been carried out since 1999
by Structural Funds departments covering compliance with
certain aspects of the Regulation. In preparation for the clo-
sure of programmes from the period 1994 to 1999, a full
enquiry was launched at the beginning of 2001 on the imple-
mentation of the regulation by all Member States. Where
problems have been identified in the course of this enquiry, the
national authorities are being informed so that they are able
to take remedial action.
9.60. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
With regard to the closed programmes cited in para-
graph 3.39, the financial consequences are under examina-
tion on the basis of the information supplied by Member
States. In one case, the Court accepts that there is no impact
on the Community budget.
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9.61. Unless the Commission and the Member States
undertake prompt action to ensure correct application
of the regulation by Member States, there will not be
sufficient reliable information to form the basis upon
which to close the forms of assistance of the Commu-
nity support framework (CSF) for the period 1994 to
1999 in such a way as to prevent the co-financing of
ineligible expenditure.
Internal policies
9.62. The internal policy budgetary area, which repre-
sents about 6 % of the budget, is characterised by the
great number and the diversity of measures and govern-
ing rules. The geographical dispersion of the many ben-
eficiaries adds a further level of complexity to central
management and control. The Court has concentrated
its audit on the European Community fifth framework
programme for research and technological develop-
ment (fifth FP), which, in financial terms, is the most
important management system in the internal policies
area.
9.63. In the research framework programmes, finan-
cial contributions are granted on the basis of costs actu-
ally incurred. The high level of detail and the complex-
ity resulting from contractual arrangements based on a
system of cost reimbursement demand a significant
administrative effort both from the contractors and the
Commission with regard to the proposal, contract and
project management for indirect RTD actions. While
verificationsby theCommission servicesof costs claimed
are mainly limited to plausibility checks, the verification
of the reality and accuracy of the cost claims normally
requires audits on the spot. The Commission has used
private sector audit firms to carry out such audits.
9.61. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
As indicated in the replies to points 3.47 and 9.59, the Com-
mission is currently carrying out an enquiry into the imple-
mentation of the regulation. Closure of forms of assistance is
conditional upon the submission of the closure statement by
the independent body under Article 8 of the regulation. Where
control requirements have not been complied with, this body
will have to give a qualified opinion. The Commission has the
power under Article 8(2) of the regulation to require further
checks to be carried out and has the responsibility to make
financial corrections where appropriate and justified.
9.63. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The funding system of the research framework programmes
has both strengths and limitations. The Commission has pro-
gressively addressed the limitations. Even though it is con-
stantly evolving, the participants and the Commission services
are quite familiar with the system.
For the next framework programme the funding system is
again being reviewed to make it simpler for project partici-
pants to continue to improve controls within the limits of the
Commission’s financial and human resources, to make it more
focused on results and to improve its capacity to discourage
overcharging and fraud.
The Commission has significantly increased the number of
on-the-spot audits of contractors of the research framework
programme, in particular by using external professional audi-
tors who work under the Commission’s responsibility. Fur-
thermore, the Commission has launched pilot schemes whereby
a limited number of projects are to submit cost claims accom-
panied by audit certificates.
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9.64. Under the rules of the 5th FP the Commission
has no means of sanctioning entities which overstate
their costs, other than to claim back and charge interest
on the amounts overpaid. Therefore there is only a
minor risk for beneficiarieswhen overstating their actual
costs.
9.65. The Commission did not set out a framework of
checks to ensure that policies decided by management
are carried out and that necessary actions are imple-
mented to address the identified risks. As a conse-
quence, important steps in the control system were not
applied in the same manner or were lacking across the
whole or parts of the 5th FP. Tests of the operational key
controls in each of the subsystems and processes audited
have revealed that a number of controls have not been
effectively operated by all DGs and all programmes. In
particular, the verification of the legal and financial
viability of contractors and the prior authorisation of
the contract conditions were found to be lacking or not
applied coherently. As a consequence, for the whole of
the 5th FP, only a limited assurance can be derived from
the control procedures in place. The weaknesses identi-
fied are confirmed by the Court’s audit findings on
underlying transactions.
9.64. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The legal framework for direct expenses and contracts under
the 5th framework programme of the European Community
already includes measures to protect the Community’s finan-
cial interests. In case of suspected fraud or serious financial
irregularity, Article 3.2 and Article 7.6 of Annex II of the
contract explicitly allow the Commission not only to reduce its
financial contribution but also to recover the contribution in
full.
Nevertheless, strengthening the provisions on controls is a
high priority for the Commission. This is why the OLAF
work programme includes incorporation of administrative
measures and sanctions in the domain of direct expenditure.
In addition to the existing provisions for the reimbursement
of the Community’s financial contribution, an additional
financial penalty clause is under discussion in the event of
excessive expenses being claimed deliberately or by negligence
in the area of direct expenditure.
9.65. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
With the 5th framework programme, the Commission has
introduced significant improvements to address potential risks,
in particular with regard to the selection of proposals, a new
strategy to strengthen on-the-spot controls and more effective
measures in case of financial irregularities.
Internal controls were strengthened, in some DGs along with
adapted organisation charts, decentralising financial manage-
ment, while at the same time formalising the financial circuits
and strengthening financial management and internal audit
activities.
For the a priori verification of the legal and financial viability
of participating entities a more elaborate methodology has
been developed in order to assure consistent application of
standard criteria for determining financial risk. With regard
to the contractor’s cost systems, once the ‘participants’ cost
reimbursement system is chosen, for research, development
and demonstration projects, guidelines for the participants to
follow are provided. On-the-spot audits are the only way of
checking whether or not the choice is appropriate. The check
on a consistent cost reimbursement model for each contractor
is undertaken as part of the legal and financial viability cer-
tification within each programme. This verification will be
extended beyond a specific research programme by setting up
a shared database.
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External Actions
9.66. The external actions area represents about 6 % of
the budget and is characterised by great diversity of
measures and worldwide geographical dispersion. The
general control framework in this area is being further
developed by the EuropeAid cooperation office set up
with effect from 1 January 2001.
9.67. For the financial year 2000, the Court under-
took an audit, mainly at the level of the Commission,
on the Tacis programme (see paragraphs 5.24 to 5.44).
This programme is a component of the external action
financial perspective area targeted at the new indepen-
dent States and Mongolia. The European Union assis-
tance under the Tacis programme generally involves
grants for technical assistance contracts to promote the
transition of the beneficiary countries towards well-
functioning market economies. This involves financing
the costs of the consultants involved, the majority of
which is based on time spent at agreed rates, together
with other expenses such as travel and subsistence. The
inherent risk in such contracts lies in the reality and
quality of the services performed not matching the
claims for costs being made by the consultant and sup-
ported by time records and performance reports.
9.68. The Commission has a relatively well-developed
system covering the process of receipt of invoice from
consultant to payment of that invoice. This includes
detailed checking of the contents of each invoice to
ensure its arithmetical accuracy, compliance with con-
tractual terms (including rates used), receipt of reports
or other deliverables and apparent reasonableness. The
Court’s work found these controls to be generally effec-
tive but recommends that the payment procedure
include consideration of the reports provided to project
managers by monitoring units before payments are
authorised. Also, timely on-the-spot inspections should
be undertaken on a larger scale.
The negotiation outcome is subject to authorisation, some-
times implicitly, as it requires the agreement of different sci-
entific and financial departments within the Directorate Gen-
eral in order to launch the Commission’s selection decision for
each project.
9.66. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Since January 2001, following the introduction of the practi-
cal guide to EC external aid contract procedures, the same
procedures, standard publication formats and standard con-
tracts have been applicable throughout the world for all bud-
get expenditure — something that has been greatly appreci-
ated by potential tenderers. A supplementary finance guide to
EC external aid is in preparation.
9.67. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
There is a risk that a contractor may make a false claim in
any contract. Under the new arrangements, the project man-
ager is responsible for confirming that costs invoiced by the
contractor are acceptable. The new service contract incorpo-
rates a monthly estimated cash-flow forecast to be used to
ensure that deviations from the forecast correspond to known
changes in the actual time inputs of experts and incidental
expenditure.
9.68. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
Under the new standard arrangements introduced in 2001, a
project manager representing the interests of the contracting
authority is identified for every contract. The project manager
is responsible for monitoring contract progress and the results
achieved. In addition, programmes are independently evalu-
ated to address issues of efficiency, effectiveness, impact rel-
evance and sustainability.
Project managers have to confirm that invoices reflect the
activities actually carried out by the contractors (on the basis
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Administrative expenditure
9.69. In planning its audit of administrative expendi-
ture, which represents about 5 % of the overall budget,
the Court took into account the generally satisfactory
results of the examination of the main systems cover-
ing pay and the provision of office space carried out in
previous years. This year the Court undertook a detailed
examination of the controls over procurement proce-
dures used by the institutions to purchase goods and
services, whose results are reported in paragraphs 7.20
to 7.33. The Court concludes that from the standpoint
of legality and regularity the administrative expenditure
of the Commission — the dominant element in this
financial perspective area — and the expenditure of Par-
liament, the Council and the Court of Justice was satis-
factory (see paragraph 7.7). The accounts of the Court
of Auditors are the subject of a separate report by inde-
pendent auditors published separately in the Official
Journal (see paragraph 7.7).
CONCLUSION
Reliability of the accounts
9.70. In the Court’s opinion, the accounts are reliable,
save for the problems mentioned above relating to fixed
assets, the lack of information on advances and pay-
ments on account, the overstatement of commitments
still outstanding and the lack of budgetary commit-
ments, particularly in the Structural Funds, as well as
the evaluation of the economic result.
of personal knowledge of the project through monitoring
reports) before approving them for payment. The removal
from the new service contract of the need for supporting docu-
mentation to be verified before payment of invoices should
allow project managers to monitor the progress of contracts
more closely in future.
9.70. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission would point out the real improvements
achieved in terms of reliability of the accounts, especially in
fixed assets, debts, economic result and information contained
in the annexes to the financial statements (financial perspec-
tive, abnormal RAL, pensions, financial intermediaries, etc.).
It does not agree with some of the methodological observa-
tions made by the Court on the subject of fixed assets and the
economic result. It will continue its efforts to improve the reli-
ability of the accounts and to put in place the new accounting
framework.
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9.71. Furthermore, as part of the adoption of a new
budgetary nomenclature, the commitments still out-
standing for the four Structural Funds at the end of
1999 were included in one single article for each objec-
tive. For the headings to which substantial amounts of
this kind are allocated, the principle of the specificity of
the budget loses some of its meaning.
9.72. The Commission is invited to revise the part of
its proposal for amending the Financial Regulation
which relates to the accounts and the presentation of
the accounts so as to take into consideration the pro-
posals contained in the study made by the experts. Fur-
thermore, it must make a start on carrying out the work
to define a new accounting framework based on the
principles of accrual accounting, and must at the same
time allocate to this the necessary resources. Pending
completion of the work to modernise the accounting,
the economic result only partially reflects the true eco-
nomic situation.
Legality and regularity of the underlying transactions
9.73. Except for the EU’s internal management, the
administration and control systems examined suffer
from shortcomings, particularly as regards their imple-
mentation.
9.71. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The budgetary structure groups together the appropriations
intended for any given category of operations. The ‘comple-
tion’ lines mentioned by the Court group together programmes
decided on before the current period for a specific objective,
this objective constituting the logical link between them. On
the other hand, the amounts on these lines are not such a fun-
damental criterion. Furthermore, the amounts to be entered
should decline rapidly over the next few years and frequent
changes in the nomenclature should be avoided. Furthermore,
implementation can be monitored, if necessary, at a more
decentralised level since there are subdivisions in the accounts.
9.72. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
As far as the project of modernising the accounts is concerned,
a working document detailing the various priorities and set-
ting out a plan of action was drawn up. In the amended pro-
posal for the recasting of the Financial Regulation, the Com-
mission included the generally accepted accounting principles,
detailed the composition of the annual accounts and took
account of the proposals from the experts’ study. In order to
improve the reliability of the accounts, the Commission is
endeavouring to make improvements to the financial state-
ments every year, particularly regarding the economic result.
9.73. to 9.76. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission is making considerable efforts to put in place
coherent monitoring systems and to ensure effective imple-
mentation, especially in the fields of agriculture, structural
operations, research and external actions. The reform of the
Commission and the recasting of the Financial Regulation are
important elements of this action.
With the annual review of management policies there is a
temptation to continually raise standards such that though
there may be a net improvement in the situation compared
with the previous year the result could still be viewed nega-
tively as the standard would have been set higher. The institu-
tions should guard against moving the goalposts.
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9.74. Thus, the general framework provisions govern-
ing checks in the area of Structural Operations (Regula-
tion (EC) No 2064/97) have not succeeded in setting up
complete, consistent and effective checks, do not lay
down penalties that act as a sufficient deterrent in the
event of wrong declaration by beneficiaries, and are far
from being applied in full. In the agricultural sector, the
implementation of IACS was found to suffer fromweak-
nesses in that in some cases elements had not yet reached
an acceptable level of completion to allow effective
checks to be made and there were even cases where ele-
ments of the system had not yet been put in place (see
Special Report No 4/2001, paragraphs 74 to 80,
The likelihood of errors occurring, and how serious they are,
depends on the complexity of the set of regulations. This
should be taken into account when reasonable assurance is to
be given.
Finally, such an assessment would also have to take into
account the costs of the corrective measures necessary to
achieve an acceptable level of irregularities. If it looks as
though new checks will only result in marginal benefit, their
cost/benefit could be called into question.
9.73. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The Commission has recognised the scope for the further
development of its internal control systems, and this action
forms a major plank of the current reforms to financial man-
agement. The process of improving financial management
cannot, however, be completed overnight and the Court will
be aware that many of the systems referred to were in fact put
in place before the reform process was begun. The actions
taken under the reform, notably the development of minimum
control standards to be implemented by Commission depart-
ments together with greater accountability of the authorising
departments and self-assessment of internal control systems,
can be expected to result in significant improvements in sys-
tems in the future.
Of course, the Commission must also look to its partners who
manage indirect expenditure on its behalf to share in the pro-
cess of improving control. In this context, the Commission is
taking measures to improve control of expenditure. The Com-
mission will also continue to take action to improve systems
in response to the Court’s special reports.
9.74. THE COMMISSION’S REPLIES
The control requirements in relation to structural operations
were strengthened and more precisely defined in Regula-
tion (EC) No 2064/97. For the new programming period
2000 to 2006, Regulations (EC) No 438/2001 and (EC)
No 448/2001 provide further detailed obligations on the
management and control of the Structural Funds by Mem-
ber States as well as defining the procedures for the applica-
tion of financial corrections. Sanctions against individual
beneficiaries in the case of irregularities are the responsibility
of Member States, which are obliged to comply with the pro-
visions of Article 280 of the Treaty. The procedure for closure
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OJ C 214,31.7.2001). For the part of the common agri-
cultural policy not covered by IACS, the control frame-
work still needs to be further developed. For Internal
Policies and External Actions, where the Commission
has direct responsibility for the execution of pro-
grammes, the control arrangements still need substan-
tial improvement and rigorous implementation, as the
Court’s audits have demonstrated.
9.75. The checks made by the Court on payment
transactions reveal that the control arrangements are
not sufficient to prevent irregular uses of Community
funds from occurring all too frequently.
9.76. As a consequence, the Commission’s insufficient
control over the internal control procedures, in particu-
lar at decentralised levels, does not make it possible to
give a reasonable assurance that the transactions under-
lying payments are, on the whole, legal and regular. The
Commission should further develop the framework
regulations and provisions concerning checks, by
strengthening existing procedures, ensuring their full
application and introducing such mechanisms in cases
where they do not yet exist.
of programmes laid down by Article 8 of Regulation (EC)
No 2064/97would help ensure that shortcomings and irregu-
larities previously identified are rectified before the submission
of the final declaration of expenditure. The Commission will
continue to develop its own audit activities, notably by car-
rying out further checks on the management and control sys-
tems of the Member States to ensure that they conform with
the Community requirements and provide an adequate safe-
guard of Community funds.
As regards agriculture, the Commission agrees that Member
States should work towards the integration of their control
systems, and encourages this by both legislative and practical
means. To this end, special provisions already exist in the cur-
rent legislation and are being further emphasised in the cur-
rent IACS review, and on-the-spot audits often give rise to
recommendations to Member States. Concerning other CAP
expenditure, sectors not covered by the IACS have their own
monitoring methods. The Commission has also endeavoured
to align its monitoring approach with the IACS, wherever
appropriate, by providing for the same land and animal iden-
tification systems, cross-checks with the databases and risk
analysis and control procedures similar to those used in the
IACS. It has made substantial financial corrections where
failure to comply with monitoring arrangements has been
detected.
As regards internal policies, specifically research, the Commis-
sion has introduced significant improvements with the 5th
framework programme with the aim of addressing potential
risks in the monitoring arrangements, in particular with
regard to the selection procedure, the negotiation phase and
the preparation of contracts. At the same time, internal con-
trols have been strengthened and are improved further in the
context of the Commission reform. Additional improvements
are anticipated for the next framework programme.
As regards external actions, the Commission is further devel-
oping the monitoring framework, notably through the intro-
duction since January 2001 of standard procedures (particu-
larly for the publication of tenders and standard contracts)
which are now applicable for all budget expenditure on exter-
nal development programmes. Moreover, a supplementary
finance guide to EC external aid is in preparation.
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